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Abstract
International Oil Companies (lOCs) and Oil-rich nations (States) pool their 
resources together in order to explore for and exploit oil in the most effective 
and efficient manner. The lOCs are entrusted with the exploration and 
exploitation activities due to their technological expertise and financial 
capability. However, the uncertainties surrounding the exploration for oil 
constitute the major source of risks in upstream operations. Similarly, moral 
hazard and adverse-selection problems emerge during the exploitation of oil 
reserves. Hence, States adopt a number of control mechanisms in order to 
maximise their take from the oil reserves. Thus, establishing Joint Venture 
Companies (JVCs) is considered to be one of such control mechanisms. The 
Nigeria Government has ownership (about 57%) in the JVCs operating in the 
upstream sector. The JVCs operate alongside other upstream oil and gas 
companies (non-JVCs) that do not have Government ownership. This study 
adopts an agency theory in order to critically analyse the principal-agent 
relationship expounded above. Therefore, using a multivariate regression 
analysis based on a panel dataset of monthly observations (1999 -  2007) 
this study examines the cost efficiency and gross margin of both the JVCs 
and non-JVCs with the aim of determining whether or not Government 
ownership in the JVCs has any significant and systematic effect on their 
performance. Findings of the study indicate that JVCs are more efficient and 
more profitable than the non-JVCs, as non-JVCs spend twice as much as 
the JVCs to produce a barrel of crude oil. Hence, it can be concluded that 
Government ownership really matters in improving the cast efficiency and 
gross margin of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. 
Similarly, due to perennial funding problem bedeviling the operations of the 
JVCs in Nigeria, an alternative funding (AF) arrangement was introduced in 
2003; so that the companies will provide funds as loan to cover for the 
Government share of funding shortfalls. Effect of the AF arrangement on 
performance of the companies on one hand and Government Take on the 
other hand was determined by using Wilcoxon Sign Tests on both the pre- 
alternative and post-alternative funding performance measures such as 
capital expenditures, companies’ gross margin, companies’ drilling activities 
and Government Take. Findings of the study indicate that the alternative 
funding arrangement improved capital expenditures made by the upstream 
oil and gas companies as well as their gross margin. However, the findings 
indicate that such arrangement did not improve drilling activities. Therefore, 
the implication of these findings is that policy makers need to review such 
arrangement in such a way that not only the upstream oil and gas 
companies benefit from such arrangement but also the Government.
v
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Statement of the Research Problem
Upstream activities require intensive capital investment. While on the one 
hand oil-rich nations (states hereafter) are endowed with huge oil reserves, 
but lack the capacity to explore for and exploit their oil reserves, on the other 
hand international oil companies (lOCs hereafter) who have the required 
funds and expertise are willing to invest their funds for good returns 
(Bindemann, 1999). Therefore, the lOCs and the states pool their resources 
together in order to explore for and exploit oil in the most effective and 
efficient manner. However, the uncertainties surrounding the discovery of oil, 
despite the intensive capital investment, constitute the major source of risks 
in upstream operations (Wright and Gallun, 2008). These risks may be 
geological, prospect, political, regulatory, or commercial (Johnston, 1994).
Consequently, before the lOCs take-up such risks, that may or may not 
result to oil discovery, they need to be motivated by the states via an 
effective incentive-system (Bindemann, 1999). Similarly, moral hazard and 
adverse-selection problems (explained in chapter 3) emerge with the 
discovery of oil reserves (Pongsiri, 2004). It can be argued, however, that 
these problems do arise because the value of assets (oil reserves) is not 
contractible; hence, whoever has ownership in the asset in question receives 
maximum value (Gibbons, 2005a). Thus, there is the need for an optimal 
incentive system to effectively govern the agency relationship between the
1
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lOCs and the states (ibid.). It is important to note that an optimal incentive- 
system facilitates such risk-taking behaviour by the lOCs on the one hand 
and increases oil revenue (government take hereafter) to the states on the 
other.
Aside the inherent risks associated with upstream operation, another 
distinctive feature of the upstream operation is that, the relationship between 
the lOCs (agents) and the states (principals) is governed by different 
petroleum fiscal systems around the world, these include concessionary, 
contractual, and hybrid1 2systems (Johnston, 1994). Each of these systems is 
governed by different fiscal terms informing the operational relationship, 
incentive-system, performance measurement, and reward system in a 
particular country or agreement(s) within a country. Therefore, agent’s 
actions ex-ante (before uncertainties are resolved) and the principal’s 
decisions ex-post (after uncertainties are resolved) are influenced by the 
nature of fiscal terms involved in a particular contractual relationship 
(Gibbons, 2005b).
To this end, fiscal terms used by the principal in a particular fiscal system, 
ex-ante actions chosen by the agent, ex-post decisions taken by the 
principal, payoff received by both parties, control mechanisms and 
performance measures adopted by the principal, and the effect of such 
control on the performance of the agent are issues this study aims to
1 This is a joint operation between an IOC with another IOC or national oil company (NOC) o f  the 
oil-rich nation with an IOC 2
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address. To address these issues, agency theory is adopted. Agency theory 
is applied in analysing contractual relationships between parties to a 
particular contract or joint operations among parties involved in a particular 
venture (Pongsiri, 2004; Gibbons, 2005a). Hence, agency theory is adopted, 
in this study, in order to analyse the performance of upstream oil and gas 
companies operating in Nigeria that have different ownership status and 
operate under different petroleum fiscal regimes2.
Government participates in the upstream oil and gas companies in order to 
control the activities of such companies and maximise its share from its oil 
resources. The control mechanism in the context of this study refers to the 
Government ownership in the joint venture companies (JVCs). However, the 
question here is to what extent such government ownership affects the 
performance of the upstream oil and gas companies in Nigeria. This 
question is central to all oil-rich nations around the world, as to how can the 
oil-rich nations maximise their benefits from their oil resources while 
providing adequate control and attractive incentives for investment in their 
countries (Kemp and Stephens, 1996). 23
2 This is the name used (in Nigeria) to identify upstream oil and gas companies such as: joint venture 
companies, production-sharing, and service contracts. These companies operate as joint ventures 
between Nigerian National Oil Company (NOC) and IOCs on the one hand and production-sharing 
contract between the NOC (principal) and IOCs (agents) on the other.
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1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study
The study aims to investigate the effect of government control on the 
performance of upstream oil and gas companies in Nigeria. Other specific 
objectives of the study include:
i) to investigate the extent to which government ownership in the 
JVCs affects cost efficiency of the upstream oil and gas 
companies;
ii) to investigate the extent to which government ownership in the 
JVCs affects gross margin of the upstream oil and gas companies;
iii) to investigate the extent to which the alternative funding
arrangement introduced affects performance3 of the upstream oil 
and gas companies;
iv) to investigate the extent to which the alternative funding
arrangement introduced affects Government Take.
1.3 Motivation for the Study
Despite their strategic role in the global economy, upstream oil and gas 
companies have received little attention in terms of research on their 
performance (Wolf, 2008). Additionally, the few studies conducted are mostly 
regarding their operations in the developed countries (see for example Al- 
Obaidan and Scully, 1991; Al-Mazeedi, 1992; Victor, 2007; Hartley and 34
3 The performance metrics considered include both financials (production efficiency and gross 
margin) and non-financials (drilling activities).
4
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Medlock, 2008; Wolf and Pollitt, 2008; Wolf, 2009; Eller et al., 2011), with 
few studies on the developing countries like Libya (Mahmud and Russell, 
1999), Indonesia (Sihotang, 2003), and Nigeria (Gidado, 1992; Alalade, 
2004).
In Nigeria, for example, Alalade’s (2004) study indicates that fiscal terms 
negatively affected performance of the upstream oil and gas companies, and 
government take is not affected by contract type. Similarly, Gidado (1992) 
argues that government ownership in the upstream oil and gas companies 
does not accord government any significant control over the upstream oil 
and gas companies because the government officials on the management 
boards of the joint venture companies lack the requisite skills needed for 
understanding the upstream activities.
From the foregoing, the gaps identified in the literature which makes this 
study different from the previous ones include the following:
While Alalade’s (2004) study is limited to financial indicators and focused on 
only three companies (two JVCs one non-JVC) this study investigates the 
performance of nine upstream oil and gas companies (five JVCs and four 
non-JVCs). Therefore, this provides us with a more comprehensive picture 
on the performance of the upstream oil and gas companies.
5
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The performance indicators investigated in this study include both the 
financials and non-financials. This is particularly important because an 
investigation on non-financial performance indicators, such as drilling 
activities, alongside the financial performance indicators, such as cost 
efficiency and gross margin, could provide a very useful index for 
understanding performance of upstream oil and gas companies.
Overall, this study is the first of its kind that investigates the performance of 
upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria using a monthly panel 
dataset on both the financial and non-financial performance metrics.
1.4 Scope of the Study
This study builds on the previous studies by investigating the effect of 
government control on the performance of oil and gas companies, but this 
study focuses on the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. 
Additionally, in order to understand the performance metrics beyond the 
narrow view of profitability alone, both financial and non-financial 
performance measures are considered in this study. As Boardman and 
Vining (1989) argue, when comparing performance differentials of 
companies, lower profit does not necessarily signify inefficiency.
6
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Considering the complexities and interdependence nature amongst the 
various factors affecting the performance of upstream oil and gas 
companies, Boardman and Vining’s (1989) argument is especially important 
in the context of this study. Some of the important performance measures 
considered in this study include: drilling activities (exploration and 
development), capital expenditure (CAPEX), operating expenditure (OPEX) 
and output (oil & gas).
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is composed of six chapters. The first chapter provides us with 
the general introduction about the thesis. This includes the statement of the 
research problem, motivation for undertaking the study, aim and objectives 
of the study, research hypotheses, scope of the study, and the outline of the 
thesis.
Chapter two is divided into three sub-sections, focusing on conceptual 
issues on the upstream oil and gas companies, theoretical framework 
underpinning the study, and findings of previous studies on the effect of 
Government control on the performance of companies respectively.
Chapter three provides us with the detailed account on the institutional and 
regulatory framework in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. This account is 
preceded by the history of oil exploration in Nigeria. This study is the first of 
its kind to provide a comprehensive institutional framework in the Nigerian
upstream oil and gas sector with a clear categorization of the various
7
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stakeholders into ‘stake-holders’, ‘stake-keepers’, and ‘stake-watchers’. This 
categorization is followed by a discussion on the various legislation 
governing the affairs of the upstream oil and gas sector in Nigeria.
Chapter four focuses on the research methodology adopted in the study and 
the research methods used to collect and analyse data.
Chapter five is where the data collected were presented and analysed using 
the appropriate tools identified in chapter four.
Finally, chapter six is where the summary of findings is presented and 
conclusions from such findings are made. Contributions made by the study 
are also enumerated. Accordingly, limitations of the study and areas of future 
research are also enumerated.
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ON COMPANIES’ PERFORMANCE
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE EFFECT OF 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL ON COMPANIES’ PERFORMANCE
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is structured into five sections as follows. Section 2.2 discusses 
conceptual issues on the upstream oil and gas companies. Section 2.3 
provides theoretical framework underpinning the study. Prior studies on the 
effect of government control on the performance of companies are 
synthesised in section 2.4. Finally, chapter summary is provided in section 
2.5.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
This section provides a brief discussion on different kinds of agreements/ 
contracts under which the upstream oil and gas companies operate. These 
include Concessionary Agreement (CA); Joint Venture Companies (JVCs); 
Production-sharing Contracts (PSCs), Service Contracts (SC), and the 
Marginal Field Operation (MFO).
2.2.1 Concessionary Agreement
The traditional concessionary agreement in oil exploration is considered the 
first generation of petroleum exploration contracts. Concessionary 
agreement is defined by William and Meyers (1962, p. 150)4 in (Gidado, 
1992) as:
10
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“an agreement permitting a foreign petroleum company to 
prospect for and produce oil in the area subject to the 
agreement. The terms ordinarily include a time limitation and a 
provision for royalty to be paid to the government”.
Some of the basic features of concessionary system include the following. 
Firstly, development rights granted to the lOCs cover a vast area or even the 
entire country. Secondly, contracts are for a long period. Lastly, and perhaps 
the most important is that, the lOCs have absolute control over their 
operations; which accords them with opportunity to determine when to 
produce and how much to produce. Hence, it is argued that the lOCs may 
manipulate their operations to their own advantage (Bindemann, 1999). For 
example, productions may be lowered when oil prices are low, which in turn 
reduces the oil revenue accruable to the states.
Consequently, some of the oil-rich nations who are still operating the 
concessionary system take some corrective measures to address such 
anomalies. Hence, the modern concessionary agreements are being 
structured in such a way to provide for shorter contract period, work 
obligation for the lOCs, relinquishment clause at the expiration of agreed 
period, higher royalties, and option for state participation, which is being 
referred to as ‘concessionary joint venture’ (Johnston 1994).
Although the concessionary agreement was the first type of petroleum 
exploration contract in Nigeria, as in the case of German Bitumen Company, 
and Shell D’Arcy Petroleum Company in 1908 and 1937 respectively 
(Oromade, 1986), the concessionary system does not exist anymore in
11
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Nigeria. At present, upstream oil and gas companies operate under either of 
the following: JVC, PSC, SC, and MFO. These are discussed hereunder.
2.2.2 Joint Venture Companies
Joint Venture Companies (JVCs) emerged when oil-rich nations wanted to 
reclaim control of their oil resources; as against the previous status under 
the concession agreements where they simply received royalties and taxes 
from the lOCs (OPEC, 2008). This paradigm shift in the 1970s changed the 
status of oil-rich nations from ‘landlords to entrepreneurs’ (Klapp, 1982). 
More so, membership of OPEC is considered to be the major momentum 
towards such paradigm shift (Gidado, 1992). For example, OPEC demanded 
its members to modify the traditional concessionary agreements in order to 
participate in the exploration and exploitation of their oil resources; the 
OPEC policy statement states that:
“Where provision for the governmental participation in the 
ownership of the concession holding company under any of the 
present contracts has not been made, the government may 
acquire a reasonable participation, on the grounds of the 
principle of changing circumstances. If such provision has 
actually been made, but avoided by the operators concerned, 
the rate provided for shall serve as a minimum basis for the 
participation to be acquired” (Adedeji, 1977, p. 374).
Under the JVCs, both the lOCs and the oil-rich nations (represented by their 
NOCs) participate in upstream operations. Production output and costs are 
shared on a pro-rata basis between the JV partners involved. Therefore, the 
oil-rich nations do not only receive royalties and taxes but also share in the 
equity oil. Similarly, the lOCs share with the oil-rich nations costs of
12
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production which is funded via particular funding agreement (Wright and 
Gallun, 2008). Table 1 below presents JVCs in Nigeria.
As can be seen in Table 1, the Nigerian government (being represented by 
the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation - NNPC) has a controlling stake 
in all the six JVCs currently operating in Nigeria. However, due to obvious 
reasons such as the technical know-how required in upstream operation and 
the risk capital needed for investment in the JVCs which are readily at the 
disposal of the lOCs, the JVCs are being operated by the lOCs. Hence, 
NNPC is a non-operator in all the JVCs.
It, therefore, can be discerned from the foregoing that the two most important 
reasons upon which the JVCs were formed are aimed at transferring 
technical know-how to Nigerians and addressing funding problem associated 
with upstream operations.
13
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Table 1: Oil and Gas Joint Venture Companies in Nigeria
S/N I Joint Venture j Joint Venture Partners and Their Working Interest in 
I Company !
| ; Non- Joint Venture Operators - lOCs
| i Operat
i ; or
%
Total
NNPC j Shell i Chevron I Mobil j Agip j Elf Texa
co
| Phillips
Shell
Petroleum
Development
Company of
Nigeria
Limited
(SPDC)
Chevron
Nigeria
Limited
(CNL)
Mobil
Producing
Nigeria
Unlimited
(MPNU)
55 30 10 100
60
60
! 40
40
; 100
100
Nigerian
Agip
OilCompany
Limited
(NAOC)
Elf
Petroleum
Nigeria
Limited
(EPNL)
: 60
60
20
40
20 100
100
Texaco
Overseas
Petroleum
Company
Unlimited
(TOPCON)
60 20 20 100
Source: Hassan (2012, p. 36)
14
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
The JVCs are funded by either billing or cash-call system. The billing system 
requires the operator to bill other partners after the expenditures are made, 
but under the cash-call system the operator requests for payment of 
budgeted cash before the expenditures are made (Wright and Gallun, 2008). 
In Nigeria, for example, the JVCs are funded via a cash-call system. 
However, the Government share of cash-call funding is constrained by other 
financial needs which results to a delay in funding of the JVCs.
These short-falls in government funding necessitates the need for alternative 
funding for the JVCs (Ameh, 2005; Ariweriokuma, 2009). The alternative 
funding arrangements are made in such a way that the lOCs advance loans 
to the JVCs in order to finance Government’s share of funding; so as to 
avoid unnecessary delays in the operations. With the introduction of these 
alternative funding arrangements in 2003, the expectation is that JVCs will 
perform better in the post-Alternative Funding period, since the funding 
problems are supposedly addressed; hence, the following questions (RQ):
RQ 1: To what extent does alternative funding affect gross margin?
RQ 2: To what extent does alternative funding affect crude oil 
production?
RQ 3: To what extent does alternative funding affect Government 
take?
RQ 4: To what extent does alternative funding affect capital 
expenditure?
RQ 5: To what extent does alternative funding affect exploration 
activities?
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RQ 6: To what extent alternative funding affects development 
activities?
In the course of the literature review in this PhD project, the following eight 
hypotheses have been developed in order to address the research questions 
raised above; these hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1.0• Gross margin is not significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 1A: Gross margin is significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 2.o• Crude oil production is not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
Hypothesis 2A: Crude oil production is significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 3.0: Government take is not significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 3A: Government take is significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 4.0' Capital expenditure is not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
Hypothesis 4A: Capital expenditure is significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 5.0: Exploration activities are not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
Hypothesis 5A: Exploration activities are significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
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Hypothesis 6.o• Development activities are not significantly higher in 
the post-alternative funding period
Hypothesis s.a- Development activities are significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
The hypotheses developed above have been tested using the relevant data 
collected, as aptly stated by Blaikie (2010, p. 76):
“a hypothesis is not produced by a deductive machine... it is a 
product of creative imagination, of a mind which absorbs... 
data until it sees them fall into a pattern”
Having explained the operational structure of the JVCs above, the section 
below focuses on PSCs.
2.2.3 Production-sharing Contracts
As mentioned in section 2.2.1 above, the traditional concessionary 
agreement in upstream operation was considered very exploitative (OPEC, 
2008). Hence, increased criticisms on the exploitative nature of the old 
concessionary system on one hand and the perennial funding problems 
associated with the operations of the JVCs on the other hand paved way for 
the introduction of PSC (Bindemann, 1999; Pongsiri, 2004; Sihotang, 2003). 
Indeed, the introduction of PSC in Nigeria was informed by the 
aforementioned perennial funding problems under the JVCs (Ameh, 2005; 
Ariweriokuma, 2009; Alalade, 2004).
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The first PSC was introduced in Indonesia in the 1960s, which was modeled 
after the agricultural crop sharing contract (Sihotang, 2003). PSC is defined 
by William and Meyers (1962) in Gidado (1992, p. 194) as:
“a contract for the development of mineral resources under 
which the contractor’s costs are recoverable each year out of 
the production but there is a maximum amount of the 
production which can be applied to this cost recovery in any 
one year. This share of oil produced is referred to as ‘cost oil’. 
The balance of the oil is regarded as ‘profit oil’ and is divided in 
the profit sharing ratio - for instance, 55% to the government. 
After the contractor has recovered its investment, the amount 
of ‘cost oil’ will drop to cover operating expenses by a 
corresponding amount..."
One fundamental difference between PSC and concessionary system is that, 
while ownership of petroleum resources rests with the lOCs under the 
concessionary system, under the PSC ownership of petroleum resources 
rests with the states (Pongsiri, 2004). Similarly, the difference between PSC 
and JVC is that while the state must fund the JV operation based on its 
stake-holding, under the PSC the state is not obliged for any financial 
commitment. Hence, the lOCs must bare all the costs and risks associated 
with the exploration activities.
In summary, PSC shields the states from the exploration risks; because the
lOCs solely bear all the risks associated with investment in the exploration
activities (Bindemann, 1999). That notwithstanding, states being the owners
of the asset (oil reserves) not only share in the reward of oil discovered but
also own the facilities emplaced by the contractors during the contractual
period (Johnston, 1994). Even though the lOCs recover their cost of
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investment before production and/or profit is shared with the states (ibid.), 
moral-hazard and adverse selection problems normally characterise the 
relationship between states and lOCs (Pongsiri, 2004). For example, some 
of the vital aspects of the PSC are title to crude oil (Al-Attar and Alomair, 
2005), work programs and expenditures (Johnston, 1994).
As succinctly stated by Johnston (1994, p. 160)
“The national oil company ... will have the right to make 
suggestions and propose revisions to any work plan and 
budget. However, the contractor normally has the authority to 
make final decisions on matters concerning the work program 
once the contract has been negotiated”.
Consequently, the lOCs have enormous control on what to do, how to do it, 
and when to do it. This, therefore, creates avenue for agency problems.
Discussion on PSC above indicates that problems may arise due to risk- 
averse attitude of states in the contractual relationship. Conversely, under 
the Service Contract (SC) states may carry all the risks involved (if it is a 
non-risk service contract) or share some of the exploration risks with the 
lOCs (if it is a risk service contract) an issue discussed hereunder.
2.2.4 Service Contracts (SC)
Unlike the PSC, under SC lOCs provide services for upstream activities.
These services are of two categories, which are risk-service and non-risk
service contracts. Under the risk-service contract, lOCs bear all the risks
involved in exploration activities for a fixed fee. However, if the lOCs are paid
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a flat fee based on the services they render only without bearing the risks 
involved then the contract is called a non-risk service contract (Wright and 
Gallun, 2008).
Although the SC is similar to the PSC on the basis that lOCs do not own oil 
reserves, SC differs from the PSC from the perspectives of remunerations, 
control over operations, and risk-bearing (Bindemann, 1999). In Nigeria, for 
example, the only SC in operation is Agip Energy and Natural Resources Ltd 
(AENR).
In summary, the distinguishing features of the aforementioned petroleum 
fiscal regimes are attitude toward risk-taking; incentive-system, control 
mechanisms, and performance-reward relationship (see Table 2 below). For 
example, during the concessionary period, the lOCs assumed all the risks 
that were involved in the upstream operations; a situation that shielded the 
Nigerian Government from the risks that were involved in the operations. 
Nonetheless, the government take during that period was only from royalties 
and taxes, a situation that drastically changed when the JVCs were 
established.
Under the JVCs risks are shared between the states and the lOCs. Hence, 
costs of production as well as production output are shared on a pro-rata 
basis. It can be argued that JV operation combines both risk-sharing and 
high-powered incentive-system that motivates the lOCs to be more efficient.
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On the other hand, operation under either the concessionary agreement or 
PSC is associated with huge risks on the part of lOCs and low-powered 
incentive-system because the lOCs do not share in the residual value of oil 
reserves. Also, the non-involvement of government in either the 
concessionary or PSC raises the question of cost ‘gold-plating’, which 
means that the longer it takes the lOCs to recover costs the lesser revenue 
accrues to the government (Pongsiri, 2004).
Table 2: Comparison of Petroleum Fiscal Regimes ______
?>§rrc)fei(f7) iQ)t Nc)c:
Risks Reward Risks Reward
Concession Assumes all 
risks
Reward 
based on 
outcome
Assumes no 
risks
Reward 
based on 
outcome
PSC Assumes all 
risks
Reward 
based on 
cost recovery
Assumes no 
risks
Depends on 
cost
recovery by 
the lOCs
SC Assumes no 
risks
Reward is 
fixed
Assumes all 
risks
Reward
varies
JVCs Shares in 
risks
Reward 
based on 
stake­
holding
Shares in 
risks
Reward 
based on 
stake­
holding
Adapted and edited: (Bindemann, 1999, p. 11).
Hence, the non-JVCs may be less efficient than their JV counterparts. 
Accordingly, “a partnership model pertaining to the principal-agent
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relationship can be used to explain how contracting parties behave in order 
to minimise the problems associated with their opportunistic behaviours” 
(Pongsiri, 2004, p. 437).
Under the concessionary system, lOCs make the entire investment and bear 
the full risks associated with such investment. In this case, the lOCs benefit 
the most under such arrangement when there is a positive outcome from 
their operations. Therefore, Government gets its reward from taxes and 
royalties. Similarly, lOCs make the entire investment and bear the full risk 
associated with such investment under the PSC. Such investment can only 
be recovered when there is positive outcome.
In this case, after the investment is recovered the reminder of the output 
(profit oil) is shared between the lOCs and the Government based on the 
pre-determined sharing ratio. Therefore, in the context of this study, it is 
assumed that the lOCs under the PSC may not be as efficient as expected 
due to the cost recovery issue that is solely at their discretion which is a very 
contentious issue in the upstream operations.
However, under the JVCs the lOCs work alongside the Government, where 
the IOC’s reward is based on its stake-holding in the JVCs, thereby 
motivating the lOCs to be more efficient. This is possible where the 
Government is ready to participate in such ventures by making the required 
investment based on its stake-holding and bear the risk associated with such
investment. Therefore, in the context of this study, it is assumed that the
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interest of the lOCs in JVCs is highly aligned with that of the Government, 
thereby motivating the JVCs to be more efficient and profitable than the non- 
JVCs.
Similarly, based on the Government ownership in the JVCs and its 
representation on the boards of such ventures, Government closely monitors 
the operations of the lOCs which are assumed to enhance the operations of 
the JVCs. Therefore, based on the aforementioned assumptions the study 
finds it very relevant to adopt an agency theory due to the principal-agent 
relationship expounded above. Consequently, further questions in relation to 
production efficiency and gross margin of the upstream oil and gas 
companies are raised in section 2.3.4.
Discussion on the theoretical framework underpinning this study is provided 
in the next section.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
Effect of ownership on companies’ performance has been a subject for 
academic debate ever since Adam Smith asserts that “characters do not 
exist who are more distant than the sovereign and the entrepreneur” (Smith, 
1776, p. 771 )5. This debate centres on the efficacy of government 
involvement in business, i.e. whether or not state-owned enterprises perform
5 Cited in W olf and Pollitt (2008, p. 3)
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as efficiently as private companies6. While the majority of empirical findings 
indicate that private companies are more efficient than the state-owned 
enterprises (see for example Villalonga, 2000), another strand of the 
literature indicates that state-owned enterprises are not intrinsically less 
inefficient than the private companies (see for example Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001).
Accordingly, expert opinion on this debate is that in the competitive market 
where there are no government intervention and other ‘distortions’, most 
theorists will argue that private companies are more efficient than their state- 
owned counterparts (Pestieau, 2006). However, Stiglitz (2007)7 argues that 
such market conditions are rarely possible; hence theory alone may not give 
conclusive picture of performance differentials between private companies 
and state-owned enterprises (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
That notwithstanding, a number of theoretical frameworks have been 
adopted by different theorists in different settings in investigating ownership 
effect on companies’ performance. Some of these theories include public 
choice theory (Tullock, 1965; Buchanan, 1968; Ostrom, 2010)8, property- 
rights theory (Alchain, 1965; Alchain and Demsetz, 1972; Denison and 
Klingler-Vidra, 2012), and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Aslan and Kumar, 2014).
6 See Table 4 for extensive review on empirical literature on whether or not state-owned enterprises 
perform as efficiently as private companies.
7 Cited in (W olf and Pollitt, 2008)
8 See 7 above
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Public choice theory is used in explaining the political decision-making 
results in outcomes that are contrary to the preferences of the general public 
(Tullock, 1965; Ostrom, 2010). Similarly, property rights theory is used in 
determining the ownership and usage of a particular asset (Alchain, 1965). 
On the other hand, agency theory is used in analysing the principal-agent 
relationship in a particular venture (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Hence, all of the aforementioned theories could be adopted in any study 
investigating ownership effect on companies’ performance. However, 
considering the nature of oil and gas industry, where the owners (sovereign 
states - principals) of oil reserves are different from the managers (lOCs - 
agents) of the oil reserves, which creates the principal-agent relation 
between the states and the lOCs; and the high uncertainties and risks 
involved in the upstream operation that normally result to agency problems, 
this study finds it most appropriate to adopt agency theory as a theoretical 
framework. This is particularly important because of the high tendency of 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems that bedevil operations in the 
industry (Bindemann, 1999; Pongsiri, 2004; Sihotang, 2003). Agency theory 
is discussed hereunder.
2.3.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory focuses on the relationship between principal and agent and 
the costs of resolving conflicts of interest between them (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The basic assumptions upon which the theory is founded
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are: agent is mostly driven by self-interest and tends to be risk-averse 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, agent opts for short-term investment that 
guarantees his reward without necessarily taking into consideration the 
interest of his principal (Mustapha and Ahmad, 2011).
On the other hand, the principal prefers long-term investment that does not 
only provide him with a steady flow of income, but also the appreciation of 
his asset in the long-run (Solomon, 2009). Consequently, the divergent goals 
between the principal and his agent results to agency problems (ibid.). Thus, 
the principal adopts some control mechanisms in order to monitor the 
activities of his agent and measure his performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The literature on agency theory indicates a substantial use of different 
performance measures in order to measure the performance of agents. 
However, Ogden (1993) argues that the performance measures used in 
agency relationship may not necessarily capture the ‘real’ effort of agent in 
trying to establish the relationship between the input made by agent and the 
output resulting from such input; hence the problem of moral hazard and 
adverse-selection on the side of the agent (ibid.).
Overall, moral hazard and adverse-selection problems arise mainly because 
of the risk-averse attitude of both agent and principal which emerge due to 
divergent goals of both of them (Chikashi, 2011). Discussion on agency 
problems is provided hereunder.
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2.3.2 Agency Problem
Agency problem arises when an agent does something contrary to what is 
ordinarily expected of him. The issue of agency problem in a principal-agent 
relationship was first identified, in the finance theory, by Adam Smith in 
17769. Smith argued that managers may not manage the resources of others 
as diligently as they would otherwise manage theirs. This problem is 
compounded due to fragmentation of ownership and control, which 
characterises agency relationship because the business owners (principals) 
appoint managers (agents) to manage their businesses (Solomon, 2009).
Consequently, while the agents are expected to run the businesses in a way 
that will maximise the principals’ wealth; it is, however, argued that agents 
may pursue some goals that will enable them maximise their wealth rather 
than that of the principals’, an issue normally referred as a moral hazard 
problem (Chikashi, 2011).
Similarly, while agents have first-hand information as a result of managing 
the business on a day to day basis, principals get information periodically 
which may be maneuvered by the agents, an issue that may result to an 
adverse-selection problem (Watson and Head, 2007). Considering the 
aforementioned complications, it can be deduced that agents are in a 
position to maximise their own wealth without necessarily being detected by 
the principals. In summary, agency problem arises when agents make
9 Smith, A. (1776) ‘An Enquiry into the Nature and Courses o f the Wealth o f Nations, Oxford, The 
Clarendon Press, cited in Alalade (2004)
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decisions that are contrary to that of principals’ wealth maximisation. Hence, 
agency problems can be mitigated by instituting some control mechanisms 
by the principal, especially by owning a majority stake in the company in 
question. Therefore, this makes it pertinent to investigate the extent to which 
Government ownership affects the performance10 of the JVCs?
Consistent with the question above, and considering that the representation 
at the management board of the JVCs is based on the stake-holding of a 
particular joint venture partner, this study assumes that JVCs perform better 
than the non-JVCs.
Detailed discussion on how a principal uses control mechanisms in an 
agency relationship is discussed hereunder.
2.3.3 Control Mechanisms in Agency Relationship
In order to mitigate the negative effect of agency problems on the principal- 
agent relationship, the principal needs to put in place some control 
mechanisms (Cragg and Dyck, 1997). However, the level of control 
mechanisms to be adopted depends on the extent of the perceived agency 
problem. It is important to note here that the extent of agency problem differs 
between private and state-owned companies.
10 Performance here encapsulates both the financial and non-financial performance variables. Hence, 
the variables to be investigated, in order to address this research question and its related hypothesis 
include production efficiency, gross margin per barrel, exploration and development activities
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Similarly, when comparing the extent of agency problem in both private and 
state-owned firms, Villalonga (2000) asserts that agency problem is less 
likely in the private firms due to some control mechanisms that naturally take 
care of such problems. These mechanisms include the existence of a market 
for ownership right, the threat of takeover of the management and 
bankruptcy due to inefficiency of the management, and the managerial 
labour market relationship. On the other hand, these mechanisms are 
lacking in the state-owned enterprises (Cragg and Dyck, 1997; Cragg and 
Dyck, 1997; Cragg and Dyck, 1998; Villalonga, 2000); which results to a 
higher likelihood of having more agency problems in the state-owned 
enterprises than in the private companies.
To this end, agency theory literature indicates that agency problems can be 
mitigated by either including some clauses in the contract that formalise 
punishment and reward (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or by adopting 
effective control mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the inclusion of 
such clauses in contracts seems easier than adopting monitoring 
mechanisms which proved to be difficult and costly (Mustapha and Ahmad, 
2011). That notwithstanding, an optimal incentive-system linked to 
performance of the agent may be more effective in addressing these 
problems (Watson and Head, 2007).
The performance-related incentive system aims at mitigating moral hazards 
and adverse selection problems which ultimately motivates the agents to
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maximise the principals’ wealth. However, Ogden (1993) argues that 
whether the performance-related incentive-system works in addressing the 
agency problems is questionable. One of the problems in the performance- 
related incentive-system is the difficulty to establish a correlation between 
the agent’s efforts and the business’ performance because of the possibility 
that the performance indicators of the business may be maneuvered by the 
agent who has the advantage of information asymmetry (ibid.).
While the proponents of agency theory believe that performance-related 
incentive-systems can be used in addressing agency problems, others 
argued that the highly simplified assumptions portrayed by agency theorists 
alongside very complex models required to address such assumptions are 
not only difficult but unattainable in most cases (Scapens, 1984; Scapens 
1985; Chua, 1986; Baiman, 1990; Ashton, 1991). Also, the inability of the 
theorists to address the performance measurement issues adds to the 
limitations of agency theory (Ogden, 1993). However, others are of the 
opinion that an optimal incentive-system can mitigate such problems; an 
issue discussed hereunder.
2.3.4 Incentive-system in Agency Relationship
The need for an optimal incentive system stems from the need to align the 
goals of principal and that of the agent which can mitigate the agency 
problems and ultimately result to an efficient performance by the agent. As 
succinctly stated by Courty and Marschke (2003, p. 270) “the moral-hazard
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model of incentive design is the main tool ... used to understand ... 
performance-measurement systems and the provision of incentives”.
For example, following Sappington (1991) modeling of incentive-system, we 
can have the following assumptions on principal-agent relationship. The 
Principal may be accorded with the power to make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
contract offer to an agent. However, the agent may only accept the offer if 
the agent’s expectations (expected pay-off) are exceeded. Therefore, there 
may be two possible outcomes in this contracting relationship.
The first scenario is the situation whereby the agent, working alongside the 
principal, uses the most efficient input for production; which in turn results to 
an increased surplus to both parties. This scenario is possible where the 
principal is not risk-averse (see Table 2 above, the case of JVCs) and the 
agent is motivated by having a share on the residual value of the asset. 
Consequently, agent’s interest is aligned with that of the principal. The 
second scenario is where the principal is risk-averse and the agent does not 
share in the residual value of the asset (see Table 2 above, under the PSC). 
Consequently, there may be some friction in the principal-agent relationship.
Hence, a JVC whose reward is based on both measured performance and 
the residual value of the asset may produce more output (both oil and gas) 
than the PSC whose reward is only based on measured performance. More 
so, the closer cost monitoring under the JV operation, because the state is a
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partner in the operation, means that the JVCs may be more efficient11 than 
the PSCs who solely operate and may manipulate their costs (Bindemann, 
1999). In view of the forgoing assumptions, and in the context of upstream 
operations in Nigeria, the following research questions become very useful:
RQ 7: To what extent does government ownership, in the JVCs, affect 
the cost efficiency12 of the JVCs?
RQ 8: To what extent does government ownership, in the JVCs, affect 
the gross margin13 of the JVCs?
Consistent with the questions raised above, the following hypotheses are 
hereby formulated:
Hypothesis 7.o- Joint Venture Companies are not more efficient than 
the non-Joint Venture Companies
Hypothesis 7.a - Joint Venture Companies are more efficient than the 
non-Joint Venture Companies
Hypothesis &o• Joint Venture Companies are not more profitable than 
the non-Joint Venture Companies
11 See research question (4) and its related hypothesis (4)
Efficiency in the context o f  this study refers to the minimization o f cost o f production per barrel o f  
oil. This is consistent with the measure o f efficiency being used in the upstream sector, see Alalade 
(2004) as similar variable was used in the Nigerian context. Hence, this study adopts similar variable 
but using a different method o f analysis (see chapter on Methodology and Methods for an in-depth 
analysis).
13 See 12 above.
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Hypothesis 8. a - Joint Venture Companies are more profitable than the 
non-Joint Venture Companies
Similarly, where the upstream oil company is faced with different tasks that 
are to be carried out within the limited resources available, a good incentive 
system serves not only to effectively allocate risks between the principal and 
an agent but also influences agent’s attention between different tasks for 
efficient operation. In essence, a good incentive system can be used to 
address the problem of multi-product contract because of the desirability 
of providing incentives for any other activities that make competing demands 
on the agent’s time and attention” (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
For example, an upstream oil company may produce either oil, gas or both 
oil and gas. In the first instance, if oil is considered the primary business of 
the company, then whatever comes from gas will be considered a reduction 
in the cost of oil produced (Taher, 2008). Therefore, an interesting question 
here is what motivates the companies to opt for the production of either of 
the two or the combination of the two?14
2.3.5 Agency Relationship in Upstream Operations
First of all, the issue of separation of ownership and control (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and risk-averse attitude (Fama, 1980), as explained by the 
classical agency theory model, are analysed in the context of upstream
14 This issue is beyond the scope o f this PhD project and could be an area for further study
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operation. In upstream operation, for example, the state (principal) engages 
an IOC (agent) in either JVC or PSC or SC.
Under the JV operation, the IOC and the state engage in a joint operation 
with the state having the largest stake-holding in the venture while the IOC is 
serving as the operator of the JVC. Hence, costs of operations as well as the 
outputs are shared between the state and the IOC on a pro rata basis. 
Although the IOC’s inputs (operator’s share of costs) are being monitored, 
but due to the problem of information asymmetry the state may find it difficult 
to confirm whether the inputs of the IOC are the best chosen for a particular 
combination of outputs15. Pongsiri (2004) states that, the information 
asymmetry issue in agency relationship results to an adverse selection 
problem.
On the other hand, under the PSC the state shields itself from the risks 
associated with the exploration activities; thereby allowing the IOC to recover 
its investment only if oil is discovered. Consequently, the IOC’s action ex- 
ante (investment decisions taken) is rewarded based on the performance of 
the IOC ex-post which is associated with a number of risks and uncertainties 
(Gibbons, 2005a). Hence, if the IOC is risk-averse, it will make investment 
that provides optimal trade-off between risk-taken and expected reward 
provided under the PSC agreement (Bindemann, 1999). Thus, reward 
system based on measured performance, which may not capture the specific
15 The output may be either oil, gas, or a combination o f both
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relationship between IOC’s inputs and outputs, may warrant the IOC to 
manipulate the input (cost oil); thus the problem of moral hazard (Pongsiri, 
2004). It can, therefore, be argued that the IOC, being the sole operator of 
the venture (PSC), may engage in sub-optimal behaviours (adverse 
selection and moral hazard) that may enhance its performance.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the IOC decides on the cause of 
action to be taken in order to maximise output from the resources of the 
state. Because ownership of oil reserves plays a vital role in determining 
pay-off to the parties involved in either JVC or non-JVC, it can be argued 
that asset ownership is one of the agency problems that characterises 
upstream operation. Consequently, asset ownership can facilitate the 
principal-agent contractual relationships (Grossman and Hart, 1986). That is, 
if an agent does not own the asset, being used in the contract, the agent’s 
incentive comes only from the measured performance. However, if the agent 
owns the asset, the agent’s incentive is not only based on the measured 
performance but also on the residual value of the asset (Gibbons, 2005a).
In summary, agent performs differently based on its ownership right on 
asset. Consequently, considering the assumption that agent’s ownership 
right on asset influences the agent’s actions ex-ante the state can structure 
an optimal incentive-system in such a way that will mitigate the potentials for 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems in JVC or non-JVC.
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Discussions so far indicate how the principal-agent relations can be 
managed in the best possible ways from the theoretical view point. However, 
there is the need for considering the way and manner the upstream oil and 
gas sector works, i.e. the way governments control upstream operations. 
This is an issue discussed in the next section.
2.4 Previous Studies
Discussion on the theoretical framework provides us with the details on how 
an agency relationship between principal and agent can be managed 
effectively via an optimal incentive-system. However, where there seem to 
be some frictions in the relationship between principal and agent, the need 
for finding solutions cannot be overemphasised. For example, where there is 
an information asymmetry, the principal opts for adopting some control 
mechanisms in order to checkmate agency problems.
In the same line of argument of agency theory, government participation in 
upstream operations can be attributed to such frictions in the agency 
relationship between the oil-rich nations and the lOCs. As mentioned earlier 
on, one major factor causing such frictions is attributed to lack of goal 
congruence between the oil-rich nations and the lOCs (Bindemann, 1999). 
Therefore, there is the need for governments to take control of the sector 
where such frictions result in less profit and oil revenue to the lOCs and 
governments respectively. Discussion on the historical background on 
government control in upstream operations is provided hereunder.
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2.4.1 Reasons for Government Control in Upstream Operations
As mentioned in section 2.1 above, oil-rich nations rely on the expertise and 
funding of the lOCs for exploration and development of their oil reserves 
(Sihotang, 2003). During the period of non-state participation16, states’ role 
was that of monitoring of the upstream operations alone (Alalade, 2004). 
Therefore, the lOCs enjoyed the dominance in upstream operations until the 
1970s, the aftermath of OPEC oil crisis when the states started participating 
in the upstream operations for various reasons (Kashani, 2005).
For example, with the establishment of Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), upstream operations changed drastically 
around the world. Indeed, OPEC membership was one of the major reasons 
why the oil-rich nations (especially the less-developed countries) started 
participating in the upstream activities (OPEC, 2008). Other reasons include 
security for the supply of oil (Kashani, 2005), the need for national 
sovereignty (Wolf, 2009) and reduction in oil revenue accruable to the oil-rich 
nations as a result of some manipulations in determining the oil price by the 
lOCs (Bindemann, 1999). Hence, the economic consequence of states’ 
participation in upstream operations is the trade-off between the oil revenue 
accruable to the states and profits accruable to the lOCs.
Oil security and the need for national sovereignty are reasons not only found 
among the less-developed oil-rich nations but also among the developed
16 Participation and control mean the same in the context o f  this study. Therefore, they may be used 
interchangeably.
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nations who realised the risks associated with their huge dependence on 
imported oil. As Winston Churchill stated in July 1913, that
“if we cannot get oil we cannot get corn, we cannot get cotton 
and we cannot get a thousand and one commodities necessary  ^
for the preservation of the economic energies of Great Britain”
(cited in Wolf 2009, p. 2642).
With the paradigm shift in upstream operations, states assumed the strategic 
role in managing their oil resources. The states normally operate under joint 
ventures with the lOCs or engaging the lOCs in production-sharing or 
service contract. Similarly, some of the oil-rich nations established their 
National Oil Companies -  NOCs for national interest (Tanzer, 1980).
The need for developing domestic oil capacity and other developmental 
programs associated with the oil exploration and development also 
encouraged states to establish their NOCs in the 1970s (Levy, 1982). 
However, it is argued whether the changing role of states from landlords to 
entrepreneurs (Klapp, 1982) is really for the national interest considering the 
challenges associated with the operations of the NOCs (Hann, 1986).
The NOCs face a number of management challenges such as lack of 
efficiency in operations, conflict of interests between state’s and business’ 
needs, and accountability issues (McPherson, 2010). These management 
challenges resulted in a loss of confidence on the ability of the NOCs to 
meet-up with the realization of the ‘national interests’ (Hill and Hellriegel, 
1994); an issue that motivated the privatisation of some of the NOCs (Al- 
Mazeedi, 1992).
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Privatization programme is being championed by many countries on the 
basis of firm efficiency (Villalonga, 2000; Megginson et a/., 1994, Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). For example, Megginson et al. (1994) document a strong 
performance improvement in the post privatization period of state-owned 
firms. Section 2.4.4.1 below discusses, in detail, the effect of privatization 
(ownership change) on the performance of state-owned companies.
While some states (the UK for example) privatised their NOCs, others 
(Nigeria for example) entered into joint operations with the lOCs by 
modifying the existing concessionary agreements into joint venture 
agreements that paved way for the establishment of joint venture companies 
(Hill and Hellriegel, 1994; Hill and Hellriegel, 1994; Jennings et al., 2000). 
The discussion below focusses on the Nigerian experience.
2.4.1.1 The Nigerian Experience
Oil exploration activities in Africa have been growing steadily since the major 
oil discoveries in the 1950s. For example an increase of Africa’s oil 
production, to total world out-put, from 3% in 1957 to 9.8% in 1976 was quite 
phenomenal. The International Oil Companies (lOCs) operating in Africa 
have been the driving force for such phenomenal growth. This is because 
the lOCs have the required funds, skills, and technology needed for the 
capital intensive investment and technologically driven operations in 
upstream activities (Baker, 1977).
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Despite the role of the lOCs in the growth of oil exploration activities in 
Africa, their influence on the output of oil creates problem between them and 
their host nations. This is because the lOCs, in most cases, have the leeway 
to determine oil revenue accruable to their host nations due to their influence 
on deciding whether to increase or decrease their production level. This 
problematic situation raises questions on moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues that normally characterised the relationships between the 
lOCs and their host nations (Pongsiri, 2004). These problems arise when the 
host nations try to protect their interest of long-term sustainable 
development, and on the other hand the lOCs bring to bear the interest of 
their shareholders that is not the same as that of the host nations.
Baker (1977) argues that the lOCs’ decision on determining the production 
level is highly correlated with the price of crude oil at international market 
that the lOCs’ home nations always try to control. Consequently, the 
potential for having some agency problems, such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems, between the host nations and the lOCs, need to 
be carefully addressed in a win-win situation. Efforts by the less-developed 
oil-rich nations towards addressing such problems created tension between 
the lOCs and their host nations not only in Africa but around the world. Thus, 
one of the measures taken towards addressing such problems by the less- 
developed oil-rich nations was the establishment of Organisation of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 (OPEC, 2008).
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OPEC aims at addressing such problems both at individual country level and 
collectively among its members. OPEC, therefore, marks the beginning of 
institutionalising control measures by the less-developed oil-rich nations in 
order to effectively control their own oil resources that were hitherto 
dominated by the lOCs.
Consequent upon the establishment of OPEC, host nations started active 
participation in the upstream activities that were hitherto dominated by the 
lOCs. In similar development, Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971 and came-up 
with an oil policy in the same year that paved its way for active participation 
in the upstream sector. In order to facilitate full participation, the Nigeria 
National Oil Company (NNOC) was established in 1971. NNOC engages in 
oil exploration and production activities alongside the upstream oil 
companies operating in the country (Oromade, 1986). Nigeria’s active 
participation in oil exploration activities resulted to huge inflow of oil revenue 
that suddenly overshadowed revenue from all other sectors, including the 
agricultural sector that was the main stay of the Nigerian economy before the 
discovery of oil (Kejeh, 1986).
Since the discovery of oil in 1956 and the subsequent flow of oil revenue, the 
oil and gas industry has been playing a vital role in the nation’s economy and 
this is due to its contribution to the nation’s foreign exchange of over 90%.
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This huge flow of oil revenue makes the Nigerian economy largely 
dependent on oil revenue (Ariweriokuma, 2009). Thus, the flow of revenue to 
the Nigerian Government largely depends on the performance of the oil and 
gas industry. Consequently, there is the need to ensure effective and 
efficient operations of the industry if Government is to sustain its flow of 
revenue from oil.
In order to ensure effective and efficient operations of the oil and gas 
industry Government needs to control the activities of the industry. 
Therefore, a Hydrocarbon section in the Ministry of Lagos Affairs was 
established in 1950. The Section was saddled with the responsibility for 
controlling the affairs of the industry. Thereafter, the section became a 
division under the Ministry of Mines and Steel in 1970, and subsequently 
became a Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) in the same year. The 
Department became under a full-fledge Ministry of Petroleum Resources in 
1975. The Ministry is responsible for initiating policies and guidelines for the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry (DPR, 2012).
DPR, as a Department in the Ministry, has the responsibility for advising 
government on technical and petroleum policy issues. More so, DPR 
regulates and monitors the activities of the oil companies operating in 
Nigeria in order to ensure that the oil companies operate in accordance with 
the rules, regulations, and Petroleum Laws in Nigeria (Ariweriokuma, 2009). 
DPR, therefore, serves as the regulator in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.
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Another agency under the Ministry of Petroleum Resources that serves as a 
player in the Nigerian oil and gas industry is the Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC). NNPC participates, on-behalf of the Nigerian 
Government, in the oil exploration activities, exporting and/or importing of 
crude oil, processing of crude oil, and sales of the refined oil and/or gas. 
NNPC is a player because its subsidiaries such as the Nigeria Petroleum 
Development Company (NPDC) and the National Petroleum Investment 
Management Services (NAPIMS), Nigerian Gas Company (NGC), engage in 
the up-stream activities alongside other upstream oil companies.
NNPC, therefore, controls Government investment in the upstream sector 
with a view to enhancing the flow of oil revenue to the Government. NAPIMS 
being the investment manager of the NNPC manages such investment in the 
upstream sector (NEITI, 2011b). The upstream companies play an important 
role in the nation’s crude oil production, especially the Joint Venture 
Companies (JVCs). See for example Table below, over 80% of the nation’s 
crude oil is produced by the JVCs. This indicates the strategic role of the 
JVCs in the Nigerian oil and gas industry; therefore the aforementioned 
Ministry, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) adopt a number of control 
mechanisms in order to ensure effective and efficient operations of the 
upstream oil and gas companies.
Therefore, NNPC enters into joint venture agreements with some of the 
lOCs that were operating under the concessionary agreements since 1937
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(Oremade, 1986). Under such agreements, joint venture companies were 
established, with the NNPC holding the majority equity of 55-60% in all the 
JVCs but serving as a non-operator partner; while the lOCs serve as 
operators of the various JVCs. This indicates that equity ownership serves 
as a control determinant in the operations of the JVCs. More so, the JVCs 
operate alongside other lOCs that operate under PSCs and SC. To this end, 
the major research question of the study is to what extent government 
control affects the performance of upstream oil and gas companies in 
Nigeria?
Consequently, the next section focuses on findings of previous studies on 
the effect of government control on companies’ performance. First of all, 
such studies are synthesised on an industry-wide perspective and then 
concludes with the section specifically focusing on the upstream oil and gas 
sector.
2.4.2 Effect of Government Control on Companies’ Performance
This section reviews literature on the effect of government control on the 
performance of companies. Factors influencing companies’ performance 
include companies’ objectives, ownership type, government regulation, and 
competition among others (Pestieau, 2006). Although government regulation 
and ownership are not the only factors influencing the performance of 
companies, this study focuses only on the effect of both government 
regulation and ownership on the performance of upstream oil and gas
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companies in Nigeria. Hence, this section is divided into two main sections: 
regulatory effect and ownership effect, which are discussed in sub-sections
2.4.3 and 2.4.4 respectively.
2.4.3 Regulatory Effect
2.4.3.1 Regulatory Environment
First of all, there is the need for us to discuss what constitutes regulatory 
environment. Generally, regulation creates and/or limits responsibilities 
amongst individuals, firms or nations (Levi-Faur, 2010). As a result, 
regulation can be in different forms such as legal, contractual, or market 
regulation (ibid.). For example, market regulation refers to the determination 
of production decisions, quantity of output to be sold, and prices of such 
output in order to address the ‘profiteering’ tendency of the regulated firms 
(Pestieau, 2006).
Hence, market regulation is considered as the product of government policy 
on a particular issue that is of significant importance to the general public. 
For instance, where government believes that prices charged by a particular 
company are too high to the extent that the public are disadvantaged, then 
government may step-in in order to regulate such prices. From the foregoing, 
it can be deduced that there is a trade-off between ‘confiscating’ profit of the 
regulated firms and ensuring the attainment of public interest. This, 
therefore, forms the basis of debate in business regulation literature (Burns 
etal., 1998).
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Hence, the regulatory environment consists of regulated firms’ and 
regulators’ information structures, regulatory constraints, and regulatory 
instruments and incentive schemes (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). While the 
regulator may opt for moderate regulatory system that is of benefit to both 
the regulated firms and the general public, there may be some constraints 
that limit such regulatory effort. These regulatory constraints are discussed 
here under.
2.4.3.2 Regulatory Constraints
Regulatory constraints prevent the regulator from realising set policy, these 
constraints include informational, transactional, and administrative and 
political (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
Information Constraints
The informational constraint refers to information asymmetry which limits the 
ability of the regulator to be effective in its regulatory function. Informational 
constraint can be in form of either moral hazard or adverse selection, as 
explained in section 2.3.2 above under agency problem.
The moral hazard aspect of the informational constraint happens because of 
the advantage taken by the regulated firm from the endogenous factors that 
are not observable by the regulator (ibid.). In this instance, the regulated firm 
carefully selects its action which in turn influences its costs. In essence, the
46
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
amount of effort exerts on such action is what underscores the moral hazard 
problem in a principal-agent relationship.
In the upstream sector, for example, timing of exploration, development, and 
production activities may be associated with ‘negative’ effort on the side of 
the regulated firms (the upstream oil and gas companies), which the 
regulator may have little influence because of the fact that the upstream oil 
and gas companies possess the knowledge about the geological and 
geophysical nature of the oil fields more than the regulator. Similarly, the 
adverse selection problem arises when the regulated firm is better informed 
about some exogenous variables than the regulator (ibid.).
Considering the adverse-selection problem in the upstream sector, for 
example, the problem of adverse selection is associated with the adoption 
and usage of either appropriate or inappropriate technology in the production 
of oil and/or flaring of gas respectively. The argument here is that upstream 
oil and gas companies are better informed about the cost of either producing 
gas or the ‘benefit’ of flaring it. A case in point is the problem of gas flaring in 
Nigeria (Hassan, 2012). Although there is a penalty for flaring gas in Nigeria 
(ibid.), the question here is whether or not such penalty mitigates gas flaring 
in Nigeria17.
17 This question is not within the focus o f this study, but an issue that requires an in-depth 
investigation due to its importance and economic implication on the Nigerian economy.
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In a nutshell, the concomitant effect of moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems is the loss of control by the regulator.
Transaction Constraints
Transaction constraints are associated with incomplete contracts. Contract is 
incomplete when future contingencies are not comprehensively captured in 
the contract (Williamson, 1975). For instance, where the contingencies about 
contract are difficult (or even impossible) to be foreseen, then transaction 
costs are likely to be higher than where the contingencies are relatively 
captured (ibid.). Hence, the less comprehensive a contract is the higher the 
transaction costs that may be incurred.
Transaction costs are normally higher in the upstream sector because of the 
distinctive nature of operations in the industry, such as the long-term nature 
of investment, uncertainties associated with the discovery of oil, and its 
commercial viability if discovered (Wright and Gallun, 2005). Thus, these 
distinctive features of the industry make contracting, in the upstream sector, 
incomplete; which may add to the transaction costs in the oil exploration 
contracts.
In determining the appropriate transaction costs, Grossman and Hart (1986) 
assert the importance of a good incentive-system regarding asset 
ownership. Similarly, Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 4) state that:
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“the contingencies that are left out of the incomplete contract 
must be filled in. The authority relationship induced by the 
ownership of assets defines the status quo for renegotiation 
about what is to be done when the unforeseen contingency 
occurs".
Hence, there is the need for the oil-rich nations to adopt an optimal 
incentive-system in order to mitigate the effect of transaction constraints in 
their contractual relationships with the lOCs. In this regard, the alternative 
funding arrangement in the JVCs may serve as such an instrument with 
which the constraints associated with the funding of the upstream operations 
can be mitigated. Hence, the research questions 1-3 and their related 
hypotheses 1-3 are aimed at addressing this issue.
Administrative and Political Constraints
Administrative and political constraints are caused by some legislative acts, 
rules, and regulations defining and/or limiting the regulator’s responsibilities 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The constraints may be caused due to some 
limitations in the scope of regulation, or the regulatory instruments available 
to be used by the regulator, or the time horizon over which the regulation 
covers, or the procedural requirements (ibid.).
For instance, the regulator may be constrained on the instruments to use, 
especially by formulating their own regulations and following such objectively 
without undue influence from the political class. Procedural requirements, on 
the other hand, can be very complex due to duplication of functions. In the 
Nigerian context, for example, procedural constraints have been causing
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undue delay in carrying out some regulatory functions and the resultant loss 
of government revenue from the oil industry (Ribadu, 2012).
A case in point is the power tussle between the legislature and the executive 
arms of government that results in ineffective regulatory functions on the one 
hand and inefficient upstream operations on the other (Ariweriokuma, 2009). 
This buttresses Laffont and Tirole’s (1993, p. 5) argument that administrative 
and political constraints “are not exogenous but are driven by informational 
and transactional constraints” because “regulators themselves are agents for 
other parties”. Hence, regulators need to be incentivised to carry-out their 
duties as assigned to them by their ‘political principals’.
In other words, in the upstream sector, for example, the regulator’s capacity 
needs to be developed in order to properly develop the sector so as to 
sustain the performance of the sector. For instance, using institutional quality 
and political competitiveness as the measure of performance of the 
upstream sector of the oil-rich nations, the performance of the upstream 
sector in Nigeria is ranked poor due to frequent disruption to production, 
limited development of domestic companies with operational capacities, 
administrative red tape that imposes additional costs, and failure to develop 
natural gas resources to potential (Thurber et al, 2011).
The aforementioned problems are associated with Nigeria’s weak 
bureaucracy which inhibits the regulatory system. This problem may be
addressed by appropriate separation of functions within the upstream sector.
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To this end, Thurber et al. (2011) argue that a country’s ability to implement 
separation of functions depends on institutional development of that country.
A case in point is the tripartite systems (policy, regulation, and commercial 
functions) in the upstream sectors of both Nigeria and Norway. While 
Norway’s system works effectively, Nigeria’s system does not work well. 
This, as described by Thurber et al. (2011, p. 5375), is perhaps attributed to 
the nature of the upstream sector in Nigeria where “regulators acted as 
either pernicious micromanagers (at policy level) or mostly passive rubber 
stamps (at regulation level), or both”. Hence, government lacks the capacity 
to check-mate the activities of the sector effectively, which results to 
“government bodies exert no truly effective authority over the activities of the 
international companies that extract the country’s oil”.
Thurber et al. (2010) stated that the complexities of upstream sector in 
Nigeria results in ineffective regulatory system and inefficient operation of 
the sector. This, for example can be deduced from the confused role of the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); as succinctly stated by 
Thurber et al. (2010, p. 5):
Despite its formal organization as a vertically-integrated oil 
company, NNPC is neither a real commercial entity nor a 
meaningful oil operator. It lacks control over the revenue it 
generates and thus is unable to set its own strategy. It relies on 
other firms to perform essentially all of the most complex 
functions that are hallmarks of operating oil companies. Yet 
unlike some NOCs it also fails to fit the profile of a government 
agency: Its portfolio of activities is too diverse, incoherent, and 
beyond the reach of government control for it to function as a 
government policymaking instrument.
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In summary, clear separation of functions amongst various institutions in the 
upstream sector is at the core of the multilayered agency relationship 
described above, i.e. general public vs. politicians, politicians vs. regulators, 
and regulators vs. regulated firms. In essence, such separation of functions 
which enhances regulatory functions in a regulated market is lacking in the 
Nigerian context.
On the other hand, government may opt for having substantive control of the 
regulated firms by owning a stake in the firms. This brings us to the core 
issue of ownership effect on companies’ performance, i.e. the relationship 
between government stake-holding and companies’ performance, an issue 
discussed hereunder.
2.4.4 Ownership Effect
Literature on the effect of ownership on companies’ performance is classified 
into three strands; the first strand investigates ownership effect based on 
private or public ownership (Pestieau, 2006). The second strand of the 
literature focuses on the effect of change of ownership via privatisation of the 
hitherto state-owned companies (see for example Cragg and Dyck, 1997; 
Cragg and Dyck, 1997; Cragg and Dyck, 1998; Villalonga, 2000; Al-Mazeedi, 
1992; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Kang, 2009; Okten and Arin, 2006; 
Ramirez, 1998; Wei et a/., 2003). Lastly, the effect of joint ownership on the 
performance of companies forms the third strand of the literature (Boateng
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and Glaister, 2002). To this end, empirical findings on these three strands of 
the literature are presented hereunder.
First of all, Pestieau and Tulkens (1993) state that when comparing the 
performance of public and private companies, it is essential to establish 
whether or not both the organisational and market settings are kept constant. 
Pestieau and Tulkens (1993) classifications of these settings are presented 
in Table 3 below with the exception of joint venture, which is added by the 
researcher in order to address questions specifically related to this study. 
This is because the Nigerian government engages in joint venture operations 
with the lOCs that are engaged in the upstream activities, which results in 
mixed-ownership in the upstream oil and gas companies. The mixed- 
ownership used in the context of this study refers to stake-holding 
(ownership) of both government and private companies in joint venture 
companies.
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Table 3: Ownership Structure vs. Alternative Competitive and Regulatory Settings
r^rucHuTs
Me) cWiicTcumofi Cic)rflcT3rinc)r)
No regulation Regulation
Public Pure public 
monopoly
Autonomous 
public monopoly
Public firm  in
competitive
setting
Private Pure private 
monopoly
Regulated private 
monopoly
Private
competitive firm
Joint Venture Pure jo in t
venture
monopoly
Regulated jo in t
venture
monopoly
Jo in t venture in
competitive
setting
Adapted and modified from: (Pestieau and Tulkens, 1993, p. 352)
Therefore, this study classifies firms according to organisational and market 
settings into nine, instead of six by Pestieau and Tulkens (1993). Findings of 
previous studies on the effect of ownership structure of companies on their 
performance are presented hereunder.
As Pestieau and Tulkens (1993, p. 352) state "... expert opinion would rank 
competitive private firms as the most efficient... and noncompetitive firms as 
least efficient”. Hence, this study focuses on the effect of ownership and 
regulation on regulated private monopoly and regulated joint venture 
monopoly18. Government ownership and regulation are the two important 
aspects of government control considered in the context of this study.
The empirical literature comparing efficiency differential between private and 
state-owned is presented, as synthesised by Villalonga (2000, p. 47-49), in
18 Regulated private monopoly here are the production-sharing and service companies, and the 
regulated joint venture monopoly here are the joint venture companies.
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Table 4 below. However, it is worth noting that the empirical literature on part 
(c), petroleum industry which is the focus of this study, is synthesised by the 
researcher.
Hence, ownership effect is examined based on the cross-sectional nature of 
companies, i.e. private, state-owned, or joint venture, and longitudinal effect 
of ownership change over a period of time (privatisation).
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T a b le  4: Em pirical S tu d ie s  on th e E ffect o f O w n ersh ip  on C o m p a n ie s ’ P e rfo rm an ce
f t c js i r ( j  i\n? = jr .y r i£ is j
Based on efficiency frontiers method (like Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier models)
Electricity Fare et al. (1985), US; Cote 
(1989) US; Pollit (1994, 
1995), US and UK
Hjalmarsson and 
Veiderpass (1991), 
Sweden
Airlines Barla and Perelman 
(1991), US and Europe
Refuse
collection
Ditexhe (1993), Belgium Cubbin et al. (1987); Burgat 
and Jeanrenaud (1990), 
Switzerland
Railways Filippini and Maggi (1991), 
Switzerland
Oum and Yu (1991), Canada
Financial Tulkens (1993), Belgium
Insurance Fecher et al. (1993), France
Healthcare Grosskopf and Vladamis 
(1987), US
Wilson and Jadlow (1982), US
Education Rhodes and Southwick 
(1988), US
Petroleum Al-Obaidan and Scully (1991), 
International
Sugar Ferrantino and Ferrier (1991), 
India
Various Boussofiane et al. (1997), UK; 
Argimon et al. (1997), Spain*
Based on traditional methods (like econometric models)
Electricity Meyer (1975), US; {Db, 
BPS,M,BB,B,Y,VY,BV,PM}; 
Neuberg (1977), US; 
{M,B,YC,BV,PM}; Primeaux
Shepherd (1966), US 
{D,BV}; Mann (1970), US 
{D,BV}; Yunker (1975), 
US {M,BB,B,Y,BV,PM};
Moore (1970)°, US 
{D,BPS,B,BV,MP}; Wallace 
and Junk (1970), US 
{BPS,PM}; Peltzman (1971),
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__________
(1977), US {M}; Pescatrice 
and Trapani (1980), US {PM}
I o) iilcjrliiifiiirii «|jifejryrisis?
Spann (1977), US 
{BPS.BV}; Edison Electric 
Institute (1985), US {VY}; 
Atkinson and Halvorsen 
(1986), US {PM}; Di 
Lorenzo and Robinson 
(1982), US {PM}; Holmes 
(1990), Europe {PM}
US {D,MP,B,Y,VY,BV,PM}; 
Tilton (1973), US {D,BV}; De 
Alessi (1974, 1975, 1977), US 
{M,Be,Y,VY,BV,PM}; 
Foreman-Peck and Waterson 
(1985), US; {PM}
Airlines Forsyth and Hocking 
(1980), Australia; 
{MP,BB,DP,BV,PM}; 
Morrison (1981), Australia 
{BV}; Jordan (1982), US 
and Australia; 
{BB,DP,BV}; Millward and 
Parker (1983), Australia 
{DP}; Ashworth and 
Forsyth (1984), 
International {PM}
Davies (1971, 1977),
Australia;
{D,BPS,M,BB,B,DP,Y,BV,PM}; 
Mackay (1979), Australia 
{DP,VB}; Pryke (1982), UK 
{Y,VY,VB}; Findley and 
Forsyth (1984), Australia {VB}; 
Kirby and Albon (1985), 
Australia {DP}; Kirby (1986), 
Australia {DP,VB}; Forsyth et 
al. (1986) {VY,VB,PM}; Gillen 
etal. (1989), Canada {VB}; 
Windle (1991), US and 
Europe {PM}; Ehrlich et al. 
(1994), International
Refuse Pier et al. (1974), US; Hirsch (1965/703 Savas (1974, 1977b,c,d,
collection {BPS,M,Y,BV} {D,BPS,MP,Y,BV}; Spann 
(1974), US {Y}; Feller and 
Menzel (1976), US {B}; 
Kemper and Quigley 
(1976), US {BPS,BV}; 
Savas (1977a), US 
{DgM,B}; Audit
1980), US;
{D,BPSh,M,B,Y,VY,BV}; 
Kitchen (1976), Canada; 
{BPS,M,B,Y,VY,BV}; 
Pommerehne (1976), 
Switzerland {BPS}; 
Pommerehne and Frey
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wisite _ Mg) ^IslnliffelrU glW=Jrr)Mg£' 
Commission (1984), UK 
{VY}
iP jfiV ;Lte gjiilgjt f^ip________ |
(1977), Switzerland;
{M,B,Y,BV}; Stevens (1978),
US {BPS,MP,VY,BV}; Stevens 
and Savas (1978), US {BPS}; 
Bennett and Johnson (1979, 
1980) US {D,M}; Boorsma 
(1982), Netherlands {VB}; 
Hartley and Huby (1985), UK 
{VY}; McDavid (1985),
Canada {VB}; Lawarree 
(1986), Belgium {VB}
Water supply Mann and Mikesell (1971), 
US; {BPS’.B.Y.BV.PM}; 
Bruggink (1982), US 
{Y,VY,BV,PM}
Feigenbaum and Teeples 
(1983) {Y,BV,PM}
Hausman (1976), US {BV}; 
Morgan (1977), US {BPS,BV}; 
Crain and Zardkoohi (1978, 
1980), US;
{D,BPS,M,B,Y,VY,BV,PM}; 
Boland (1983), US {VB}; Lynk 
(1993), UK {PM}
Railways Caves and Christensen
(1980), Canada; 
{BPS,M,BB,B,YBV,PM}; 
Caves et al. (1982) US 
and Canada {BV}; 
Freeman et al. (1985), 
Canada {VB}
Urban
transportation
Oelert (1976), Germany 
{BPS,PM}; Pashigian (1976), 
US {D,MP,BB,Y,BV}; Bails 
(1979) {VB}; Pucher(1982) 
{VB}; Palmer et al. (1983), 
Canada {BB,BV,PM}; Pucher
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I l i u M M y S I - i t  t e i l  i p 'n  i s )  t s S  t f t f J  l y  r  u M s )  illSjrllilfJiinli
ef al. (1983) {VB}; McGuire 
and Van Cott (1984), US {BV}; 
Wallis (1985) {VB}; Perry and 
Babitsky (1986) {VB}
Construction Schneider and Schuppener 
(1971), Germany {BPS} 
Rechnungshof Rheinland- 
Pfalz (1972), Germany {BPS}; 
Muth (1973), US {BPS}
Telecom Denny et al. (1983), Canada 
{BB}
Gordon (1981), Canada 
{BB}; Duch (1991), 
International {PM}
Foreman-Peck (1985), 
International {PM}
Financial Lewin (1982), Europe 
{BV}
Davies (1981), Australia 
{BPS,BV,PM}; Davies and 
Brucato (1987) {VB}
Insurance Finsinger (1981,19841), 
Germany {BPS,Y,BV,PMk}
Freeh (1976, 1979, 1980) 
{BPS,Y,BV}; Kennedy and 
Mehr (1977), Canada {BPS}; 
Hsaio (1978) {VB}
Healthcare Becker and Sloan (1985) 
{BV}; Renn et al. (1985) 
{BV}
Clarkson (1972), US; 
{D,BPS,MP,BV,PM}; Hrebiniak 
and Alutto (1973) {VB};
Lindsay (1975, 1976), US 
{D,BPS‘,BV}; Bishop (1980) 
{BV}; Freeh and Ginsburg 
(1981), US {BV}; Schlesinger 
and Dorwart (1984), US {BV}; 
Schulz et al. (1984) {VB};
Freeh (1985), US {VB}
Cleaning Hamburger Senat (1974),
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IM l & l i V / _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ S S i2iis H » > V >  n i s i l  I n pjsJ t e  B  « f i d  l=J p i i
services
Timber
Various (cross­
industry 
comparison)
Millward (1990, 1991), UK 
and US {PM}; Pryke(1971), 
UK {PM}; Molyneux and 
Thompson (1987), UK {PM}
l^ ls) SjteJnlHtefelrtj £liHr)>',dncjri Pl'W-Kr •MloJK* .yiitfjlrJPl.'
Germany {BPS}; 
Bundesrechnungshop (1972), 
Germany {BPS}; 
Fischermenshausen (1975),
________________________ Germany {BPS}____________
Bundesregierung 
Deutscheland (1976a, b), 
Germany {BPS}; Pfister
_________________________(1976), Germany {BPS}_____
Ahlbrandt (1973, 1974), US; 
{BPS,MP,Y,BV}; Pausch 
(1976), Germany {BPS}; 
Funkhouser and MacAvoy 
(1979), Indonesia 
{MP,BV,PM}; Bennett and 
Johnson (1980), US {BPS}; 
Kim (1981), Tanzania 
{BV,PM}; Pryke (1981, 1982) 
UK {Y,VY,VB,PM}; Boardman 
and Vining (1989), non-US 
{VB,PM}; Picot and Kaulmann 
(1989), non-US {VB,PM}; 
Vining and Boardman (1992), 
Canada {PM}; Bhaskar and 
Khan (1995), Bangladesh 
{PM}; Enderwick (1994), Latin 
America, Asia {PM}; Adhikari 
and Kirkpatrick (1990), {PM}; 
Hamilton (1971), UK {PM}; 
Gantt and Dutto (1968), Less 
Developed Countries {PM};
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ r tg io I ip'flIgJKg . r j i u c j l y f i l i  ifc ls ) l£ jn | i  1 tc jc |r» i ___ 1 P H  te fe U g  1 B>t g jfej £)PM l=j F t j  
Monsen and Walters (1983), 
Europe {PM}; Plane (1992),
____________________________________________________________________ International {PM}__________
Petroleum______________________________________________________________________________________
Alalade (2004) Al-Obaidan and Scully (1991);
Al-Mazeedi (1992); Victor
(2007) ; Hartley and Medlock
(2008) ; Wolf and Pollitt (2008); 
Wolf (2009); Eller et al. (2011)
a( ) Not included in Villalonga (2000); D=De Alessi (1980); BPS=Borcherding et al. (1982); M=Millward (1982); 
MP=Millward and Parker (1983), not included in M; BB=Borins and Boothman (1985); B=Boyd (1986); 
DP=Domberger and Piggott (1986); Y=Yarrow (1986); VY=Vickers and Yarrow (1988); BV=Boadman and 
Vinning (1989); VB=Vining and Boardman (1992), not included in BV; PM=Martin and Parker (1997). Note: 
Millward (1982) is included and extended in Millward and Parker (1983). So is Boardman and Vining (1989) in 
Vining and Boadman (1992). 
b Classified as neutral by De Alessi. 
c Classified as neutral by Yarrow. 
d Classified as neutral by Boyd and, Martin and Parker.
e Boyd classifies De Alessi (1975) as neutral or as favourable to state ownership, depending on the 
measurement employed.
f Classified as favourable to private ownership by De Alessi and Yarrow; as favourable to state ownership by 
Millward and Parker.
9 Classified as favourable to private ownership by De Alassi. 
h Classified as neutral by Borcherding et al.
1 Classified as favourable to private ownership by Borcherding et al.
j Classified as favourable to private ownership by Vining and Boardman; as favourable to state by Yarrow. 
k Classified as favourable to private ownership by Martin and Parker.
‘ Classified as favourable to private ownership by Borcherding et al.
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2.4.4.1 Private Ownership Effect
Effect of private ownership on companies’ performance is well-researched 
and a number of studies established a positive correlation between private 
ownership and companies’ performance. The proponents of this view argue 
that, ceteris paribus, private firms are inherently more efficient than the state- 
owned enterprises (see for example Alchain, 1965; Tulkens, 1976; De Alasi, 
1974; Stiglitz, 2007).
Looking at the issue from the property rights theory perspective, Alchain 
(1965) argues that lack of diffusion in ownership in the public enterprises and 
the lack of incentive for the public to monitor the management of such 
enterprises make the public enterprises inherently less efficient than their 
private counterparts.
In the same line of reasoning as Alchain (1965), De Alesi (1974) argues that 
state-owned enterprises are less affected by market forces because they are 
protected by government ‘subsidies’ that conceals their inefficiencies. Some 
of the previous studies buttressing this view are presented in Table 5 above.
2.4.4.2 State Ownership Effect
The question of efficiency differentials between the private companies and 
state-owned enterprises is typically an empirical issue. Hence, depending on 
specific cases, private and public firms may perform differently under 
different circumstances that are otherwise not favourable for them (Dewenter
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and Malatesta, 2001). However, Dewenter and Malatesta assert that state- 
owned enterprises are less profitable than privately-owned companies. This 
is largely because state-owned enterprises tend to be more levered and 
labour-intensive than their private counterparts.
Similarly, Boycko et al. (1996) states that inefficiency in state-owned 
enterprises is caused by politicians who influence the business’ decision 
makers to employ more labour than needed. Hence, it can be argued that 
the agency problem, which results in inefficient operations, lies with the 
politicians rather than the managers of publicly-owned companies. 
Therefore, privatising such companies help to restructure the companies and 
mitigate such X-inefficiency19.
Asserting Boycko et a/.’s (1996) view, Krueger (1990) states that the labour 
employed at the instance of such political influence tends to be below the 
standard requirements for their respective positions. Hence, the question as 
to what extent political influence affects the performance of the publically- 
owned companies? However, this question is beyond the scope of this 
study, because the companies that are being studied are jointly-owned on 
one hand and privately-owned on the other hand, not publicly-owned.
19 In economic theory, x-inefficiency assumes that the management o f  firms act to maximise profit by 
minimising the inputs used to produce a given level o f output. In this case, it only looks at the outputs 
that are produced with given inputs. It does not take account o f whether the inputs are the best ones to 
be using, or whether the outputs are the best ones to be producing (Leibenstein, 1966). This is 
especially the case in the case o f Nigerian oil and gas industry where the upstream oil and gas 
companies engage in gas flaring activities (Hassan and Kouhy, 2014) that is not only detrimental to 
the environment but also reduces the oil revenue accruable to the government.
63
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
2.4.4.3 Ownership Change Effect
Empirical literature indicates that privatisation has a significant positive effect 
on companies’ financial and operating efficiency (Kireri and Nellis, 2002). 
Findings on the effect of ownership change on the performance of 
companies indicate that state-owned firms in both developed (Megginson et 
al., 1994) and developing (Boubakari and Cosset, 1998) countries perform 
significantly better after privatisation. These findings indicate that after the 
state-owned ^enterprises have been privatised profitability gets higher, 
operations are more efficient, output is higher, capital investment is higher, 
employment level increased, dividend payment increased, and leverage 
declined.
On the balance of differing views presented above, another strand of 
literature argues that ownership has no significant effect on companies’ 
performance. As Hicks (1935, p. 8) argues that monopoly managers “are 
likely to exploit their advantage much more by not bothering to get very near 
the position of maximum profit, than by storming themselves to get very 
close to it”20. Affirming Hick’s (1935) view, Leibenstein (1966) argues that 
companies operating in the pure monopoly market (private or public) are 
likely to be X-inefficient.
Hence, the main argument here is that efficiency comparison between 
private and public is most suitable where both companies operate under the
20 (Hicks 1935) quoted by Pestieau and Tulkens (1993:352)
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same competitive or regulatory environment. Hence, this study compares 
regulated private monopoly and regulated joint venture monopoly (see Table 
4 above). Findings of the previous studies indicating less significance of 
ownership are presented in Table 4 above. Having reviewed literature on 
industry-wide basis, the next section focuses exclusively on the oil and gas 
industry findings, which constitute the focus of this study.
2.4.4.4 Ownership Effect in the Oil and Gas Industry
Contrary to the extensive literature on the effect of ownership on companies’ 
performance in various industries as presented in parts A and B of Table 4 
above, part C of the Table indicates very few studies (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 
1991; Al-Mazeedi, 1992; Alalade, 2004; Victor, 2007; Hartley and Medlock, 
2008; Wolf and Pollitt, 2008; Wolf, 2009; Eller et al., 2011) that investigated 
ownership effect on the performance of oil and gas companies.
It is worth noting that investigating ownership effect in the oil and gas 
industry mitigates some of the conceptual issues that are attributable to 
other sectors, like sector specific effects, which are “automatically controlled 
for... (and which) rules out important sources of ownership endogeneity” in 
the oil and gas industry (Wolf 2009, p. 2643). Findings of the studies 
conducted specifically on oil and gas industry are discussed here under.
The first study conducted on ownership effect in the oil and gas industry is 
that of Al-Obaidan and Scully’s (1991). Using deterministic and stochastic
methods, Al-Obaidan and Scully investigated the efficiency of 44 oil and gas
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companies using a cross-sectional analysis with a 1979-1982 dataset. Input- 
output relationship was investigated by using assets as inputs and revenue 
earned as output on one hand, and number of employees as inputs and 
quantity of crude oil produced as output on the other hand.
Their findings indicate that while scale efficiency seems to be the same 
between state-owned and private oil companies, technical efficiency is 35% 
lower in state-owned oil companies. Some of the limitations of their study 
include the following. Firstly, the input-output variables are highly 
aggregated. For example, the use of total revenue as an output variable may 
be flawed considering the differences in taxes across countries. This 
limitation will be addressed in this study by considering not only the revenue 
figures but also the actual output produced.
Secondly, the definition of control variables such as integration and 
multinationality ratios are very ‘crude’; an issue acknowledged by Wolf and 
Pollitt (2008). Nonetheless, their seminal work is very important being the 
first empirical work in the oil and gas industry that specifically examined 
performance differentials between private and state-owned oil and gas 
companies.
Although this study is similar to Al-Obaidan and Scully’s (1991) in
investigating ownership effect on the performance of oil and gas companies,
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it differs from theirs based on the methodology adopted. While Al-Obaidan 
and Scully (1991) adopted a cross-sectional data analysis this study uses a 
panel data analysis; as panel data provides a more comprehensive picture of 
the performance differentials based on different ownership status over a 
period of time (Wolf, 2009).
Another important difference between this study and that of Al-Obaidan and 
Scully’s (1991) is the focus of analysis. While Al-Obaidan and Scully (1991) 
excluded companies that are not vertically integrated21 from their analysis, 
such companies are the subject of this study. Al-Obaidan and Scully argue 
that the efficiency of companies that engage in upstream activities is mainly 
determined by geographical factors rather than the ownership structures of 
the companies.
Acknowledging the differences in geographical factors across countries 
which makes Al-Obaidan and Scully’s (1991) argument relatively valid in the 
context of their work, this study argues that investigating the effect of 
ownership structure may be more appropriate in determining performance 
differentials of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria; 
considering the fact that geographical factors affecting the operations of 
these companies are relatively similar in Nigeria.
21 These are upstream oil companies that engage only in exploration, development, and production o f  
crude oil, without engaging in any refining activity. It is important to note here that this is one o f the 
control variables that this study considers as one o f the limitations o f their work.
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Similarly, Al-Mazeedi (1992) argued that the private oil companies may be 
more efficient than their state-owned22 counterparts because the strength of 
the private oil companies lies not only in their financial assets but also their 
managerial and technical expertise that is based on merit, and their cutting- 
edge technology that is an output of their continuous research and 
development. On the other hand, the state-owned oil companies may be less 
efficient due to the tendency of pursuing political rather than commercial 
objectives, absence of stock market control mechanisms, and lack of 
managerial and technical expertise.
Hence, Al-Mazeedi argues that if the state-owned oil companies in the 
Persian Golf were to be privatised the benefits accruable will not only make 
the companies more efficient but the oil and gas industry in the region will 
embark on the transformation to growth and prosperity. Consequently, the 
security of oil supply will be enhanced, which will in turn foster a harmonious 
relationship between the oil exporting and importing nations.
Although this may be considered as an indirect benefit of privatising the 
state-owned oil companies, Al-Mazeedi opined that the efficiency of the 
companies will be greatly enhanced due to inflow of foreign managerial 
expertise and technical know-how, and the inflow of foreign funds that will
22 State-owned and NOCs are used interchangeably
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facilitate the downstream integration. Thus, this study differs from Al- 
Mazeedi’s because it aims to empirically compare performance differentials 
between the jointly-owned and privately-owned oil companies, rather than 
the effect of ownership change, from state to private, on companies’ 
performance, as was the hallmark of Al-Mazeedi’s analysis that may be 
considered too anecdotal for performance differential analysis between 
jointly-owned and privately-owned oil companies.
Alalade (2004) conducted the first empirical study on financial performance 
measures of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria, using 
the actual data23 on cost of operation from the oil and gas companies not 
projected data; as before “there has not been any other such research on 
Nigeria, based on actual figures” due to sensitive nature of the data and 
opaqueness of the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Alalade, 2004, p. 132).
Using a financial regression modeling on a dataset of upstream oil and gas 
companies, Alalade (2004) investigated the effect of government control 
mechanisms used on unit cost of production and gross margin of upstream 
oil and gas companies operating under either a JVC or PSC. These control 
mechanisms include the fiscal instruments (royalty and taxes) and contract 
type (JVC or PSC).
See methodology chapter for an in-depth analysis on this ‘actual data’
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Contrary to the findings of other studies (see for example Al-Obaidan and 
Scully, 1991; Al-Mazeedi, 1992; Victor, 2007; Hartley and Medlock, 2008; 
Wolf and Pollitt, 2008; Wolf, 2009; Eller et al, 2011) that document efficient 
operation by the private oil companies, Alalade (2004) documented that the 
PSCs are not significantly more efficient than the JVCs. Reaffirming 
Alalade’s (2004) view, Adam (2014, p. 288) stated that "... the increasing 
usage of the PSC arrangement is mainly to overcome the problem of 
inadequate cash calling (sic), otherwise the JV evidently generates more 
revenue to government”. It is important to note here that the majority stake­
holding of government in the JVCs does not make the JVCs state-owned. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the findings of Alalade (2004) differ from 
other studies that examined slightly different type of ownership24.
This study builds on the contribution made by Alalade (2004), by 
investigating the effect of government control on the productive efficiency 
and profitability of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria, 
but using a more robust method of analysis, that is panel data analysis that 
captures the inherent heterogeneity of the two types of companies, i.e. JVCs 
and non-JVCs.
24 State-owned oil companies differ from the JVCs based on the extent o f stake-holding. While the 
state may hold a majority stake in the JVCs, the state-owned oil companies are owned solely by 
government.
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Similarly, Victor (2007) used Energy Intelligence’s Top 100 data for the 
period 1999-2004 and analysed efficiency differentials between the state- 
owned and private oil companies. Victor (2007) considered the accumulation 
of oil reserves and the extraction of such reserves as the non-financial 
performance measures on the one hand, and revenue per employee and 
return on assets ratios on the other.
Victor (2007) concluded that state-owned oil companies are less efficient 
than their private counterparts; she attributes their inefficiencies to the 
following factors. First of all, despite owning a much higher volume of oil 
reserves, the state-owned oil companies extract their oil reserves far less 
efficiently than their private counterparts. Hence, the private oil companies 
are ‘nearly one-third better’ at converting oil reserves into output.
Secondly, the state-owned oil companies are less efficient due to excessive 
government control that does not only limit their ability in converting oil 
reserves into output but also generates less revenue from their output. This 
inefficiency, Victor (2007) argues, is associated with factors such as slower 
depletion policy by states, poor investment strategy adopted by the states, 
and domestic market obligations regarding employment and subsidies for 
domestic sales.
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This study is similar to Victor’s research on investigating performance 
differentials in terms of productive efficiency and revenue generation, but it 
differs from Victor’s by adopting a more robust panel data analysis than the 
application of a simple regression analysis, used by Victor (2007), which 
may not provide robust results.
Further, using a dataset of 28 NOCs, Wolf and Pollitt (2008) investigated the 
effect of ownership change on the performance of such NOCs. Their findings 
indicate a significant performance improvement on return on sales by 3.6%, 
total output by 40%, and capital expenditure by 47% and a decrease in 
employment intensity by 35%.
However, it is important to note here that such performance improvements 
occurred in anticipation of ownership change. Hence, “details of residual 
government ownership... provide little incremental explanatory power for firm 
performance, except for employment intensity” (Wolf and Pollitt, 2008, p. 2). 
Therefore, the performance of partially privatised state-owned companies 
can be enhanced without government necessarily relinquishing its control 
over the oil companies. This issue is similar to the joint operation 
arrangements between the state and the private oil companies.
Furthermore, using a panel-data regression analysis covering the period 
1987-2006, Wolf (2009) investigated whether there were performance
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differentials, in terms of output efficiency and profitability, between NOCs 
and lOCs. Wolf reported systematic performance differentials between 
NOCs and lOCs, with the NOCs under-performing the lOCs in terms of 
output efficiency and profitability. This study builds on W olfs work, i.e. by 
adopting a panel data analysis to investigate output efficiency and 
profitability of oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria.
Although the methodology adopted, in this study, is similar to that of Wolfs, 
the context of analysis differs significantly. While Wolf used an international 
dataset, this study focuses specifically on the JVCs’ and non-JVCs’ 
operation in Nigeria. In essence, this may provide a much more detailed 
analysis on what obtains in a particular country with relatively similar 
operational and environmental factors that may have direct effect on the 
companies’ performance.
In order to assess revenue efficiency differentials between the state-owned 
and private oil companies based on theoretical assumptions developed by 
Hartley and Medlock (2008), Eller et al (2011) applied both Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to a 
panel of 78 National Oil Companies (NOCs) and International Oil Companies 
(lOCs) over a period of three years (2002-2004). Findings of their study 
indicate that government ownership reduces efficiency in terms of revenue
per employee and oil reserve. Hence, NOCs are less efficient than the lOCs.
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Therefore, Eller et al. (2011) argue that inefficiency can be attributed to 
differences in structural and institutional characteristics of the oil companies 
which are in line with the companies’ objectives. This point affirms the view 
of Hartley and Medlock (2008) who argued that political influence causes 
NOCs to pursue non-commercial objectives, such as excessive employment, 
underinvestment in oil reserves, and focusing more on the present extraction 
of oil reserves, which ultimately results in inefficient operation of the NOCs.
Another important finding of Eller et al. (2011) indicates that inefficiency may 
be attributed to domestic market obligations (DMOs) on the oil companies 
that determine the quantity of crude oil sold domestically and the price at 
which such is to be sold (ibid.). This study is similar to Eller et al.’s (2011) 
with regard to investigating revenue differentials between oil companies 
having different ownership, with a slight difference on the type of ownership 
being considered. While Eller et al. (2011) considered state-owned vs. 
privately owned oil companies, this study considers joint ventures vs. non­
joint venture companies.
The negative effect of the DMOs on the performance of oil companies 
revealed by Eller et al. (2011) raises an important question in the Nigerian 
context. In Nigeria, for example, from 1999 up until 2003 (when the
alternative funding arrangement was introduced), the price of domestic crude
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sales was determined by the Government. However, from 2003 up to 2011 
the price of domestic crude sales was based on the prevailing market price, 
see Table 5 below:
Table 5: Price of Domestic Crude Oil Sales: 1999 - 2011
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2 0 0 2 -July 2003 18 CDO
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2008 98 E
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2009 62 ’ (D
>
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2010 80 CL
2011 111
Source: (Ribadu, 2012, p. 62)
Considering the variations in the price of domestic crude sales above, an 
important question to be addressed here is to what extent Government
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regulation on domestic crude oil price affects the gross margin of the 
upstream companies?25.
Also, since the domestic crude sale has a direct implication on the oil 
revenue accruable to the Government, it will be interesting to address the 
question as to the extent such Government regulation on domestic crude 
sales affects government oil revenue?26
However, this study differs from Eller et a/.’s (2011) based on the method of 
analysis adopted. While Eller et at. (2011) applied DEA and SFA on a panel 
dataset, this study adopts multivariate regression analysis on a panel 
dataset, the same method used by Wolf (2009). Also, this study differs from 
that of Eller et al.’s (2011) based on the data to be used.
While Eller et al (2011) used input data such as number of employees, oil 
reserves, and natural gas reserves to determine revenue efficiency, this 
study adopts all the variables above except oil reserves which is not 
available (at public domain) on a company-by-company basis in Nigeria. 
Another important difference between this study and Eller et a/.’s (2011) is
25 This is yet another question for future study due to non-availability o f  complete data on the relevant 
variables to be examined
26 Same as 25 above
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that this study investigates both revenue efficiency and productive 
efficiency27.
2.5 Chapter Summary
Considering the intensive capital investment requirement in the upstream 
operation and the lack of correlation between the amounts invested and the 
recoverable reserves, risk-averse behaviour is common among the parties 
involved in the upstream operations. Risk-averse behaviour by either of the 
parties involved in the contract is a major source of conflict between the 
parties (principal and agent).
Other problems in the principal-agent relationship include information 
asymmetry, restrictions on asset ownership, cost of monitoring performance 
and performance measurement issues. Against all these odds, an optimal 
incentive-system induces agents to perform efficiently. Therefore, an oil-rich 
nation (principal) can use an optimal incentive-system to not only mitigate 
the effect of agency problems but also motivate the upstream oil companies 
(agents) to perform efficiently.
The principal-agent theory is employed in the context of this study in order to 
investigate the effect of government ownership on the performance of 
upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria under different 
ownership structure that is the JVCs and non-JVCs. It is hypothesised that
27 A s im ilar  va ria b le  u sed  b y  W o lf  (2 0 0 9 )
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the upstream companies with government stake-holding (JVCs) will perform 
significantly better than the upstream companies that are non-JVCs. This is 
informed by the high-powered incentive-system employed in the JVCs that 
are considered absent in the non-JVCs. The performance metric to be 
considered here is the cost efficiency28 as a proxy for performance.
In line with the Boateng and Glaister’s (2002) argument, this study believes 
that since the oil and gas JVCs in Nigeria were formed because of the 
perennial funding problems (among other things) that have negative effect 
on the upstream companies’ performance, assessing the performance of the 
companies based on output efficiency and profitability may provide the most 
appropriate yardstick to determine how well the objectives of the JVCs are 
achieved.
However, it must be stressed here that the need for funding was not the only 
reason why the JVCs were formed. The need for technology transfer was 
also one of the major reasons for the establishment of the JVCs (Gidado, 
1992). Nonetheless, in line with the aim of this study, the study focuses only 
on the financial indicators (output efficiency and gross margin) and non- 
financial indicators (exploration and development activities).
28
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
IN THE NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the institutional and regulatory framework of the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. First of all, section 3.2 presents the historical 
background on oil exploration in Nigeria; which is followed by a discussion 
on the institutions that made up the oil and gas industry in section 3.3; and 
finally section 3.4 discusses the legislations governing the affairs of the 
industry.
3.2 History of Oil Exploration in Nigeria
Oil exploration activities in Nigeria were pioneered by a German company, 
the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, in 1908. These pioneering activities, 
which ended abruptly in 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War, 
yielded some 16 shallow boreholes and confirmed a line of oil seepage in 
Eastern Dahomey Basin in Okitipupa, Ondo State (Oremade, 1986).
After the First World War, oil prospecting efforts resumed in 1937, when
Shell Petroleum Development Company was awarded the sole
concessionary rights covering the whole Nigeria. Its activities were also
disrupted by the Second World War. After the Second World War, oil
exploration activities by Shell were resumed in 1947. The renewed efforts of
Shell in the exploration activities led to the first commercial discovery in 1956
at Oloibiri, now Bayelsa State (Ariweriokuma, 2009).
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Production of oil in commercial quantity commenced in 1958 at 5,000 barrels 
per day (bpd) and reached 17,000 bpd in 1960 (Oremade, 1986). This 
discovery of oil in commercial quantity opened up the oil industry in 1961, 
bringing in other major players like Mobil, Agip, Safrap (Elf), Tenneco and 
Amoseas (Chevron).
In the 1960s, the aforementioned multinational oil companies, operating 
under a concessionary arrangement, were the ones bearing the entire risk 
and cost of exploration, development, and production activities which in turn 
provided them the title to all crude oil produced. Therefore, the Nigerian 
government was only entitled to oil rents, royalties and taxes from such 
operations.
However, today the mode of operation is different. As since Nigeria joined 
OPEC in 1979, such concessionary arrangements metamorphosed into joint 
venture operations. Also, since the early 1990s, all the new areas of interest 
are being governed by the Production Sharing Contract (PSC), which allows 
NNPC (as the licence holder) to contract with the lOCs who bear the 
exploration and production risks in return for cost oil and part of profit oil. 
Furthermore, one service contract exists in the Nigerian upstream oil and 
gas sector. In a nutshell, the upstream oil and gas sector has experienced 
substantial changes in the way and manner different companies operate 
since the establishment of the sector.
81
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
3.3 Institutional Framework
This section discusses the structure of the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
based on the institutions managing the affairs of the industry. Additionally, 
other stakeholders influencing the activities of the industry are as well 
discussed. The structure of the industry includes: Government Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies handling the affairs of the industry such as: 
NNPC, NAPIMS, NPDC, PPMC, NGC, NLNG29, and the private sector 
companies which involve both the multinational oil companies and 
indigenous companies.
This section is further divided into three sub-sections based on the various 
stakeholders in the industry; these include the stake-holders, the stake- 
keepers, and the stake-watchers. This categorisation of the stakeholders into 
stake-holders, stake-keepers, and stake-watchers is based on Fassin’s 
(2009) The Stakeholder Model Refined’. Fassin’s (2009) model is found to 
be the most appropriate model to discuss the roles of various stakeholders in 
the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Below is the discussion on these various 
stakeholders.
3.3.1 Stake-holders
Stakeholders are the stakeholders that actively participate in the upstream 
oil and gas business; these include the NNPC and its subsidiaries, the
29 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services (NAPIMS), Nigeria Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), Pipelines and Product 
Marketing Company (PPMC), Nigeria Gas Company (NGC), Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG)
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multinational oil companies as well as the indigenous oil companies. The 
aforementioned are the stakeholders that have the real stake in the 
upstream oil and gas industry. This is because such companies invested 
their funds and are fully involved in the day-to-day operations of the industry. 
Discussion on these various stakeholders is provided hereunder.
3.3.1.1 Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
NNPC is a corporation established by law (owned 100% by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria) with a responsibility to the Ministry of Energy for 
participating on behalf of the Nigerian state in the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum reserves, and the processing, import/export and 
sale of the petroleum. The exploration activities of the NNPC are carried out 
by the National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS).
Also, NNPC undertakes commercial operations, in its own right, in the 
upstream through its subsidiary: the Nigerian Petroleum Development 
Company (NPDC); and in the downstream through the Pipeline Products 
and Marketing Company (PPMC) and Nigerian Gas Company (NGC)30.
3.3.1.1.1 National Petroleum Investment Management Services 
(NAPIMS)
NAPIMS in the Exploration and Production (E&P) of the Directorate of NNPC 
is the upstream arm of NNPC that oversees the Government investment in
30 www.nnpcgroiiD.com
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the Joint Venture Companies (JVCs), Production Sharing Companies 
(PSCs) and Services Contract Companies (SCs). NAPIMS is, therefore, set 
up to earn margins arising from investments in the JVCs, PSCs and SCs 
with the multinationals and also protect the nation’s strategic interests in the 
JVCs.
3.3.1.1.2 Nigeria Petroleum Development Company (NPDC)
NPDC was established in 1988 as a wholly owned subsidiary of the NNPC 
with responsibility for Petroleum Exploration and Production activities. These 
activities cover the entire range of the upstream oil and gas business.
NPDC aims to be Nigeria’s leading E&P company with significant global 
presence and applying the best industry practices and technologies in the 
Nigerian context. The success story recorded by NPDC includes the 
following:
- Involved in 28 concessions (21 OMLs & 7 OPLs)
- 100% ownership of 5 blocks: OMLs 64, 65, 66, 111 & 119
- 55% equity in 8 blocks: OMLs 4, 26, 30, 34, 38, 40, 41 & 42
- 60% participatory interest in 4 blocks: OMLs 60, 61,62 & 63
- Varied interest in 7 deep-water concessions
- Non-equity operations in 3 blocks (selected NNPC JV fields)
- 5th largest producer in the country with about 130,000bopd
- Owns & operates the 7th largest FPSO in Nigeria (FPSO Mystras)
- Commenced total delivery of 450 million standard cubic feet wet gas 
per day (MMSCFD) to the domestic market31.
jI httn://npdc.nnpcgroiip.conVAboutUs/CompanvProfile.asr)\
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The NGC was established in 1988 as one of the 11 subsidiaries of the 
NNPC. NGC is charged with the responsibility of developing an efficient gas 
industry to fully serve Nigeria's energy and industrial feedstock needs 
through an integrated gas pipeline network and also to export natural gas 
and its derivatives to the West African sub-region. Similarly, NGC is 
committed to adding value to natural gas and making it an energy resource 
of first choice for the benefit of different stakeholders32.
The NGC is charged with the responsibility of developing an efficient gas 
industry to fully serve Nigeria’s energy and industrial feedstock needs 
through an integrated gas pipeline network and also to export natural gas 
and its derivatives to the West African Sub-region. NGC gathers, treats, 
transmit and markets Nigeria’s natural gas and its by-products to major 
industrial and utility gas distribution companies in Nigeria and neighbouring 
countries33.
3.3.1.2 Joint Venture Companies (JVCs)
NNPC operates six Joint Ventures (SPDC JV, CNL JV, TEPNG JV, MPNU 
JV, NAOC JV and POOC JV). The JVs operate according to the Joint 
Operating Agreement (JOA) governing each and every JV; these include the 
following:
3.3.1.1.3 Nigeria Gas Company (NGC)
3“ httn://\v\v\v.nnpcerouD.com/NNPCBiisiness/Siibsidiaries/NGC.aspx
33 NE1TI (2012)
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- One of the JV partners is designated as the operator of the venture 
(normally the lOCs)
- All parties to the venture share in the cost of operations (agreed 
annually and financed through cash calls or billing system)
- Each partner lifts and separately disposes its interest share of 
production subject to the payment of Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) and 
Royalty.
3.3.1.3 Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs)
These are the companies that entered into agreements with the NNPC on oil 
explorations; these companies are normally referred to as the contractors. 
The Contractors bear all the costs and the risks of development. The 
produced oil is shared between the NNPC and a particular Contractor to 
cover Royalty, Production Costs (including capital) and PPT. The remaining 
profit oil is also shared.
However, it is important to note here that the PSCs do not cover the 
exploitation of gas, except to state that where gas is discovered in 
commercial quantities, a separate Gas Development Agreement is to be 
agreed between NNPC and the respective investors34.
34 NEITI (2012)
86
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
3.3.1.4 Service Companies (SCs)
The lOCs are paid for the services they rendered. Under this type of 
contract, the ownership of oil remains with the states and the lOCs bear all 
the risks associated with their services. In Nigeria, for example, the only SC 
in operation is Agip Energy and Natural Resources Ltd (AENR).
3.3.1.5 Marginal Field Operators (MFOs)
The lOCs operate in partnership with NNPC under JVCs, PSCs or SC. 
Others, especially the indigenous oil companies, operate in partnership with 
international companies under sole risk operations or as independents in a 
marginal oil field35. A marginal oil field is normally an abandoned oil field that 
is considered unprofitable by the lOCs (Ariweriokuma, 2009).
The following are some of the indigenous companies participating in the 
upstream oil and gas sector as marginal oil field operators in Nigeria:
- Amni International
- Atlas Petroleum
- Brass Exploration Unlimited
- CAMAC
- Cavendish
- Conoil Producing/ Continental Oil and Gas
- Dubri
- Express Petroleum
- Moni Pulo
- Midwestern Oil & Gas
- Niger Delta Petroleum Resources
- Newcross Petroleum
- Platform Petroleum
- Shebah Exploration and Production Co Ltd
- Waltersmith Petroleum.
35 littn://\v\v\v.nnpc<iroiin.com^NNPCBiisiness/UnstreamVentiires/OilProdiiction.asp\
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3.3.2 Stake-keepers
Stake-keepers are the regulators in the upstream oil and gas sector in 
Nigeria. Their influence and control on the real stake-holders is far-reaching 
and monumental on the operations of the industry, because "... they exert a 
coercive power through laws, norms and codes, and control mechanisms” 
(Fassin, 2009, p. 123).
It is important to state here that Government is the generic stake-keeper in 
the Nigerian upstream oil and gas sector. Below are the relevant 
Government agencies that are saddled with the responsibility of regulating 
the affairs of the oil and gas industry in general and the upstream oil and gas 
sector in particular.
3.3.2.1 Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR)
The Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) has the mandate to initiate 
policies for the oil and gas sector and supervise the implementation of 
approved policies. The Ministry has a technical Department of Petroleum 
Resources that undertakes the regulation of the oil and gas sector. The 
Agencies and Parastatals under the supervision of the Ministry also ensure 
the execution of the approved policies for the sector. The Ministry has four 
service departments of Planning Research and Statistics, Finance and 
Accounts, Human Resources Management and Procurement.
The Departments and Agencies are as follows:
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- The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) -  this is the technical 
department of the Ministry that regulates and monitors activities of the 
oil and gas industry (see 3.3.2.2 below for details).
- The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) -  this is a 
parastatal of the Ministry that undertakes the commercial ventures in 
the petroleum industry on behalf of the Federal Government (see
3.3.1.1 above).
- The Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) -  this is a parastatal of the 
Ministry that undertakes human capacity development for the Nigeria 
Petroleum industry.
- The Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) -  this is a 
parastatal which initiates and coordinates programmes aimed at 
developing petroleum technology in Nigeria.
- The Petroleum Equalization Fund (PEF) -  this is a fund that oversees 
petroleum bridging activities.
- The Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) -  this is an agency 
of ministry that regulates and monitors all activities involving 
development and use of nuclear tools and radioactive materials.
- The Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPRA) -  
this is an agency of Government responsible for fixing the benchmark 
prices of petroleum products and regulating and monitoring the 
transportation and distribution of petroleum products in Nigeria.
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- The Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board -  this is an 
agency of the Ministry that regulates and monitors the implementation 
of Nigerian content in all activities of the petroleum industry36.
3.3.2.2 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)
DPR is responsible for the supervision of all petroleum industry operations 
being carried out under licences and leases in Nigeria; so as to ensure 
adherence to petroleum policy. This includes processing all applications for 
licences, monitoring the timeliness and adequacy of all rent and royalty 
payments and maintaining records on the operations of the industry; 
particularly those relating to petroleum reserves, technical viability of 
production and export of crude oil, gas and condensate, licences and 
leases37.
Some of the specific functions of the DPR include the following:
- Regulate upstream oil and gas activities
- Conserve Nigeria’s oil and gas reserves
- Maximise Government’s take in the oil and gas activities
- Ensure compliance with the laid-down health, safety and 
environmental standards
- Maintain and administer the National Data Repository
- Administer oil and gas acreages and concessions
36 httn://\v\v\v.nigeria.Qov.ng/2012-10-29-11 -06-51 /executive-branch/104-federal-m inistrv-of- 
petroleiim-resources/184-ministrv-of-netroleiim-resources?start=1
37 w w w .dprnigeria.com
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Implement Government policies on upstream oil and gas activities38.
3.3.2.3 Federal Inland Revenue Service Board (FIRS)
Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act No. 13 of 2007 formally 
established the FIRS to control and administer the different taxes and laws 
specified in the First Schedule or other laws made from time to time by the 
National Assembly or other regulations made hereunder by the Government 
of the Federation and to account for all taxes collected39.
Therefore, the FIRS is responsible for the collection and assessment of, and 
the accounting for, revenues accruable to the Government from the 
upstream oil and gas activities.
3.3.2.4 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
The CBN Act of 2007 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria charges the Bank 
with the overall control and administration of the monetary and financial 
sector policies of the Federal Government of Nigeria. The main objects of 
the CBN are as follows:
- To ensure monetary and price stability;
- To issue legal tender currency in Nigeria;
- To maintain external reserves to safeguard the international value of 
the legal tender currency;
- To promote a sound financial system in Nigeria; and
j8 http://dnr.gov.ng/index/dpr-operations/uDstream-regulation/roles-of-dpr-iinstream/
39 http://\v\v\v.firs.gov.ng/aboutus/Pages/What-FlRS-Does.aspx
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- To act as Banker and provide economic and financial advice to the 
Federal Government40.
Consequently, CBN keeps all the oil proceeds accruable to the Government.
3.3.2.5 Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF)
The Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF) was 
established under civil services re-organization Decree No. 43 of 1988.
The Office is headed by Accountant-General of the Federation who is the 
chief accounting officer for the receipts and payments of account of the 
federation41.
OAGF is responsible for the overall management of all receipt and payments 
of the Federal of the Republic of Nigeria; including proceeds from the oil and 
gas industry. Therefore, the office is responsible for the information on: 
Domestic Crude Oil Sales proceeds, Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT), Royalty, 
Signature Bonus, Withholding Tax, Value Added Tax (VAT), Education Tax, 
Company Income Tax and contributions to NDDC42. Other specific functions 
of the office include the following:
- Supervision of the accounts of Federal Ministries and Extra-Ministerial 
department;
40 httn://\v\v\v.cenbank.org/AboutCBN/
41 http://oagf.gov.ng/about-us/
42 www.oagfnig.org
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- Collate, present and publish statutory financial statements of account 
required by the Minister of finance;
- Manage federal Government Investments;
- Maintain and operate the federation account;
- Maintain and operate the accounts of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund, Department Fund, Contingencies Fund and other public funds 
and provides cash backing for the operation of the federal 
Government;
- Conduct routine and in-depth inspection of the books of accounts of 
Federal Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Department to ensure 
compliance with rules, regulations, policies, and Internal Audit Guides;
- Investigates cases of fraud, loss of funds, assets and store items and 
other financial malpractices in Ministries/Extra-Ministerial department;
- Provides financial regulations and issues Treasury Circulars to 
Federal Ministries/Extra -  Ministerial Departments to ensure that 
there are adequate systems in public funds and for the co-ordination 
of the collection and disbursement of public funds and for the co­
ordination of accounting systems;
- Ensures Revenue Monitoring and accounting;
- Issues officially approved forms bearing Treasury Numbers for use in 
all Federal Ministries to ensure uniformity;
- Formulate the accounting policies of the Federal Government;
- Loans servicing and public debt management;
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The office also manages all the Federal Pay Offices (FPOs) in the 36 states 
of the Federation. The office has six offices, one in each of geopolitical 
zones of the country coordinating the activities of the Federal Pay Offices in 
the zone.
3.3.3 Stake-watchers
Stake-watchers keep an eye on the industry operations in general. They 
serve as monitors of the industry operations. These stake-watchers cut- 
across different sectors of the Nigerian institutions; these include the various 
institutions that look after the stake of the real stakeholders (shareholders for 
example) with utmost scrutiny like the auditors, NEITI, the national 
assembly, including the pressure groups such as the trade unions and 
activists.
3.3.3.1 Auditor General of the Federation (AGF)
The Office of the Auditor-General for the Federation operates within the 
framework of the Nigerian Constitution. In carrying out its functions, the 
Office has eight Departments namely:
Ministerial Audit Department, Extra-Ministerial Audit Department, Revenue 
Audit Department, Project audit Department, Treasury Audit Department, 
Finance and Accounts Department, Administration and Human Resources 
Management Department, and Public Procurement Department43.
43 http://\v\v\v.oaimf.»ov.ng/structure.html
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The Revenue Department was established primarily to ensure:
- Timely collection of revenue due to the Government.
- That amounts due are actually collected.
- That what is collected is properly accounted for in accordance with 
financial regulations and other extant rules.
In order to achieve these objectives the following divisions were created.
NOGRA1: for the audit of Non-Oil and Gas revenue in the Federal Capital 
Territory and Northern states of the Federation and FIRS headquarters and 
Tax Offices.
NOGRA2: for the audit of Non-Oil and Gas revenue in Lagos and the 
Southern States of the Federation and FIRS Area Tax Offices. 
OGRA: audit of Oil and Gas revenue throughout the Federation.
From the foregoing, we can see that it is the OGRA that carries the audit of 
the oil and gas industry.
3.3.3.2 Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) is an 
Agency charged with the responsibility, among other things, for the 
development of a framework for transparency and accountability in the 
reporting and disclosure by all extractive industry companies (including oil
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and gas companies) of revenues due to or paid to the Government of
Nigeria.
The objectives of NEITI are as follows:
- Ensure due process, transparency and accountability in the payment 
made by extractive industry companies;
- Ensure due process, transparency and accountability in the revenue 
receipts of the Federal Government from extractive industry 
companies;
- Ensure accountability and transparency and the prudent management 
of the revenue accruing from oil, gas and mining payments;
- Ensure that all payments due to the Federal Government from 
extractive industry companies including taxes, royalties, dividends, 
penalties, levies are duly paid44.
3.3.3.3 National Assembly Committees on Upstream Oil and Gas Sector
National assembly is saddled with the responsibility of law-making function.
The national assembly has two separate units, which is the Senate and the
House of representatives.
The Senate Committee on Upstream Oil and Gas Sector
44 http://neiti.org.nq/index.php?q=paqes/secretariat
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Order XIII 98 rule (54) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 as amended 
states that there shall be a Committee to be known as Committee on 
Petroleum Resources appointed at the commencement of the life of the 
Senate; the jurisdiction of the committee shall include the followings:
- Exploration of hydrocarbons generally;
- Petroleum and petrochemicals;
- Energy conventions;
- Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR);
- Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC);
- Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NNRA);
- Petroleum Training Institute (PTI);
- Oil block allocation;
- Consideration and appropriation of Annual budget estimates of 
related institutions45.
The House of Representatives Committee on Upstream Oil and Gas 
Sector
Order XVII Rule B. 55 (1) of the House Standing Order 2007 states that 
there shall be a committee to be known as Committee on Petroleum 
Resources of not more than 40 Members appointed at the commencement 
of the life of the House. The Committee’s jurisdiction shall cover the 
following:
45 http://www.nassniq.orq/nass/committees.php?id=56
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- Oversight over the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the NNPC 
upstream activities;
- Oil exploration and exploitation;
- Energy conservation;
- Crude oil marketing and revenue therefrom;
- Matters relating to upstream petroleum sector generally except as 
may be assigned to other committee;
- Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF);
- National Petroleum Investment management Services (NAPIMS);
- Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC);
- Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR);
- Oversight the board implication of NEITI;
- National Engineering and Technical Company (NETCO);
In conference with relevant Committee(s) examine and scrutinize the annual 
budget estimates of the NNPC and its subsidiaries and present same to the 
Flouse for consideration and approval46.
3.3.3.4 Trade Unions
The trade unions here include the various labour unions (both senior staff 
and junior staff) that are guarding the stake of their members in the oil and
46 http://www.nassniq.orq/nass2/committees.php?id=50
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gas industry. In Nigeria, for example, there are two major trade unions in the 
oil and gas industry which are PENGASSAN and NUPENG.
PENGASSAN
PENGASSAN is the acronyms for Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff 
Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) and it is one of the registered Senior 
Staff Associations in Nigeria. As a Trade Union, her members are Organised 
among Senior Staff in the temporary and regular employment in the Nigeria 
Oil and Gas Sector. Its key objectives include the following:
- To safeguard and protect the jobs of its members
- To ensure a safe and healthy working environment for its members
- To improve the terms and conditions of employment of its members
- To support and promote legislation in the interest of its members in 
particular, and Nigeria in general.
To render assistance to other trade union organizations in the spirit of 
cooperation and solidarity.
NUPENG
Another strong trade union in the Nigerian oil and gas industry is the 
NUPENG. The Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers 
(NUPENG) is one of the trade unions that are affiliated to the Nigeria Labour 
Congress. It aims at organising, protecting, promoting and defending the
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socio-economic and political interest of the oil and gas workers in Nigeria. Its 
objectives are as follows:
- To ensure the complete unionization of all workers employed in the 
petroleum and gas industry.
- To regulate the relations and settle disputes between members and 
employers and between a member and another.
- To obtain and maintain a just and equitable general conditions of 
service.
- To advance the education and training of members.
- To provide benefits and other assistance as provided in the 
Constitution.
- To encourage the participation of members in decision making in the 
undertaking both at industrial and National levels.
- To protect and advance the socio-economic and cultural interest of 
the community and such other objectives as are lawful and are not 
inconsistent with the spirit and practice of trade unionism.
- To promote and encourage International Fraternal relations with 
bodies having the interest of petroleum and Gas Workers.
- To establish and carry on or participate (financial and otherwise) in 
the business of the printing or publishing of a general Newspaper or 
of any other undertaking, industrial or otherwise, in the interest of or
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with the main purpose of furthering the interest of the Union or trade 
unionism generally.
3.3.3.5 Activists
By activists here we mean those who mean good for the industry in general. 
These include the various civil society organisations and the human rights 
organisations. Therefore, the activists envisaged here do not include the 
terrorist groups who are false activists and are uncontrollable in their efforts 
to sabotage the industry operations. Although these terrorist groups consider 
themselves as part of the stakeholders, Fassin (2009, p. 122) argues that 
the “ ...more appropriate term might be ‘stake imposters’”.
It is important to clarify this issue in the Nigerian context. We do not refer to 
the immediate community where oil operation takes place and demand for 
responsible operations as false activists, but we argue here that where such 
activism is criminal in nature such so called activists do not form part of the 
stake-watchers envisage in this study.
3.4 Regulatory Framework
This section discusses the various laws and legislations governing the affairs 
of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. However, it is important to state here 
that the two main laws are the Petroleum Profits Tax Act 1959 and the 
Petroleum Act 1969. Of course there are a myriad of other Acts, Legislations 
and Agreements governing the affairs of the industry, which are discussed
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accordingly. In fact, the main aim of the Petroleum Industry Bill47 is to bring 
together these various Acts and Legislations into a single coherent Law.
Therefore, this section is sub-divided into four. Sub-section 3.4.1 discusses 
the Petroleum Profits Tax 1959; sub-section 3.4.2 discusses the Petroleum 
Act 1969; other Acts and Agreements are discussed in sub-section 3.4.3; 
and finally the Petroleum Industry Bill is discussed in sub-section 3.4.4.
3.4.1 Petroleum Profits Tax Act 1959
Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) is the law governing the assessment of 
companies that are engaged in the upstream oil and gas operations and the 
collection of taxes therefrom. As mentioned in the previous chapter, oil was 
first traded in commercial quantity in 1958; this necessitated the need for a 
law specifically governing the affairs of petroleum operations in Nigeria; 
hence, the enactment of the Petroleum Act in 1959 (as amended 1990).
Below is a brief on the key aspects of the PPT Act 1959 as written by 
Oremade (1986, p. 44). That for any company to qualify for assessment 
under the law, such company must engage in petroleum operations as 
defined in the PPT Act. These operations include the winning or obtaining 
and transportation of petroleum or chargeable oil in Nigeria by or on behalf 
of a company for its own account and all operations incidental thereto and 
any sale of or any disposal of chargeable oil by or on behalf of the company.
47 This bill is currently awaiting the ratification o f the legislative arm o f Government.
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A company is required to be engaged in all the defined activities to qualify, 
and that for example, transportation without winning and sale will not qualify 
a company for this purpose that is the PPT. PPT is being administered by 
the FIRS. The following are some of the roles of FIRS:
- To carry out such acts as may be deemed necessary or expedient for 
the assessment and collection of the tax
- To sue and be sued in the official tax name
- To acquire, hold and dispose of any property taken as security for, or 
in satisfaction of any penalty, tax or judgment debt due from a 
company
It may authorise any person within or outside Nigeria to perform or exercise 
any of its powers or duties or receive any notice or other document to be 
served upon or delivered or given to the Service.
3.4.2 Petroleum Act 1969
“An Act to provide for the exploration of petroleum from the 
territorial waters and the continental shelf of Nigeria and to vest 
the ownership of, and all on-shore and off-shore revenue from 
petroleum resources derivable therefrom in the Federal 
Government and for all other matters incidental there to”48
The above definition of encapsulates the essence of the Petroleum Act 
1969. In the context of our study, two major sections of the Act are 
discussed hereunder.
48 The Petroleum Law 1969, No. 51, Laws o f the Federation o f Nigeria
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3.4.2.1 Oil Exploration Licence, Oil Prospecting Licence & Oil Mining 
Lease
The rights to explore and exploit oil and gas in Nigeria are granted to 
investors by the Minister of petroleum through the Oil Prospecting Licence 
(OPL), which is converted to Oil Mining Lease (OML) once commercial 
quantities of oil are discovered. An OPL or OML is held by NNPC, the 
companies in Joint Venture with the NNPC, or by other companies as sole 
risk operators. See Appendix 13 for the relevant provisions in the Petroleum 
Act 1969.
3.4.3 Other Acts and Agreements
Other Acts aside the 1969 Petroleum Act that were promulgated before and 
after the 1969 Petroleum Act in order to enhance the operations of the sector 
include the following:
Oil Pipeline Act, Land Use Act 1978, Bendel State Land (Amendment) Edict 
No. 12 1978, Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979, Ministry of Lands and 
Housing Directives, Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree 1984, 
The Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations 1963, Oil in Navigable Waters Act 
1968, Income Tax Management Act 1961, Oil Terminal Dues Act 1969, 
Offshore Oil Revenues Act 1971, Offshore Oil Revenues (Registration of 
Grants) Act 1972.
Similarly, in order to provide for fiscal incentives that would encourage the 
upstream oil and gas companies to continue with their operations,
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Government entered into a number of agreements with the relevant 
companies, these agreements and/or memorandum of understanding 
(MOUs) were made in the following years 1971, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1994, 
2000, 2002.
3.4.4 Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 2012
The PIB 2012, that is yet to be passed into law, puts together all the 
aforementioned Acts, legislations, and agreements in the oil and gas 
industry into a much more coherent piece of legislation. As succinctly stated 
by Lukman (2009, p.3) that the PIB is a:
“reform legislation which aims to put in place of the existing 
myriad of legislative and administrative instruments governing 
the petroleum industry one omnibus legislation that establishes 
clear rules, procedures and institutions for the administration of 
the petroleum industry in Nigeria."
The PIB was first introduced in 2009, but as at 2014 the bill is yet to be 
passed into law. The journey of the PIB includes the following: The 
Petroleum Industry Draft Bill 2009 which was overshadowed by politics, the 
Government Memorandum on the PIB 2009, and the Petroleum Industry Bill 
2012 that is now awaiting ratification of the National Assembly.
Some of the major highlights of the bill include the following:
It establishes a robust legal and regulatory framework for the various 
stakeholders (stake-holders, stake-keepers, and stake-watchers) in the 
industry:
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- It establishes a dynamic fiscal regime that is fair to all and sundry;
- It stipulates transparent guidelines of operations for the 
aforementioned stakeholders for enhanced corporate governance;
- It aligns the industry operation to international best practice.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical framework underpinning this 
research. This chapter focuses on the research methodology and methods 
employed in this research.
First of all, it is important to clarify the concepts ‘methodology’ and ‘methods’ 
as the discussion in this chapter centres on them. As Ryan et al. (2002, 
p.36) stated, methodology is “the process of doing research” and methods 
are “the particular techniques used” in a particular research. Similarly, the 
process of doing research and the techniques used in that particular 
research are underpinned by some philosophical assumptions that normally 
differ based on the nature of that research and the views of the researcher 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Consequently, the researcher’s views will either 
implicitly or explicitly influence the types of research questions to be asked, 
the nature of data to be gathered, the kind of methods to be used, and 
ultimately, the process to adopt in carrying out such research (ibid.).
It is, therefore, important to note that the process (methodology) of doing
research is easily delineated when the philosophical assumptions
underpinning such research are clearly identified (Blaikie, 2007). In this
context, Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four distinct but related
assumptions about the nature of social science and society, these include
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ontological, epistemological, human nature, and methodological 
assumptions; these assumptions are discussed in section 4.2. Section 4.3 
discusses the research paradigms model proposed by Burrell and Morgan, 
the criticisms the Burrell and Morgan Model attracts from different quarters, 
the Chua framework (as one of the major critics of the Burrell and Morgan 
Model), the paradigms of accounting research, and the research paradigm 
adopted by the study. Subsequently, research methods (population of the 
study, sample size, nature of data and sources of data, variables used) are 
discussed in section 4.4 Section 4.5 presents summary of the chapter.
4.2 Philosophical Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science and 
Society
“It takes two of us to create a truth, one to utter it and one to
understand it’49
First of all it is important to explain why it is important to start this chapter 
with a discussion on philosophical assumptions; even though the thesis is of 
accounting background not philosophy. Therefore, this section is devoted 
towards addressing this very important issue. As Mitroff and Turoff (1975) 
stated, the underlying foundation of any scientific work, postulation of 
hypothesis or even the development of a theory is unpinned by some 
assumptions.
49 Kahlil Gibran In Mitroff and Turoff (1975, p.l 7)
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However, Mitroff and Turoff (1975) stressed that there is no ‘best’ way of 
conducting research using some specific assumptions. Hence, the 
assumptions of a researcher will largely depend on a particular approach the 
researcher adopts in his inquiry about the truth. Similarly, a researcher’s 
assumptions are shaped and influenced by different factors; these include 
the experience of the researcher in a particular field of life, 
psychophysiological expressions of the researcher, educational level 
attained, and some environmental factors external to the researcher (Blaikie, 
2007; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Deetz, 1996; Turoff, 1975; Willmott, 1993).
In this context, philosophical assumptions, about social science, are 
discussed based on the four different approaches mentioned above (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). These approaches are neatly presented in the 
subjective-objective dimension, as depicts in Table 6 Below.
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Table 6: The Burrell and Morgan Subjective -  objective Dimension
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3) 
4.2.1 Ontological Assumptions
“the mind is but a barren soil; a soil which is soon exhausted, 
and will produce no crop, or only one, unless it be continually 
fertilized and enriched with foreign matter”50
First of all, ontology is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of 
‘being’ and ‘reality’ and the term ‘ontological’ refers to “philosophical 
questions relating to the nature of being and the reality, or otherwise, of 
existence (Somekh, 2011, p. 326). In this context, Burrell and Morgan (1979, 
p.1) stated that ontological assumptions are basically concerned with the "... 
very essence of the phenomena under investigation”, that is the nature of 
reality. Hence, the basic ontological question faced by a researcher is "...
50 Sir Joshua Reynolds in Mitroff and Turoff (1975)
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whether the ‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual ... or the 
product of individual consciousness”.
As succinctly stated by Scheele (1975, p. 37) in Turoff (1975) that the term 
reality is a name “we give our collections of tacit assumptions about what is. 
We bring along these realities to give meaning to our interactions”. Hence, 
the key point to be noted here is that our realities are defined by the 
caricature of interactions in the various aspects of our lives.
As can be seen in Table 7 above, the ontological assumptions, as modelled 
by Burrell and Morgan, can be identified under the subjective-objective 
dimension. This is about the question of whether ‘reality’ subsists within 
individual mind (nominalism) or being a product of an objective nature 
(realism).
Affirming this point, Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 4) stated that:
‘‘the nominalist position revolves around the assumption that 
the social world external to individual cognition is made up of 
nothing more than names, concepts and levels which are used 
to structure reality. The nominalist does not admit to there 
being any ‘real’ structure to the world which these concepts are 
used to describe. ’’
However, the realist point of view about the reality is that “...there is only one 
reality” which is external to the researcher and can be objectively described 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 59), because the reality is made up of real, hard 
and tangible structures (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In this context, Morgan
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and Smircich (1980) provided six ontological assumptions, these 
assumptions are provided in Table 7 below:
Table 7: Morgan and Smircich's Six Ontological Assumptions
Reality as a concrete structure (naive realism)
Reality as concrete process (transcendental realism)
Reality as a contextual field of information (contextual relativism) 
Reality as a symbolic discourse (transcendental idealism [Kant])
Reality as social construction (social constructionism [socially 
mediated idealism])
Reality as a projection of human imagination (idealism [Berkeley])
Source: Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 492)
In the context of Morgan and Smircich’s six ontological assumptions 
provided above, Ryan et at. (2002) opined that the world can be viewed via 
different alternatives ranging from the concrete structure to the projection of 
human imagination. This, in essence, provides us with the instrument of 
viewing reality from the most objective as well as the most subjective points 
of view respectively.
That said, it is now appropriate to discuss the ontological assumptions 
underpinning this research. As the research aims at investigating the effect
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of Government control on the performance of oil and gas companies, and 
considering the research questions focusing on the performance variables 
that can be measured objectively using scientific enquiry approach that is 
independent of the researcher. Hence, the ontological assumptions 
underpinning this study are based on the realist perspective. However, it is 
important to explain the type of realist assumptions underpinning this study, 
as there are six categories of ontological assumptions, i.e. shallow realist, 
conceptual realist, cautious realist, depth realist, idealist, and subtle realist 
(Blaikie, 2010).
This study adopts the cautious realist perspective as it is believed that, as 
humans, it is “impossible” for us to perceive the reality “accurately”, even 
though it is external to us (Blaikie, 2010, p. 15). Therefore, there is the need 
for us, as social scientists, to be cautious about our assumptions considering 
the inherent human imperfections (ibid.).
4.2.2 Epistemological Assumptions
The term ‘Epistemology’ is also a branch of philosophy that is concerned 
with the theory of knowledge and the use of knowledge to know the world 
around us (Jary and Jary, 2000). Hence, an epistemological assumption is 
concerned with the validity of knowledge and what really constitutes an 
acceptable knowledge in a particular field (Bryman and Bell, 2007).
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In this regard, Burrell and Morgan (1979) distinguished between the two 
perspectives via which one can understand the world around him and 
communicate knowledge about it. These, as depicted in Table 7 above, are 
anti-positivism and positivism perspectives, which are along the subjective- 
objective dimension respectively.
Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 2) opined that as a social scientist, a 
researcher needs to address the question as to whether “knowledge is 
something which can be acquired”, that is from the positivist perspective or 
from the anti-positivist perspective as “something which has to be 
experienced”.
Looking at knowledge from the positivist perspective, it is argued that the 
social world can be studied by applying the same principles and by using the 
same procedures as used in the natural science (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In 
this regard, the positivists argue that a researcher can maintain his 
independent position while providing an objective view of the world being 
investigated.
On the other hand, the anti-positivist theorists argue that the principles and 
procedures used in the natural science cannot and should not be used to 
study the social world (ibid.). The argument of the anti-positivists is based on 
the fact that “the subject matter of the social sciences -  people and their
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institutions -  is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences” 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 16). Therefore, the anti-positivist view is that the 
social world “can only be understood from the point of view of the individuals 
who are directly involved in the activities which are to be studied" (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979, p. 5).
As explained under the ontological assumptions, it is important to also 
explain the epistemological assumptions adopted in this study. In this regard, 
considering the research questions focusing on the performance variables 
that can be measured objectively using scientific enquiry approach that is 
independent of the researcher, this study adopts the positivist perspective.
However, a falsification51 approached is considered appropriate here; as it is 
believed to cater for the short-comings associated with the ‘pure’ positivist 
view (Blaikie, 2010). It is important to note here that the falsification 
approach towards investigating the social world is closely associated with 
the cautious realist approach adopted under the ontological assumption 
underpinning this study.
4.2.3 Assumptions about Human Nature
Assumptions here are on human beings and their relationship with their 
environment. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) model, as depicted in
51 This is normally known as a ‘hypothetico-deductive method’ (Blaikie, 2010, p. 21). The 
hypothetico-deductive method is based on theory testing by using available data.
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Table 7 above; there are two approaches to assumptions about human 
nature. These are voluntarism and determinism based on the subjective- 
objective dimension respectively. The voluntarism and determinism are two 
opposing perspectives on the views of human beings in relation to their 
environment; these can be neatly presented in Table 8 below:
Table 8: Assumptions about Human Nature
Vclluni-lMm
(sweJiayn'/igi
(■ cJ rTr) i r'l rYi
(cie^Einv/^f
Humans operate in mechanistic Humans operate in deterministic
environment environment
Humans are product o f their Humans are creators of their
environment environment
Humans are conditioned by their 
environment
Humans control their environment
Humans are marionette in the ir Humans are masters of their
environment environment
Source: (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 2)
The above division on the assumptions about human nature makes out the 
“philosophical debate between the advocates of determinism on one hand 
and voluntarism on the other” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 2). Assumptions 
about humans in this study are made from the objectivist perspective.
4.2.4 Methodological Assum ptions
As explained in section 4.1 above, methodology entails the ‘process’ of 
doing research (Ryan et a/., 2002), which in turn requires logical approach to
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answering research questions raised in the course of literature review 
(Blaikie, 2010). It is important to note here that the aforementioned 
ontological and epistemological assumptions discussed in sections 4.2.1 and
4.2.2 respectively, as well as the assumptions about human nature in section
4.2.3 constitute the foundation for any methodological assumptions about 
any research. In this regard, the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979, p. 3) 
subjective-objective dimension of methodological assumptions are 
discussed.
From the objective standpoint of the methodological assumption, nomothetic 
assumptions are employed by considering that the social world can be 
understood using systematic approach normally used in the natural 
sciences. On the other hand, the subjective methodological approach is 
based upon ideographic assumptions that the social world can best be 
understood by obtaining the “first-hand knowledge of the subject under 
investigation” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 6).
Consistent with the ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted 
above, this study adopts the objectivist approach towards answering the 
research questions raised regarding the effect of Government control on the 
performance of upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, a deductive strategy is used which is consistent with the
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hypotheses developed in chapter two. Therefore, it is important to clearly 
indicate the strategy being adopted within the objectivist approach.
As Blaikie (2010) stated, the natural science involves three major research 
strategies, these include the inductive, deductive and retroductive research 
strategies. These strategies differ fundamentally from one another in terms 
of their ontological and epistemological assumptions, starting points of an 
enquiry, logic of enquiry, use of concepts and theories, styles of explanation, 
and the status of their products, as succinctly stated by Blaikie (2010, p. 56- 
56):
“one involves collecting data and generalizing from them; 
another starts by finding a suitable theory that will provide 
some hypotheses to test; a third searches for underlying causal 
mechanisms. ”
Furthermore, as Blaikie (2010, p. 8) stated, the aim of an inductive strategy 
is to establish a theory to be used as pattern of explanations, it begins with 
the collection of data in order to generate such theory, when the theory is 
produced it is used to explain further observations. On the other hand, the 
aim of the deductive strategy is to test theories so as to eliminate the false 
ones and corroborate the survived ones. Thus, a deductive approach begins 
with the identification of a regularity to be explained, construct a theory and 
deduced some hypotheses, and then tests the hypotheses by matching them 
with data. The retroductive research approach combines elements of both
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the inductive and deductive approaches. Hence, a deductive approach is 
adopted in this study.
4.2.5 Assumptions about the Nature of Society
Burrell and Morgan (1979) stated that assumptions about the nature of 
society can be viewed from the standpoint of the ‘order-conflict’. On one 
hand, the ‘order’ view of the society encompasses stability, integration, 
functional coordination, and consensus. On the other hand, the conflict view 
of the society encompasses change, conflict, disintegration, and coercion.
In this regard, it can be deduced that the ‘order’ view entails explanation 
about the ‘nature of social order and equilibrium’ and the conflict view entails 
explanation about the ‘problems in the social setting’. However, ‘regulation’ 
and ‘radical change’ will be adopted in place of ‘order’ and ‘conflict’ 
respectively (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).
4.2.6 Assumptions Underpinning this Study
As mentioned in section 4.2.1 above, this study adopts the cautious realist 
perspective as it is believed that it is impossible for us to perceive the reality 
accurately, even though it is external to us. Therefore, there is the need for 
us to be cautious about our assumptions on the factors affecting the 
performance of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. 
We are being cautious in the sense that not all factors affecting the
companies’ performance can be accurately captured by our model (s).
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Hence, we can only draw conclusions based on the variables employed in 
our models.
Secondly, as mentioned in section 4.2.2 above, this study adopts a 
falsificationist approach in trying to determine the extent to which 
Government control affects performance of the upstream oil and gas 
companies operating in Nigeria. In this regard, an agency theory is adopted 
in order to test its validity in relation to the control mechanism (ownership in 
JVCs) used by Government (as a principal) and the effect of such control 
mechanism on the performance of the upstream oil and gas companies (as 
agents). Hence, a deductive strategy is adopted in order to test the 
hypotheses developed.
Overall, our assumptions about the factors affecting performance of the 
upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria may not be completely 
accurate. However, considering the nature of the upstream operations in 
Nigeria and the role of Government in such operations, our assumptions 
may be considered relatively realistic and the methodology to be used fairly 
robust.
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4.3 Research Paradigms
The term “paradigm” is defined differently by different people, see for 
example Burrell and Morgan (1979); White (1983); Hopper and Powell 
(1985); Chua (1986); Morgan (1990); Guba and Lincoln (1994); Laughlin 
(1995); Gummesson (1999); Collis and Hussey (2003) and Collis and 
Hussey (2009). For example, Gummesson (1999, p. 16) described research 
paradigm as “the underpinning values and rules that govern the thinking and 
behaviour of researchers”. However, Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 46) defined 
research paradigm as “the process of scientific practice based on people’s 
philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge”.
Nonetheless, despite the differing views on what constitute research 
paradigm, what is common in all the views is that research paradigm 
provides a researcher with a framework for better understanding of the 
problem that is being investigated. The aforementioned studies attempted to 
develop a reliable classification of a research paradigm that can be used in 
social sciences. However, the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model is 
considered the most comprehensive in the world of social sciences research 
(Morgan, 1990 and White, 1983). Thus, the next section discusses the 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model in detail.
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed a two-by-two matrix depicting their four 
research paradigms. These paradigms cut across the assumptions about the 
nature of social science on one hand and the nature of society on the other. 
Table 9 below depicts the horizontal axis representing subjective-objective 
dimension and the vertical axis representing the regulation-radical change 
dimension.
Table 9: Burrell and Morgan Research Paradigms Matrix 
The Sociology of Radical Change
4.3.1 The Burrell and Morgan Research Paradigms
| Radical Radical
0>£5 Humanist Structuralist
0>
O0
•4->
o0
■Q
3
CO
Interpretive Functionalist S '
O
The Sociology of Regulation
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22)
These paradigms are referred to as functionalist, interpretive, radical 
humanist, and radical structuralist. It is important to note here that the 
dichotomous nature of these paradigms is what makes the Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979) model not only unique but also generated a lot of criticisms 
(discussed in section 4.3.2. below). These paradigms are discussed in detail 
below.
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4.3.1.1 Functionalist Paradigm
This paradigm involves realist ontology, a positivist epistemology, a 
deterministic model of human nature, and a nomothetic methodology. 
Theorists belonging to the functionalist paradigm adopt methods of analysis 
that are normally used in the natural sciences. This is because such 
theorists believe that our social world is concrete and relationships within its 
constituents can be identified and analysed using models commonly used in 
the natural science.
This view has been reaffirmed by the Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 25) that 
"... the social world is composed of relatively concrete artefacts and 
relationships which can be identified, studied and measured through 
approaches derived from natural sciences”. It is important to note here that, 
this paradigm dominates accounting and finance research (see for example 
Chua, 1986; Hopper and Powell, 1995; Ryan etal., 2002).
4.3.1.2 Interpretive Paradigm
This paradigm involves a subjectivist point of view about the society and 
social science. It adopts a nominalist ontology, an anti-positivist 
epistemology, a voluntarist model of human nature and an ideographic 
methodology. This paradigm provides explanation on the status quo of the 
society and its constituents. As Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 28) aptly stated 
that this paradigm is adopted in order to "... understand the world as it is...”
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Hence, theorists using this paradigm are only interested in investigating and 
understanding their social world without any attempt to change it. In doing 
so, a theory is developed based on the understanding of the problem being 
investigated via an interaction between the researcher and the subjects of 
the researcher.
4.3.1.3 Radical Humanist Paradigm
This paradigm adopts nominalist ontology, an anti-positivist epistemology, a 
voluntarism model of human nature and an ideographic methodology on the 
one hand, and radical change, modes of domination and potentiality on the 
other hand. We can see that this paradigm shares the aforementioned 
assumptions with the interpretive paradigm based on the subjective view 
about the social science.
4.3.1.4 Radical Structuralist Paradigm
This paradigm adopts realist ontology, a positivist epistemology, a 
deterministic view of human nature, and a nomothetic methodology. This 
paradigm shares its assumptions with that of the functionalist of paradigm 
regarding the social science. On the other hand, it concerns itself with 
developing a society from the radical perspective via a “... radical change, 
emancipation, potentiality, structural conflict, modes of domination and 
deprivation” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 34).
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4.3.2 Critique on Burrell and Morgan Model
Despite the prominence the Burrell and Morgan (1979) model gained in the 
world of social science research (see for example Ryan et al., 2002 and 
Chua, 1986), the model has generated a myriad of academic debate based 
on the criticisms it generated. This is because Burrell and Morgan (1979, 
p.67) argued that the aforementioned paradigms are alternatives to one 
another; that is "... one cannot operate in more than one paradigm at any 
given point in time since in accepting the assumptions of one, we defy the 
assumptions of all the others”.
Hence, such paradigms are mutually exclusive; an issue that formed the 
basis for the criticisms attracted by their model, despite being very important 
in methodological assumptions underpinning research in accounting and 
finance (see for example Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Laughling, 
1995; Ryan et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2009).
The model has been criticised on a number of grounds by different 
researchers, see for example Hopper and Powell (1985); Chua (1986) and 
Laughlin (1995). These criticisms are discussed hereunder. In this context, 
Hopper and Powell (1985) argued that the Burrell and Morgan model only 
dealt with the subjective-objective dimension of social science, which is not 
the only aspect researchers consider while conducting a research.
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Similarly, Chua criticised the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model based on 
the following reasons. Firstly, their use of ‘mutually exclusive’ dichotomy on 
their paradigms makes it impossible for a researcher to adopt two or more 
research paradigms at a time. Secondly, they wrongly misinterpreted Kuhn’s 
argument as advocating irrational paradigm choice. Thirdly their 
encouragement of latent relativism of truth and reason; and lastly, their 
model is not very clear about the difference between the ‘radical structuralist’ 
and ‘radical humanist’ paradigms.
Consequently, Chua developed the model of methodological assumptions in 
accounting and finance research which is categorised into beliefs about 
knowledge, beliefs about physical and social reality, and relationship 
between theory and practice, these assumptions are presented in Table 10 
below:
Table 10: Chua’s Classification of Methodological Assumptions
____________Bgrrgla Acreiiji Krrciy;fcctcj£___________
______________ Epistemological__________________________________
______________ Methodological___________________________________
_B____________Beliefs About Physical and Social Reality_________________
______________ Ontology________________________________________
______________ Human Intention and Rationality____________________
______________ Social Order/Conflict______________________________
_C____________Relationship Between Theory and Practice________________
Source: Chua (1986, p. 604)
127
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
Assumptions about knowledge are categorised into two: epistemological and 
methodological. Chua (1986, p 604) stated that epistemological assumptions 
are assumptions about decision on "... what is to count as acceptable truth 
by specifying the criteria and process of assessing truth claims.”
On the other hand, the methodological assumptions are concerned with "... 
the research methods (that are) deemed appropriate for the gathering of 
valid evidence" to be used in a particular research. Secondly, assumptions 
about the physical and social reality are based on the assumption that reality 
exists ‘independent’ of the researcher. Lastly, assumptions about theory and 
practice are based on the relationship between the knowledge and the ‘truth’ 
about the empirical world.
Consequently, Chua’s assumptions are considered to be assumptions about 
the conventional accounting that are interpretive in nature and critical by 
substance. In a nutshell, while the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model argues 
for mutual exclusiveness amongst the four research paradigms, Chua’s 
(1986) model argues for establishing and assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of such ‘alternative’ assumptions in the context of conventional 
accounting and finance research. This is particularly important in accounting 
research as aptly stated by Ryan (2012) that an interesting aspect of 
accounting research is that it cuts across many ‘boundaries’. Hence the
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need for us to consider the paradigms normally used in accounting research, 
an issue discussed hereunder.
4.3.3 Paradigms used in Accounting Research
As argued by Ryan et al. (2002) that accounting research cuts across many 
boundaries, understanding and appropriately using the right paradigms will 
go a long way in developing good accounting theories. For example, Hopper 
and Powell (1985) viewed that accounting theories can be classified, by 
using the aforementioned Burrell and Morgan model, into three; that is the 
mainstream accounting research, the interpretive accounting research, and 
the critical accounting research. The Hopper and Powell’s (1985) 
categorisation is provided in Figure 1 below.
First of all, in the context of Burrell and Morgan’s model, the functionalist 
research paradigm in the Hopper and Powell’s categorisation is argued to be 
consistent with the mainstream accounting research (Hopper and Powell, 
1985; Chua, 1986; Ryan et al., 2002). For example, adopting a particular 
theory to test hypotheses is in line with the positivist epistemological 
assumptions based on the methods commonly used in the natural sciences.
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Secondly, the interpretive accounting research paradigm adopts a different 
approach to accounting research than the functionalist approach. This 
approach is adopted from the Burrell and Morgan’s model in order to have a 
good understanding of the ‘social nature of accounting’ problem under 
investigation based on the human behaviour that is believed to be behind the 
actions of human beings (Ryan et al. 2002).
Thirdly, the critical accounting research paradigm encompasses both the 
radical humanist and radical structuralist under the Burrell and Morgan’s 
(1979) model. Hence, Hopper and Powell (1985) argue that the 
shortcomings associated with the subjective-objective dimensions in the
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Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model are adequately taken-care of. Under the 
critical accounting research paradigm, researchers consider acquisition of 
knowledge via qualitative enquiry - similar to that of the interpretive paradigm 
(Hannah, 2003).
In a nutshell, while section 4.3.1 above considers the critics of the Burrell 
and Morgan’s (1979) model on the possible research paradigms to be 
adopted by a researcher in a particular research, and the research 
paradigms used in accounting research, discussed in section 4.3.2 above, 
the bottom-line is adopting the most appropriate paradigm in the context of 
one’s research. Hence, the next section discusses the paradigm adopted by 
this study.
4.3.4 Research Paradigm Adopted by this Study
The discussions above focused on the different research paradigms a 
researcher can adopt in his or her research, which was mainly based on the 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model. Subsequently, critics of the Burrell and 
Morgan’s model were discussed, and finally the research paradigms used in 
accounting research were also discussed. Therefore, this section discusses 
the research paradigm adopted in this study.
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In particular, this study adopts functionalist research paradigm which falls 
within the objectivist dimension and the sociology of regulation that is based 
on both the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) model and the Hopper and Powell’s 
(1985) taxonomy of accounting research.
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4.4 Research Methods
Quantitative research approach is adopted for the purpose of collecting and 
analysing data in this study. The quantitative method is argued to be more 
scientific than the qualitative method in conducting research that involves 
establishing a relationship between variables or measurement of effect of 
one variable on another (Sheila, 2009). As aptly stated by Sheila (2009, p. 
12) that quantitative method involves “statistical and numerical measurement 
of the raw data ... the results can be used as a benchmark ... and ... can be 
compared”. On the other hand, the qualitative research approach is argued 
to be a more useful way of understanding the views, experiences, and 
perceptions of the researched (Spencer et ai, 2003).
However, considering the nature of this study, that is establishing the effect 
of Government control on the upstream oil and gas companies’ performance, 
quantitative research approach is considered to be more suitable for this 
study. Nonetheless, a qualitative approach may be used in the future (where 
there is access for such) for validation of the findings of this study.
Using a quantitative approach is in line with the hypotheses developed, in 
the context of agency theory, which will be either validated or rejected. 
Details of the research methods such as the population of the study, sample
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size, data and sources of data, variables definition and model specification 
are provided hereunder.
4.4.1 Population of the Study
Companies involved in the upstream operation in Nigeria constitute the 
population of this study, and these companies include both lOCs and 
indigenous oil companies. Based on the NNPC ASB of 2012, there are 31 
upstream oil and gas companies engaged in the exploration and production 
of crude oil (NNPC, 2012, p. 9).
These companies engage in different upstream operations ranging from the 
JV operation, PSC, SC, and marginal field operators. Hence, the upstream 
oil and gas companies that engaged in the exploration and production during 
the period 1999 -2007 formed the population of the study.
4.4.2 Sample Size
Obtaining complete data on all the upstream oil and gas companies 
operating in Nigeria is not feasible; thus, the need for sampling from the 
population. In this regard, a convenience sampling method was adopted 
based on the availability of data from some of the upstream oil and gas 
companies. Hence, the upstream oil and gas companies that operated 
during the period (1999 -  2007) and have complete data on the
aforementioned variables automatically formed part of the sample.
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The sample of the study comprises of 5 JVCs and 3 non-JVCs, i.e. 8, 
making the sample 26% of the total population. It is important to note here 
that this sample (26%) produces more than 80% of the total crude oil 
production. It is important to note here that the identity of the sample is not 
identified in this study due to the sensitive nature of the data analysed.
4.4.3 Sampling Procedure
This study used a non-probability sampling procedure where a convenience 
sampling was used (Krippendorff, 2004). As stated by Leedy and Ormrod 
(2005, p. 206) that a convenience sampling makes no claim of ascertaining a 
“representative subset of the population. It takes ... units that are readily 
available.” Indeed, Leedy and Ormrod’s view explains the reality in the 
context of this study. This is because companies with complete dataset 
required for the purpose of this study were selected to form the sample of 
the study.
4.4.4 Limitations of the Sampling Procedure
Although the sample for the study is representative, i.e. 26% of the sampling 
frame (31 upstream oil and gas companies), some of the limitations 
associated with the sampling procedure can be attributed to non-probability 
process of selecting the companies. Secondly, since not all the upstream oil 
and gas companies had equal chance of being selected, by only considering 
the companies with complete data, automatically prevented some of the
companies from being part of the sample; this raises the issue of being
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biased in the selection process of the sample. Nonetheless, considering the 
importance for having complete data for this analysis and the difficulty to 
obtain such data from the remaining companies, such limitations can be 
considered as less important where there is little variation in the 
population ...” (Saunders et al., 2007).
4.4.5 Nature and Sources of Data
This section discusses the sources of data used in this study. Researchers 
employ various procedures of obtaining data relevant for their studies, these 
include interview, observation, content analysis, questionnaire based 
surveys, case studies among others (see for example Jonker and Pennink, 
2010; Hoque, 2006; Parahoo, 2006; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Smith, 2003; 
Creswell, 1998; Remenyi et al., 1998; Sekaran, 1992; de Vaus, 1991 and 
Morgan and Smircich, 1980).
Therefore, researchers select the most appropriate method (s) they consider 
being the most suitable for the collection and analysis of data in their 
research (Spencer et al., 2003). In this regard, considering the performance 
measures to be investigated in this study and the availability of data on such 
performance measures, this study considered using a secondary data 
readily available at the public domain. Consequently, the quantitative nature 
of this study and the availability of data influenced the choice and usage of 
secondary data.
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Our dataset is secondary in nature and it includes the following: volume of 
crude oil produced, operating expenditure (OPEX), capital expenditure 
(CAPEX), wells drilled (both exploratory and development wells), royalty 
payment, and prices of crude oil (both domestic and international prices).
The source of our data includes NNPC annual statistical bulletins (ASB) from 
1999 to 2007; NEITI audit reports for the period 1999 -  2004, 2005, and 
2006 -  2008; Central Bank of Nigeria annual reports; companies’ websites 
and/or reports (where available).
Data on upstream operation are generally lacking in Nigeria. For example, 
data on crude oil production on a company-by-company basis are only 
available (at public domain) for the period 1997 -  201352; and data on royalty 
payments are only available for the period 1999 -  20011. However, data on 
OPEX and CAPEX (the important variables in this study) are only available 
(at public domain) for the period 1999-2007 (NEITI, 2006; NEITI, 2008; 
NEITI 2011). Hence the selection of the period (1999-2007) because of the 
availability of complete data needed for this study.
52 '
httr>://\v\v\v. nnpcgroiip.com/PublicRe1ations/OilandGasStatistics/AnnualStatisticsBulletin/MonthlvPe 
rformancc.aspx
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4.4.6 Method of Data Analysis
The data analysed by this study involve both cross-sectional and time-series. 
They are cross-sectional because they cut across different upstream oil and 
gas companies (both JVCs and non-JVCs) and they are time-series because 
they involve different periods (1999 -  2007); hence, these type of data are 
referred to as panel data (Kennedy, 2003).
This study employed a multivariate regression analysis based on the panel 
dataset available. Panel data regression technique allows for multiple cases 
to be observed at two or more periods. Therefore, the cross-sectional 
information reflected in the differences between companies and the time- 
series information reflected in the changes within companies over time 
provide rich information about the companies; hence more variability is 
obtain in the dataset. More so, the problem of multicollinearity is mitigated 
while controlling for individual heterogeneity (Greene 2000, Brooks 2008).
The aforementioned benefits associated with the panel data influenced the 
researcher’s decision to employ such technique for a robust analysis that will 
reflect the distinctive and unique nature of the upstream oil and gas 
companies, especially in the Nigerian case where there are differences in 
the ownership of such upstream oil and gas companies, but operating within 
the same environment.
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4.4.6.1 Model Specification
Following Brooks’ (2008) modeling, the panel regression model to be used in 
this study is in the form of:
y„ = a + f i x u +U„ (1)
The independent variables are all captured b y *". Individual effect is a  that 
is taken as constant over time (f) and is specific to each company (/); where 
a  is considered to be uniform across all companies, in this case the ordinary
least squares (OLS) provide efficient estimate of a  and P (Greene 2000). 
However, if heterogeneity exists across companies, the OLS will lead to a 
heterogeneity bias because the differences across companies have not been 
captured by the OLS. Hence, the two approaches that are normally applied 
in addressing the issue of heterogeneity bias will be adopted, these are: (i) 
the fixed-effects model, and (ii) the random-effects model.
Under the fixed-effect approach, a  is taken to be a company specific 
constant term. Therefore, by decomposing thew, into a company specific
effect, and the ‘remainder disturbance’, v" (idiosyncratic error term), that 
varies over time and companies “capturing everything that is left unexplained
a b o u t ( B r o o k s  2008, p.490). Hence, the equation below:
11 a ~  Mi *** Vh / o \
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Now we can re-write equation (1) as follows:
y„ = Ct + P xu + + vit (3)
We now consider company heterogeneity that affects -^"across 
companies but does not vary over time. In this context, let us consider 
hypothesis 8; Hypothesis 8.a states that JVCs are more efficient than the 
non-JVCs. In essence, cost efficiency is assumed to vary across the 
upstream oil and gas companies based on their ownership status (JVCs and 
non-JVCs). Although the cost efficiency is hypothesised to vary across 
companies, the ownership status remains fixed over time. Therefore, 
efficiency differentials based on different ownership status can be estimated 
using the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach as follows:
y,t = f i xi, +Ai +M2D2i +/A  D2i + -  + MnDN' +V" (4)
The LSDV set out in equation (4) above includes a company-specific dummy
variable ^  that changes the intercept a  for each company. Thus, the effect 
of ownership type can be easily determined on the efficiency of the 
companies that have different ownership status. In summary, the LSDV
provides unbiased coefficients^ because the companies’ differences are 
considered to be correlated with the independent variables.
In the case of equation (4) above, our dependent variable is the unit cost of 
producing crude oil per barrel of oil based on the total oil produced and the
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total costs incurred in relation to such production. Similarly, the independent 
variables include the production volume, OPEX, royalties, and a dummy 
variable capturing the ownership type of the companies (= 1 if a JVC, 0 
otherwise). Hence the equation (5) below:
l c o s tb b l it  =  a  +  P ilo u tp u t i t  +  p 2lo p e x it +  (33l r o y a l t y it +  (3Ao w n J o u tp u t it 
+  P s o w n _ lo p e x it +  f3e o w n _ lr o y a l ty it +  £; + ( 5 )
More so, considering the effect of AF on performance of the JVCs, we can 
adopt a time-fixed effects model. Using the time-fixed effects model, the 
intercepts are assumed to vary over time, that is pre and post AF periods, 
but not across the JVCs. The time-fixed effects model to be used is in the 
form of:
y „ = a + P  x„+y,+v„  (6)
Where yt represents the AF period which is associated with all the 
independent variables assumed to affectyit, that is the individual 
performance measures. Hence, the least squares dummy variable model in 
equation (7) below:
y jt = P xjt + ^ D \ t + Z 1D 2 I +^7)3 , +... + A jD T t +vit (7)
Therefore, hypotheses 1 -  7 can be tested using equation (8) below. In 
essence, the effect of AF arrangement on performance of the JVCs post-AF
period can be determined by using the following model:
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PERF„ = a, + pu *AF„+02,* TIME„ + P 3f * TIME *AF„+yl * SIZE,, + u„ (8)53
Where AF captures performance differentials before and after AF 
arrangement, TIME * AF captures changes in performance trend, and the 
effect of AF can be observed from the coefficients of AF and TIME * AF. In 
essence, a positive coefficient of TIME * AF indicates an improvement in 
performance post-AF period. However, a negative coefficient of TIME * AF 
indicates that the AF negatively affects a particular performance variable. 
Nonetheless, other factors beyond the AF arrangement may also affect the 
performance of the upstream oil and gas companies. For example, the size 
of the companies differs substantially. In this case, a control variable, y is
needed in order to capture SIZE effect, hence, the variable yx *SIZEt l.
Consequently, we can now incorporate our LSDV models above, equations 
(4) and (7). Hence, the equation (9) below:
y it = /?*,, +Ai D \t +M iD2i + Mi D2>, +... + AarDNf + ^ D l,  + ^ 0 2 ,  + ^D 3 , +
.., + AjDT, +vjt
On the other hand, if the companies’ differences are not correlated with the 
independent variables, then we can assume that the causes of differences 
are random in nature. In this case, it does not matter whether the company 
in question is either a JVC or a non-JVC. Therefore, we can assume that 
such effect is random in nature. Therefore, for us to be able to properly
53 See Villalonga (2000, p. 57) for the use o f similar model in determining the effect o f privatization 
on the performance o f companies pre and post-privatisation periods.
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address the aforementioned issues, there is the need for us to adopt a 
random-effects model (REM). The REM is specified below:
yu =  & +  P  x,t +  co„ , o)lt =  £, +  v n o )
The REM considers a  being a group specific disturbance that is captured by 
random error te rm ^, which is independent of the individual observation error 
term v" and the independent variables*".
In the context of equation (10) above, our dependent variable is the gross 
margin based on earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Similarly, our 
independent variables include the quantity of crude oil produced, OPEX, 
royalty payments, petroleum profit tax, oil price as obtained from the NNPC 
records, and ownership type as a dummy variable which is interacted with 
the aforementioned independent variables. Hence the equation (11) below:
l g r o s s m a r g in it
=  a  +  p j o u t p u t u  +  (32lo p e x it +  p 3l r o y a l t y it +  /?4 /p p t it +  (35o w n _ lo u tp u t it 
+  (]6o w n _ lo p e x it +  p 7o w n _ lr o y a l ty it +  p 8o w n _ lp p tit +  p 9lo i lp r ic e t +  £t
+ (H )
Finally, below is the summary of our model:
Panel data type:
The panel data used in this study is a long panel. A long panel data involves 
many time periods and few cases. In the context of this study, we have 108 
months observations on each and every company; making the total 
observations to be 972.
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Regressors:
We have three types of regressors in our models, these include: varying 
regressors, time-invariant regressors, and individual-invariant regressors. 
The varying regressors (xa) include crude oil production (output), operating 
expenditure (opex), royalty payments (royalty) and petroleum profit tax 
(PPT). These variables vary according to companies’ performance and are 
not similar to one another on a company-by-company basis.
Time-invariant regressor (xn = x, for all t) in our models is basically the 
ownership type of the companies. This is either a JVC or a non-JVC, this 
ownership type does not vary over time (at least during the period of the 
study).
Individual-invariant regressor {xn = xt for all i) in our models is the oil price 
(oilprice) which does not vary based on companies’ ownership type but 
uniformly across the board.
4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the research methodology and methods adopted in 
this study. On the methodology aspect, the process via which this study was 
conducted has been delineated; in this regard, the assumptions 
underpinning this study have been discussed thoroughly. For example, the 
study adopts a cautious realist approach and a falcificationist approach in its 
ontological and epistemological assumptions respectively.
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Similarly, a functionalist research paradigm that is in line with the 
aforementioned philosophical assumptions is adopted. The functionalist 
research paradigm falls within the objectivist dimension and the sociology of 
regulation of the Burrell and Morgan’s model. This paradigm is also in line 
with what Chua emphasised in her model and the Hopper and Powell’s 
taxonomy of accounting research.
Similarly, this chapter discussed the research methods adopted in this study. 
In particular this study adopts a quantitative research approach in the 
process of collecting and analysing the most important aspect of this study, 
which is ‘data’. The quantitative approach is in line with both the 
philosophical assumptions and research paradigm adopted in this study. In 
this regard, a quantitative secondary data were collected and analysed for 
the purpose of investigating the effect of Government control on the 
performance of upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. 
Moreover, the panel dataset were analysed using a multivariate regression 
analysis.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the dataset used in this study, the statistical tools and 
econometric models used in analysing the data. First of all, statistical tests 
were conducted in order to determine the appropriateness of the methods of 
analysis used; these tests include Bartlett’s test for equal variance, F-test for 
joint significance of the independent variables used in our models, Hausman 
test for deciding between fixed-effects vs random-effects models, Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random-effects, Wilcoxon 
signedrank test and Wilcoxon sign test.
There are three parts to the analysis conducted in this chapter, the first part 
focuses on the effect of Government ownership, and a model was developed 
in order to examine the production efficiency of the upstream oil and gas 
JVCs operating alongside non-JVCs. The second part focuses on the effect 
of Government ownership on companies’ gross margin. Similarly, a model 
was developed in order to examine the gross margin of such companies. 
Lastly, the third part focuses on the effect of alternative funding arrangement 
on the various performance measures considered in our previous models.
5.2 Dataset
Although data on crude oil production, oil price, and royalty payments are
available on a monthly basis, data on OPEX are on annual basis.
Consequently, the OPEX annual data were converted to a monthly data
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based on output. In order to apportion the OPEX data appropriately, the 
natural gas produced was converted to oil equivalent based on a general 
approximation that one barrel of oil contains six times as much energy as 
does one thousand cubic feet (mcf) of gas” (Jennings et a!., 2000, p. 422). 
Therefore, the cost of producing a barrel of oil was appropriately ascertained 
using this method.
5.2.1 Variables Defined
5.2.1.1 Crude oil production
This is the quantity of oil produced and this is represented by the term output 
as used in the model. Quantity of oil produced by all the upstream oil and 
gas companies in the sample was obtained from the NNPC ASB for the 
period 1999 to 2007 on a monthly basis. The quantity of crude oil produced 
is assumed to be negatively associated with the production cost per barrel of 
oil produced due to economies of scale theory. Therefore, the higher the 
volume of oil produced the lower the cost per barrel of oil produced will be.
On the other hand, the quantity of oil produced is assumed to be positively 
associated with both the companies’ gross margin and Government take 
(royalty and petroleum profit tax). In this regard, companies will strive much 
harder to produce as much as they can in order to reduce the cost of 
production and increase their gross margin.
148
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
5.2.1.2 Operating expenditure
This is the operating expenditure incurred for the production of oil, which is 
represented by the term opex in our models. This refers to the summation of 
the expenses incurred during the exploration and production activities of the 
upstream oil and gas companies. The constituents of the opex include the 
followings:
- Direct transportation expenses (crude oil transportation)
- Expenses on maintenance of exploration and production facilities
- Insurance premium
- Security expenses
- Expenses incurred on the community where the exploration and 
production activities take place
- Expenses on health safety and environment (HSE)
- G & A (Salaries and Allowance) and
- Production cost
5.2.1.3 Oil price
This is the average price of crude oil per barrel of oil as per NNPC records. 
Although the price of oil is subject to the forces of demand and supply in the 
international market, but this study relies on the record of oil price provided 
by the NNPC (see Appendix 14).
5.2.1.4 Royalty payments
These are the payments of royalties made to the relevant Government 
agency (DPR) by the upstream oil and gas companies. The payments of 
royalty depends on whether the production is onshore or offshore and the
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charges are made at well-head. This variable is represented by the term 
royalty in our models (see Appendix 14).
5.2.1.5 Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT)
This is the tax payment made to the relevant Government agency (FIRS) by 
the upstream oil and gas companies; this is represented by the term PPT in 
our models (see Appendix 14).
5.2.1.6 Government Take per Barrel of Oil
In the context of this study, Government take refers to the summation of 
royalty payments and the petroleum profit tax as payments to Government 
by the upstream oil and gas companies. Therefore, Government take per 
Barrel of oil produced is the summation of Government take by the quantity 
of crude oil produced (see Appendix 14).
5.2.1.7 Cost per Barrel of Oil Produced
This refers to the actual cost per barrel of oil produced. This is obtained by 
dividing the production cost by the total crude oil produced. Find below the 
cost per barrel of oil across all the upstream oil and gas companies over the 
period: 1999 -  2007, (see Appendix 14).
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5.2.1.8 Gross margin per Barrel of Oil Produced
This represents the profit margin on each barrel of oil sold by the upstream 
oil and gas companies (see Appendix 14).
5.2.1.9 Ownership
This is a dummy variable representing the ownership types of the 
companies; 1 represents the joint venture companies (JVCs) and 0 
represents the non-joint venture companies (non-JVCs) (see Appendix 14).
5.2.1.10 Alternative Funding
This is also a dummy variable representing the period of alternative funding 
(AF) arrangements, with the value of 1 post-AF period and 0 pre-AF period.
5.2.1.11 Drilling Activities
These are the drilling activities of the upstream oil and gas companies that 
include both the exploration and development activities during the period of 
the study (1999-2007) (see Appendix 15).
5.3 Cost Efficiency
This section investigates the effect of Government ownership on cost 
efficiency of the upstream oil and gas JVCs operating in Nigeria alongside 
the non-JVCs. The ownership type takes the value 1 if the company is a JVC 
and the value 0 for non-JVCs (see Appendix 14). Ownership is interacted 
with the independent variables so as to see its effect on such variables.
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We now present our models below after the relevant diagnostic tests were 
conducted (see Appendices 4 and 5): Find below the model we estimated:
lco stb b lit =  a  +  P J ou tpu tit  +  p 2lopex it +  p 3lr o y a lty it +  p4ow n _lou tpu tit +  p 5o w n J o p ex it 
+  p 6ow n _ lro ya lty it +  +  #  (7)
Table 11 below provides us with interesting results on the parameters used 
in our cost efficiency model, below is a discussion on the overall, between 
and within variations.
Overall variation is the variation over time and between the companies 
involved, that is both the JVCs and the non-JVCs. Find below the formula for 
determining the overall variation:
So =  EiEtfrft -  *)2
The overall variation can be decomposed as follows:
C*2 — <-2 I c2
Using the above formula, we will be able to determine the overall variations 
both within and between companies.
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5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics on Cost Efficiency
Table 11: Overall, Between and Within Variations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Id Overall 5 2.583318 1 9 N = 972
Between 2.738613 1 9 n = 9
Within 0 5 5 T = 108
!
Month Overall 521.5 31.19163 468 575 N = 972
Between 0 521.5 521.5 n = 9
■■ •
Within 31.19163 468 575 T = 108
Costbbl Overall 18.44764 89.50728 0 1993.01 N = 972
Between 10.29532 6.142942 36.87675 n = 9
Within 88.97887 -18.4291 1988.908 T = 108
Output Overall 7122288 1.31 E+07 0 3.23E+08 N = 972
Between 8532307 11281.55 2.22E+07 n = 9
Within 1.04E+07 -1.50E+07 3.11E+08 T = 108
Opex Overall 2.00E+07 2.80E+07 0 6.17E+08 N = 972
Between 1.90E+07 411350.4 5.48E+07 n = 9
. _ ----- Within 2.15E+07 -3.49E+07 5.98E+08 T = 108
Royalty Overall 1.45E+07 2.02E+07 0 9.83E+07 N = 972
Between 1.41 E+07 0 3.88E+07 n = 9
Within 1.52E+07 -2.43E+07 7.40E+07 T = 108
Own_output Overall 6931084 1.32E+07 0 3.23E+08 N = 972
Between 8699029 0 2.22E+07 n = 9
Within 1.04E+07 -1.52E+07 3.11E+08 T = 108
Own_opex Overall 1.75E+07 2.91 E+07 0 6.17E+08 N = 972
Between 2.11 E+07 0 5.48E+07 n = 9
Within 2.12E+07 -3.73E+07 5.96E+08 T = 108
Own_royalty Overall 1.35E+07 2.06E+07 0 9.83E+07 N = 972
Between 1.50E+07 0 3.88E+07 n = 9
Within 1.50E+07 -2.52 E+07 7.31 E+07 T = 108
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However, it is important to note that the aim of this analysis is not only about 
the overall mean and the standard deviation for the overall variation over 
time and between companies, but to break it down to the level of between 
and within variation.
Between variation is the variation between the companies involved. Here, 
the variation accounts for changes in our parameters between companies, 
taking into consideration the companies distinctive characteristics but not 
focusing on how it changes over time. Find below the formula for 
determining the between variation:
Using the above formula, we will be able to determine the variation between 
the companies in our sample. In this case, the aim is to find out the extent to 
which the parameters used in our models differ between companies.
On the other hand, within variation is the variation within the companies 
involved over time; that is how the respective parameters change over time. 
Find below the formula for determining the within variation:
$ W  =  J\J —  I  —  =  N  —  1 ~  +  *0
Using the formula above, we can determine the extent to which the 
parameters used in our models differ within companies over time.
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We now consider the variations (both between and within) for each of the 
parameters used in our production efficiency model so as to understand how 
they vary between and within companies and the extent to which such 
variations affect the dependent variable (production efficiency). From our 
production efficiency model, we can see that the time-invariant regressor id 
(ownership) model does not vary over time, hence the within variation is 0. 
On the other hand, the individual-invariant regressor (month) does not vary 
between individual companies; hence the between variation is 0 because it 
does not vary with the ownership type of the companies.
On the dependent variable in our model, the production efficiency (costbbl), 
we have less between variations (10.29532) than within variation (88.97887). 
This indicates that a fixed-effects model may be appropriate in this context, 
because as Torres-Reyna (2014, p. 10) states that, “fixed-effects will not 
work well with data for which within-cluster variation is minimal...” This 
indicates that ownership type is instrumental on the performance of the 
companies being studied. Therefore, there is the need to control for the 
ownership type of companies in our model. Similarly, we can see that all the 
regressors in our model have more within than between variation.
Additionally, we can see a huge difference between the minimum and the 
maximum cost per barrel of oil produced. The overall minimum cost per
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barrel is zero and the maximum is $1993.01. Considering the between 
variation, the minimum cost per barrel is $6.14294 and the maximum is 
$36.87675. On the other hand, the within variation differs significantly, with a 
minimum of $-18.42911 and a maximum of $1988.908. This clearly indicates 
that, companies’ distinctiveness accounts for such variation. It is important to 
state here that, such companies’ differences emerge when their mean value 
is deducted from the overall mean.
More so, it is important to distinguish the effect of ownership from other
factors such as royalty payments, quantity of oil produced and the operating
expenditure. Table 13 below presents Bartlett's test for equal variances on
the sampled companies based on their ownership type; that is the JVCs (=1)
and the non-JVCs (=0). We tested the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7.o■ Joint Venture Companies are not more efficient than the non- 
Joint Venture Companies
Analysis of variance was first conducted in order to decide whether the 
variances assumed are equal or not (see Table 12 below). The essence of 
doing this is to find out whether or not sampling distributions of the two 
groups have similar or different standard errors, because the difference (if 
any) between the two sample variances is one out of many possible 
differences. The test for equality variances used is as follows:
F = Shsi
156
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
This means that the ratio of variances has F-distribution with the 
denominator degrees of freedom calculated as in n1 — 1 and the numerator 
degrees of freedom calculated as n2 -  1. So, the following null hypothesis 
was tested, which states that the variances between the two groups are the 
same:
Hq-.g '  = g22 
Hi .G!1 =£ a22
5.3.2 Bartlett's test for equal variances
Table 12: Bartlett's test for equal variances
S u m m a r y  of
c o s t  p e r
o w n e r s h i p b a r r e l  of
t y p e o i l
( l = J V C s , p r o d u c e d
0 = n o n -J V C s ) M e a n
0 2 5 . 3 6 6 2 8 3
1 1 2 . 9 1 2 7 2 4
T o t a l 1 8 . 4 4 7 6 3  9
S o u r c e
A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r i a n c e
SS df M S  F P r o b  > F
B e t w e e n  g r o u p s  3 7 2 2 1 . 8 7 0 7  1 3 7 2 2 1 . 8 7 0 7  4 . 6 6  0 . 0 3 1 1
W i t h i n  g r o u p s  7 7 4 1 9 9 6 . 0 2  9 7 0  7 9 8 1 . 4 3 9 2
T o t a l 7 7 7 9 2 1 7 . 8 9  9 7 1  8 0 1 1 . 5 5 2 9 3
From the results obtained in Table 12 above, (F = 4.66, P-value = 0.0311) 
we can reject the null hypothesis H0:gi 1 =  g 2 and accept that there are 
differences between the two group of companies, that is H x \g  ^ *  g 2 . In 
essence, non-JVCs spend twice as much as the JVCs in producing a barrel
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of oil. Therefore, based on our findings here, we can conclude that the JVCs 
are more efficient than the non-JVCs.
We now consider the extent to which production cost per barrel is affected 
by other factors such as the quantity of crude oil produced (loutput), 
operating expenditure (lopex), royalty payments (Iroyalty), and Government 
ownership (ownership).
First of all, F-test for joint significance of the independent variables was 
conducted and the following results were obtained with F = 654.34 and P- 
value = 0.0000.
5.3.3 F test for Joint Significance of Independent Variables
Table 13: F test for Joint Significance of Variables
( 1) loutput = 0 
( 2) lopex = 0 
( 3) Iroyalty = 0 
( 4) own_loutput = 0 
( 5) own_lopex = 0 
( 6) own_lroyalty = 0
F ( 6, 720) = 654.34
Prob > F =  0.0000
The essence of conducting the F test is to ascertain which of the variables to 
be included and which ones to be excluded. Therefore, we tested whether at 
the same time the coefficients are all equal to zero. The results provided us 
with the evidence that we can reject the null hypothesis which postulates that 
at the same time these variables are all equal to zero; hence, our decision to
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include all the variables in our model. We now present our regression results 
on production efficiency (Icostbbl), see Table 14 below.
5.3.4 Regression Results on Cost Efficiency
Table 14: R egression  R esu lts  on P roduction E ffic iency (Icostbbl)
OLS Estim ator Fixed-effects Random -effects
E stim ator E stim ator
Variables Coeff. t-test
i
i Coeff. t-test Coeff. z-test
(output ]
-0.9984 -96.02*** -1.00917 -28.39*** -9.9994 -32.11***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0000)
lopex 1.0151 78.98*** 1.01793 28.57*** 1.0163 32.85***
I (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000)
Iroyalty ] 0.0343 22.83*** 0.03359 4.25*** 0.0344 11.33***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
o w n jo u tp u t 0.1998 2.40*** 0.21575 0.93 0.2035 1.22
(0.017) (0.378) (0.223)
o w n jo p e x  ]
J
-0.2694 -4 14*** -0.26231 -1.18 -0.2723 -1.75
(0.000) (0.273) (0.079)
o w n jro ya lty 0.0913 4.69*** 0.09829 5.29*** 0.0909 9.74***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
cons ] -0.2426 -2.18** -0.39486 -1.43 -0.2493 -1.79
(0.029) (0.191) (0.073)
N 1 972 972 972
F-test 4901.64 162.64 6331.84
R-Sq/W ald  1 0.8586 0.8225 0.8225
Note: ***, ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% respectively
After series of diagnostic tests (see the Appendices), we can adopt the OLS 
model to explain our results. Our OLS model, with an R-sq. of 0.8586, 
explains quite a lot about the cost efficiency of the upstream oil and gas 
companies operating in Nigeria. Crude oil production (output) with a 
coefficient of -0.9984 has a negative relationship with the cost per barrel of 
oil produced. That is production cost reduces with every increase of a barrel
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of oil produced. This is in line with the economies of scale theory, that 
companies take advantage of cost reduction due to their size (throughput). 
This relationship is found to be significant at 1% (P-value < 0.05 = 0.000). 
This indicates that for every additional barrel of oil produced there is a 
reduction in the production cost by 1.01%. However, Government ownership 
is slightly significant (P-value = 0.017) on the quantity of crude oil produced 
(loutput) by the companies and in turn does not reduce cost (-0.9984 + 
0.1998 = -0.7986).
On the other hand, operating expenditure (lopex) has a positive (1.0151) and 
significant (P-value < 0.05 = 0.000) effect on production cost. This indicates 
that an increase in operating expenditure by one dollar increases cost of 
production by 1.02% for the non-JVCs. On the other hand, the JVCs spend 
less than the non-JVCs per barrel of oil produced 0.7457 (1.0151 + -0.2694). 
Therefore, an increase in operating expenditure by the JVCs increases the 
cost per barrel by 0.75% unlike in the case of the non-JVCs where the cost 
per barrel increases by 1.02%.
Spending patterns by the upstream oil and gas companies and the control
mechanisms put in place to monitor such patterns greatly contribute to how
much is spent per barrel of oil produced. Consequently, the operating
expenditure in the upstream oil and gas operations proves to be one of the
contentious areas. In this context, the agency theory issue becomes useful
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in explaining the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms in the upstream 
operations. Therefore, government ownership proves to be effective as a 
control mechanism as argued by Eisenhardt (1989). At this juncture, we can 
reject the null hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 7.0: Joint Venture Companies are not more efficient than
the non-Joint Venture Companies
Therefore, it can be argued that the higher cost per barrel of oil produced by 
the non-JVCs is due to the problem of information asymmetry because 
government may not effectively confirm whether the inputs of the upstream 
oil and gas companies are the best chosen for the output. Hence, we can 
reject the null hypothesis and accept that government ownership in the JVCs 
has a significant and systematic effect of the companies’ production 
efficiency.
Consequently, one major policy implication of this result is that government 
ownership in the upstream oil and gas sector needs to be consolidated and 
the benefit of such consolidation needs to be fully exploited just as in the 
case of Saudi Aramco where government ownership started from 24% 
ownership in 1973 to a 100% government ownership in 1980 (Inkpen and 
Moffett, 2011). To date, Saudi Aramco is the largest and the most profitable 
oil and gas company in the world. In this regard and based on the results, 
that government ownership enhances the efficiency of the upstream oil and
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gas companies in Nigeria, the Nigerian government needs to increase and 
consolidate its ownership in the upstream sector.
Similarly, royalty payment (royalty) has a positive and significant effect on 
the production cost per barrel of oil, with a coefficient of 0.0343 (P-value < 
0.05 = 0.000). However, we can see here that the JVCs pay more royalty 
0.1256 (0.0343 + 0.0913) than the non-JVCs (0.0343). This may be 
attributed to the disparity in the different royalty rates paid by the upstream 
oil and gas companies based on their area of operations. Overall, we can 
see that Government ownership has a significant effect (P-value < 0.05) on 
the production cost per barrel of oil produced by the JVCs.
Another interesting aspect of this model is the rho that is very high 
(0.92064221). Rho is the interclass correlation of the error term due to 
companies’ ownership effect. It approaches 1 if the companies’ ownership 
effect dominates the error term. Find below the formula for calculating the 
rho:
(Sigma _u) 2rho —------------------~ j(Sigma _ n) +  (Sigma _ e)
Where:
Sigm a _ u  -  0 f  residuals within groups Uj
Sigm a  _^ = s d  of residuals (overall error term) e-,
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Based on our assumption, the rho will be high because companies’ 
ownership is hypothesised to have effect on their productive efficiency. 
Having a rho of 0.92064221 indicates that 92% of the variance in our model 
is due to ownership differences across companies. Therefore, the rho affirms 
our assumption on government ownership effect on the production efficiency 
of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria.
In summary, the results obtained from our analysis are in line with the 
assumptions of agency theory, that agent performs differently based on its 
ownership right on asset. Considering the assumption that agent’s 
ownership right on asset influences the agent’s actions ex-ante, it can be 
argued that the JVCs have an optimal incentive-system in such a way that 
the lOCs ownership in the oil resources mitigates the potentials for adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. Similarly, Government ownership in 
the JVCs provides it with the majority representation on the management 
boards of such companies, which is an effective control mechanism towards 
ensuring efficiency in operations.
However, under the non-JVCs (PSC for example), Government control is 
only limited to vetting of the work programs to be undertaken by the 
upstream oil and gas companies, with no voting right on the management
boards of such companies. Since the companies have to recoup their total
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costs before any profit is shared between them and the Government, the 
argument here is that such companies may not be as efficient as companies 
where Government has a majority stake and controls substantial aspect of 
the'operations. This is in line with the assumption of separation of ownership 
and control expounded in our theoretical framework under agency theory.
We now move on to address the second question of this study, which is the 
effect of Government ownership on the profitability (gross margin) of the 
upstream oil and gas companies, an issue discussed in the next section.
5.4 Gross Margin
This section discusses the effect of Government ownership on the 
profitability of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria.
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5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics on Gross Margin
Table 15: Overall, Between and Within Variations
V a r i a b l e M e a n S t d .  D e v . M i n M a x O b s e r v a t i o n s
i d o v e  r a l 1 5 2 . 5 8 3 3 1 8 1 9 N  = 9 72
b e t w e e n 2 . 7 3 8 6 1 3 1 9 n  = 9
w i t h i n 0 5 5 T  = 1 0 8
m o n t h o v e r a l l 5 2 1 . 5 3 1 . 1 9 1 6 3 4 6 8 5 7 5 N  = 9 7 2
b e t w e e n 0 5 2 1 . 5 5 2 1 . 5 n  = 9
w i t h i n 3 1 . 1 9 1 6 3 4 6 8 5 7 5 T  = 1 0 8
o i l p r i c e o v e r a l l 3 7 . 4 5 9 9 5 1 8 . 2 6 7 2 4 0 7 4 . 2 8 7 7 N  = 9 7 2
b e t w e e n 0 3 7 . 4 5 9 9 5 3 7 . 4 5 9 9 5 n  = 9
w i t h i n 1 8 . 2 6 7 2 4 - 7 . 1 l e - 15 7 4 . 2 8 7 7 T  = 1 0 8
g r o s s m - n o v e r a l l 40 6 5 6 9 3 5 0 . 7 0 6 5 - 7 8 0 5 . 6 3 3 9 7 . 4 2 0 7 6 N  = 9 7 2
b e t w e e n 3 2 . 4 4 3 7 4 -2 . 8 3 2 1 1 6 7 9 . 8 7 5 3 9 n  = 9
w i t h i n 3 4 9 . 3 6 8 6 - 7 7 7 6 . 0 1 3 1 2 3 . 5 4 3 5 T  = 1 0 8
o u t p u t o v e r a l l 7 1 2 2 2 8 8 1 . 3 1 e + 0 7 0 3. 2 3 e + 0 8 N  = 972
b e t w e e n 8 5 3 2 3 0 7 1 1 2 8 1 . 5 5 2 . 2  2 e+ 0 7 n  = 9
w i t h i n 1 . 0 4 e + 07 - 1 . 5  0 e +  0 7 3 . l l e + 0 8 T  = 1 08
o p e x o v e r a l l 2 . 0 0 e + 0 7 2 .8 0 e + 07 0 6 . 1 7 e  + 08 N  = 9 72
b e t w e e n 1 . 9 0 e + 07 4 1 1 3 5 0 . 4 5 . 4  8 e + 0 7 n  = 9
w i t h i n 2 . 1 5 e + 07 - 3 . 4  9 e + 07 5 . 9  8 e + 0 8 T  = 1 08
r o y a l t y o v e r a l l 1 . 4 5 e + 0 7 2 . 0 2 e + 07 0 9 . 8  3 e + 07 N  = 9 72
b e t w e e n 1 . 4 l e + 07 0 3 . 8 8 e + 0 7 n  = 9
w i t h i n 1 . 5  2 e+ 0 7 - 2 . 4  3 e + 0 7 7 . 4 0 e + 0 7 T  = 1 08
p p t o v e r a l 1 3 . 2 2 e + 0 7 5 . 5 6 e + 0 7 0 2 . 9 8 e  + 08 N  = 9 7 2
b e t w e e n 3 . 1 7 e + 0 7 0 8 . 3  6 e + 07 n  = 9
w i t h i n 4 . 6  9e + 07 - 5 . 1 4 e +  07 2 .8 7e + 0 8 T  = 1 0 8
o w n _ o u ~ t o v e r a l l 6 9 3 1 0 8 4 1 . 3 2 e  + 07 0 3 . 2  3 e +  0 8 N  = 9 72
b e t w e e n 8 6 9 9 0 2 9 0 2 . 2  2 e +  0 7 n  = 9
w i t h i n 1 . 0 4  e + 07 - 1 . 5 2 e + 0 7 3 . l l e  + 08 T  = 1 0 8
o w n _ o p e x o v e r a l l 1 . 7 5 e  + 07 2 . 9 le + 0 7 0 6 . 1 7 e  + 08 N  = 9 7 2
b e t w e e n 2 . l l e + 0 7 0 5 . 4  8 e + 0 7 n  = 9
w i t h i n 2 . 1 2 e +  07 - 3 . 7 3 e  + 07 5 . 9 6 e +  08 T  = 1 0 8
o w n _ r o - y o v e r a l l 1 . 3 5 e  + 07 2 . 0 6 e + 0 7 0 9 . 8 3 e +  07 N  = 9 7 2
b e t w e e n 1 . 5  0 e +  0 7 0 3 . 8 8 e + 0 7 n  = 9
w i t h i n 1 . 5  0 e + 07 - 2 . 5 2 e + 07 7 . 3 le + 07 T  = 1 0 8
o w n _ p p t o v e r a l l 3 . 0 2 e + 07 5 . 6 3 e +  07 0 2 . 9  8 e + 0 8 N  = 9 7 2
b e t w e e n 3 . 3 4 e +  07 0 8 . 3 6 e + 0 7 n  = 9
w i t h i n 4 . 6  6 e + 0 7 - 5 . 3 4 e + 0 7 2 . 8 5 e + 0 8 T  = 1 0 8
Table 15 above provides us with interesting statistics on the parameters 
used in our gross margin model, below is a discussion on the overall, 
between and within variations.
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We now consider the variations (both between and within) for each of the 
parameters used in our gross margin model so as to understand how they 
vary between and within companies and the extent to which such variations 
affect the dependent variable (gross margin). From our gross margin model, 
we can see that the time-invariant regressor id (ownership) model does not 
vary over time, hence the within variation is 0. On the other hand, the 
individual-invariant regressor (oil price) does not vary between individual 
companies; hence the between variation is 0 because it does not vary with 
the ownership type of the companies.
On the dependent variable in our model, the gross margin (Igrossmargin), 
we have less between variations (32.44) than within variation (349.36). This 
indicates that a fixed-effects model may be appropriate in this context as 
well, just as it is applied in the production efficiency model above. Similarly, 
we can see that all the regressors in our model have more within than 
between variation. This indicates that the variations within companies have 
more influence on the companies’ gross margin than the variations between 
them.
More so, we can see that there is a huge difference between the minimum 
and the maximum gross margin per barrel of oil produced. Looking at the 
between variation, the minimum gross margin per barrel is $-2.83 and the 
maximum is $79.87.
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5.4.2 Regression Results on Gross Margin
Below is the model we estimate on the gross margin:
l g r o s s m a r g in it
=  a  +  p i l o u t p u t it +  p 2lo p e x it +  p 3l r o y a l t y it +  P4 l p p t it +  p s o w n _ lo u tp u t it 
+  P 6o w n _ lo p e x it +  p 7o w n _ lr o y a l ty it +  p 8o w n _ lp p t it +  p 9lo i lp r ic e t +  e t 
+ tfit (8)
Table 16: Regression results on Gross Margin (Igrossmargin) _________________
Regression Results on Gross Margin (Igrossmargin)
: ! O LS Estimator Fixed-effects Estimator Random-effects Estimator
! Variables  :
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test Coeff. z-test
Loutput
1.4434 28.20*** 1.6992 8.44*** 1.4434 9.85***
! (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) .
Lopex -1.0423 -22.60*** -1.2243 -6.99*** -1.0423 -8.00***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Iroyalty -0.0437 -2.92*** -0.0768 _7.44*** -0.0437 -2.20
(0.004) (0.000) (0.028)
Lppt -0.0364 -2.57*** -0.0129 -0.49 -0.0364 -1.87
(0.000) (0.636) (0.061)
Loilprice 0.5879 8.16*** 0.5822 5.75*** 0.5879 7.82***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
own loutput -0.9452 -11.96*** -1.1374 -5.11*** -0.9452 -5.23***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ownjopex 0.7593 12.02*** 0.9228 4.59*** 0.7592 5.08***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ownjroyalty 0.1105 3.74*** 0.1472 4.80 0.1105 3.61***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
own Ippt -0.0404 -1.82 -0.0539 -1.66 -0.0404 -1.73
(0.070) (0.135) (0.084)
cons 1 -0.7546 -2.33 -1.4120 -2.05 -0.7546 -1.20
(0.020) (0.075) (0.229)
N 972 972 972
F-test 155.94 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
R-Sq 0.6820 0.6717 0.6820
On the other hand, the within variation differs significantly, with a minimum of 
$-7776 (this indicates a loss) and a maximum of $123. Similarly, this clearly
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indicates that, companies’ distinctiveness accounts for such variation in their 
gross margin.
The model investigates the extent to which companies’ profitability 
(Igrossmargin) varies between the two groups of companies. Our null 
hypothesis is that ownership does affect companies’ profitability. The r2 of 
our model is quite strong (0.68) with an F value 155.94. This indicates that 
68% of variability in the companies’ gross margin is explained by our model.
Crude oil production (loutput) is positively correlated with companies’ 
profitability and the variable is significant at 1% level (P-value < 0.01). 
Similarly, oil price (loilprice) is positively correlated with companies’ 
profitability and the variable is significant at 1% level (P-value < 0.01).
On the other hand, operating expenditure (lopex), royalty payments 
(Iroyalty), petroleum profit tax (Ippt) are negatively correlated with 
companies’ gross margin. However, only operating expenditure is significant 
at 1 % level (P-value < 0.01). Royalty payments and petroleum profit tax are 
not significant in explaining the gross margin of the upstream oil and gas 
companies.
Overall, our model indicates that Government ownership is positively 
associated with operating expenditure (0.75) and the variable is significant at 
1 % level (P-value < 0.01), unlike the association obtains with no
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Government intervention (-1.04). This indicates that Government ownership 
improves companies’ gross margin. Therefore, we can reject the null 
hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 8.o- Joint Venture Companies are not more profitable than 
the non-Joint Venture Companies
Based on the findings above, Government needs to review the royalty rates 
in such a way that it will be much more favourable to the non-JVCs, as it was 
done in the UK in 2003 when royalty was abolished for all fields so as to 
retain investors due to maturing fields in the North Sea (Alalade, 2004). 
Although it is quite a different situation in Nigeria because of the prosperous 
nature of oil fields in the country, the need for such review needs to be taken 
seriously because of the large scale divestment the country started 
witnessing recently.
This is particularly important because harsh fiscal terms tend to negatively 
affect the investors in terms of postponement of field development and 
premature field abandonment (Kemp and Rose, 1981). However, with the 
current proposal by the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) that is awaiting 
approval of the legislative arm of Government, it can be argued that such 
trend may be reversed as it proposes 50% tax rate for the onshore and 
shallow oil fields and the 20% tax rate for the deep water oil fields, as 
against the current 85% and 50% respectively.
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5.5 Alternative Funding
This sub-section focuses on the effect of alternative funding (AF) 
arrangement on the performance of the upstream oil and gas companies on 
one hand and Government revenue on the other. In order to test for the 
effect of AF on the aforementioned parameters, Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
sign rank test and test equality of matched pairs were conducted.
The sign rank test the equality of matched pairs of observations. Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is a test of the hypothesis that two distributions of a 
particular observation (variable) are the same, which is expressed as 
x 1 ~ x 2 (Wilcoxon, 1945). This nonparametric test is used in order to 
investigate the extent of differences between the matched groups, which is 
the pre-AF period vs. post-AF period.
In the context of our study, the essence of these tests is to test the 
effectiveness of the AF arrangement that was introduced in 2003 (see the 
literature review chapter for a detailed discussion on the AF arrangements). 
Consequently, the following hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis t 0: Gross margin is not significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 2.o‘ Crude oil production is not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
Hypothesis 3.0: Government take is not significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Hypothesis 4,0: Capital expenditure is not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
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Hypothesis 5.0; Exploration activities are not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
Hypothesis 6.0• Development activities are not significantly higher in 
the post-alternative funding period
5.5.1 Pre-Alternative Funding vs. Post-Alternative Funding 
Performance Analysis
In order to test the above hypotheses, two sets of variables were compared, 
that before the alternative funding was introduced (Pre-AF period: 1999 - 
2002) and that after the alternative funding was introduced (Post-AF period: 
2003 - 2007). Find the test results in Table 17 below:
Table 17: Wilcoxon Test Statistics on Alternative Funding
1 I
GovtTake Capex Opex Output Grossmargin Explowells Devwells
I_ _ _  — i
[Mann- 1 
Whitne
l y u ____ |
34353.000 13056.000 24473.000 35045.000 21963.000 233.500 230.500
[ Wilcox 
[on W__ 1
63273.000 41976.000 53393.000 80195.000 50883.000 558.500 440.500
i z  .....!
1 Asym p. i 
Sig. (2- 
LtaHed)_
-.914 -12.738 -6.398 -.530 -7.791 -.408 -.449
.361 .000 .000 .596 .000 .683 .653
a. Grouping Variable: AF
For each of the performance variables analysed, means and medians of the 
p re-AF (-48 to -1) and Post-AF (+1 to +60) are presented in Table 18 below. 
Additionally, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test was employed to test whether or 
not the median difference in the respective variables are zero.
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T a b le  18: R e su lts  o f un ivariate t e s t s
; i
108 months Means (Medians): -48 to -1 vs. +1 to +60
Variable "] Mean Mean Mean z-statistic % o f
| Obs (Median) (Median) (Median) (Asymp. chan
Pre AF Post AF Changes Sig. 2- ge
tailed)
GovtTake 540 58488441.67 94798555.49 36310113.82 -0.914 62
] (47519000) (54726500) (7207500)
(0.361) (15)
Capex 540 515283333.33 1162080000 646796666.67 -12.738 126
(398500000) (1100000000) (701500000) (0.000) (176)
Opex i 540 23370669.13 38019113.03 14648443.90 -6.398 63
(25531589.92) (37118448.77) (11586858.85) (0.000) (45)
Output ~! 540 12048142.16 12818198.27 770056.11 -0.53 6
(12695695.5) (10074813.5) (-2620882) (-0.530) (-21)
Grosmargi 540 243138292.49 547685360.64 304547068.15 -7.791 125
n (212462288.4) (419356447.1) (206894158.7) (0.000) (97)
Explowells 45 1.40 0.84 -0.56 -0.408 -40
(1) (0) (-1) (0.683) (-
100)
Devwells 45 15.15 15.04 -0.11 -0.449 -0.7
(12) (18) (6) (0.653) (50)
5.5.1.1 Capital Expenditure (Capex)
Table 18 above indicates that capital expenditure significantly increased in 
the Post-AF period (mean value +126% and median value +176%). This 
clearly indicates that the upstream oil and gas companies increased their 
capital expenditures due to the new funding arrangements. Find below a box 
plot presenting a pictorial change in the capital expenditures:
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F igu re  2: B o x  plot co m p arin g  P re-A F v s . P o st-A F  on C ap ita l exp en d itu re
4.0E9-
0.0E0-
Pre AF Post AF
Fiscal Regime
From the box plot above, we can see that there is more variability in the post 
alternative funding period. This is evidenced by the significant changes in 
capital expenditures by the upstream oil and gas companies in the Post-AF 
period (see Table 19 below).
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Table 19: Pre-AF vs. Post-AF Descriptives on Capital Expenditures
'■•Yr -3 m a w  i
Capex Pre_AF Mean 515283333.33 25640634.406
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
464772837.22
Interval for Upper 
^ ean Bound
565793829.44
5% Trimmed Mean 481148148.15
Median 398500000.00
Variance 1.578E+17
Std. Deviation 397223000.159
Minimum 135000000
Maximum 1510000000
Range 1375000000
Interquartile Range 258750000
Skewness 1.403 .157
Kurtosis .600 .313
Post_AF Mean 1162080000.00 49555808.666
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
1064557653.85
Interval for Upper 
Mean Bound
1259602346.15
5% Trimmed Mean 1068355555.56
Median 1100000000.00
Variance 7.367E+17
Std. Deviation 858331784.203
Minimum 364000000
Maximum 3900000000
Range 3536000000
Interquartile Range 913000000
Skewness 1.519 .141
Kurtosis 2.087 .281
For example, the minimum capital expenditures were $135,000,000 and
$364,000,000 in the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods respectively and the 
maximum capital expenditures were $1,510,000,000 and $3,900,000,000 
respectively.
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Consequently, the median of capital expenditure in the Pre-AF period was 
$398, 500,000 but this was significantly increased in the Post-AF period to 
$1, 100,000,000. Similarly, the average capital expenditure in the Pre-AF 
was N515, 283,333 but it was increased to $1, 162,080,000. Additionally, 
below is the Wilcoxon sign test on the capital expenditures in the Pre-AF and 
Post-AF periods.
5.5.1.1.1 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Capital Expenditures
Table 20: Sign Test on Capital Expenditure (Icapex)
sign observed expected
positive 240 120
negative 0 120
zero 300 300
all 540 540
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AFJcapex -  post-AFJcapex = 0 vs. 
Ha: median of pre-AFJcapex -  post-AFJcapex > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 240) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5) = 0.0000 
Ho: median of pre-AFJcapex -  post-AFJcapex = 0 vs.
175
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
Ha: median of pre-AFJcapex -  post-AFJcapex < 0 
Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000 
Two-sided test:
Ho: median of pre-AFJcapex -  post-AFJcapex = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJcapex -  post-AFJcapex != 0
Pr(#positive >= 240 or #negative >= 240) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 20 above indicates that there were 240 comparisons for which capital 
expenditure (Icapex) pre-AF period exceeded capital expenditure post-AF 
period, zero comparison for which capital expenditure post-AF period 
exceeded capital expenditure pre-AF period, and 300 comparisons for which 
they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJcapex -  pre-AFJcapex > 0, the significance of the 
one-sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two-sided test, where 
the alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the differences is 
different from zero, is 0. Findings from the above tests indicate that 
alternative funding arrangement significantly increased capital expenditures
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made by the upstream oil and gas companies in the post-AF period. 
Therefore, we can now reject the null hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 5.0: Capital expenditure is not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
5.5.1.2 Operating Expenditure (Opex)
Table 18 above indicates that operating expenditure increased in the Post- 
AF period (mean value +63% and median value +45%). This clearly 
indicates that the upstream oil and gas companies increased their operating 
expenditures due to the increased in their capital expenditures which in turn 
affects their operating activities. Find below a box plot presenting a pictorial 
change the operating expenditures:
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From the box plot above, we can see that there is more variability in the post 
alternative funding period. This is evidenced by changes in operating 
expenditures, see Table 21 below:
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Table 21: Pre-AF vs. Post-AF Descriptive on Operating Expenditures
AF Statistic Std. Error
Opex Pre_AF Mean 23370669.13 961348.885
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
21476870.08
Mol val (ui upper
Mean Bound
25264468.18
5% Trimmed Mean 22924136.22
Median 25531589.92
Variance 2.218E+14
Std. Deviation 14893152.887
Minimum 26762
Maximum 57321899
Range 57295136
Interquartile Range 26968898
Skewness .325 .157
Kurtosis -1.166 .313
Post_AF Mean 38019113.03 2360469.090
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
33373875.88
Inloivol fui upper 
Mean Bound
42664350.19
5% Trimmed Mean 35593964.13
Median 37118448.77
Variance 1.672E+15
Std. Deviation 40884523.939
Minimum 0
Maximum 617469116
Range 617469116
Interquartile Range 43375387
Skewness 9.586 .141
Kurtosis 134.870 .281
For example, the minimum operating expenditures were $26,762 and NO in
the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods respectively and the maximum operating 
expenditures were $57,321,899 and $617,469,116 respectively.
Consequently, the median of operating expenditure in the Pre-AF period was 
$25,531,589 but this was increased in the Post-AF period to $37,118,448.
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5.5.1.2.1 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Operating Expenditure
Table 22: Sign Test on Operating Expenditure (lopex)
sign observed expected
positive 240 120
negative 0 120
zero 300 300
all 540 540
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AF_lopex -  post-AFJopex = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJopex -  post-AFJopex > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 240) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5) = 0.0000 
Ho: median of pre-AFJopex -  post-AFJopex = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJopex -  post-AFJopex < 0 
Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000 
Two-sided test:
Ho: median of pre-AFJopex -  post-AFJopex = 0 vs.
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Pr(#positive >= 240 or #negative >= 240) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 22 above indicates that there were 240 comparisons for which 
operating expenditure (lopex) pre-AF period exceeded operating expenditure 
post-AF period, zero comparison for which operating expenditure post-AF 
period exceeded operating expenditure pre-AF period, and 300 comparisons 
for which they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJopex -  pre-AFJopex > 0, the significance of the 
one-sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two-sided test, where 
the alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the differences is 
different from zero, is 0. Findings from the above tests indicate that 
alternative funding arrangement increased operating expenditures made by 
the upstream oil and gas companies in the post-AF period. Therefore, we 
cannot reject the view that operating expenditure is not significantly lower in 
the post-alternative funding period.
5.5.1.3 Gross Margin
Table 18 above indicates that companies’ gross margin significantly 
increased in the Post-AF period (mean value +125% and median value
Ha: median of pre-AFJopex -  post-AFJopex != 0
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+97%). Find below a box plot presenting a pictorial change in the companies 
gross margin:
From the box plot above, we can see that there is more variability in the post 
alternative funding period. This is evidenced by changes in companies’ gross 
margin, see Table 23 below:
182
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
Table 23: Pre-AF vs. Post-AF Descriptives on Companies’ Gross Margin______________
AF Statistic Std. Error
Grossmargin Pre_AF Mean 243138292.49 11290010.393
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
220897656.13
Interval for Upper 
Mean Bound
265378928.86
5% Trimmed Mean 233262214.62
Median 212462288.40
Variance 3.059E+16
Std. Deviation 174904088.924
Minimum -41056181
Maximum 734852672
Range 775908853
Interquartile Range 276098012
Skewness .690 .157
Kurtosis -.385 .313
Post_AF Mean 547685360.64 65557576.580
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
418672660.66
Interval for Upper 
Mean Bound
676698060.62
5% Trimmed Mean 457496176.62
Median 419356447.10
Variance 1.289E+18
Std. Deviation 1135490534.570
Minimum -35404588
Maximum 18916645303
Range 18952049891
Interquartile Range 491390802
Skewness 14.282 .141
Kurtosis 230.716 .281
We can see from Table 23 above, the minimum gross margins/(losses) were 
($41,056,181) and ($35,404,588) in the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods 
respectively and the maximum gross margins/(losses) were $734,852,672 
and $18,916,645,303 respectively.
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Consequently, the median of gross margin in the Pre-AF period was 
$212,462,288 but this was increased in the Post-AF period to $419,356,447.
5.5.1.3.1 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Gross Margin
Table 24: Sign Test on Gross Margin (Igrossmargin)
sign observed expected
positive 237 118.5
negative 0 118.5
zero 303 303
all 540 540
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AFJgrossmargin -  post-AFJgrossmargin = 0 vs. 
Ha: median of pre-AFJgrossmargin -  post-AFJgrossmargin > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 237) =
Binomial(n = 237, x >= 237, p = 0.5) = 0.0000 
Ho: median of pre-AFJgrossmargin -  post-AFJgrossmargin = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJgrossmargin -  post-AFJgrossmargin < 0 
Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 237, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000 
Two-sided test:
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Ha: median of pre-AFJgrossmargin -  post-AFJgrossmargin != 0
Pr(#positive >= 237 or #negative >= 237) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 237, x >= 237, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 24 above indicates that there were 237 comparisons for which gross 
margin (Igrossmargin) pre-AF period exceeded gross margin post-AF period, 
zero comparison for which gross margin post-AF period exceeded gross 
margin pre-AF period, and 303 comparisons for which they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJgrossmargin -  pre-AFJgrossmargin > 0, the 
significance of the one-sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two- 
sided test, where the alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the 
differences is different from zero, is 0.
Similarly, findings from Table 24 above indicates that alternative funding 
arrangement improved gross margin of the upstream oil and gas companies 
in the post-AF period. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 1m0: Gross margin is not significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
Ho: median of pre-AFJgrossmargin -  post-AFJgrossmargin = 0 vs.
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5.5.1.4 Crude Oil Production
Table 18 above indicates that there was a decrease in crude oil production in 
the Post-AF period (mean value +6% and median value -21%). Find below a 
box plot presenting a pictorial change in the companies’ crude oil production:
Figure 5: Box plot comparing Pre-AF vs. Post-AF on Crude Oil Production
From the box plot above, we can see that there is more variability in the post 
alternative funding period. This is evidenced by changes in companies’ 
crude oil production, see Table 25 below.
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T a b le  2 5 : P re-A F  v s . P o st-A F  D escrip tive  on C ru d e  Oil Production
AF Statistic Std. Error
Output Pre_AF Mean 12048142.16 483140.773
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
11096384.11
Interval for y 
Mean Bound
12999900.21
5% Trimmed Mean 11783845.61
Median 12695695.50
Variance 5.602E+13
Std. Deviation 7484784.669
Minimum 12940
Maximum 28257977
Range 28245037
Interquartile Range 13638377
Skewness .326 .157
Kurtosis -1.189 .313
Post_AF Mean 12818198.27 1149836.221
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
10555401.46
Interval for Upper 
^ ean Bound
15080995.08
5% Trimmed Mean 11378076.47
Median 10074813.50
Variance 3.966E+14
Std. Deviation 19915747.554
Minimum 0
Maximum 323129035
Range 323129035
Interquartile Range 10716699
Skewness 12.784 .141
Kurtosis 198.179 .281
We can see from Table 25 above, the minimum crude oil productions were 
12,940bbls and Obbl in the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods respectively and the
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maximum crude oil productions were 28,257,977bbls and 323,129,035bbls 
respectively.
Consequently, the median of crude oil production in the Pre-AF period was 
12,695,695bbls but this was reduced in the Post-AF period to 
10,074,813bbls.
5.5.1.4.1 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Crude Oil Production
Table 26: Sign Test on Crude Oil Production (loutput)
sign observed expected
positive 240 120
negative 0 120
zero 300 300
all 540 540
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AF_loutput -  post-AF_loutput = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJoutput -  post-AFJoutput > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 240) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5) = 0.0000
Ho: median of pre-AFJoutput -  post-AFJoutput = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJoutput -  post-AFJoutput < 0
188
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000 
Two-sided test:
Ho: median of pre-AFJoutput -  post-AF_loutput = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJoutput -  post-AFJoutput != 0
Pr(#positive >= 240 or #negative >= 240) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 26 above indicates that there were 240 comparisons for which crude 
oil production (loutput) pre-AF period exceeded crude oil production post-AF 
period, zero comparison for which crude oil production post-AF period 
exceeded crude oil production pre-AF period, and 300 comparisons for 
which they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJoutput -  pre-AFJoutput > 0, the significance of the 
one-sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two-sided test, where 
the alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the differences is 
different from zero, is 0. Findings from the above tests indicate that 
alternative funding arrangement did not improve crude oil production of the 
upstream oil and gas companies in the post-AF period. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis below:
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Hypothesis 2.o■ Crude oil production is not significantly higher in the
post-alternative funding period
5.5.1.5 Government Take
Table 18 above indicates that there was no significant improvement in 
Government Take in the Post-AF period (mean value +62% and median 
value +15%). Find below a box plot presenting a pictorial change in 
Government Take:
Figure 6: Box plot comparing Pre-AF vs. Post-AF on Government Take 
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From the box plot above, we can see that there is more variability in the post 
alternative funding period. This is evidenced by changes in Government 
Take, see Table 27 below:
Pre_AF Post_AF
Fiscal Regime
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Table 27: Pre-AF vs. Post-AF Descriptives on Government Take
AF Statistic Std. Error
GovtTake Pre_AF Mean 58488441.67 2649043.247
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
53269986.99
Interval for Upper 
^ean Bound
63706896.35
5% Trimmed Mean 55741662.04
Median 47519000.00
Variance 1.684E+15
Std. Deviation 41038801.514
Minimum 2577000
Maximum 225887000
Range 223310000
Interquartile Range 62836000
Skewness .977 .157
Kurtosis 1.003 .313
Post_AF Mean 94798555.49 6108629.459
95% Lower 
Confidence Bound
82777202.34
Interval for Upper 
Mean Bound
106819908.64
5% Trimmed Mean 85427787.71
Median 54726500.00
Variance 1.119E+16
Std. Deviation 105804565.878
Minimum 41908
Maximum 365850000
Range 365808092
Interquartile Range 151908585
Skewness 1.153 .141
Kurtosis .338 .281
We can see from Table 27 above, the minimum Government Take was 
$2,577,000 and $41,908 in the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods respectively and 
the maximum Government Take was $225,887,000 and $365,850,000 
respectively.
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Consequently, the median of Government Take in the Pre-AF period was 
$47,519,000 but this was increased in the Post-AF period to $54,726,500.
For us to be able to test for the effect of alternative funding on Government 
Take, we have to look into the effect of alternative funding on both the 
royalty payments and petroleum profits tax separately.
5.5.1.5.1 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Royalty Payments
Table 28: Sign Test on Royalty Payments (Iroyalty)
sign observed expected
positive 240 120
negative 0 120
zero 300 300
all 540 540
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AFJroyalty -  post-AFJroyalty = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJ royalty -  post-AFJroyalty > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 240) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5) = 0.0000 
Ho: median of pre-AFJroyalty -  post-AFJroyalty = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJroyalty -  post-AFJroyalty < 0
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Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 240, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000 
Two-sided test:
Ho: median of pre-AF_lroyalty -  post-AFJroyalty = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJroyalty -  post-AFJ royalty != 0
Pr(#positive >= 240 or #negative >= 240) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 240, x >= 240, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 28 above indicates that there were 240 comparisons for which royalty 
payments (Iroyalty) pre-AF period exceeded royalty payments post-AF 
period, zero comparison for which royalty payments post-AF period 
exceeded royalty payments pre-AF period, and 300 comparisons for which 
they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJroyalty -  pre-AFJroyalty > 0, the significance of the 
one-sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two-sided test, where 
the alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the differences is 
different from zero, is 0. Findings from the above tests indicate that 
alternative funding arrangement did not increase royalty payments by the 
upstream oil and gas companies in the post-AF period. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis below:
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It is important to state that royalty payments are part of Government Take 
together with the petroleum profit tax, an issue discussed hereunder.
Hypothesis 4.0: Government take is not significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
5.5.1.5.2 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Petroleum Profit Tax
Table 29: Sign Test on Petroleum Profit Tax (Ippt)
s i g n o b s e r v e d e x p e c t e d
p o s i t i v e 236 118
n e g a t i v e 0 118
zero 304 304
all 540 540
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AFJppt -  post-AFJppt = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJppt -  post-AFJppt > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 236) =
Binomial(n = 236, x >= 236, p = 0.5) = 0.0000 
Ho: median of pre-AFJppt -  post-AFJppt = 0 vs.
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Ha: median of pre-AFJppt -  post-AFJppt < 0 
Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 236, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000 
Two-sided test:
Ho: median of pre-AFJppt -  post-AFJppt = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJppt -  post-AFJppt != 0
Pr(#positive >= 236 or #negative >= 236) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 236, x >= 236, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 29 above indicates that there were 236 comparisons for which 
petroleum profit tax payments (Ippt) pre-AF period exceeded petroleum profit 
tax payments post-AF period, zero comparison for which petroleum profit tax 
payments post-AF period exceeded petroleum profit tax payments pre-AF 
period, and 304 comparisons for which they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJppt -  pre-AFJppt > 0, the significance of the one­
sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two-sided test, where the 
alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the differences is different 
from zero, is 0. Findings from the above tests indicate that alternative 
funding arrangement did not increase petroleum profit tax payments by the
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upstream oil and gas companies in the post-AF period. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 4.0: Government take is not significantly higher in the post­
alternative funding period
We now look into the effect of alternative funding on exploration activities, an 
issue discussed hereunder.
5.5.1.6 Exploration Activities
Table 18 above indicates that there was no significant improvement in 
exploration activities in the Post-AF period. In fact, such drilling activities 
reduced significantly (mean value -40% and median value -100%). Find 
below a box plot presenting a pictorial change in exploration activities:
From the box plot above, we can see that there is more variability in the pre 
alternative funding period. This is evidenced by changes in exploration 
activities, see Table 30 below:
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We can see from Table 30 below, the minimum number of wells drilled was 
zero in both the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods, and the maximum number of 
wells drilled was 9 and 3 in the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods respectively.
Consequently, the median of the number of wells drilled in the Pre-AF period 
was one but this was reduced in the Post-AF period to zero.
197
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
T a b le  30 : P re-A F v s . P o st-A F  D escr ip tiv e s on E xploration  A ctivities
AF Statistic Std.
Error
Explowells Pre_AF Mean 1.40 .525
95%
Confidence
Lower
Bound
.30
Interval for 
Mean
Upper
Bound
2.50
5% Trimmed Mean 1.06
Median 1.00
Variance 5.516
Std. Deviation 2.349
Minimum 0
Maximum 9
Range 9
Interquartile Range 1
Skewness 2.388 .512
Kurtosis 5.637 .992
Post_AF Mean 0.84 .214
95%
Confidence
Lower
Bound
.40
Interval for ~ 
Mean
Upper
Bound
1.28
5% Trimmed Mean .77
Median 0.00
Variance 1.140
Std. Deviation 1.068
Minimum 0
Maximum 3
Range 3
Interquartile Range 2
Skewness .790 .464
Kurtosis -.887 .902
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5.5.1.6.1 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Exploration Activities
Table 31: Sign Test on Exploration Activities
sign observed expected
sitive 45 22
po
negative 0 23
zero 4 5 4 5
all 45 45
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AF_lexplowells -  post-AF_lexplowells = 0 vs. 
Ha: median of pre-AFJexplowells -  post-AFJexplowells > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 45, x >= 45, p = 0.5) = 0.0000 
Ho: median of pre-AFJexplowells -  post-AFJexplowells = 0 vs. 
Ha: median of pre-AFJexplowells -  post-AFJexplowells < 0 
Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 45, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000
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Two-sided test:
Ho: median of pre-AFJexplowells -  post-AFJexplowells = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJexplowells -  post-AFJexplowells != 0
Pr(#positive >= 45 or #negative >= 45) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 45, x >= 45, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 31 above indicates that there were 45 comparisons for which 
exploration activities (lexplowells) pre-AF period exceeded exploration 
activities post-AF period, zero comparison for which exploration activities 
post-AF period exceeded exploration activities pre-AF period, and 45 
comparisons for which they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJexplowells -  pre-AFJexplowells > 0, the significance 
of the one-sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two-sided test, 
where the alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the differences 
is different from zero, is 0. Findings from the above tests indicate that 
alternative funding arrangement did not increase exploration activities by the 
upstream oil and gas companies in the post-AF period. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 6.o- Exploration activities are not significantly higher in the 
post-alternative funding period
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We now look into the effect of alternative funding on the development
activities, an issue discussed hereunder.
5.5.1.7 Development Activities
Table 18 above indicates that there was no improvement in development 
activities in the Post-AF period. In fact, such drilling activities reduced (mean 
value -0.7% and median value -50%). Find below a box plot presenting a 
pictorial change in development activities:
Figure 8: Box plot comparing Pre-AF vs. Post-AF on Development Activities______________
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From the box plot above, we can see that there is more variability in the pre 
alternative funding period. This is evidenced by changes in development 
activities, see Table 32 below:
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Table 32: Pre-AF vs. Post-AF Descriptives on Development Activities
AF Statistic Std.
Error
Devwells Pre AF Mean 15.15 3.677
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 7.45
for Mean Upper Bound 22.85
5% Trimmed Mean 14.11
Median 12.00
Variance 270.345
Std. Deviation 16.442
Minimum 0
Maximum 49
Range 49
Interquartile Range 26
Skewness .930 .512
Kurtosis -.153 .992
Post AF Mean 15.04 1.999
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 10.91
for Mean Upper Bound 19.17
5% Trimmed Mean 14.69
Median 18.00
Variance 99.873
Std. Deviation 9.994
Minimum 0
Maximum 39
Range 39
Interquartile Range 16
Skewness .013 .464
Kurtosis -.126 .902
We can see from Table 32 above, the minimum number of we Is drilled was
zero in both the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods, and the maximum number of 
wells drilled was 49 and 39 in the Pre-AF and Post-AF periods respectively.
Consequently, the median of the number of wells drilled in the Pre-AF period
was 12 but this was increased in the Post-AF period to 18.
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5.5.1.7.1 Wilcoxon Sign Test on Development Activities
T a b le  33: S ig n  T e s t on  D e v e lo p m e n t A c tiv it ie s
sign observed expected
sitive 45 20
po
negative 0 25
zero 4 5 4 5
all 45 45
One-sided tests:
Ho: median of pre-AF_ldevwells -  post-AFJdevwells = 0 vs. 
Ha: median of pre-AFJdevwells -  post-AFJdevwells > 0 
Pr(#positive >= 45) =
Binomial(n = 45, x >= 45, p = 0.5) = 0.0000 
Ho: median of pre-AFJdevwells -  post-AFJdevwells = 0 vs. 
Ha: median of pre-AFJdevwells -  post-AFJdevwells < 0 
Pr(#negative >= 0) =
Binomial(n = 45, x >= 0, p = 0.5) = 1.0000
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Two-sided test:
Ho: median of pre-AFJdevwells -  post-AF_ldevwells = 0 vs.
Ha: median of pre-AFJdevwells -  post-AFJdevwells != 0
Pr(#positive >= 45 or #negative >= 45) =
min(1, 2*Binomial(n = 156, x >= 45, p = 0.5)) = 0.0000
Table 33 above indicates that there were 45 comparisons for which 
development activities (Idevwells) pre-AF period exceeded development 
activities post-AF period, zero comparison for which development activities 
post-AF period exceeded development activities pre-AF period, and 0 
comparisons for which they were the same.
Based on the binomial distribution where the alternative hypothesis is that 
the median of post-AFJdevwells -  pre-AFJdevwells > 0, the significance of 
the one-sided test is 1. Similarly, the significance of the two-sided test, 
where the alternative hypothesis is simply that the median of the differences 
is different from zero, is 0. Findings from the above tests indicate that 
alternative funding arrangement did not increase development activities by 
the upstream oil and gas companies in the post-AF period. Therefore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis below:
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Hypothesis 7.0'. Development activities are not significantly higher in 
the post-alternative funding period
5.6 Chapter Summary
Overall, we can see from the foregoing analysis that the alternative funding 
arrangement that was introduced in 2003 has improved the capital 
expenditures made by the upstream oil and gas companies and their 
profitability. However, we can see that such alternative funding 
arrangements did not improve the drilling activities of the upstream oil and 
gas companies.
Therefore, the implication of these findings is that policy makers need to 
review such alternative funding arrangements so that Government will 
benefit from in the long run; because the future of the industry largely 
depends on the drilling activities that are taking place now. This is against 
the backdrop of calls for more flexible alternative funding arrangements by 
the upstream oil and gas companies in Nigeria; one of the managers of such 
companies stated that “We urgently need to put money onshore. Financial 
institutions must come in. Government must also be more flexible. Oil 
companies must come up with innovative solutions to help fund their 
operations” (Bello and Akpe, 2013, p. 1). The implication of this accession is 
that the upstream oil and gas companies need Government to be much 
more flexible in terms of funding the operations of the JVCs. However, the
implication of doing such may result to less Government revenue.
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents summary of findings and draws some conclusions 
based on the findings. Contributions made by the study are also enumerated 
in this chapter. Similarly, some of the limitations of the study are 
enumerated. Accordingly, areas for future study are suggested. Section 6.2 
presents the summary of our findings. Conclusions drawn from the findings 
are presented in section 6.3. Contributions of the study are enumerated in 
section 6.4. Finally, limitations of the study and areas for future study are 
presented in section 6.5.
6.2 Summary of Findings
Revenue enhancement is one of the major reasons advanced in the 
argument on why Government has ownership in upstream oil and gas 
operations. This is largely because Government increases its take by not 
only having a substantial ownership but also controlling the upstream oil and 
gas operations. On the other hand, it is believed that Government ownership 
in the upstream oil and gas operations reduces the efficiency of such 
operations, thereby discouraging investment by the lOCs.
In Nigeria, Government participates in upstream oil and gas operations in 
what is commonly known as JV operations. Government owns about 57% 
stake in the JVCs which operate alongside other companies (non-JVCs).
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
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Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the effect of such 
government ownership in upstream oil and gas companies operating in 
Nigeria. Below is the summary of major findings of our study which are 
categorised into two major sub-sections; these are findings on the effect of 
government ownership on performance of the upstream oil and gas 
companies and findings on the effect of alternative funding on performance 
of the upstream oil and gas companies.
6.2.1 Findings on the Effect of Government Ownership on Companies’ 
Performance
One of the objectives of this study was to investigate the effect of 
government ownership on production efficiency of the upstream oil and gas 
companies operating in Nigeria. Similarly, another objective of the study is to 
investigate the effect of government ownership on gross margin of the 
upstream oil and gas companies. Consistent with the aforementioned 
research objectives and after reviewing the relevant literature, it was 
hypothesised (see Hypotheses 7 and 8) that government ownership 
improves performance of the upstream oil and gas companies on both cost 
efficiency and gross margin respectively. These hypotheses were formulated 
based on the following assumptions:
Government ownership in the JVCs provides government with majority 
representation on the management boards of the JVCs. Hence providing 
government with the necessary strength to be able to influence vital
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decisions associated with the operations of the JVCs; which in turn affects 
their performance.
Secondly, unlike under the non-JVCs where the lOCs are less motivated due 
to non-ownership in oil resources, the joint operating agreement (JOA) 
underpinning operations of the JVCs provide the lOCs with a high-powered 
incentive by allowing them to have a real ownership in the oil resources 
commensurate with their stake in the JVCs. Therefore, it is argued that this 
high-powered incentive system makes the JVCs to be more efficient and 
profitable than the non-JVCs.
Consequently, data on the relevant performance metrics were collected and 
analysed. The results obtained indicate that JVCs are more efficient and 
profitable than the non-JVCs. At this juncture, it is important to state that 
findings of this study reaffirmed the findings of previous studies on the 
performance of the upstream oil and gas sector in Nigeria (see Alalade, 
2004 and Akinwumi, 2009). For example, Akinwumi (2009) argued that 
ineffective government control mechanism in the upstream oil and gas sector 
leads to cost gold-plating in the case of non-JVCs which findings of this 
study indicate that the non-JVCs are less efficient in their operations; which 
was found to be that the non-JVCs spend twice as much as the JVCs in 
producing a barrel of crude oil.
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Consequently, findings of this study indicate that JVCs, which are 
substantially owned by the government, are more efficient and profitable 
than the non-JVCs, which are privately owned. Therefore, findings of this 
study are not in-line with the view that private firms are inherently more 
efficient than the non-private firms, as argued by Victor (2007) and Wolf 
(2009). Similarly, findings of this study reaffirmed the view of Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) that even the private companies can be as inefficient as 
the non-private companies, depending on the circumstances surrounding 
their operations.
For example, in the context of what obtains in the Nigerian upstream oil and 
gas operations, the need for arrangements other than the JVCs "... is mainly 
to overcome the problem (funding), otherwise the JVCs evidently generate 
more revenue to government” (Adam, 2014, p. 288). Therefore, findings of 
this study clearly reaffirmed the aforementioned view.
In the context of findings of this study are in-line with the literature on the 
effect of government ownership on the performance of companies, this study 
considered the view of Alchain (1965) that the diffusion in ownership in the 
non-private firms and the lack of incentive are some of the major reasons 
why the private firms outperform the non-private firms. However, considering 
that the JVCs are owned by both government and private companies and the
availability of high-powered incentive-system in the JVCs, it can be argued
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here that findings of this study provide an interesting perspective on the 
government role in enhancing the performance of companies especially in 
the upstream oil and gas sector where institutions that are encumbered with 
responsibility of managing the affairs of the industry are weak.
Similarly, findings of this study clearly indicate the importance of government 
ownership in the upstream oil and gas operations in Nigeria. This is in-line 
with the view of Inkpen and Moffett (2011) who stated that state ownership 
is desirable if and when the economic activity in a particular oil-rich nation 
renders the drafting of oil contracts incomplete and the stake-keepers (see 
3.3.2) do not have the capacity to regulate the operations of the major stake­
holders (see 3.3.1) effectively.
Therefore, it can be argued here that the stake-keepers discussed under the
institutional framework in the Nigerian oil and gas industry are ineffective in
their duties; which makes the government ownership in the upstream
operations vital, since the stake-keepers cannot regulate the stake-holders
effectively. This argument is in-line with the view of Eller et al. (2011) that the
major regulatory institution in the Nigerian oil and gas industry is a confused
institution; confused in the sense that a regulatory function is mistaken for
commercial function. This state of confusion clearly warrants the overhauling
of the operational and structural settings in the Nigerian upstream oil and
gas sector (Kassim-Momodu and Nwajide, 2012).
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Similarly, a recent study conducted by Adam (2014) argued that such 
institution is deficient in its mandate for ensuring value for money in the 
Nigerian upstream oil and gas operations. Therefore, it can be concluded 
here that government ownership in the upstream oil and gas operations in 
Nigeria is not only timely but very essential in ensuring the attainment of 
government’s strategic objectives in the industry.
The summary of findings on the effect of government ownership indicate that 
government ownership is a determining factor in the performance of 
upstream oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The findings of this study are in 
line with the assumptions of agency theory, that agent performs differently 
based on its ownership right on asset. Considering the assumption that 
agent’s ownership right on asset influences the agent’s actions ex-ante, it 
can be argued that the JVCs have an optimal incentive-system in such a 
way that the lOCs ownership in the oil resources mitigates the potentials for 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Similarly, Government 
ownership in the JVCs provides it with the majority representation on the 
management boards of such companies, which is an effective control 
mechanism towards ensuring efficiency in operations.
However, under the non-JVCs (PSC for example), Government control is 
only limited to vetting of the work programs to be undertaken by the
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upstream oil and gas companies, with no voting right on the management 
boards of such companies. Since the companies have to recoup their total 
costs before any profit is shared between them and the Government, the 
argument here is that such companies may not be as efficient as companies 
where Government has a majority stake and controls substantial aspect of 
the operations. This is in line with the assumption of separation of ownership 
and control expounded in our theoretical framework under agency theory.
6.2.2 Findings on the Effect of Alternative Funding on Companies’ 
Performance
Findings of this study indicate that the alternative funding arrangement does 
not yield positive results on the drilling activities of the upstream oil and gas 
companies; which is a serious policy implication for government 
consideration in the long-run. Even though such arrangement increased 
government take now but lack of improvement in the drilling activities may be 
detrimental to the performance of the sector in the future; as Wilcoxon tests 
conducted indicated that the upstream oil and gas companies performed 
better in drilling before the alternative funding arrangement was introduced.
It is important to note here that, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
this study is the first of its kind to have investigated the effect of government 
ownership on non-financial performance such as exploration and
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development activities. Therefore, this can be considered as one of the 
major contributions of this study.
6.3 Conclusions
Findings of this study indicate the importance of government ownership in 
upstream oil and gas operations in Nigeria. Therefore, our findings are not 
in-line with the argument that government ownership in upstream operations 
is associated with inefficient operations of the upstream oil and gas 
companies which results to divestment in the upstream sector and 
consequent loss of government revenue.
On the contrary, findings of this study indicate that government ownership 
really matters in improving production efficiency and companies’ profitability 
of the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. Therefore, in the 
comparative analysis of the JVCs and the non-JVCs we can conclude that 
the JVCs, where government has ownership, are more efficient and 
profitable than the non-JVCs.
Considering the alternative funding arrangement, it can be seen that such 
arrangement succeeded in increasing the amount of capital expenditure, and 
the gross margin of the upstream oil and gas companies on one hand and 
increased government revenue on the other. However, such arrangement 
has negative effect on exploration and development activities. Therefore, it
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can be concluded here that the alternative funding arrangement largely 
benefits the upstream oil and gas companies and an increased government 
take in the short-run. In this regard, policy makers need to carefully re­
examine such arrangement in such a way that it will be a win-win situation 
for both parties in the long-run.
6.4 Contribution of the Study
First of all, it is important to reiterate here that this study is an extension of 
previous studies conducted on the Nigerian upstream oil and gas sector as 
enumerated in the empirical part of the study.
Findings of the study corroborate the findings of Alalade (2004) that 
government participation in upstream activities positively affects the financial 
performance of the upstream oil and gas companies that are involved in 
such operations.
While it is difficult to make a general conclusion on the positive effect of 
government ownership on the performance of companies in other sectors, 
findings of this study provide us with an interesting perspective that we can 
make such conclusions on upstream oil and gas companies operating in 
Nigeria.
Findings of this study contribute to the debate on agency theory that 
separation of ownership and control results to a serious agency problem, 
especially in upstream oil and gas sector where there are huge risks
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associated with investments. Nonetheless, findings of this study indicate that 
such agency problems may be addressed in the upstream oil and gas sector 
via active participation by government which results to efficient operations by 
the relevant companies involved in such operations, especially in a 
developing country like Nigeria where the upstream oil and gas industry 
stake-keepers are ineffective in ensuring their mandate.
Similarly, findings of this study indicate that the preferred alternative funding 
arrangement by the upstream oil and gas companies is counterproductive 
from the government perspective because it hampers investment in drilling 
activities which have a severe negative effect in the long-run. This is 
especially dangerous because the upstream oil and gas companies may opt 
for short-termism in order for them to recover their investment within the 
shortest possible time.
However, if government were the provider of such funds such short-termism 
would have been automatically addressed because government strategic 
objective for long-term investment is in stark contrast to that of the private 
companies whose short-term attitude is manifested in their laidback attitude 
towards investing in drilling activities.
Therefore, it is important to state here that the alternative funding
arrangement is somewhat similar to the PSC arrangement where
government shields itself from the required investment in the upstream
operations due to risk-averse attitude towards risk. Therefore, this study
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argues that the preference to the alternative funding arrangement by the 
upstream oil and gas companies is an opportunity cost for the long-term 
investment. Consequently, this is another policy implication and an issue the 
policy makers need to take very seriously due to its implication on the 
nation’s revenue in the long-run.
6.5 Limitations of the Study and Areas for Future Study
Sufficient efforts have been made to address the questions on the possible 
effect of Government control on the performance of upstream oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria. In order to be able to address such questions, 
secondary data obtained from official statistics on the relevant performance 
variables were analysed using appropriate techniques.
Even though such data presented us with the basic facts on the performance 
of the relevant companies, there may be more interesting findings if such 
secondary data were coupled with a primary data; this is an issue that may 
be exploited in the future. However, considering the appalling situation in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry at the moment an attempt to either administer a 
questionnaire or conduct interview was considered not feasible by the 
researcher considering the need for managers of such upstream oil and gas 
companies needed to respond to such questions if meaningful conclusions 
were to be drawn.
A case in point is the non-response by the managers of such companies to a
questionnaire issued by NEITI; as stated “a questionnaire on control
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procedures over Capex and Opex was issued to all companies... (but only 
one) company responded” (NEITI, 2005, p. 11). Therefore, this may be an 
area where the views of the managers of the relevant companies need to be 
taken into consideration in the future by obtaining a primary data via either a 
questionnaire or an interview.
Further, the use of official statistics may be a serious limitation because such 
statistics include not only facts about the phenomena under consideration 
but also social and political constructions (Mahmud and Russell, 1999), 
which may be manipulated by the political actors, administrators or even the 
researchers (Bhat et al., 1988).
Therefore, because such official statistics may be manipulated by the 
political actors or their agencies (Bulmer, 1986), the accuracy of such 
statistics are sometimes seriously questioned (Jones, 1992). Nonetheless, 
such official statistics provided us with quite a useful data in the Nigerian 
context where data on the upstream oil and gas operations are treated with 
utmost confidentiality. As mentioned above, a primary data may be required 
to corroborate such statistics, an area worth exploiting in the future.
Furthermore, this study focused only on oil; however, an upstream oil
company may produce either oil, gas or both oil and gas. In the first
instance, if oil is considered the primary business of the upstream oil and
gas company, then whatever comes from gas will be considered a reduction
in the cost of oil produced. However, data on gas production is not enough to
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warrant comprehensive analysis. Therefore, an interesting question to be 
address in the future is what motivates the companies to opt for the 
production of either of the two or the combination of the two?
The negative effect of the DMOs on the performance of oil companies 
revealed by Eller et al. (2011) raises an important question in the Nigerian 
context. In Nigeria, for example, from 1999 up until 2003 (when the 
alternative funding arrangement was introduced), the price of domestic crude 
sales was determined by the Government. However, from 2003 up to 2011 
the price of domestic crude sales was based on the prevailing market price.
Considering the variations in the price of domestic crude sales discussed in 
chapter two sub-section 2.4.2.4, an important question to be addressed in 
the future is to what extent Government regulation on domestic crude oil 
price affects the gross margin of the upstream companies? Also, since the 
domestic crude sale has a direct implication on the oil revenue accruable to 
the Government, it will be interesting to address the question as to what 
extent Government regulation on domestic crude sales affects government 
oil revenue?
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Appendices
Appendix 9: OLS Regression Results on Production Efficiency
Linear regression Number of obs
F ( 6, 965)
Prob > F 
R-squared 
Root MSE
972
4901.64
0.0000
0.8586
.39271
lcostbbl Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
loutput -.9984199 .010398 -96.02 0.000 -1.018825 -.9780147
lop ex 1.015116 .0128526 78.98 0.000 .9898939 1.040338
lroyalty .0342787 .0015013 22.83 0.000 .0313325 .0372249
own loutput .1997828 .0833552 2.40 0.017 .0362046 .3633611
own lopex -.2693724 .0651128 -4.14 0.000 -.3971513 - .1415934
own_lroyalty .0913448 .019487 4.69 0.000 .0531029 .1295866
cons -.2426415 .1111136 -2.18 0.029 -.4606937 - .0245893
Appendix 2: FEM Regression Results on Production Efficiency
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 972 
Group v a r i a b l e : id Number of groups = 9
R- sq : within 
between 
o v e r a l 1
= 0.7766 
= 0.9435 
= 0.8225
Obs per group: min — 108 
avg = 108.0 
max — 108
c o r r (u_i , Xb) = 0.4060
F ( 6,8) = 162.64 
Prob > F = 0.0000
(Std. Err. adj usted for 9 clusters in id)
lcostbbl Coef .
Robust 
S t d . E r r . t P> | t | [95% C o n f . Interval ]
loutput -1.009169 .0355461 -28 3 9 0.000 -1.091138 - . 9271995
lopex 1.017932 .0356268 28 57 0.000 .9357769 1.100088
lroyalty .0335994 .0079039 4 25 0.003 .0153731 .0518257
own loutput . 2157458 .231217 0 93 0.378 -.3174415 .7489332
own lopex -.2623086 .2226571 -1 18 0.273 -.7757568 . 2511395
own lrovalty .0982895 .0185858 5 29 0.001 .0554305 .1411485
_cons -.3948574 .2763208 - 1 43 0.191 -1.032054 . 2423396
sigma_u . 24902174
sigma_e . 38524237
rho . 29470008 (f ract ion of variance due to u_i)
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Appendix 3: REM Regression Results on Production Efficiency
R a n d o m - e ff ec t s GLS r e g r e s s i o n N u m b e r  of obs = 972
Gr o u p v a r i a b l e : id N u m b e r  of g r o u p s  = 9
R- sq : wi th in = 0 . 775 1 Ob s per g r o u p : m i n  = 10 8
tie tw ee n = 0 . 9859 av g  = 10 8.0
o v e r a l 1 = 0 . 8586 m a x  = 10 8
c o r r (u_i , X) = 0 ( a s s u m e d )
W a l d
Pr ob
chi 2(6) 
> chi 2
= 633 
= 0 .
(Std . Er r . ad j us ted for 9 c l u s t e r s  in
1 cos tbbl Coe f .
R o bu st  
S t d . E r r . z P> 1 z 1 [95% C o n f . In te rv a l ]
l o ut pu t - . 99 93 80 1 .0311255 - 3 2 11 0 .000 - 1 . 0 60 3 85 - . 93 83753
1 o p e x 1. 01 62 7 2 .0309401 3 2 85 0 .000 . 9 5 5 6 3 0 5 1. 076913
l r o y a l t y .0343573 .0030336 11 3 3 0 .00 0 . 0284 115 . 04 03 03 1
ow n lo u t p u t .2034973 . 16 6 9 0 6 1 1 22 0 .223 - . 12 36 325 . 53 06272
ow n l o p e x - . 2 7 23 05 1 .1552529 - 1 7 5 .0 .07 9 - . 57 65 952 . 03 19851
o w n_l r o y a l t y .0908574 .0093304 9 74 0 .00 0 . 0 7257 01 . 10 91448
_cons - . 2 4 93 07 9 .1388946 - 1 7 9 0 .073 - . 52 15 363 . 022 92 0 5
s i g m a_u.
s i g m a_e
r ho
. 01 64 99 5 5 
.38524237 
.00183097 (f ract ion of v a r i a n c e due to u_i )
Appendix 4: Hausman Test for Fixed vs random Effects Models on Production Efficiency
-----  Co e ffic
(b)
f i x e d
:ients -----
(B)
r a n d o m
(b-B)
D i f f e r e n c e
s q r t ( d i a g ( V _ b - V _ B ) ) 
S.E.
l o u t p u t - 1 . 0 0 9 1 6 9 - . 9 9 9 3 8 0 1 - . 0 0 9 7 8 8 9 . 0 1 6 3 7 0 8
l o p e x 1 . 0 1 7 9 3 2 1 . 0 1 6 2 7 2 . 0 0 1 6 6 0 3 . 0 1 1 2 6 1 9
l r o y a l t y . 0 3 3 5 9 9 4 . 0 3 4 3 5 7 3 - . 0 0 0 7 5 7 9 . 0 0 3 6 8 2 2
o w n _ l o u t p u t . 2 1 5 7 4 5 8 . 2 0 3 4 9 7 3 . 0 1 2 2 4 8 5 . 0 2 5 0 9 2 3
o w n _ l o p e x - . 2 6 2 3 0 8 6 - . 2 7 2 3 0 5 1 . 0 0 9 9 9 6 4 . 0 2 3 7 4 0 1
o w n _ l r o y a l t y . 0 9 8 2 8 9 5 . 0 9 0 8 5 7 4 . 0 0 7 4 3 2 1 . 0 0 5 5 6 5 8
b = c o n s i s t e n t u n d e r  H o  a n d  Ha; o b t a i n e d  f r o m x t r e g
B = i n c o n s i s t e n t u n d e r  Ha, e f f i c i e n t  u n d e r  Ho; o b t a i n e d  f r o m x t r e g
T e s t :  H o d i f f e r e n c e  in c o e f f i c i e n t s n o t  s y s t e m a t i c
c h i 2 (6) = ( b - B ) 1 [ ( V _ b - V _ B ) A ( - 1 ) ] (b-B
= 2 5 . 5 3
P r o b > c h i 2  = 0 . 0 0 0 3
(V _ b - V _ B  is n o t  p o s i t i v e  d e f i n i t e )
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Appendix 5: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects on 
Production Efficency
lcostbbl [id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Estimated results:
Var sd = sqrt(Var)
lcostbbl 1.083887 1.041099
e . 1484117 .3852424
u .0002722 . 0164996
Test: Var(u) = 0
chibar2(01) = 47.02
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000
Appendix 6: OLS Regression Results on Gross Margin
Linear regression Number of obs = 972
F ( 9, 962) = 15 5.94
Prob > F = 0 .0000
R-sguared = 0 .6820
Root MSE . 86469
Robust
lgrossmargin Coef S t d . E r r . t P> |1 1 [95 % Conf . Interval]
loutput 1.443 406 . 051 1771 28 20 0 000 1 342974 1 .54 3838
lopex -1.042 279 . 046 1283 -22 60 0 000 -1 132803 - . 9517555
lroyalty - . 0436 907 . 014 9724 -2 92 0 004 - 073073 - . 014 3083
lppt -.0363 551 . 014 1358 -2 57 0 010 064 0956 - . 0086145
own_loutput -.9451 906 .079 0452 - 11 96 0 000 -1 100312 - . 7900697
own_lopex . 7592 687 .063 1844 12 02 0 000 -6352735 . 8832639
own_lroyalty .1104 669 . 029 5024 3 74 0 000 0525703 . 1683634
own_lppt -.0403 597 . 022 2219 -1 82 0 070 0839688 . 0032494
loilprice . 5879 385 . 07 2034 8 16 0 000 44 65766 . 72 93003
cons -.7545 838 . 323 2599 -2 33 0 020 -1 38896 - . 12 02079
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Appendix 7: FEM Regression Results on Gross Margin
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 9 7 :
Group va r i abl e : ± d Number of groups = -
R - sq : within = 0.5732 Obs per g r o u p : min = 1 O £
he tween = 0.9531 a*vg = 1 O 8 . C
ove rail = 0.6717 max = 1 O £
corr (u i , X b ) = - O . V 3 9 7
F ( 8,8 ) - 
Prob > F =
(Std. Err. adjusted for 9 clusters in id)
Appendix 8 REM Regression Results on Gross Margin
Random-effects GLS regression 
Group variable: id
Number of obs = 
Number of groups =
972
9
R - sq : wi thin 
be tween 
ove r a11
= 0.5670 
= 0.9447 
= 0.6820
Obs per* group: min = 
avg = 
ma.sc =
10 8 
X O 8 . O 
X O 8
corr(u_i , X) = O (assumed)
Wald chi 2 (8)
Prob > chi2 =
(Std . Err. adjusted for 9 clusters in id)
lgrossmargin Coe f .
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> 1 Z 1 [95% Conf. X nt e rva1]
loutput 1.443406 . 1464666 9 8 5 O . o o o 1.156337 X . 7 3 04 7 5
1 ope>c -1.042279 . 13 03633 - 8 O O O . o o o -X. 297786 - .78677X9
1roya1ty - . 0436907 . 0 19 8 949 -2 2 O o .02 8 - . 0826839 - . 0 046975
lppt -.0363551 . 0194 13 1 - X 8 7 o . 061 _ . 0 74 4 04 . 0 0 16 9 3 9
own loutput -.9451906 . X805888 - 5 2 3 o . o o o -1.299138 - . 5 9 X 2 4 3 X
own 1 ope>c . 7592687 . 14 9344 X 5 O 8 o . o o o . 4665597 1.051978
own lroyalty . 1104 6 6 9 . 03 06426 3 6 1 o . o o o . 05 04 O 84 . 1705253
own lppt - . 0403597 . 02 3 34 3 8 - X 7 3 o . 084 -.0861126 .0053932
loilprice . 5 8 7 9385 . 0 7 5X706 7 8 2 o . o o o .4406067 . 73 52 7 03
_cons - . 7 54 5 8 3 8 . 62 724 7 - X 2 O o .22 9 -1.983965 .4747977
s i cjma_u.
s±gma_e
rXio
O
. 82 14 5773 
O (f rac t ion of variance due to u_i )
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Appendix 9: Hausman Test Fixed-effect vs Random-effect Models on Gross Margin
-----  C o e f f i c i e n t s  -----
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt (di a g (V_b -V _ B ) )
f ixed r a n d o m Di f ference S . E .
l o u tput 1. 6 9 9 1 9 1 . 443406 .2557838 .0347701
lopex - 1 .224354 - 1 .042279 - .1820749 .0233091
l r o y a l t y - . 0768714 - . 0436907 - .0331807 . 0030866
lppt - . 012866 - . 0363551 .0234891 . 0070455
o w n  loutput -1.1374 - . 9451906 -.1922097 .0513083
o w n _ l o p e x .92279 .7592687 .1635213 .0488819
o w n_l r o y a l t y .1471946 . 1 1 04669 .0367277 .0041181
o w n_lppt - .0503 936 - . 0403597 - . 0100339 . 0047642
l o i l p r i c e . 58 2 2 0 7 9 . 5 8 79385 -.0057306
k> = c o n s i s t e n t u n d e r  Ho and Ha, o b t a i n e d  fr o m  x t r e g
B = i n c o n s i s t e n t u n d e r  Ha, e f f i c i e n t  u n d e r  Ho, o b t a i n e d  fr o m  x t r e g
T e s t : Ho d i f f e r e n c e  in c o e f f i c i e n t s  not s y s t e m a t i c
chi 2 ( 9) = ( b - B ) '[(V _b -V _B )~ ( - 1 ) ] (b-B)
= 12.23
P r o b > c h i 2  = 0.2007
(V _ b -V_B i s not p o s i t i v e de f i n i t e )
Appendix 10: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects on Gross 
MarginBreusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
lgrossmargin [id, t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t]
Estimated results:
Var sd = sqrt(Var)
lgrossm~n 2.329692 1.526333
e . 6747928 .8214577
u 0 0
Test: Var(u) = 0
chibar2(01) = 0.00
Prob > chibar2 = 1.0000
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Appendix 103: Petroleum Act 1969 provisions on oil exploration and prospecting liceses and oil 
mining lease__________________________________________________________________________________
Oil exploration licences
1. An oil exploration licence shall apply to the area specified therein which 
may be any area on which a premium has not been placed by the Minister, 
and shall authorise the licensee to undertake exploration for petroleum in the 
area of the licence, excluding land in respect of which the grant of an oil 
prospecting licence or oil mining lease has been approved by the Minister 
and land in respect of which an oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease is 
in force.
2. An oil exploration licence shall not confer any exclusive rights over the 
area of the licence, and the grant of an oil exploration licence in respect of 
any area shall not preclude the grant of another oil exploration licence or of 
an oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease over the same area or any part 
thereof.
3. An oil exploration licence shall terminate on 31 December next following 
the date on which it was granted, but the licensee shall have an option to 
renew the licence for one further year if:
(a) he has fulfilled in respect of the licence, all obligations imposed upon him 
by this Act or otherwise;
(b) the Minister is satisfied with work done and the reports submitted by the
2 3 7
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(c) an application for renewal has been made at least three months before 
the date of expiry of the licence.
4. An oil exploration licence shall not confer any right to the grant of an oil 
prospecting licence or an oil mining lease.
Oil prospecting licences
5. The holder of an oil prospecting licence shall have the exclusive right to 
explore and prospect for petroleum within the area of his licence.
6. The duration of an oil prospecting licence shall be determined by the 
Minister, but shall not exceed five years (including any periods of renewal).
7. The holder of an oil prospecting licence may carry away and dispose of 
petroleum won during prospecting operations, subject to the fulfilment of 
obligations imposed upon him by or under this Act (including any special 
terms or conditions imposed under paragraph 34 of this Schedule) or by the 
Petroleum Profits Tax Act or any other law imposing taxation in respect of 
petroleum.
Oil mining leases
8. An oil mining lease may be granted only to the holder of an oil prospecting 
licence who has:
licensee in pursuance of the licence; and
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(a) satisfied all the conditions imposed on the licence or otherwise imposed 
on him by this Act; and
(b) discovered oil in commercial quantities.
9. For the purposes of paragraph 8 of this Schedule, oil shall be deemed to 
have been discovered in commercial quantities by the holder of an oil 
prospecting licence if the Minister, upon evidence adduced by the licensee, 
is satisfied that the licensee is capable of producing at least 10,000 barrels 
per day of crude oil from the licensed area.
10. The term of an oil mining lease shall not exceed twenty years, but may 
be renewed in accordance with this Act.
11. Subject to this Act and any special terms or conditions imposed under 
paragraph 34 of this Schedule, the lessee of an oil mining lease shall have 
the exclusive right within the leased area to conduct exploration and 
prospecting operations and to win, get, work, store, carry away, transport, 
export or otherwise treat petroleum discovered in or under the leased area.
12. (1) Ten years after the grant of an oil mining lease, one half of the area 
of the lease shall be relinquished.
(2) Paragraph 18 of this Schedule shall apply to the relinquished area.
13. (1) The lessee of an oil mining lease shall be entitled to apply in writing 
to the Minister, not less than twelve months before the expiration of the
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lease, for a renewal of the lease either in respect of the whole of the leased 
area or any particular part thereof; and the renewal shall be granted if the 
lessee has paid all rent and royalties due and has otherwise performed all 
his obligations under the lease.
3.4.2.2 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969
Under section 9 of the 1979 Petroleum Act, the following provisions are 
made as they affect the drilling and production activities of the upstream oil 
and gas companies:
1.(1) Every application for an oil exploration licence, oil prospecting licence 
or oil mining lease shall be made to the Minister in writing on the appropriate 
form as set out in the Schedule to these Regulations.
(2) Every application shall be accompanied by:
(a) the prescribed fee as set out in Part VI of these Regulations (the fee in 
question not being refundable in any circumstances);
(b) ten copies of a map on a scale or scales specified by the Director of 
Petroleum Resources upon which is delineated in red the boundaries of the 
area in respect of which the application is made;
(c) an adequate survey description of the boundaries of that area (at least 
one boundary corner being tied, in the case of an application for an oil 
mining lease, to an official survey control beacon, or an existing survey mark
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itself previously tied to an official survey grid) or, where the area has been 
blocked out or delineated and described by or on behalf of the Minister, a 
reference to the particulars of identification used by him or on his 
behalf:
(d) evidence of the financial status and technical competence of the 
applicant;
(e) details of the work which the applicant is prepared to undertake or a 
programme for carrying out any minimum working obligations 
imposed;
(f) details of the annual expenditure which the applicant is prepared to make 
on each area applied for;
(g) the date on which he is prepared to begin operations after the grant of 
the oil exploration licence, oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease to which 
the application relates:
(h) details of a specific scheme for the recruitment and training of 
Nigerians:
(i) evidence of the applicant’s ability to market any petroleum 
produced;
(j) annual reports in respect of the applicant’s oil exploration and production
241
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(k) any other information which the Minister may call for by notice in the 
Federal Gazette or otherwise.
(3) The applicant shall furnish such further evidence relating to the matters 
mentioned in paragraph (2) of this regulation as the Director of Petroleum 
Resources may require.
2. (1) The boundaries of the area applied for:
(a) shall be straight lines in North to South and East to West directions and, 
where so required by the Director of Petroleum Resources, shall be 
coincident with all or part of any existing licence or lease boundaries or 
international or inter-State boundaries or with grid lines designated by him; 
or
(b) where the boundaries of the area have been already delineated by or on 
behalf of the Minister, shall correspond to those boundaries.
(2) The area applied for shall be a compact unit not exceeding in area
(a) in the case of an oil exploration licence, 5,000 square miles;
(b) in the case of an oil prospecting licence, 1,000 square miles;
(c) in the case of an oil mining lease, 500 square miles.
(3) All oil mining leases deriving from an oil prospecting licence shall be in
activities in the preceding three years; and
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compact blocks or units; and, where more than one block or unit is so 
derived, each block or unit shall be the subject of a separate and distinct 
lease.
(4) Where there is provision for the relinquishment or surrender of part of the 
relevant area of a licence or lease, the relinquishment or surrender shall be 
such that the retained part is a compact unit as provided in paragraphs (2) 
and (3) of this regulation; and the licensee or lessee shall obtain the prior 
agreement of the Director of Petroleum Resources as to the shape and area 
of the retained part before an application for the relinquishment or surrender 
is made to the Minister.
3. An applicant may withdraw his application by notifying the Minister of his 
intention in writing, and the Minister shall accept the withdrawal if the 
prescribed fee is paid:
Provided that the Minister may for good reasons waive the fee.
4. (a) An application for the assignment of an oil prospecting licence or oil 
mining lease (or of an interest in the same) shall be made to the Minister in 
writing and accompanied by the prescribed fee; and the applicant shall 
furnish in respect of the assignee all such information as is required to be 
furnished in the case of an applicant for a new licence or lease.
(b) Application for the assignment or takeover of an oil prospecting licence or
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oil mining lease (or of an interest in the same) shall be made to the Minister 
in writing and accompanied by the prescribed fees at the discretion of the 
Minister; and the applicant shall furnish in respect of the assignment, or 
takeover, all such information as is required to be furnished in the case of an 
applicant for a new licence or lease.
5. All grants and renewals of oil prospecting licences and oil mining leases 
and all surrenders, determinations or assignments thereof shall be published 
in the Federal Gazette with the name of the licensee or lessee and the 
situation of the relevant area.
6. (1) The holder of an oil exploration licence may remove for examination 
and analysis samples and specimens of rock and petroleum found by him in 
the course of his operations.
(2) The Director of Petroleum Resources shall be given particulars of all 
such samples and specimens and provided, if he so requests, with 
representative samples and specimens not exceeding one half of the 
samples and specimens removed.
7. The holder of an oil exploration licence, oil prospecting licence or oil 
mining lease may not export samples or specimens abroad except with the 
written permission of the Director of Petroleum Resources and subject to 
such conditions as he may prescribe.
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8. If the law of the State in which the relevant area is situated provides for an 
oil exploration licence, oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease to be 
‘registrable’, the licensee or lessee shall register the licence or lease 
accordingly at his own expense and supply one copy of the registered 
licence or lease to the Director of Petroleum Resources.
9. The holder of an oil exploration licence, oil prospecting licence or oil 
mining lease shall—
(a) appoint a manager resident in Nigeria to supervise the operations under 
the licence or lease; and
(b) notify the name and address of the manager (and changes therein) to the 
Director of Petroleum Resources, and any notices required to be served on 
the licensee or lessee shall be sufficiently served if delivered or posted to the 
manager at the address notified.
10. Oil exploration licences shall be in the appropriate form in the Schedule 
to these Regulations.
11. Subject to the rights of the owners and occupiers of the relevant area, 
the licensee of an oil exploration licence may, with the approval of the 
Director of Petroleum Resources, bring and erect upon the relevant area 
temporary structures, machinery and other things necessary for his 
operations, and may dismantle and remove the same.
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12. (1) As soon as possible (but not more than three months) after the grant 
of an oil exploration licence, the licensee shall commence to examine the 
relevant area by geological and geophysical methods, and shall continue the 
examination during the subsistence of the licence.
(2) Work under paragraph (1) of this regulation shall be supervised 
continuously by a qualified petroleum geologist and shall be carried out to 
the satisfaction of the Director of Petroleum Resources.
13. (1) The licensee of an oil exploration licence shall report without delay to 
the Director of Petroleum the discovery of any hydrocarbons or other 
economic minerals in the relevant area.
(2) In addition to reports and information required to be submitted under 
Part V of these Regulations, the licensee of an oil exploration licence shall 
within two months of the expiration of the licence forward to the Director of 
Petroleum Resources a report in triplicate on the work done and the 
conclusions reached on the relevant area, the report in question being 
accompanied by all necessary data, maps, plans and sections.
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Appendix 114: Data on Financial Variables
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JV_S 1 1999ml 20241025.00 45011285.47 11.32 229128403.00 12424000.00 57435285.47 1219000.00 13643000 58654285.47 171693117.5 2.83 74.9331 0.67403 0
JV_S 1 1999m2 18096707.00 40242825.89 10.75 194539600.25 6901000.00 47143825.89 1193000.00 8094000 48336825.89 147395774.4 2.60 75.7665 0.44726 0
JV_S 1 1999m3 23319237.00 51856505.97 12.86 299885387.82 20910000.00 72766505.97 1212000.00 22122000 73978505.97 227118881.9 3.12 75.7352 0.94866 0
JV_S 1 1999m4 22270228.00 49523756.34 15.73 350310686.44 17469000.00 66992756.34 9319000.00 26788000 76311756.34 283317930.1 3.00 80.8762 1.20286 0
JV_S 1 1999m5 25048858.00 55702776.82 16.12 403787590.96 24703000.00 80405776.82 10958000.00 35661000 91363776.82 323381814.1 3.20 80.0871 1.42366 0
JV_S 1 1999m6 20752569.00 46148839.18 16.24 337021720.56 18655000.00 64803839.18 14049000.00 32704000 78852839.18 272217881.4 3.12 80.7716 1.5759 0
JV_S 1 1999m7 20559334.00 45719129.93 18.75 385487512.50 24942000.00 70661129.93 15816000.00 40758000 86477129.93 314826382.6 3.43 81.6697 1.98246 0
JV_S 1 1999m8 20679444.00 45986226.36 20.21 417931563.24 28009000.00 73995226.36 20383000.00 48392000 94378226.36 343936336.9 3.57 82.2949 2.3401 0
JV_S 1 1999m9 21971021.00 48858390.24 22.37 491491739.77 31998000.00 80856390.24 27009000.00 59007000 107865390.2 410635349.5 3.68 83.5488 2.68567 0
JV_S 1 1999ml0 21299278.00 47364591.59 22.19 472630978.82 25700000.00 73064591.59 38436000.00 64136000 111500591.6 399566387.2 3.43 84.5409 3.01118 0
JV_S 1 1999mll 20676849.00 45980455.69 24.22 500793282.78 33677000.00 79657455.69 70239000.00 103916000 149896455.7 421135827.1 3.85 84.0937 5.02572 0
JV_S 1 1999ml2 22859000.00 50833046.98 25.01 571703590.00 28401000.00 79234046.98 70809000.00 99210000 150043047 492469543 3.46 86.1407 4.34008 0
JV_S 1 2000ml 20864.00 34162.57 25.21 525981.44 41548000.00 41582162.57 34481000.00 76029000 76063162.57 -41056181.13 1993. -7805.6 3644.03 0
JV_S 1 2000m2 20582650.00 33701885.40 27.15 558818947.50 32551000.00 66252885.40 38254000.00 70805000 104506885.4 492566062.1 3.21 88.1441 3.44003 0
JV_S 1 2000m3 23404214.00 38321894.32 27.49 643381842.86 39882000.00 78203894.32 44703000.00 84585000 122906894.3 565177948.5 3.34 87.8449 3.61409 0
JV_S 1 2000m4 22216571.00 36377256.08 23.45 520978589.95 37667000.00 74044256.08 49878000.00 87545000 123922256.1 446934333.9 3.33 85.7875 3.94053 0
JV_S 1 2000m5 22929979.00 37545385.29 27.23 624383328.17 40700000.00 78245385.29 52855000.00 93555000 131100385.3 546137942.9 3.41 87.4684 4.08003 0
JV_S 1 2000m6 23378014.00 38278994.63 29.62 692456774.68 26417000.00 64695994.63 60958000.00 87375000 125653994.6 627760780.1 2.76 90.657 3.73749 0
JV_S 1 2000m7 23931532.00 39185321.08 28.16 673911941.12 31228000.00 70413321.08 71753000.00 102981000 142166321.1 603498620 2.94 89.5516 4.30315 0
JV_S 1 2000m8 27394911.00 44856233.34 29.41 805684332.51 54728000.00 99584233.34 84376000.00 139104000 183960233.3 706100099.2 3.63 87.6398 5.07773 0
JV_S 1 2000m9 23354428.00 38240375.08 32.08 749210050.24 30681000.00 68921375.08 99948000.00 130629000 168869375.1 680288675.2 2.95 90.8008 5.59333 0
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JV_S 1 2000ml0 26314888.00 43087811.32 31.4 826287483.20 48347000.00 91434811.32 124313000.00 172660000 215747811.3 734852671.9 3.47 88.9343 6.5613 0
JV_S 1 2000mll 25536879.00 41813904.89 32.33 825607298.07 49633000.00 91446904.89 176254000.00 225887000 267700904.9 734160393.2 3.58 88.9237 8.84552 0
JV_S 1 2000ml2 26799311.00 43881002.11 25.28 677486582.08 36903000.00 80784002.11 176128000.00 213031000 256912002.1 596702580 3.01 88.0759 7.94912 0
JV_S 1 2001ml 26689986.00 46315077.55 25.95 692605136.70 49235000.00 95550077.55 52322000.00 101557000 147872077.5 597055059.2 3.58 86.2042 3.80506 0
JV_S 1 2001m2 24031150.00 41701204.93 27.24 654608526.00 17760000.00 59461204.93 52276000.00 70036000 111737204.9 595147321.1 2.47 90.9165 2.91438 0
JV_S 1 2001m3 25675304.00 44554301.97 25.02 642396106.08 54578000.00 99132301.97 57356000.00 111934000 156488302 543263804.1 3.86 84.5684 4.3596 0
JV_S 1 2001m4 5764797.00 10003640.32 25.66 147924691.02 27736000.00 37739640.32 59808000.00 87544000 97547640.32 110185050.7 6.54 74.4873 15.186 0
JV_S 1 2001m5 26121163.00 45328000.17 27.55 719638040.65 46194000.00 91522000.17 61836000.00 108030000 153358000.2 628116040.5 3.50 87.2822 4.13573 0
JV_S 1 2001m6 22496565.00 39038242.75 26.97 606732358.05 28431000.00 67469242.75 55774000.00 84205000 123243242.8 539263115.3 2.99 88.8799 3.74302 0
JV_S 1 2001m7 22861397.00 39671334.97 24.8 566962645.60 33521000.00 73192334.97 57546000.00 91067000 130738335 493770310.6 3.20 87.0904 3.98344 0
JV_S 1 2001m8 25903317.00 44949972.46 25.81 668564611.77 28688000.00 73637972.46 59046000.00 87734000 132683972.5 594926639.3 2.84 88.9857 3.38698 0
JV_S 1 2001m9 25846761.00 44851830.95 25.03 646944427.83 23668000.00 68519830.95 47916000.00 71584000 116435830.9 578424596.9 2.65 89.4087 2.76955 0
JV_S 1 2001ml0 28257977.00 49036009.09 20.73 585787863.21 40937000.00 89973009.09 45668000.00 86605000 135641009.1 495814854.1 3.18 84.6407 3.0648 0
JV_S 1 2001mll 25330272.00 43955568.65 18.69 473422783.68 21382000.00 65337568.65 80518000.00 101900000 145855563.7 408085215 2.57 86.1989 4.02285 0
JV_S 1 2001ml2 25478939.00 44213550.19 18.52 471869950.28 30525000.00 74738550.19 87198000.00 117723000 161936550.2 397131400.1 2.93 84.1612 4.6204 0
JV_S 1 2002ml 22751350.00 50646598.97 19.15 435688352.50 27054000.00 77700598.97 5647000.00 32701000 83347598.97 357987753.5 3.41 82.166 1.43732 0
JV_S 1 2002m2 17632649.00 39251899.45 19.98 352300327.02 23138000.00 62389899.45 12011000.00 35149000 74400899.45 289910427.6 3.53 82.2907 1.9934 0
JV_S 1 20O2m3 19990462.00 44500608.19 23.64 472574521.68 33159000.00 77659608.19 13487000.00 46646000 91146608.19 394914913.5 3.88 83.5667 2.33341 0
JV_S 1 2002m4 19846518.00 44180175.60 25.43 504696952.74 27998000.00 72178175.60 16405000.00 44403000 88583175.6 432518777.1 3.63 85.6987 2.23732 0
JV_S 1 2002m5 20529257.00 45700015.45 25.69 527396612.33 31018000.00 76718015.45 27504000.00 58522000 104222015.4 450678596.9 3.73 85.4534 2.85066 0
JV_S 1 2002m6 19905515.00 44311508.35 24.49 487486062.35 21049000.00 65360508.35 29121000.00 50170000 94481508.35 422125554 3.28 86.5923 2.52041 0
JV_S 1 2002m6 22116370.00 49233075.05 25.75 569496527.50 25802000.00 75035075.05 32732000.00 58534000 107767075 494461452.5 3.39 86.8243 2.64664 0
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JV_S 1 2002m8 24504729.00 54549781.99 26.78 656236642.62 34190000.00 88739781.99 45203000.00 79393000 133942782 567496860.6 3.62 86.4775 3.23991 0
JV_S 1 2002m9 23487471.00 52285272.06 28.28 664225679.88 35475000.00 87760272.06 59225000.00 94700000 146985272.1 576465407.8 3.73 86.7876 4.03194 0
JV_S 1 2002ml0 22030495.00 49041909.40 27.53 606499527.35 35401000.00 84442909.40 53289000.00 88690000 137731909.4 522056618 3.83 86.077 4.02578 0
JV_S 1 2002mll 23857896.00 53109872.20 24.79 591437241.84 36900000.00 90009872.20 80689000.00 117589000 170698872.2 501427369.6 3.77 84.7812 4.92872 0
JV_S 1 2002ml2 25750013.00 57321898.78 27.89 718167862.57 35775000.00 93096898.78 83863000.00 119638000 176959898.8 625070963.8 3.61 87.0369 4.64613 0
JV_S 1 2003ml 27857392.00 55588788.57 30.77 857171951.84 55906000.00 111494788.57 45064000.00 100970000 156558783.6 745677163.3 4.00 86.9927 3.62453 1
JV_S 1 2003m2 25581434.00 51047166.44 32.88 841117549.92 51459000.00 102506166.44 54342000.00 105801000 156848166.4 738611383.5 4.00 87.8131 4.13585 1
JV_S 1 2003m3 26089962.00 52061922.43 30.36 792091246.32 50945000.00 103006922.43 50711000.00 101656000 153717922.4 689084323.9 3.94 86.9956 3.89636 1
JV_S 1 2003m4 23291843.00 46478339.97 25.49 593709078.07 41894000.00 88372339.97 55046000.00 96940000 143418340 505336738.1 3.79 85.1152 4.16197 1
JV_S 1 2003mS 26145120.00 52171988.96 26.06 681341827.20 35274000.00 87445988.96 63068000.00 98342000 150513989 593895838.2 3.34 87.1656 3.76139 1
JV_S 1 2003m6 25693639.00 51271068.95 27.91 717109464.49 41642000.00 92913068.95 69872000.00 111514000 162785069 624196395.5 3.61 87.0434 4.34014 1
JV_S 1 2003m7 27676368.00 55227559.32 28.59 791267361.12 54589000.00 109816559.32 77571000.00 132160000 187387559.3 681450801.8 3.96 86.1214 4.77519 1
JV_S 1 2003m8 28853662.00 57576822.57 29.68 856376688.16 50055000.00 107631822.57 85590000.00 135645000 193221822.6 748744865.6 3.73 87.4317 4.70114 1
JV_S 1 2003m9 28540857.00 56952627.35 26.88 767178236.16 46972000.00 103924627.35 99266000.00 146238000 203190627.3 663253608.8 3.64 86.4537 5.12381 1
JV_S 1 2003ml0 31759469.00 63375293.98 29.01 921342195.69 63542000.00 126917293.98 148284000.00 211826000 275201294 794424901.7 3.99 86.2247 6.6697 1
JV_S 1 2003mll 30941305.00 61742666.43 29.12 901010801.60 57142000.00 118884666.43 222818000.00 279960000 341702666.4 782126135.2 3.84 86.8054 9.0481 1 '
JV_S 1 2003ml2 31815168.00 63486440.06 29.95 952864281.60 54219000.00 117705440.06 223719000.00 277938000 341424440.1 835158841.5 3.69 87.6472 8.73602 1
JV_S 1 2004ml 32672045.00 83753984.06 31.4 1025902213.00 81359000.00 165112984.06 112359000.00 193718000 277471984.1 860789228.9 5.05 83.9056 5.92917 1
JV_S 1 2004m2 31238331.00 80078693.47 31.32 978384526.92 63787000.00 143865693.47 113539000.00 177326000 257404693.5 834518833.4 4.60 85.2956 5.67655 1
JV_S 1 2004m3 33216705.00 85150206.58 33.67 1118406457.35 50903000.00 136053206.58 124744000.00 175647000 260797206.6 982353250.8 4.09 87.8351 5.28791 1
JV_S 1 2004m4 30177390.00 77358997.30 33.71 1017279816.90 64624000.00 141982997.30 137129000.00 201753000 279111997.3 875296819.6 4.70 86.0429 6.68557 1
JV_S 1 2004m5 30617175.00 78486375.34 37.63 1152124295.25 83814000.00 162300375.34 146636000.00 230450000 308936375.3 989823919.9 5.30 85.9129 7.52682 1
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JV_S 1 2004m6 30201710.00 77421341.03 35.54 1073368773.40 62502000.00 139923341.03 162356000.00 224858000 302279341 933445432.4 4.63 86.9641 7.44521 1
JV_S 1 2004m7 31887503.00 81742829.93 37.93 1209492988.79 80440000.00 162182829.93 184797000.00 265237000 346979829.9 1047310159 5.08 86.5908 8.3179 1
JV_S 1 2004m8 31119853.00 79774978.03 42.08 1309523414.24 85502000.00 165276978.03 207650000.00 293152000 372926978 1144246436 5.31 87.3788 9.4201 1
JV_S 1 2004m9 29918507.00 76695357.10 41.65 1246105816.55 71135000.00 147830357.10 218928000.00 290063000 366758357.1 1098275459 4.94 88.1366 9.6951 1
JV_S 1 2004ml0 29740211.00 76238299.69 46.87 1393923689.57 89662000.00 165900299.69 276188000.00 365850000 442088299.7 1228023390 5.57 88.0983 12.3015 1
JV_S 1 2004mll 29644764.00 75993623.65 42.23 1251898383.72 78535000.00 154528623.65 287116000.00 365651000 441644623.6 1097369760 5.21 87.6565 12.3344 1
JV_S 1 2004ml2 27702320.00 71014216.21 39.09 1082883688.80 75302000.00 146316216.21 281166000.00 356468000 427482216.2 936567472.6 5.28 86.4883 12.8678 1
JV_S 1 2005ml 31476569.00 80564917.15 43.822 1379366206.72 98311000.00 178875917.15 258761000.00 357072000 437636917.1 1200490290 5.68 87.032 11.3441 1
JV_S 1 2005m2 28321588.00 72489679.25 46.9836 1330650161.96 98311000.00 170800679.25 258761000.00 357072000 429561679.3 1159849483 6.03 87.1641 12.6078 1
JV_S 1 2005m3 33460587.00 85643051.48 53.2387 1781398153.12 98311000.00 183954051.48 258761000.00 357072000 442715051.5 1597444102 5.49 89.6736 10.6714 1
JV_S 1 2005m4 29445299.00 75365840.36 52.1535 1535675401.40 98311000.00 173676840.36 258761000.00 357072000 432437840.4 1361998561 5.89 88.6905 12.1266 1
JV_S 1 2005m5 32298233.00 82667982.83 48.7608 1574887679.67 98311000.00 180978982.83 258761000.00 357072000 439739982.8 1393908697 5.60 88.5085 11.0555 1
JV_S 1 2005m6 32531201.00 83264269.15 54.3858 1769235391.35 98311000.00 181575269.15 258761000.00 357072000 440336269.2 1587660122 5.58 89.7371 10.9763 1
JV_S 1 2005m7 30744129.00 78690222.10 58.7619 1806583433.89 98311000.00 177001222.10 258761000.00 357072000 435762222.1 1629582212 5.75 90.2024 11.6143 1
JV_S 1 2005m8 31131186.00 79680902.35 65.3707 2035067420.65 98311000.00 177991902.35 258761000.00 357072000 436752902.3 1857075518 5.71 91.2538 11.4699 1
JV_S 1 2005m9 30281288.00 77505571.17 63.8832 1934465577.56 98311000.00 175816571.17 258761000.00 357072000 434577571.2 1758649006 5.80 90.9114 11.7918 1
JV_S 1 2005ml0 29560664.00 75661119.42 60.87 98311000.00 173972119.42 258761000.00 357072000 432733119.4 5.88 12.0793 1
JV_S 1 2005mll 29472874.00 75436419.13 55.1381 1625078273.90 98311000.00 173747419.13 258761000.00 357072000 432508419.1 1451330855 5.89 89.3084 12.1153 1
JV_S 1 2005ml2 30060556.00 76940603.14 58.3034 1752632620.69 98311000.00 175251603.14 258761000.00 357072000 434012603.1 1577381018 5.82 90.0007 11.8784 1
JV_S 1 2006ml 22066694.00 99537353.36 63.4921 1401060742.12 79960.00 99617313.36 224268.00 304228 99841581.36 1301443429 4.51 92.8899 0.01379 1
JV_S 1 2006m2 17310372.00 78082771.01 60.2523 1042989726.86 85034.00 78167805.01 207358.00 292392 78375163.01 964821921.8 4.51 92.5054 0.01689 1
JV_S 1 2006m3 14187623.00 63996829.06 62.1603 881906901.97 40473.00 64037302.06 195723.00 236196 64233025.06 817869599.9 4.51 92.7388 0.01665 1
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JV_S 1 2006m4 0.00 0.00 0.00 58079.00 58079.00 175333.00 233412 233412 -58079 1
JV_S 1 2006m5 12988717.00 58588863.10 70.0808 910259678.33 48777.00 58637640.10 131761.00 180538 58769401.1 851622038.2 4.51 93.5581 0.0139 1
JV_S 1 2006m6 0.00 0.00 0.00 58387.00 58387.00 93254.00 151641 151641 -58387 1
JV_S 1 2006m7 11647590.00 52539373.67 74.2877 865272671.64 35997.00 52575370.67 5911.00 41908 52581281.67 812697301 4.51 93.9238 0.0036 1
JV_S 1 2006m8 11533220.00 52023479.12 69.6639 803449084.76 59518.00 52082997.12 44091.00 103609 52127088.12 751366087.6 4.51 93.5176 0.00898 1
JV_S 1 2006m9 11951371.00 53909654.00 63.1611 754861738.87 44783.00 53954437.00 29751.00 74534 53984188 700907301.9 4.51 92.8524 0.00624 1
JV_S 1 2006ml0 11132864.00 50217573.05 58.4447 650656896.62 44332.00 50261905.05 9461.00 53793 50271366.05 600394991.6 4.51 92.2752 0.00483 1
JV_S 1 2006mll 11512691.00 51930877.92 60.4533 695980162.83 60009.00 51990886.92 55203.00 115212 52046089.92 643989275.9 4.51 92.5298 0.01001 1
JV_S 1 2006ml2 12402105.00 55942802.66 59.084 732765971.82 24968.00 55967770.66 55203.00 80171 56022973.66 676798201.2 4.51 92.3621 0.00646 1
JV_S 1 2007ml 12128498.00 70302449.44 54.5782 661951589.54 53799.00 70356248.44 32667.00 86466 70388915.44 591595341.1 5.80 89.3714 0.00713 1
JV_S 1 2007m2 11156968.00 64671006.98 58.5746 653514937.81 20615.00 64691621.98 33617.00 54232 64725238.98 588823315.8 5.79 90.101 0.00486 1
JV_S 1 2007m3 9142805.00 52995975.78 64.3595 588426358.40 58741.00 53054716.78 35574.00 94315 53090290.78 535371641.6 5.80 90.9836 0.01032 1
JV_S 1 2007m4 12002163.00 69570152.67 68.6 823348381.80 42059.00 69612211.67 30884.00 72943 69643095.67 753736170.1 5.79 91.5452 0.00608 1
JV_S 1 2007m5 9586421.00 55567381.69 68.88 660312678.48 35760.00 55603141.69 33733.00 69493 55636874.69 604709536.8 5.80 91.5793 0.00725 1
JV_S 1 2007m6 9586421.00 55567381.69 68.88 660312678.48 35933.00 55603314.69 39220.00 75153 55642534.69 604709363.8 5.80 91.5792 0.00784 1
JV_S 1 2007m7 9586421.00 55567381.69 68.88 660312678.48 46950.00 55614331.69 76671.00 123621 55691002.69 604698346.8 5.80 91.5776 0.0129 1
JV_S 1 2007m8 9586421.00 55567381.69 68.88 660312678.48 70933.00 55638314.69 76394.00 147327 55714708.69 604674363.8 5.80 91.5739 0.01537 1
JV_S 1 2007m9 9586421.00 55567381.69 68.88 660312678.48 71156.00 55638537.69 89657.00 160813 55728194.69 604674140.8 5.80 91.5739 0.01678 1
JV_S 1 2007ml0 9586421.00 55567381.69 68.88 660312678.48 67980.00 55635361.69 181284.00 249264 55816645 69 604677316.8 5.80 91.5744 0.026 1
JV_S 1 2007mll 12680000.00 73499213.09 68.88 873398400.00 38497.00 73537710.09 206610.00 245107 73744320.09 799860689.9 5.79 91.5803 0.01933 1
JV_S 1 2007ml2 0.00 0.00 68.88 0.00 114784.00 114784.00 206610.00 321394 321394 -114784 1
JV_C 1 1999ml 13094886.00 27401405.52 11.32 148234109.52 10730000.00 38131405.52 0.00 10730000 38131405.52 110102704 2.91 74.2762 0.8194 0
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JVC 1 1999m2 9983571.00 20890894.16 10.75 107323388.25 7304000.00 28194894.16 0.00 7304000 28194894.16 79128494.09 2.82 73.729 0.7316 0
JVC 1 1999m3 13296995.00 27824324.11 12.86 170999355.70 11268000.00 39092324.11 1187000.00 12455000 40279324.11 131907031.6 2.93 77.1389 0.93668 0
JV_C 1 1999m4 13115967.00 27445518.09 15.73 206314160.91 14438000.00 41883518.09 1187000.00 15625000 43070518.09 164430642.8 3.19 79.6992 1.1913 0
JVC 1 1999m5 13412852.00 28066758.03 16.12 216215174.24 15362000.00 43428758.03 4221000.00 19583000 47649758.03 172786416.2 3.23 79.9141 1.46002 0
JV_C 1 1999m6 14055393.00 29411292.57 16.24 228259582.32 13679000.00 43090292.57 4221000.00 17900000 47311292.57 185169289.7 3.06 81.1222 1.27353 0
JVC 1 1999m7 12406754.00 25961470.57 18.75 232626637.50 17143000.00 43104470.57 8806000.00 25949000 51910470.57 189522166.9 3.47 81.4705 2.09152 0
JV_C 1 1999m8 13559212.00 28373020.32 20.21 274031674.52 21081000.00 49454020.32 8806000.00 29887000 58260020.32 224577654.2 3.64 81.9532 2.20418 0
JVC 1 1999m9 12253315.00 25640395.29 22.37 274106656.55 20295000.00 45935395.29 16881000.00 37176000 62816395.29 228171261.3 3.74 83.2418 3.03395 0
JV_C 1 1999ml0 12103479.00 25326859.38 22.19 268576199.01 20163000.00 45489859.38 30000000.00 50163000 75489859.38 223086339.6 3.75 83.0626 4.14451 0
JV_C 1 1999mll 12672487.00 26517524.11 24.22 306927635.14 23118000.00 49635524.11 30000000.00 53118000 79635524.11 257292111 3.91 83.8283 4.1916 0
JV_C 1 1999ml2 13146214.00 27508810.76 25.01 328786812.14 25567000.00 53075810.76 45269000.00 70836000 98344810.76 275711001.4 4.03 83.8571 5.38832 0
JV_C 1 2000ml 12940.00 26762.33 25.21 326217.40 24360000.00 24386762.33 65290000.00 89650000 89676762.33 •24060544.93 1884.
6
-7375.6 6928.13 0
JV_C 1 2000m2 12256144.00 25347987.21 27.15 332754309.60 25096000.00 50443987.21 65290000.00 90386000 115733987.2 282310322.4 4.11 84.8405 7.37475 0
JV_C 1 2000m3 12780270.00 26431977.34 27.49 351329622.30 28254000.00 54685977.34 29693000.00 57947000 84378977.34 296643645 4.27 84.4346 4.5341 0
JV_C 1 2000m4 12072024.00 24967192.78 23.45 283088962.80 21552000.00 46519192.78 37252000.00 58804000 83771192.78 236569770 3.85 83.5673 4.8711 0
JV_C 1 2000m5 13035775.00 26960409.25 27.23 354964153.25 27580000.00 54540409.25 37252000.00 64832000 91792409.25 300423744 4.18 84.635 4.97339 0
JV_C 1 2000m6 12281052.00 25399501.59 29.62 363764760.24 20517000.00 45916501.59 37252000.00 57769000 83168501.59 317848258.6 3.73 87.3774 4.70391 0
JVC 1 2000m7 13106792.00 27107285.62 28.16 369087262.72 26519000.00 53626285.62 53406000.00 79925000 107032285.6 315460977.1 4.09 85.4706 6.09798 0
JV_C 1 2000m8 13007497.00 26901925.08 29.41 382550486.77 27263000.00 54164925.08 53406000.00 80669000 107570925.1 328385561.7 4.16 85.8411 6.20173 0
JV_C 1 2000m9 12708286.00 26283101.03 32.08 407681814.88 29919000.00 56202101.03 67550000.00 97469000 123752101 351479713.8 4.42 86.2142 7.66972 0
JV_C 1 2000ml0 12911544.00 26703476.41 31.4 405422481.60 28664000.00 55367476.41 67550000.00 96214000 122917476.4 350055005.2 4.28 86.3433 7.45178 0
JV_C 1 2000mll 13102331.00 27098059.44 32.33 423598361.23 30757000.00 57855059.44 85019000.00 115776000 142874059.4 365743301.8 4.41 86.342 8.83629 0
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JV_C 1 2000ml2 13620273.00 28169259.91 25.28 344320501.44 24536000.00 52705259.91 104374000.00 128910000 157079259.9 291615241.5 3.86 84.693 9.46457 0
JV_C 1 2001ml 13742900.00 37556026.86 25.95 356628255.00 25386000.00 62942026.86 90099000.00 115485000 153041026.9 293686228.1 4.57 82.3508 8.40325 0
JV_C 1 2001m2 12683105.00 34659863.06 27.24 345487780.20 24573000.00 59232863.06 90099000.00 114672000 149331863.1 286254917.1 4.67 82.8553 9.04132 0
JV_C 1 2001m3 14097132.00 38524057.37 25.02 352710242.64 24386000.00 62910057.37 54710000.00 79096000 117620057.4 289800185.3 4.46 82.1638 5.61079 0
JV_C 1 2001m4 13443161.00 36736912.56 25.66 344951511.26 24788000.00 61524912.56 54710000.00 79498000 116234912.6 283426598.7 4.57 82.1642 5.91364 0
JV_C 1 2001m5 12226294.00 33411508.92 27.55 336834399.70 25211000.00 58622508.92 54710000.00 79921000 113332503.9 278211890.8 4.79 82.596 6.53681 0
JV_C 1 2001m6 13565211.00 37070445.73 26.97 365853740.67 26867000.00 63937445.73 54710000.00 81577000 118647445.7 301916294.9 4.71 82.5238 6.01369 0
JV_C 1 2001m7 14035142.00 38354653.67 24.8 348071521.60 24453000.00 62807653.67 54710000.00 79163000 117517653.7 285263867.9 4.47 81.9555 5.64034 0
JV_C 1 2001m8 13984324.00 38215780.35 25.81 360935402.44 25399000.00 63614780.35 54710000.00 80109000 118324780.4 297320622.1 4.54 82.375 5.72849 0
JV_C 1 2001m9 13453749.00 36765847.01 25.03 336747337.47 24331000.00 61096847.01 54710000.00 79041000 115806847 27S650490.5 4.54 81.8568 5.87502 0
JV_C 1 2001ml0 12844142.00 35099938.29 20.73 266259063.66 18335000.00 53434938.29 54710000.00 73045000 108144938.3 212824125.4 4.16 79.9312 5.68703 0
JV_C 1 2001mll 13561244.00 37059604.88 18.69 253459650.36 17973000.00 55032604.88 40805000.00 58778000 95837604.88 198427045.5 4.05 78.2874 4.33426 0
JV_C 1 2001ml2 12841375.00 35092376.75 18.52 237822265.00 16658000.00 51750376.75 40805000.00 57463000 92555376.75 186071888.3 4.02 78.2399 4.47483 0
JV_C 1 2002ml 772767.00 2146425.89 19.15 14798488.05 16815000.00 18961425.89 40805000.00 57620000 59766425.89 -4162937.837 24.53 -28.131 74.5632 0
JV_C 1 2002m2 10038076.00 33564069.75 19.98 200560758.48 14024000.00 47588069.75 25224000.00 39248000 72812069.75 152972688.7 4.74 76.2725 3.90991 0
JV_C 1 2002m3 10943959.00 36593048.63 23.64 258715190.76 18244000.00 54837048.63 15014000.00 33258000 69851048.63 203878142.1 5.01 78.8041 3.03894 0
JV_C 1 2002m4 10459932.00 34974619.37 25.43 265996070.76 18921000.00 53895619.37 21729000.00 40650000 75624619.37 212100451.4 5.15 79.7382 3.88626 0
JVC 1 2002m5 10202621.00 34114254.85 25.69 262105333.49 18055000.00 52169254.85 21729000.00 39784000 73898254.85 209936078.6 5.11 80.0961 3.89939 0
JV_C 1 2002m6 10086885.00 33727271.22 24.49 247027813.65 17194000.00 50921271.22 21729000.00 38923000 72650271.22 196106542.4 5.04 79.3864 3.85877 0
JV_C 1 2002 m6 5806420.00 19414784.86 25.75 149515315.00 10345000.00 29759784.86 22510000.00 32855000 52269784.86 119755530.1 5.12 80.0958 5.65839 0
JV_C 1 2002m8 11487129.00 38409232.91 26.78 307625314.62 22157000.00 60566232.91 18504000.00 40661000 79070232.91 247059081.7 5.27 80.3117 3.5397 0
JV_C 1 2002 m9 11630177.00 38887539.01 28.28 328901405.56 23566000.00 62453539.01 18504000.00 42070000 80957539.01 266447866.5 5.36 81.0115 3.61731 0
253
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
C
O
M
P
A
N
Y
C
O
D
E
O
W
N
E
R
S
H
IP
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
T
IM
E
O
U
T
P
U
T
(B
B
L)
O
P
E
X
($
)
O
IL
P
R
IC
E
($
)
>
U J  ____
6 RO
Y
A
LT
Y
($
)
P
X
N
C
O
S
T
($
)
P
P
T
($
) 5
T
O
T
A
LC
O
S
T
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
P
R
O
F
IT
($
)
C
O
S
T
B
B
L
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
M
A
R
G
IN
($
)
G
T
B
B
L
($
)
A
F
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
JVC 1 2002ml0 11566159.00 38673483.59 27.53 318416357.27 23020000.00 61693483.59 40597000.00 63617000 102290483.6 256722873.7 5.33 80.6249 5.50027 0
JVC 1 2002mll 11667452.00 39012174.52 24.79 289236135.08 19753000.00 58765174.52 40597000.00 60350000 99362174.52 230470960.6 5.03 79.6826 5.17251 0
JV_C 1 2002ml2 13215098.00 44187000.68 27.89 368569083.22 27586000.00 71773000.68 40597000.00 68183000 112370000.7 296796082.5 5.43 80.5266 5.15948 0
JVC 1 2003ml 13586609.00 42313341.53 30.77 418059958.93 30210000.00 72523341.53 40597000.00 70807000 113120341.5 345536617.4 5.33 82.6524 5.21153 1
JV_C 1 2 003 m2 12790006.00 39832447.67 32.88 420535397.28 29726000.00 69558447.67 40597000.00 70323000 110155447.7 350976949.6 5.43 83.4595 5.49828 1
JVC 1 2003m3 9713338.00 30250652.55 30.36 294896941.68 21457000.00 51707652.55 36054000.00 57511000 87761652.55 243189289.1 5.32 82.4659 5.92083 1
JV_C 1 2003m4 8334081.00 25955175.10 25.49 212435724.69 14684000.00 40639175.10 36054000.00 50738000 76693175.1 171796549.6 4.87 80.8699 6.08801 1
JVC 1 2003m5 10827198.00 33719593.07 26.06 282156779.88 19235000.00 52954593.07 36054000.00 55289000 89008593.07 229202186.8 4.89 81.2322 5.10649 1
JV_C 1 2003m6 10320197.00 32140618.77 27.91 288036698.27 19760000.00 51900618.77 49074000.00 68834000 100974618.8 236136079.5 5.02 81.9812 6.66983 1
JV_C 1 2003m7 10488825.00 32665783.97 28.59 299875506.75 21376000.00 54041783.97 49074000.00 70450000 103115784 245833722.8 5.15 81.9786 6.71667 1
JV_C 1 2003m8 10169361.00 31670863.94 29.68 301826634.48 21440000.00 53110863.94 49074000.00 70514000 102184863.9 248715770.5 5.22 82.4035 6.93397 1
JV_C 1 2003m9 9977777.00 31074205.92 26.88 268202645.76 18980000.00 50054205.92 44660000.00 63640000 94714205.92 218148439.8 5.01 81.3372 6.37817 1
JV_C 1 2003ml0 10372245.00 32302714.02 29.01 300898827.45 21429000.00 53731714.02 44650000.00 66079000 9838171402 247167113.4 5.18 82.1429 6.37075 1
JV_C 1 2003mll 10090825.00 31426276.01 29.12 293844824.00 20509000.00 51935276.01 44650000.00 65159000 96585276.01 241909548 5.14 82.3256 6.45725 1
JV_C 1 2003ml2 9977623.00 31073726.32 29.95 298829808.85 21056000.00 52129726.32 44650000.00 65706000 96779726.32 246700082.5 5.22 82.5554 6.58534 1
JV_C 1 2004ml 10572816.00 34411262.18 31.4 331986422.40 23327000.00 57738262.18 24585000.00 47912000 82323262.18 274248160.2 5.46 82.6082 4.53162 1
JV_C 1 2004m2 9766412.00 31786665.34 31.32 305884023.84 21261000.00 53047665.34 24585000.00 45846000 77632665.34 252836358.5 5.43 82.6576 4.69425 1
JV_C 1 2004m3 10455884.00 34030684.51 33.67 352049614.28 24916000.00 58946684.51 31656000.00 56572000 90602684.51 293102929.8 5.63 83.2561 5.41054 1
JV_C 1 2004m4 10626391.00 34585632.32 33.71 358215640.61 25575000.00 60160632.32 31656000.00 57231000 91816632.32 298055008.3 5.66 83.2055 5.38574 1
JV_C 1 2004m5 10995876.00 35788192.28 37.63 413774813.88 29934000.00 65722192.28 31656000.00 61590000 97378192.28 348052621.6 5.97 84.1164 5.60119 1
JV_C 1 2004m6 9836023.00 32013227.72 35.54 349572257.42 24938000.00 56951227.72 31656000.00 56594000 88607227.72 292621029.7 5.79 83.7083 5.75375 1
JV_C 1 2004m7 10756161.00 35007993.73 37.93 407981186.73 29331000.00 64338993.73 72380000.00 101711000 136718993.7 343642193 5.98 84.2299 9.45607 1
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JVC 1 2004m8 10661200.00 34698924.90 42.08 448623296.00 32371000.00 67069924.90 72380000.00 104751000 139449924.9 381553371.1 6.29 85.0498 9.82544 1
JVC 1 2004m9 10335041.00 33637377.73 41.65 430454457.65 32069000.00 65706377.73 81461000.00 113530000 147167377.7 364748079.9 6.357 84.7356 10.985 1
JV_C 1 2004ml0 10678780.00 34756142.39 46.87 500514418.60 38166000.00 72922142.39 81461000.00 119627000 154383142.4 427592276.2 6.828 85.4306 11.2023 1
JVC 1 2004mll 10166759.00 33089671.61 42.23 429342232.57 33466000.00 66555671.61 115029000.00 148495000 181584671.6 362786561 6.546 84.4982 14.6059 1
JV_C 1 2004ml2 9935109.00 32335722.16 39.09 388363410.81 29025000.00 61360722.16 108531000.00 137556000 169891722.2 327002688.7 6.176 84.2002 13.8454 1
JV_C 1 2005ml 10869798.00 40976731.52 43.822 476336287.96 45217000.00 86193731.52 107035000.00 152252000 193228731.5 390142556.4 7.929 81.9049 14.0069 1
JV_C 1 2005m2 10101819.00 38081620.74 46.9836 474619823.17 45217000.00 83298620.74 107035000.00 152252000 190333620.7 391321202.4 8.245 82.4494 15.0717 1
JV_C 1 2005m3 11171882.00 42115521.30 53.2387 594776474.23 45217000.00 87332521.30 107035000.00 152252000 194367521.3 507443952.9 7.817 85.3167 13.6281 1
JV_C 1 2005m4 10954623.00 41296502.98 52.1535 571321930.63 45217000.00 86513502.98 107035000.00 152252000 193548503 484808427.6 7.897 84.8573 13.8984 1
JV_C 1 2005m5 11225432.00 42317392.95 48.7608 547361044.67 45217000.00 87534392.95 107035000.00 152252000 194569392.9 459826651.7 7.797 84.0079 13.5631 1
JV_C 1 2005m6 10957270.00 41306481.59 54.3858 595919894.77 45217000.00 86523481.59 107035000.00 152252000 193558481.6 509396413.2 7.896 85.4807 13.8951 1
JV_C 1 2005m7 11240021.00 42372390.25 58.7619 660484990.00 45217000.00 87589390.25 107035000.00 152252000 194624390.2 572895599.8 7.792 86.7386 13.5455 1
JV_C 1 2005m8 10947219.00 41268591.54 65.3707 715627369.08 45217000.00 86485591.54 107035000.00 152252000 193520591.5 629141777.5 7.900 87.9147 13.9078 1
JV_C 1 2005 m9 10530538.00 39697796.44 63.8832 672724465.16 45217000.00 84914796.44 107035000.00 152252000 191949796.4 587809668.7 8.063 87.3775 14.4581 1
JV_C 1 2005ml0 10579612.00 39882794.55 60.87 45217000.00 85099794.55 107035000.00 152252000 192134794.6 8.043 14.3911 1
JV_C 1 2005mll 11359711.00 42823595.04 55.1381 626352881.09 45217000.00 88040595.04 107035000.00 152252000 195075595 538312286 7.750 85.9439 13.4028 1
JV_C 1 2005ml2 12038485.00 45382422.72 58.3034 701884606.35 45217000.00 90599422.72 107035000.00 152252000 197634422.7 611285183.6 7.525 87.092 12.6471 1
JV_C 1 2006ml 12482856.00 65354136.57 63.4921 792562741.44 51153.00 65405289.57 46920.00 98073 65452209.57 727157451.9 5.239 91.7476 0.00786 1
JV_C 1 2006m2 11085059.00 58035954.25 60.2523 667900300.39 51924.00 58087878.25 46920.00 98844 58134798.25 609812422.1 5.240 91.3029 0.00892 1
JV_C 1 2006m3 12659393.00 66278398.07 62.1603 786911666.70 58132.00 66336530.07 112274.00 170406 66448804.07 720575136.6 5.240 91.57 0.01346 1
JV_C 1 2006m4 323354.00 1692923.60 0.00 52266.00 1745189.60 112274.00 164540 1857463.597 -1745189.597 5.397 0.50885 1
JV_C 1 2006m5 12232609.00 64043965.51 70.0808 857271024.81 58684.00 64102649.51 112274.00 170958 64214923.51 793168375.3 5.240 92.5225 0.01398 1
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JV_C 1 2006m6 650359.00 3404962.05 0.00 70861.00 3475823.05 112274.00 183135 3588097.046 -3475823.046 5.344 0.28159 1
JVC 1 2006m7 11716877.00 61343844.68 74.2877 870419843.51 66760.00 61410604.68 125906.00 192666 61536510.68 809009238.8 5.241 92.9447 0.01644 1
JV_C 1 2006m8 11786702.00 61709414.27 69.6639 821107629.46 63538.00 61772952.27 179123.00 242661 61952075.27 759334677.2 5.240 92.4769 0.02059 1
JV_C 1 2006m9 11479986.00 60103599.12 63.1611 725088543.74 67462.00 60171061.12 112274.00 179736 60283335.12 664917482.6 5.241 91.7016 0.01566 1
JV_C 1 2006ml0 11524964.00 60339081.96 58.4447 673573063.49 67700.00 60406781.96 112274.00 179974 60519055.96 613166281.5 5.241 91.0319 0.01562 1
JV_C 1 2006mll 11406559.00 59719171.21 60.4533 689564133.19 51770.00 59770941.21 214358.00 266128 59985299.21 629793192 5.240 91.3321 0.02333 1
JV_C 1 2006ml2 11754248.00 61539500.98 59.084 694487988.83 52668.00 61592168.98 69074.00 121742 61661242.98 632895819.9 5.239 91.1313 0.01036 1
JVC 1 2007ml 11130209.00 62488016.55 54.5782 607466772.84 51764.00 62539780.55 60455.00 112219 62600235.55 544926992.3 5.618 89.7048 0.01008 1
JV_C 1 2007m2 9856947.00 55339577.83 58.5746 577366727.75 105831.00 55445408.83 218917.00 324748 55664325.83 521921318.9 5.625 90.3968 0.03295 1
JV_C 1 2007m3 10280800.00 57719203.70 64.3595 661667147.60 52368.00 57771571.70 110696.00 163064 57882267.7 603895575.9 5.619 91.2688 0.01586 1
JV_C 1 2007m4 10499270.00 58945753.62 68.6 720249922.00 50303.00 58996056.62 110696.00 160999 59106752.62 661253865.4 5.619 91.8089 0.01533 1
JV_C 1 2007m5 10217705.00 57364971.23 68.88 703795520.40 54646.00 57419617.23 113382.00 168028 57532999.23 646375903.2 5.619 91.8414 0.01644 1
JV_C 1 2007m6 10217705.00 57364971.23 68.88 703795520.40 63307.00 57428278.23 110696.00 174003 57538974.23 646367242.2 5.620 91.8402 0.01703 1
JV_C 1 20O7m7 10217705.00 57364971.23 68.88 703795520.40 60558.00 57425529.23 176860.00 237418 57602389.23 646369991.2 5.620 91.8406 0.02324 1
JV_C 1 2007m8 10217705.00 57364971.23 68.88 703795520.40 66339.00 57431310.23 110696.00 177035 57542006.23 646364210.2 5.620 91.8398 0.01733 1
JV_C 1 2007m9 10217705.00 57364971.23 68.88 703795520.40 64658.00 57429629.23 66889.00 131547 57496518.23 646365891.2 5.620 91.84 0.01287 1
JV_C 1 2007ml0 10217705.00 57364971.23 68.88 703795520.40 61658.00 57426629.23 66889.00 128547 57493518 23 646368891.2 5.620 91.8404 0.01258 1
JV_C 1 2007mll 10450000.00 58669138.46 68.88 719796000.00 73383.00 58742521.46 66889.00 140272 58809410.46 661053478.5 5.621 91.839 0.01342 1
JV_C 1 200m712 0.00 0.00 68.88 0.00 83444.00 83444.00 66889.00 150333 150333 -83444 1
JV_E 1 1999ml 4181299.00 10718876.26 11.32 47332304.68 7904000.00 18622876.26 1000000.00 8904000 19622876.26 28709428.42 4.453 60.655 2.12948 0
JV_E 1 1999m2 3746527.00 9604326.15 10.75 40275165.25 5812000.00 15416326.15 1000000.00 6812000 16416326.15 24858839.1 4.114 61.7225 1.81822 0
JV_E 1 1999m3 4328274.00 11095650.76 12.86 55661603.64 8585000.00 19680650.76 1000000.00 9585000 20680650.76 35980952.88 4.547 64.6423 2.21451 0
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JV_E 1 1999m4 4281115.00 10974757.36 15.73 67341938.95 10701000.00 21675757.36 1000000.00 11701000 22675757.36 45666181.59 5.063 67.8124 2.73317 0
JV_E 1 1999m5 3905549.00 10011983.47 16.12 62957449.88 11415000.00 21426983.47 1000000.00 12415000 22426983.47 41530466.41 5.486 65.9659 3.17881 0
JV_E 1 1999m6 4081166.00 10462182.53 16.24 66278135.84 10460000.00 20922182.53 1000000.00 11460000 21922182.53 45355953.31 5.126 68.4328 2.80802 0
JV_E 1 1999m7 3019860.00 7741495.09 18.75 56622375.00 11631000.00 19372495.09 2000000.00 13631000 21372495.09 37249879.91 6.415 65.7865 4.51379 0
JV_E 1 1999m8 3806464.00 9757976.32 20.21 76928637.44 13723000.00 23480976.32 2000000.00 15723000 25480976.32 53447661.12 6.168 69.4769 4.13061 0
JV_E 1 1999m9 3618142.00 9275207.63 22.37 80937836.54 15468000.00 24743207.63 2000000.00 17468000 26743207.63 56194628.91 6.838 69.4294 4.82789 0
JV_E 1 1999ml0 3313939.00 8495374.78 22.19 73536306.41 14684000.00 23179374.78 2000000.00 16684000 25179374.78 50356931.63 6.994 68.479 5.03449 0
JV_E 1 1999mll 3776811.00 9681960.03 24.22 91474362.42 16569000.00 26250960.03 5055000.00 21624000 31305960.03 65223402.39 6.950 71.3024 5.72547 0
JV_E 1 1999ml2 3328418.00 8532492.10 25.01 83243734.18 17990000.00 26522492.10 5055000.00 23045000 31577492.1 56721242.08 7.968 68.1388 6.92371 0
JV_E 1 2000ml 4072185.00 10495510.30 25.21 102659783.85 18794000.00 29289510.30 5328000.00 24122000 34617510.3 73370273.55 7.192 71.4693 5.9236 0
JV_E 1 2000m2 3894479.00 10037496.94 27.15 105735104.85 21350000.00 31387496.94 15928000.00 37278000 47315496.94 74347607.91 8.059 70.315 9.57201 0
JV_E 1 2000m3 4469563.00 11519698.77 27.49 122868286.87 24394000.00 35913698.77 15928000.00 40322000 51841698.77 86954588.1 8.035 70.7706 9.02146 0
JV_E 1 2000m4 4487210.00 11565181.54 23.45 105225074.50 17883000.00 29448181.54 15928000.00 33811000 45376181.54 75776892.96 6.562 72.0141 7.53497 0
JV_E 1 2000m5 4437594.00 11437302.96 27.23 120835684.62 21864000.00 33301302.96 15927000.00 37791000 49228302.96 87534381.66 7.504 72.4408 8.5161 0
JV_E 1 2000m6 3923071.00 10111188.98 29.62 116201363.02 16933000.00 27044188.98 25049000.00 41982000 52093188.98 89157174.04 6.893 76.7264 10.7013 0
JV_E 1 2000m7 4457253.00 11487971.39 28.16 125516244.48 22481000.00 33968971.39 40122000.00 62603000 74090971.39 91547273.09 7.621 72.9366 14.0452 0
JV_E 1 2000m8 4513241.00 11632272.95 29.41 132734417.81 24476000.00 36108272.95 50023000.00 74499000 86131272.95 96626144.86 8.000 72.7966 16.5068 0
JV_E 1 2000m9 4261339.00 10983029.35 32.08 136703755.12 23962000.00 34945029.35 50023000.00 73985000 84968029.35 101758725.8 8.200 74.4374 17.3619 0
JV_E 1 2000ml0 4281714.00 11035543.18 31.4 134445819.60 24569000.00 35604543.18 50023000.00 74592000 85627543.18 98841276.42 8.315 73.5176 17.4211 0
JV_E 1 2000mll 4645730.00 11973745.57 32.33 150196450.90 26447000.00 38420745.57 75000000.00 101447000 113420745.6 111775705.3 8.270 74.4197 21.8366 0
JV_E 1 2000ml2 2548639.00 6568774.97 25.28 64429593.92 21462000.00 28030774.97 75000000.00 96462000 103030775 36398818.95 10.99 56.4939 37.8484 0
JV_E 1 2001ml 4745726.00 14383188.49 25.95 123151589.70 22106000.00 36489188.49 20093000.00 42199000 56582188.49 86662401.21 7.688 70.3705 8.892 0
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JV_E 1 2001m2 4302557.00 13040046.62 27.24 117201652.68 20751000.00 33791046.62 20093000.00 40844000 5388404662 83410606.06 7.853 71.1685 9.49296 0
JV_E 1 2001m3 4994375.00 15136785.60 25.02 124959262.50 20097000.00 35233785.60 20093000.00 40190000 55326785.6 89725476.9 7.054 71.8038 8.04705 0
JV_E 1 2001m4 4588186.00 13905721.50 25.66 117732852.76 20629000.00 34534721.50 20093000.00 40722000 54627721.5 83198131.26 7.526 70.6669 8.8754 0
JV_E 1 2001m5 4625886.00 14019981.40 27.55 127443159.30 23918000.00 37937981.40 25034000.00 48952000 62971981.4 89505177.9 8.201 70.2314 10.5822 0
JV_E 1 2001m6 4600644.00 13943478.79 26.97 124079368.68 20827000.00 34770478.79 25034000.00 45861000 59804478.79 89308889.89 7.557 71.9772 9.96839 0
JV_E 1 2001m7 4500673.00 13640490.01 24.8 111616690.40 18289000.00 31929490.01 18762000.00 37051000 5069149001 79687200.39 7.094 71.3936 8.23232 0
JV_E 1 2001m8 4646866.00 14083566.89 25.81 119935611.46 20890000.00 34973566.89 18762000.00 39652000 53735566.89 84962044.57 7.526 70.8397 8.53306 0
JV_E 1 2001m9 4613799.00 13983348.52 25.03 115483388.97 20805000.00 34788348.52 18762000.00 39567000 53550348.52 80695040.45 7.540 69.8759 8.5758 0
JV_E 1 2001ml0 4557701.00 13813328.57 20.73 94481141.73 17186000.00 30999328.57 18762000.00 35948000 49761328.57 63481813.16 6.801 67.1899 7.88731 0
JV_E 1 2001mll 4446784.00 13477165.02 18.69 83110392.96 14765000.00 28242165.02 18762000.00 33527000 47004165.02 54868227.94 6.351 66.0185 7.53961 0
JV_E 1 2001ml2 4296691.00 13022268.15 18.52 79574717.32 14344000.00 27366268.15 18762000.00 33106000 46128268.15 52208449.17 6.369 65.6093 7.705 0
JV_E 1 2002ml 4668754.00 17360372.79 19.15 89406639.10 14359000.00 31719372.79 5025000.00 19384000 36744372.79 57687266.31 6.793 64.5224 4.15186 0
JV_E 1 2002m2 4275460.00 15897941.82 19.98 85423690.80 12873000.00 28770941.82 5025000.00 17898000 33795941.82 56652748.98 6.729 66.3197 4.18622 0
JV_E 1 2002m3 4355141.00 16194228.98 23.64 102955533.24 16120000.00 32314228.98 5025000.00 21145000 37339228.98 70641304.26 7.419 68.6134 4.85518 0
JV_E 1 2002m4 3758798.00 13976777.21 25.43 95586233.14 16320000.00 30296777.21 5025000.00 21345000 35321777.21 65289455.93 8.060 68.3042 5.67868 0
JV_E 1 2002m5 3859143.00 14349901.74 25.69 99141383.67 16433000.00 30782901.74 5025000.00 21458000 35807901.74 68358481.93 7.976 68.9505 5.5603 0
JV_E 1 2002m6 3762685.00 13991230.70 24.49 92148155.65 15428000.00 29419230.70 5025000.00 20453000 34444230.7 62728924.95 7.818 68.074 5.43575 0
JV_E 1 2002m6 3829021.00 14237895.59 25.75 98597290.75 17782000.00 32019895.59 5025000.00 22807000 37044895.59 66577395.16 8.362 67.5246 5.95635 0
JV_E 1 2002m8 4031976.00 14992566.85 26.78 107976317.28 19938000.00 34930566.85 5025000.00 24963000 39955566.85 73045750.43 8.663 67.6498 6.19126 0
JV_E 1 2002m9 4090174.00 15208971.26 28.28 115670120.72 21093000.00 36301971.26 5025000.00 26118000 41326971.26 79368149.46 8.875 68.6159 6.38555 0
JV_E 1 2002ml0 4070308.00 15135101.20 27.53 112055579.24 19951000.00 35086101.20 5025000.00 24976000 40111101.2 76969478.04 8.620 68.6887 6.13614 0
JV_E 1 2002mll 4048364.00 15053504.26 24.79 100358943.56 17790000.00 32843504.26 5025000.00 22815000 37868504.26 67515439.3 8.112 67.274 5.63561 0
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JV_E 1 2002ml2 3689333.00 13718477.40 27.89 102895497.37 21897000.00 35615477.40 5025000.00 26922000 40640477.4 67280019.97 9.653 65.3867 7.29725 0
JV_E 1 2003ml 4055402.00 6535904.15 30.77 124784719.54 25499000.00 32034904.15 13454000.00 38953000 45488904.15 92749815.39 7.899
32
74.3279 9.60521 1
JV_E 1 2003m2 3767820.00 6072421.52 32.88 123885921.60 24096000.00 30168421.52 13454000.00 37550000 43622421.52 93717500.08 8.006 75.6482 9.96598 1
JV_E 1 20O3m3 3494690.00 5632230.51 30.36 106098788.40 22662000.00 28294230.51 13454000.00 36116000 41748230.51 77804557.89 8.096 73.3322 10.3345 1
JV_E 1 2003m4 3586266.00 5779819.32 25.49 91413920.34 16666000.00 22445819.32 13454000.00 30120000 35899819.32 68968101.02 6.258 75.446 8.39871 1
JV_E 1 2003m5 3667942.00 5911452.75 26.06 95586568.52 22353000.00 28264452.75 13454000.00 35807000 41718452.75 67322115.77 7.705
81
70.4305 9.76215 1
JV_E 1 2003m6 3511449.00 5659240.21 27.91 98004541.59 20606000.00 26265240.21 13454000.00 34060000 39719240.21 71739301.38 7.479 73.2 9.6997 1
JV_E 1 2003m7 3802000.00 6127507.84 28.59 108699180.00 23449000.00 29576507.84 13454000.00 36903000 43030507.84 79122672.16 7.779 72.7905 9.70621 1
JV_E 1 2003m8 4534281.00 7307691.32 29.68 134577460.08 28937000.00 36244691.32 35075000.00 64012000 71319691.32 98332768.76 7.993 73.0678 14.1173 1
JV_E 1 2003m9 4715190.00 7599254.00 26.88 126744307.20 25872000.00 33471254.00 35075000.00 60947000 68546254 93273053.2 7.098 73.5915 12.9257 1
JV_E 1 2003ml0 4699565.00 7574071.91 29.01 136334380.65 27962000.00 35536071.91 35075000.00 63037000 70611071.91 100798308.7 7.561 73.9346 13.4134 1
JV_E 1 2003mll 4919919.00 7929206.28 29.12 143268041.28 30863000.00 38792206.28 70150000.00 101013000 108942205.3 104475835 7.884 72.9233 20.5314 1
JV_E 1 2003ml2 9427958.00 15194604.57 29.95 282367342.10 37309000.00 52503604.57 70150000.00 107459000 122653604.6 229863737.5 5.568 81.4059 11.3979 1
JV_E 1 2004ml 5800015.00 16626961.51 31.4 182120471.00 37969000.00 54595961.51 15380000.00 53349000 69975961.51 127524509.5 9.413
07
70.0221 9.19808 1
JV_E 1 2004m2 5257980.00 15073104.31 31.32 164679933.60 35392000.00 50465104.31 15380000.00 50772000 65845104.31 114214829.3 9.597 69.3556 9.65618 1
JV_E 1 2004m3 6454596.00 18503455.47 33.67 217326247.32 44954000.00 63457455.47 15380000.00 60334000 78837455.47 153868791.9 9.831 70.8008 9.34745 1
JV_E 1 2004m4 5995389.00 17187042.13 33.71 202104563.19 41727000.00 58914042.13 72275000.00 114002000 131189042.1 143190521.1 9.826 70.8497 19.0149 1
JV_E 1 2004m5 6305217.00 18075229.18 37.63 237265315.71 40929000.00 59004229.18 72275000.00 113204000 131279229.2 178261086.5 9.358 75.1315 17.954 1
JV_E 1 2004m6 6623941.00 18988918.49 35.54 235414863.14 55147000.00 74135918.49 72275000.00 127422000 146410918.5 161278944.7 11.19 68.5084 19.2366 1
JV_E 1 2004m7 5846739.00 16760905.67 37.93 221766810.27 49577000.00 66337905.67 72275000.00 121852000 138612905.7 155428904.6 11.34 70.0866 20.841 1
JV_E 1 2004m8 7297964.00 20921147.02 42.08 307098325.12 61502000.00 82423147.02 150259000.00 211761000 232682147 224675178.1 11.29 73.1607 29.0164 1
JV_E 1 2004m9 6708200.00 19230464.61 41.65 279396530.00 58464000.00 77694464.61 150259000.00 208723000 227953464.6 201702065.4 11.58
2
72.192 31.1146 1
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JV_E 1 2004ml0 6431625.00 18437604.27 46.87 301450263.75 64276000.00 82713604.27 150259000.00 214535000 232972604.3 218736659.5 12.86 72.5614 33.3563 1
JV_E 1 2004mll 6695679.00 19194570.53 42.23 282758524.17 50678000.00 69872570.53 297833000.00 348511000 367705570.5 212885953.6 10.43 75.289 52.0501 1
JV_E 1 2004ml2 6643064.00 19043738.58 39.09 259677371.76 49918000.00 68961738.58 290187000.00 340105000 359148738.6 190715633.2 10.38 73.4433 51.197 1
JV_E 1 2005ml 11884969.00 45986101.22 43.822 520823111.52 233000.00 46219101.22 178010000.00 178243000 224229101.2 474604010.3 3.888 91.1258 14.9973 1
JV_E 1 2005m2 8854892.00 34261928.64 46.9836 416034703.77 233000.00 34494928.64 178010000.00 178243000 212504928.6 381539775.1 3.895 91.7086 20.1293 1
JV_E 1 2005m3 9516227.00 36820809.38 53.2387 506631554.38 233000.00 37053809.38 178010000.00 178243000 215063809.4 469577745 3.893 92.6862 18.7304 1
JV_E 1 2005m4 7673626.00 29691296.79 52.1535 400206453.59 233000.00 29924296.79 178010000.00 178243000 207934296.8 370282156.8 3.899 92.5228 23.228 1
JV_E 1 20O5m5 8531702.00 33011420.71 48.7608 416012614.88 233000.00 33244420.71 178010000.00 178243000 211254420.7 382768194.2 3.896 92.0088 20.8918 1
JV_E 1 2005m6 8870645.00 34322881.18 54.3858 482437124.84 233000.00 34555881.18 178010000.00 178243000 212565881.2 447881243.7 3.895 92.8372 20.0936 1
JV_E 1 2005m7 9468303.00 36635378.70 58.7619 556375474.06 233000.00 36868378.70 178010000.00 178243000 214878378.7 519507095.4 3.893 93.3735 18.8252 1
JV_E 1 2005m8 6020104.00 23293381.07 65.3707 393538412.55 233000.00 23526381.07 178010000.00 178243000 201536381.1 370012031.5 3.907 94.0218 29.608 1
JV_E 1 2005m9 7994206.00 30931705.95 63.8832 510695460.74 233000.00 31164705.95 178010000.00 178243000 209174705.9 479530754.8 3.898 93.8976 22.2965 1
JV_E 1 2005ml0 10053068.00 38897989.77 60.87 233000.00 39130989.77 178010000.00 178243000 217140989.8 3.892 17.7302 1
JV_E 1 2005mll 9670075.00 37416088.15 55.1381 533189562.36 233000.00 37649088.15 178010000.00 178243000 215659088.1 495540474.2 3.893 92.9389 18.4324 1
JV_E 1 2005ml2 8603677.00 33289911.09 58.3034 501623621.60 233000.00 33522911.09 178010000.00 178243000 211532911.1 468100710.5 3.896 93.3171 20.7171 1
JV_E 1 2006ml 9909094.00 42275403.45 63.4921 629149187.16 64890.00 42340293.45 209363.00 274253 42549656.45 586808893.7 4.272 93.2702 0.02768 1
JV_E 1 2006m2 9655622.00 41194009.83 60.2523 581773433.43 71586.00 41265595.83 203536.00 275122 41469131.83 540507837.6 4.273 92.9069 0.02849 1
JV_E 1 2006m3 8932883.00 38110571.24 62.1603 555270687.14 66989.00 38177560.24 137859.00 204848 38315419.24 517093126.9 4.273 93.1245 0.02293 1
JV_E 1 2006m4 2019664.00 8616540.57 0.00 65173.00 8681713.57 137859.00 203032 8819572.568 -8681713.568 4.298 0.10053 1
JV_E 1 2006m5 8954347.00 38202143.62 70.0808 627527801.24 66173.00 38268316.62 137859.00 204032 38406175.62 589259484.6 4.273 93.9017 0.02279 1
JV_E 1 2006m6 3074955.00 13118753.66 0.00 58361.00 13177114.66 137859.00 196220 13314973.66 -13177114.66 4.285 0.06381 1
JV_E 1 2006m7 8792576.00 37511976.15 74.2877 653180248.12 187806.00 37699782.15 166179.00 353985 37865961.15 615480466 4.287 94.2283 0.04026 1
68
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JV_E 1 2006m8 1997624.00 8522510.79 69.6639 139162278.57 63751.00 8586261.79 148263.00 212014 8734524.792 130576016.8 4.298 93.83 0.10613 1
JV_E 1 2006m9 8332487.00 35549087.51 63.1611 526289044.66 50066.00 35599153.51 148263.00 198329 35747416.51 490689891.2 4.272 93.2358 0.0238 1
JV_E 1 2006ml0 8247605.00 35186953.41 58.4447 482028799.94 44545.00 35231498.41 89639.00 134184 35321137.41 446797301.5 4.271 92.691 0.01627 1
JV_E 1 2006mll 8364129.00 35684082.52 60.4533 505639199.68 50066.00 35734148.52 89639.00 139705 35823787.52 469905051.2 4.272 92.9329 0.0167 1
JV_E 1 2006ml2 10058802.00 42914106.26 59.084 594314257.37 44545.00 42958651.26 89639.00 134184 43048290.26 551355606.1 4.270 92.7717 0.01334 1
JV_E 1 2007ml 6145836.00 20710827.17 54.5782 335428666.38 88269.00 20799096.17 125000.00 213269 20924096.17 314629570.2 3.384 93.7992 0.0347 1
JV_E 1 2007m2 5826043.00 19633158.07 58.5746 341258138.31 55057.00 19688215.07 125000.00 180057 19813215.07 321569923.2 3.379 94.2307 0.03091 1
JV_E 1 2007m3 6339223.00 21362521.22 64.3595 407989222.67 45636.00 21408157.22 72556.00 118192 21480713.22 386581065.4 3.377 94.7528 0.01864 1
JV_E 1 2007m4 6532532.00 22013952.42 68.6 448131695.20 56730.00 22070682.42 82179.00 138909 22152861.42 426061012.8 3.378 95.075 0.02126 1
JV_E 1 2007m5 6301710.00 21236106.32 68.88 434061784.80 82672.00 21318778.32 76984.00 159656 21395762.32 412743006.5 3.383 95.0885 0.02534 1
JV_E 1 2007m6 6301710.00 21236106.32 68.88 434061784.80 58663.00 21294769.32 72566.00 131229 21367335.32 412767015.5 3.379 95.0941 0.02082 1
JV_E 1 2007m7 6301710.00 21236106.32 68.88 434061784.80 64545.00 21300651.32 118874.00 183419 21419525.32 412761133.5 3.380 95.0927 0.02911 1
JV_E 1 2007m8 6301710.00 21236106.32 68.88 434061784.80 60840.00 21296946.32 118874.00 179714 21415820.32 412764838.5 3.379 95.0936 0.02852 1
JV_E 1 2007m9 6301710.00 21236106.32 68.88 434061784.80 69822.00 21305928.32 118874.00 188696 21424802.32 412755856.5 3.380 95.0915 0.02994 1
JV_E 1 2007ml0 6301710.00 21236106.32 68.88 434061784.80 67414.00 21303520.32 202383.00 269797 21505903.32 412758264.5 3.380 95.0921 0.04281 1
JV_E 1 2007mll 3160000.00 10648870.86 68.88 217660800.00 71282.00 10720152.86 202383.00 273665 10922535.86 206940647.1 3.392 95.0748 0.0866 1
JV_E 1 200m712 0.00 0.00 68.88 0.00 80667.00 80667.00 202383.00 283050 283050 -80667 1
JV_N 1 1999ml 4089307.00 8177262.45 11.32 46290955.24 3811000.00 11988262.45 0.00 3811000 11988262.45 34302692.79 2.931 74.1024 0.93194 0
JV_N 1 1999m2 3838843.00 7676417.23 10.75 41267562.25 2577000.00 10253417.23 0.00 2577000 10253417.23 31014145.02 2.670 75.1538 0.6713 0
JV_N 1 1999m3 4328682.00 8655933.33 12.86 55666850.52 2875000.00 11530933.33 1046000.00 3921000 12576933.33 44135917.19 2.663 79.2858 0.90582 0
JV_N 1 1999m4 3972929.00 7944544.91 15.73 62494173.17 5471000.00 13415544.91 1046000.00 6517000 14461544.91 49078628.26 3.376 78.5331 1.64035 0
JV_N 1 1999m5 4125510.00 8249656.48 16.12 66503221.20 5534000.00 13783656.48 1046000.00 6580000 14829656.48 52719564.72 3.341 79.2737 1.59495 0
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JV_N 1 1999m6 3501986.00 7002814.56 16.24 56872252.64 5763000.00 12765814.56 2108000.00 7871000 14873814.56 44106438.08 3.645 77.5535 2.24758 0
JV_N 1 1999m7 4055473.00 8109605.63 18.75 76040118.75 3863000.00 11972605.63 2108000.00 5971000 14080605.63 64067513.12 2.952 84.2549 1.47233 0
JV_N 1 1999m8 3592892.00 7184596.52 20.21 72612347.32 5974000.00 13158596.52 2103000.00 8077000 15261596.52 59453750.8 3.662 81.8783 2.24805 0
JV_N 1 1999m9 3554987.00 7108799.04 22.37 79525059.19 6758000.00 13866799.04 5560000.00 12318000 19426799.04 65658260.15 3.900 82.563 3.46499 0
JV_N 1 1999ml0 3630615.00 7260030.05 22.19 80563346.85 7049000.00 14309030.05 5560000.00 12609000 19869030.05 66254316.8 3.941 82.2388 3.47297 0
JV_N 1 1999mll 3225835.00 6450603.83 24.22 78129723.70 3162000.00 9612603.83 5560000.00 8722000 15172603.83 68517119.87 2.979 87.6966 2.7038 0
JV_N 1 1999ml2 4392834.00 8784216.13 25.01 109864778.34 8335000.00 17119216.13 5560000.00 13895000 22679216.13 92745562.21 3.897 84.4179 3.16311 0
JV_N 1 2000ml 4801851.00 6500011.48 25.21 121054663.71 9589000.00 16089011.48 8591000.00 18180000 24680011.48 104965652.2 3.350 86.7093 3.78604 0
JV_N 1 2000m2 4491359.00 6079714.90 27.15 121940396.85 9762000.00 15841714.90 8591000.00 18353000 24432714.9 106098682 3.527 87.0086 4.08629 0
JV_N 1 2000m3 4651845.00 6296956.30 27.49 127879219.05 6094000.00 12390956.30 9532000.00 15626000 21922956.3 115488262.8 2.663 90.3104 3.3591 0
JV_N 1 2000m4 4523511.00 6123237.36 23.45 106076332.95 7575000.00 13698237.36 9532000.00 17107000 23230237.36 92378095.59 3.028 87.0864 3.7818 0
JV_N 1 2000m5 3580891.00 4847262.57 27.23 97507661.93 16593000.00 21440262.57 11536000.00 28129000 32976262.57 76067399.36 5.987 78.0117 7.85531 0
JV_N 1 2000m6 4558735.00 6170918.22 29.62 135029730.70 5646000.00 11816918.22 11536000.00 17182000 23352918.22 123212812.5 2.592 91.2487 3.76903 0
JV_N 1 2000m7 5050974.00 6837236.09 28.16 142235427.84 10115000.00 16952236.09 11536000.00 21651000 28488236.09 125283191.7 3.356 88.0816 4.2865 0
JV_N 1 2000m8 5465693.00 7398619.25 29.41 160746031.13 10318000.00 17716619.25 11536000.00 21854000 29252619.25 143029411.9 3.241 88.9785 3.9984 0
JV_N 1 2000m9 5299774.00 7174023.48 32.08 170016749.92 8038000.00 15212023.48 11536000.00 19574000 26748023.48 154804726.4 2.870 91.0526 3.69337 0
JV_N 1 2000ml0 5380621.00 7283461.78 31.4 168951499.40 8951000.00 16234461.78 26327000.00 35278000 42561461.78 152717037.6 3.017 90.3911 6.55649 0
JV_N 1 2000mll 5393549.00 7300961.73 32.33 174373439.17 18682000.00 25982961.73 33678000.00 52360000 59660961.73 148390477.4 4.817 85.0992 9.70789 0
JV_N 1 2000ml2 5948864.00 8052662.25 25.28 150387281.92 12488000.00 20540662.25 39534000.00 52022000 60074662.25 129846619.7 3.452 86.3415 8.74486 0
JV_N 1 2001ml 5839474.00 9016371.27 25.95 151534350.30 15882000.00 24898371.27 53071000.00 68953000 77969371.27 126635979 4.263 83.5692 11.8081 0
JV_N 1 2001m2 4863934.00 7510100.19 27.24 132493562.16 18929000.00 26439100.19 66852000.00 85781000 93291100.19 106054462 5.435 80.045 17.6361 0
JV_N 1 2001m3 5878264.00 9076264.52 25.02 147074165.28 4722000.00 13798264.52 15005000.00 19727000 28803264.52 133275900.8 2.347 90.6182 3.35592 0
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JV_N 1 2001m4 5898459.00 9107446.37 25.66 151354457.94 13099000.00 22206446.37 15005000.00 28104000 37211446.37 129148011.6 3.764 85.3282 4.76463 0
JV_N 1 2001m5 6049773.00 9341080.97 27.55 166671246.15 10734000.00 20075080.97 15005000.00 25739000 35080080.97 146596165.2 3.318
32
87.9553 4.25454 0
JV_N 1 2001m6 5612897.00 8666527.72 26.97 151379832.09 10874000.00 19540527.72 15005000.00 25879000 34545527.72 131839304.4 3.481 87.0917 4.61063 0
JV_N 1 2001m7 5742972.00 8867368.49 24.8 142425705.60 14295000.00 23162368.49 15005000.00 29300000 38167368.49 119263337.1 4.033 83.7372 5.10189 0
JV_N 1 2001m8 5760696.00 8894735.03 25.81 148683563.76 13920000.00 22814735.03 20040000.00 33960000 42854735.03 125868828.7 3.960 84.6555 5.89512 0
JV_N 1 2001m9 5398162.00 8334968.66 25.03 135115994.86 9307000.00 17641968.66 20040000.00 29347000 37681968.66 117474026.2 3.268
14
86.9431 5.43648 0
JV_N 1 2001ml0 5234042.00 8081561.10 20.73 108501690.66 8902000.00 16983561.10 20040000.00 28942000 37023561.1 91518129.56 3.244 84.3472 5.52957 0
JV_N 1 2001mll 5507070.00 8503126.78 18.69 102927138.30 12820000.00 21323126.78 20040000.00 32860000 41363126.78 81604011.52 3.871 79.2833 5.96688 0
JV_N 1 2001ml2 5785733.00 8933393.11 18.52 107151775.16 7758000.00 16691393.11 20040000.00 27798000 36731393.11 90460382.05 2.884 84.4227 4.80458 0
JV_N 1 2002ml 5799122.00 10724131.42 19.15 111053186.30 8200000.00 18924131.42 26596000.00 34796000 45520131.42 92129054.88 3.263
28
82.9594 6.00022 0
JV_N 1 2002m2 4263359.00 7884093.87 19.98 85181912.82 12930000.00 20814093.87 26596000.00 39526000 47410093.87 64367818.95 4.882 75.5651 9.27109 0
JV_N 1 2002m3 5202395.00 9620623.20 23.64 122984617.80 4253000.00 13873623.20 16121000.00 20374000 29994623.2 109110994.6 2.666 88.7192 3.91627 0
JV_N 1 2002m4 4701087.00 8693570.30 25.43 119548642.41 9649000.00 18342570.30 16121000.00 25770000 34463570.3 101206072.1 3.901 84.6568 5.48171 0
JV_N 1 2002m5 4495065.00 8312580.38 25.69 115478219.85 13102000.00 21414580.38 16121000.00 29223000 37535580.38 94063639.47 4.764 81.4557 6.50113 0
JV_N 1 2002m6 4035819.00 7463311.40 24.49 98837207.31 8480000.00 15943311.40 16121000.00 24601000 32064311.4 82893895.91 3.950 83.8691 6.09566 0
JV_N 1 2002m6 4865591.00 8997782.30 25.75 125288968.25 9270000.00 18267782.30 12156000.00 21426000 30423782.3 107021185.9 3.754 85.4195 4.40358 0
JV_N 1 2002m8 4688779.00 8670809.51 26.78 125565501.62 8778000.00 17448809.51 12156000.00 20934000 29604809.51 108116692.1 3.721 86.1038 4.4647 0
JV_N 1 2002m9 5086094.00 9405551.47 28.28 143834738.32 8742000.00 18147551.47 12156000.00 20898000 30303551.47 125687186.8 3.568
07
87.3831 4.10885 0
JV_N 1 2002ml0 5295010.00 9791893.17 27.53 145771625.30 9048000.00 18839893.17 12156000.00 21204000 30995893.17 126931732.1 3.558 87.0757 4.00453 0
JV_N 1 2002mll 5681650.00 10506894.19 24.79 140848103.50 13538000.00 24044894.19 12156000.00 25694000 36200894.19 116803209.3 4.232 82.9285 4.52228 0
JV_N 1 2002ml2 5276656.00 9757951.70 27.89 147165935.84 11241000.00 20998951.70 12156000.00 23397000 33154951.7 126166984.1 3.979 85.7311 4.43406 0
JV_N 1 2003ml 5605228.00 9811148.82 30.77 172472865.56 9686000.00 19497148.82 12156000.00 21842000 31653148.82 152975716.7 3.478 88.6955 3.89672 1
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JV_N 1 2003m2 4913321.00 8600064.72 32.88 161549994.48 11239000.00 19839064.72 12156000.00 23395000 31995064.72 141710929.8 4.037 87.7196 4.76155 1
JV_N 1 2003m3 5766525.00 10093476.12 30.36 175071699.00 7817000.00 17910476.12 12899000.00 20716000 30809476.12 157161222.9 3.105 89.7696 3.59246 1
JV_N 1 2003m4 5607678.00 9815437.20 25.49 142939712.22 15464000.00 25279437.20 12899000.00 28363000 38178437.2 117660275 4.508 82.3146 5.05789 1
JV_N 1 2003m5 5946001.00 10407623.15 26.06 154952786.06 18201000.00 28608623.15 12899000.00 31100000 41507623.15 126344162.9 4.811 81.5372 5.23041 1
JV_N 1 2003m6 5767667.00 10095475.03 27.91 160975585.97 14364000.00 24459475.03 12899000.00 27263000 37358475.03 136516110.9 4.240 84.8055 4.72687 1
JV_N 1 2003m7 5484479.00 9599794.99 28.59 156801254.61 10801000.00 20400794.99 12899000.00 23700000 33299794.99 136400459.6 3.719
73
86.9894 4.32129 1
JV_N 1 2003m8 6006760.00 10513973.08 29.68 178280636.80 12079000.00 22592973.08 12899000.00 24978000 35491973.08 155687663.7 3.761 87.3273 4.15831 1
JV_N 1 2003m9 4831898.00 8457545.42 26.88 129881418.24 17915000.00 26372545.42 25647000.00 43562000 52019545.42 103508872.8 5.458 79.6949 9.0155 1
JV_N 1 2003ml0 5878547.00 10289554.59 29.01 170536648.47 15674000.00 25963554.59 30245000.00 45919000 56208554.59 144573093.9 4.416 84.7754 7.81128 1
JV_N 1 2003mll 5616606.00 9831064.38 29.12 163555566.72 15706000.00 25537064.38 35104000.00 50810000 60641064.38 138018502.3 4.546 84.3863 9.04639 1
JV_N 1 2003ml2 6104056.00 10684275.79 29.95 182816477.20 6429000.00 17113275.79 42027000.00 48456000 59140275.79 165703201.4 2.803 90.6391 7.93833 1
JV_N 1 2004ml 5806730.00 12347938.65 31.4 182331322.00 23511000.00 35858938.65 49743000.00 73254000 85601938.65 146472383.4 6.175 80.3331 12.6154 1
JV_N 1 2004m2 5200487.00 11058770.50 31.32 162879252.84 18223000.00 29281770.50 79381000.00 97604000 108662770.5 133597482.3 5.630 82.0224 18.7682 1
JV_N 1 2004m3 5634221.00 11981100.42 33.67 189704221.07 6497000.00 18478100.42 20149000.00 26646000 38627100.42 171226120.6 3.279 90.2595 4.72931 1
JV_N 1 2004m4 5480907.00 11655080.12 33.71 184761374.97 21452000.00 33107080.12 21008000.00 42460000 54115080.12 151654294.9 6.040 82.0812 7.74689 1
JV_N 1 2004m5 5594562.00 11896766.05 37.63 210523368.06 24851000.00 36747766.05 29232000.00 54083000 65979766.05 173775602 6.568 82.5446 9.66707 1
JV_N 1 2004m6 5425738.00 11537763.93 35.54 192830728.52 15643000.00 27180763.93 30812000.00 46455000 57992763.93 165649964.6 5.009 85.9043 8.56197 1
JV_N 1 2004m7 5621564.00 11954185.47 37.93 213225922.52 18433000.00 30387185.47 35731000.00 54164000 66118185.47 182838737.1 5.405 85.7488 9.63504 1
JV_N 1 2004m8 5481935.00 11657266.15 42.08 230679824.80 22958000.00 34615266.15 38991000.00 61949000 73606266.15 196064558.7 6.314 84.9942 11.3006 1
JV_N 1 2004m9 5356586.00 11390713.07 41.65 223101806.90 20285000.00 31675713.07 43355000.00 63640000 75030713.07 191426093.8 5.913 85.8021 11.8807 1
JV_N 1 2004ml0 5534951.00 11770004.01 46.87 259423153.37 11237000.00 23007004.01 47515000.00 58752000 70522004.01 236416149.4 4.156 91.1315 10.6147 1
JV_N 1 2004mll 5399332.00 11481611.90 42.23 228013790.36 39549000.00 51030611.90 53604000.00 93153000 104634611.9 176983178.5 9.451 77.6195 17.2527 1
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JV_N 1 2004m 12 5724656.00 12173409.32 39.09 223776803.04 18367000.00 30540409.32 64050000.00 82417000 94590409.32 193236393.7 5.334 86.3523 14.3968 1
JV_N 1 2005ml 5252198.00 11553321.46 43.822 230161820.76 13649000.00 25202321.46 39492000.00 53141000 64694321.46 204959499.3 4.798 89.0502 10.1179 1
JV_N 1 2005m2 4637079.00 10200236.99 46.9836 217866664.90 13649000.00 23849236.99 39492000.00 53141000 63341236.99 194017427.9 5.143 89.0533 11.46 1
JV_N 1 2005m3 5313488.00 11688141.80 53.2387 282883193.59 13649000.00 25337141.80 39492000.00 53141000 64829141.8 257546051.8 4.768 91.0432 10.0012 1
JV_N 1 2005m4 5212974.00 11467039.97 52.1535 271874839.51 13649000.00 25116039.97 39492000.00 53141000 64608039.97 246758799.5 4.817 90.7619 10.194 1
JV_N 1 2005m5 5310483.00 11681531.66 48.7608 258943399.47 13649000.00 25330531.66 39492000.00 53141000 64822531.66 233612867.8 4.769 90.2177 10.0068 1
JV_N 1 2005m6 5488834.00 12073852.45 54.3858 298514628.16 13649000.00 25722852.45 39492000.00 53141000 65214852.45 272791775.7 4.686 91.3831 9.68166 1
JV_N 1 2005m7 5111694.00 11244253.17 58.7619 300372851.66 13649000.00 24893253.17 39492000.00 53141000 64385253.17 275479598.5 4.869 91.7125 10.396 1
JV_N 1 2005m8 5201961.00 11442814.55 65.3707 340055831.94 13649000.00 25091814.55 39492000.00 53141000 64583814.55 314964017.4 4.823 92.6213 10.2156 1
JV_N 1 2005m9 5135737.00 11297140.84 63.8832 328087313.92 13649000.00 24946140.84 39492000.00 53141000 64438140.84 303141173.1 4.857 92.3965 10.3473 1
JV_N 1 2005ml0 5268998.00 11590276.62 60.87 13649000.00 25239276.62 39492000.00 53141000 6473127662 4.790 10.0856 1
JV_N 1 2005mll 4961657.00 10914215.02 55.1381 273576339.83 13649000.00 24563215.02 39492000.00 53141000 64055215.02 249013124.8 4.950 91.0214 10.7103 1
JV_N 1 2005ml2 5367932.00 11807902.90 58.3034 312968686.57 13649000.00 25456902.90 39492000.00 53141000 64948902.9 287511783.7 4.742 91.866 9.89972 1
JV_N 1 2006ml 2643876.00 8873024.90 63.4921 167865239.38 32931000.00 41804024.90 122852000.00 155783000 164656024.9 126061214.5 15.81 75.0967 58.9222 1
JV_N 1 2006m2 5149183.00 17281002.96 60.2523 310250118.87 35308000.00 52589002.96 106579000.00 141887000 159168003 257661115.9 10.21 83.0495 27.5552 1
JV_N 1 2006m3 2108491.00 7076236.99 62.1603 131064433.11 29428000.00 36504236.99 63590000.00 93018000 100094237 94560196.12 17.31 72.1479 44.1159 1
JV_N 1 2006m4 0.00 0.00 0.00 16651000.00 16651000.00 64392000.00 81043000 81043000 -16651000 1
JV_N 1 2006m5 2441578.00 8194099.27 70.0808 171107739.50 23726000.00 31920099.27 75671000.00 99397000 107591099.3 139187640.2 13.07 81.345 40.7101 1
JV_N 1 2006m6 0.00 0.00 0.00 28796000.00 28796000.00 51727000.00 80523000 80523000 -28796000 1
JV_N 1 2006m7 2225343.00 7468400.13 74.2877 165315613.18 15946000.00 23414400.13 53052000.00 68998000 76466400.13 141901213.1 10.52 85.8365 31.0056 1
JV_N 1 2006m8 2489026.00 8353337.93 69.6639 173395258.36 29121000.00 37474337.93 62200000.00 91321000 99674337.93 135920920.4 15.05 78.3879 36.6895 1
JV_N 1 2006m9 2260757.00 7587251.88 63.1611 142791898.95 26408000.00 33995251.88 104490000.00 130898000 138485251.9 108796647.1 15.03 76.1925 57.9001 1
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JV_N 1 2006ml0 831351.00 2790069.63 58.4447 48588059.79 16498000.00 19288069.63 14539000.00 31037000 33827069.63 29299990.16 23.20 60.3029 37.3332 1
JV_N 1 2006mll 556730.00 1868423.16 60.4533 33656165.71 25913000.00 27781423.16 25266000.00 51179000 53047423.16 5874742.548 49.90
11
17.4552 91.9279 1
JV_N 1 2006ml2 1746150.00 5860196.33 59.084 103169526.60 19266000.00 25126196.33 18544000.00 37810000 43670196.33 78043330.27 14.38 75.6457 21.6534 1
JV_N 1 2007ml 1602786.00 7495185.88 54.5782 87477174.87 16411000.00 23906185.88 30044000.00 46455000 53950185.88 63570988.99 14.91
54
72.6715 28.9839 1
JV_N 1 2007m2 1430609.00 6690026.23 58.5746 83797349.93 6359000.00 13049026.23 30150000.00 36509000 43199026.23 70748323.7 9.121 84.4279 25.5199 1
JV_N 1 2007mB 1706183.00 7978706.28 64.3595 109809084.79 12007000.00 19985706.28 58820000.00 70827000 78805706.28 89823378.5 11.71
37
81.7996 41.512 1
JV_N 1 2007m4 1460754.00 6830994.75 68.6 100207724.40 23062000.00 29892994.75 15627000.00 38689000 45519994.75 70314729.65 20.46 70.169 26.4856 1
JV_N 1 2007m5 1559387.00 7292237.03 68.88 107410576.56 24745000.00 32037237.03 16251000.00 40996000 48288237.03 75373339.53 20.54
48
70.1731 26.2898 1
JV_N 1 2007m6 1559387.00 7292237.03 68.88 107410576.56 17334000.00 24626237.03 30452000.00 47786000 55078237.03 82784339.53 15.79 77.0728 30.6441 1
JV_N 1 2007m7 1559387.00 7292237.03 68.88 107410576.56 17091000.00 24383237.03 13870000.00 30961000 38253237.03 83027339.53 15.63
64
77.299 19.8546 1
JV_N 1 2007m8 1559387.00 7292237.03 68.88 107410576.56 13174000.00 20466237.03 16695000.00 29869000 37161237.03 86944339.53 13.12 80.9458 19.1543 1
JV_N 1 2007m9 1559387.00 7292237.03 68.88 107410576.56 21013000.00 28305237.03 18776000.00 39789000 47081237.03 79105339.53 18.15 73.6476 25.5158 1
JV_N 1 2007ml0 1559387.00 7292237.03 68.88 107410576.56 22439000.00 29731237.03 21274000.00 43713000 51005237.03 77679339.53 19.06 72.32 28.0322 1
JV_N 1 2007mll 1765000.00 8253755.07 68.88 121573200.00 29621000.00 37874755.07 26799000.00 56420000 64673755.07 83698444.93 21.45
88
68.8461 31.966 1
JV_N 1 200m712 0.00 0.00 68.88 0.00 0.00 44838000.00 44838000 44838000 0 1
JV_M 1 1999ml 20474737.00 36459418.08 11.32 231774022.84 16502000.00 52961418.08 8838000.00 25340000 61799418.08 178812604.8 2.586
67
77.1495 1.23762 0
JV_M 1 1999m2 15900400.00 28313884.14 10.75 170929300.00 11349000.00 39662884.14 8838000.00 20187000 48500884.14 131266415.9 2.494 76.7957 1.26959 0
JV_M 1 1999m3 19150541.00 34101418.78 12.86 246275957.26 15973000.00 50074418.78 8651000.00 24624000 58725418.78 196201538.5 2.614 79.6674 1.28581 0
JV_M 1 1999m4 18791513.00 33462096.68 15.73 295590499.49 23592000.00 57054096.68 14846000.00 38438000 71900096.68 238536402.8 3.036 80.6983 2.0455 0
JV_M 1 1999m5 18374277.00 32719123.43 16.12 296193345.24 20526000.00 53245123.43 14846000.00 35372000 68091123.43 242948221.8 2.897 82.0235 1.92508 0
JV_M 1 1999m6 18969722.00 33779433.91 16.24 308068285.28 20304000.00 54083433.91 14846000.00 35150000 68929433.91 253984851.4 2.851 82.4443 1.85295 0
JV_M 1 1999m7 18673802.00 33252488.39 18.75 350133787.50 25444000.00 58696488.39 14846000.00 40290000 73542488.39 291437299.1 3.143 83.236 2.15757 0
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JV_M 1 1999m8 19846869.00 35341371.88 20.21 401105222.49 29480000.00 64821371.88 36283000.00 65763000 101104371.9 336283850.6 3.266 83.8393 3.31352 0
JV_M 1 1999m9 19359331.00 34473211.68 22.37 433068234.47 31162000.00 65635211.68 36283000.00 67445000 101918211.7 367433022.8 3.390 84.8441 3.48385 0
JV_M 1 1999ml0 19188213.00 34168501.41 22.19 425786446.47 31090000.00 65258501.41 66219000.00 97309000 131477501.4 360527945.1 3.400 84.6734 5.07129 0
JV_M 1 1999mll 17667653.00 31460836.21 24.22 427910555.66 31135000.00 62595836.21 66219000.00 97354000 128814836.2 365314719.4 3.542 85.3717 5.5103 0
JV_M 1 1999ml2 18166375.00 32348911.79 25.01 454341038.75 34375000.00 66723911.79 96928000.00 131303000 163651911.8 387617127 3.672 85.3141 7.2278 0
JV_M 1 2000ml 18697706.00 28962106.71 25.21 471369168.26 33474000.00 62436106.71 96928000.00 130402000 159364106.7 408933061.5 3.339
24
86.7543 6.97422 0
JV_M 1 2000m2 17335046.00 26851393.00 27.15 470646498.90 33934000.00 60785393.00 73275000.00 107209000 134060393 409861105.9 3.506 87.0847 6.18452 0
JV_M 1 2000m3 18206324.00 28200972.81 27.49 500491846.76 39057000.00 67257972.81 67039000.00 106096000 134296972.8 433233874 3.694
21
86.5616 5.82743 0
JV_M 1 2000m4 16478987.00 25525386.91 23.45 386432245.15 27914000.00 53439386.91 67039000.00 94953000 120478386.9 332992858.2 3.242 86.1711 5.76207 0
JV_M 1 2000m5 15302010.00 23702289.82 27.23 416673732.30 30934000.00 54636289.82 67039000.00 97973000 121675289.8 362037442.5 3.570
53
86.8875 6.40262 0
JV_M 1 2000m6 17114945.00 26510464.09 29.62 506944670.90 37766000.00 64276464.09 67039000.00 104805000 131315464.1 442668206.8 3.755 87.3208 6.1236 0
JV_M 1 2000m7 18452088.00 28581652.83 28.16 519610798.08 38103000.00 66684652.83 67039000.00 105142000 133723652.8 452926145.2 3.613 87.1664 5.69811 0
JV_M 1 2000m8 18398288.00 28498318.48 29.41 541093650.08 39287000.00 67785318.48 93787000.00 133074000 161572318.5 473308331.6 3.684 87.4725 7.23296 0
JV_M 1 2000m9 17773674.00 27530812.76 32.08 570179461.92 41609000.00 69139812.76 93787000.00 135396000 162926812.8 501039649.2 3.890
01
87.874 7.61778 0
JV_M 1 2000ml0 18299515.00 28345322.48 31.4 574604771.00 41585000.00 69930322.48 93787000.00 135372000 163717322.5 504674448.5 3.821 87.8298 7.39757 0
JV_M 1 2000mll 17738052.00 27475635.51 32.33 573471221.16 41916000.00 69391635.51 117840000.00 159756000 187231635.5 504079585.7 3.912
02
87.8997 9.0064 0
JV_M 1 2000ml2 17291357.00 26783720.24 25.28 437125504.96 34240000.00 61023720.24 117840000.00 152080000 178863720.2 376101784.7 3.529 86.0398 8.79515 0
JV_M 1 2001ml 18598681.00 29558529.06 25.95 482635771.95 35249000.00 64807529.06 117840000.00 153089000 182647529.1 417828242.9 3.484
52
86.5722 8.23118 0
JV_M 1 2001m2 16523839.00 26261022.23 27.24 450109374.36 35708000.00 61969022.23 134310000.00 170018000 196279022.2 388140352.1 3.750 86.2325 10.2893 0
JV_M 1 2001m3 18523937.00 29439739.85 25.02 463468903.74 33450000.00 62889739.85 72808000.00 106258000 135697739.8 400579163.9 3.395 86.4306 5.73625 0
JV_M 1 2001m4 17890014.00 28432258.11 25.66 459057759.24 32730000.00 61162258.11 72808000.00 105538000 133970258.1 397895501.1 3.418 86.6766 5.89927 0
JV_M 1 2001m5 17836736.00 28347584.40 27.55 491402076.80 37303000.00 65650584.40 72808000.00 110111000 138458584.4 425751492.4 3.680 86.6401 6.17327 0
64
267
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
C
O
M
P
A
N
Y
C
O
D
E
O
W
N
E
R
S
H
IP
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
T
IM
E
O
U
T
P
U
T
(B
B
L)
O
P
E
X
($
)
O
IL
P
R
IC
E
($
)
O
IL
R
E
V
($
)
R
O
Y
A
LT
Y
($
)
P
X
N
C
O
S
T
($
)
P
P
T
($
)
5  ~
T
O
T
A
LC
O
S
T
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
P
R
O
F
IT
($
)
C
O
S
T
B
B
L
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
M
A
R
G
IN
($
)
G
T
B
B
L
($
)
A
F
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
JV_M 1 2001m6 16472664.00 26179690.78 26.97 444267748.08 33340000.00 59519690.78 72808000.00 106148000 132327690.8 384748057.3 3.613 86.6027 6.44389 0
JV_M 1 2001m7 17353678.00 27579869.53 24.8 430371214.40 31391000.00 58970869.53 72808000.00 104199000 131778869.5 371400344.9 3.398 86.2977 6.00443 0
JV_M 1 2001m8 17323230.00 27531479.11 25.81 447112566.30 32306000.00 59837479.11 72808000.00 105114000 132645479.1 387275087.2 3.454 86.6169 6.06781 0
JV_M 1 2001m9 16938860.00 26920607.20 25.03 423979665.80 31556000.00 58476607.20 94638000.00 126194000 153114607.2 365503058.6 3.452 86.2077 7.44997 0
JV_M 1 2001ml0 16930924.00 26907994.66 20.73 350978054.52 25270000.00 52177994.66 94638000.00 119908000 146815994.7 298800059.9 3.081 85.1335 7.08219 0
JV_M 1 2001mll 16068772.00 25537792.93 18.69 300325348.68 22182000.00 47719792.93 68955000.00 91137000 116674792.9 252605555.8 2.969
72
84.1106 5.67168 0
JV_M 1 2001ml2 16971689.00 26972781.70 18.52 314315680.28 23028000.00 50000781.70 68955000.00 91983000 118955781.7 264314898.6 2.946 84.0922 5.41979 0
JV_M 1 2002ml 15932154.00 3974749.14 19.15 305100749.10 22551000.00 26525749.14 68955000.00 91506000 95480749.14 278575000 1.664 91.3059 5.74348 0
JV_M 1 20O2m2 13844923.00 3454027.36 19.98 276621561.54 20162000.00 23616027.36 68955000.00 89117000 92571027.36 253005534.2 1.705 91.4627 6.4368 0
JV_M 1 2002m3 14398915.00 3592237.12 23.64 340390350.60 26999000.00 30591237.12 27186000.00 54185000 57777237.12 309799113.5 2.124 91.0129 3.76313 0
JV_M 1 2002m4 14786869.00 3689023.77 25.43 376030078.67 27727000.00 31416023.77 27186000.00 54913000 58602023.77 344614054.9 2.124 91.6453 3.71363 0
JV_M 1 2002 m5 14410564.00 3595143.31 25.69 370207389.16 26309000.00 29904143.31 27186000.00 53495000 57090143.31 340303245.9 2.075 91.9223 3.71221 0
JV_M 1 2002m6 13780325.00 3437911.47 24.49 337480159.25 24295000.00 27732911.47 27186000.00 51481000 54918911.47 309747247.8 2.012 91.7824 3.73583 0
JV_M 1 2002m6 14195464.00 3541480.22 25.75 365533198.00 26693000.00 30234480.22 46657000.00 73350000 76891480.22 335298717.8 2.129 91.7287 5.16714 0
JV_M 1 2002m8 15240898.00 3802294.79 26.78 408151248.44 29643000.00 33445294.79 46657000.00 76300000 80102294.79 374705953.6 2.194 91.8057 5.00627 0
JV_M 1 2002m9 15025482.00 3748552.87 28.28 424920630.96 31130000.00 34878552.87 46657000.00 77787000 81535552.87 390042078.1 2.321 91.7917 5.17701 0
JV_M 1 2002ml0 14092963.00 3515908.30 27.53 387979271.39 28516000.00 32031908.30 46657000.00 75173000 78688908.3 355947363.1 2.272 91.7439 5.33408 0
JV_M 1 2002mll 14805848.00 3693758.64 24.79 367036971.92 26391000.00 30084758.64 46657000.00 73048000 76741758.64 336952213.3 2.031 91.8033 4.93373 0
JV_M 1 2002ml2 13948323.00 3479823.56 27.89 389018728.47 30602000.00 34081823.56 46657000.00 77259000 80738823.56 354936904.9 2.443 91.239 5.53895 0
JV_M 1 2003ml 16855211.00 41871166.41 30.77 518634842.47 42502000.00 84373166.41 156581000.00 199083000 240954166.4 434261676.1 5.005 83.7317 11.8114 1
JV_M 1 2003m2 15835117.00 39337082.10 32.88 520658646.96 41335000.00 80672082.10 156581000.00 197916000 237253082.1 439986564.9 5.094 84.5058 12.4985 1
JV_M 1 2003m3 18009538.00 44738707.96 30.36 546769573.68 42263000.00 87001707.96 58487000.00 100750000 145488708 459767865.7 4.830 84.088 5.59426 1
87
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JV_M 1 2003m4 19336771.00 48035776.97 25.49 492894292.79 40099000.00 88134776.97 58487000.00 98586000 146621777 404759515.8 4.557 82.1189 5.09837 1
JV_M 1 2003m5 16902209.00 41987917.31 26.06 440471566.54 36425000.00 78412917.31 58487000.00 94912000 136899917.3 362058649.2 4.639 82.198 5.61536 1
JV_M 1 2003m6 15454826.00 38392375.58 27.91 431344193.66 38049000.00 76441375.58 58487000.00 96536000 134928375.6 354902818.1 4.946 82.2783 6.24633 1
JV_M 1 2003 m7 165113.00 410168.34 28.59 4720580.67 39715000.00 40125168.34 58487000.00 98202000 98612168.34 -35404587.67 243.0 -750 594.756 1
JV_M 1 2003m8 16363303.00 40649184.57 29.68 485662833.04 41599000.00 82248184.57 58487000.00 100086000 140735184.6 403414648.5 5.026 83.0648 6.11649 1
JV_M 1 2003 m9 15859822.00 39398453.46 26.88 426312015.36 36671000.00 76069453.46 58487000.00 95158000 134556453.5 350242561.9 4.796 82.1564 5.99994 1
JV_M 1 2003ml0 16254275.00 40378340.76 29.01 471536517.75 44293000.00 84671340.76 101681000.00 145974000 186352340.8 386865177 5.209 82.0435 8.98065 1
JV_M 1 2003mll 16306917.00 40509112.30 29.12 474857423.04 39889000.00 80398112.30 101681000.00 141570000 182079112.3 394459310.7 4.930 83.069 8.68159 1
JV_M 1 2003ml2 16338228.00 40586894.07 29.95 489329928.60 40970000.00 81556894.07 138384000.00 179354000 219940894.1 407773034.5 4.991 83.3329 10.9776 1
JV_M 1 2004ml 17032607.00 52519375.61 31.4 534823859.80 45357000.00 97876375.61 170958000.00 216315000 268834375.6 436947484.2 5.746 81.6993 12.7001 1
JV_M 1 2004m2 15591608.00 48076111.72 31.32 488329162.56 41319000.00 89395111.72 165234000.00 206553000 254629111.7 398934050.8 5.733 81.6937 13.2477 1
JV_M 1 2004m3 16941083.00 52237164.95 33.67 570406264.61 49230000.00 101467164.95 59001000.00 108231000 160468164.9 468939099.7 5.989 82.2114 6.38867 1
JV_M 1 2004m4 16726901.00 51576743.15 33.71 563863832.71 46270000.00 97846743.15 59001000.00 105271000 156847743.2 466017089.6 5.849 82.6471 6.29351 1
JV_M 1 2004m5 16197359.00 49943921.17 37.63 609506619.17 55559000.00 105502921.17 88515000.00 144074000 194017921.2 504003698 6.513 82.6904 8.89491 1
JV_M 1 2004mG 16323493.00 50332850.41 35.54 580136941.22 52115000.00 102447850.41 94587000.00 146702000 197034850.4 477689090.8 6.276 82.3407 8.98717 1
JV_M 1 2004m7 17004082.00 52431419.89 37.93 644964830.26 57440000.00 109871419.89 94587000.00 152027000 204458419.9 535093410.4 6.461 82.9647 8.94062 1
JV_M 1 2004m8 16622287.00 51254169.99 42.08 699465836.96 63694000.00 114948169.99 94587000.00 158281000 209535170 584517667 6.915 83.5663 9.52222 1
JV_M 1 2004m9 15755140.00 48580356.23 41.65 656201581.00 61379000.00 109959356.23 140446000.00 201825000 250405356.2 546242224.8 6.979 83.2431 12.8101 1
JV_M 1 2004ml0 16404564.00 50582829.66 46.87 768881914.68 73358000.00 123940829.66 162472000.00 235830000 286412829.7 644941085 7.555 83.8804 14.3759 1
JV_M 1 2004mll 15291157.00 47149682.84 42.23 645745560.11 60067000.00 107216682.84 198026000.00 258093000 305242682.8 538528877.3 7.011 83.3965 16.8786 1
JV_M 1 2004ml2 16160135.00 49829142.42 39.09 631699677.15 56807000.00 106636142.42 198026000.00 254833000 304662142.4 525063534.7 6.598 83.1192 15.7692 1
JV_M 1 2005ml 17677057.00 43524494.05 43.822 774643991.85 80381000.00 123905494.05 226469000.00 306850000 350374494.1 650738497.8 7.009
4
84.0048 17.3587 1
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JV_M 1 2005m2 16829807.00 41438392.98 46.9836 790724920.17 80381000.00 121819392.98 226469000.00 306850000 348288393 668905527.2 7.238 84.594 18.2325 1
JV_M 1 2005m3 18838153.00 46383347.54 53.2387 1002918776.12 80381000.00 126764347.54 226469000.00 306850000 353233347.5 876154428.6 6.729 87.3605 16.2888 1
JV_M 1 2005m4 17245725.00 42462467.32 52.1535 899424918.79 80381000.00 122843467.32 226469000.00 306850000 349312467.3 776581451.5 7.123 86.342 17.7928 1
JV_M 1 2005m5 19053628.00 46913890.62 48.7608 929070144.18 80381000.00 127294890.62 226469000.00 306850000 353763890.6 801775253.6 6.680
87
86.2987 16.1045 1
JV_M 1 2005m6 17327593.00 42664042.92 54.3858 942375007.38 80381000.00 123045042.92 226469000.00 306850000 349514042.9 819329964.5 7.101 86.9431 17.7087 1
JV_M 1 2005m7 21417603.00 52734475.79 58.7619 1258539045.73 80381000.00 133115475.79 226469000.00 306850000 359584475.8 1125423570 6.215
24
89.423 14.327 1
JV_M 1 2005m8 22819701.00 56186725.00 65.3707 1491739828.16 80381000.00 136567725.00 226469000.00 306850000 363036725 1355172103 5.984 90.8451 13.4467 1
JV_M 1 2005m9 22196915.00 54653299.75 63.8832 1418009960.33 80381000.00 135034299.75 226469000.00 306850000 361503299.8 1282975661 6.083 90.4772 13.824 1
JV_M 1 2005ml0 23099925.00 56876693.24 60.87 80381000.00 137257693.24 226469000.00 306850000 363726693.2 5.941 13.2836 1
JV_M 1 2005mll 23250039.00 57246304.30 55.1381 1281962975.39 80381000.00 137627304.30 226469000.00 306850000 36409630-1.3 1144335671 5.919
44
89.2643 13.1978 1
JV_M 1 2005ml2 22748762.00 56012058.82 58.3034 1326330170.39 80381000.00 136393058.82 226469000.00 306850000 362862058.8 1189937112 5.995 89.7165 13.4886 1
JV_M 1 2006ml 23342211.00 44604764.14 63.4921 1482045995.03 101658.00 44706422.14 234658.00 336316 44941080.14 1437339573 1.915
26
96.9835 0.01441 1
JV_M 1 2006m2 20411096.00 39003679.77 60.2523 1229815479.52 106267.00 39109946.77 234658.00 340925 39344604.77 1190705533 1.916 96.8199 0.0167 1
JV_M 1 2006m3 24219064.00 46280347.54 62.1603 1505464283.96 114514.00 46394861.54 304849.00 419363 46699710.54 1459069422 1.915 96.9182 0.01732 1
JV_M 1 2006m4 6536714.00 12491044.07 0.00 97192.00 12588236.07 304089.00 401281 12892325.07 -12588236.07 1.925 0.06139 1
JV_M 1 2006m5 22614484.00 43214146.47 70.0808 1584841130.31 115690.00 43329836.47 304089.00 419779 43633925.47 1541511294 1.916
02
97.266 0.01856 1
JV_M 1 2006m6 5700600.00 10893309.06 0.00 121921.00 11015230.06 363736.00 485657 11378966.06 -11015230.06 1.932 0.08519 1
JV_M 1 2006m7 24506322.00 46829270.49 74.2877 1820518296.84 126283.00 46955553.49 363736.00 490019 47319289.49 1773562743 1.916
06
97.4208 0.02 1
JV_M 1 2006m8 23181971.00 44298560.61 69.6639 1614946509.55 128764.00 44427324.61 363736.00 492500 44791060.61 1570519185 1.916 97.249 0.02124 1
JV_M 1 2006m9 21861202.00 41774695.60 63.1611 1380777565.64 135846.00 41910541.60 363736.00 499582 42274277.6 1338867024 1.917 96.9647 0.02285 1
JV_M 1 2006ml0 23498450.00 44903322.14 58.4447 1373359860.72 130548.00 45033870.14 363736.00 494284 45397606.14 1328325991 1.916 96.7209 0.02103 1
JV_M 1 2006mll 323129035.00 617469116.08 60.4533 19534216491.5
7
102072.00 617571188.08 139837.00 241909 617711025.1 18916645303 1.911
22
96.8385 0.00075 1
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JV_M 1 2006ml2 18927163.00 36168023.74 59.084 1118292498.69 100128.00 36268151.74 150886.00 251014 36419037.74 1082024347 1.916 96.7568 0.01326 1
JV_M 1 2007ml 18975909.00 71394628.00 54.5782 1035670956.58 99348.00 71493976.00 251537.00 350885 71745513 964176980.6 3.767
62
93.0968 0.01849 1
JV_M 1 2007m2 16913472.00 63634951.11 58.5746 990699857.01 110268.00 63745219.11 251537.00 361805 63996756.11 926954637.9 3.768 93.5656 0.02139 1
JV_M 1 2007m3 16754154.00 63035535.86 64.3595 1078288974.36 95255.00 63130790.86 281313.00 376568 63412103.86 1015158184 3.768
07
94.1453 0.02248 1
JV_M 1 2007m4 14387533.00 54131402.42 68.6 986984763.80 90951.00 54222353.42 281313.00 372264 54503666.42 932762410.4 3.768 94.5063 0.02587 1
JV_M 1 2007m5 6543548.00 24619330.50 68.88 450719586.24 121011.00 24740341.50 296150.00 417161 25036491.5 425979244.7 3.780
88
94.5109 0.06375 1
JV_M 1 2007m6 6543548.00 24619330.50 68.88 450719586.24 92008.00 24711338.50 296150.00 388158 25007488.5 426008247.7 3.776 94.5174 0.05932 1
JV_M 1 2007m7 6543548.00 24619330.50 68.88 450719586.24 106775.00 24726105.50 296150.00 402925 25022255.5 425993480.7 3.778 94.5141 0.06158 1
JV_M 1 2007m8 6543548.00 24619330.50 68.88 450719586.24 154377.00 24773707.50 296150.00 450527 25069857.5 425945878.7 3.785 94.5035 0.06885 1
JV_M 1 2007m9 6543548.00 24619330.50 68.88 450719586.24 102198.00 24721528.50 261775.00 363973 24983303.5 425998057.7 3.778 94.5151 0.05562 1
JV_M 1 2007ml0 6543548.00 24619330.50 68.88 450719586.24 90432.00 24709762.50 261775.00 352207 24971537.5 426009823.7 3.776 94.5177 0.05383 1
JV_M 1 2007mll 13070000.00 49174339.31 68.88 900261600.00 135130.00 49309469.31 300582.00 435712 49610051.31 850952130.7 3.772
72
94.5228 0.03334 1
JV_M 1 200m712 0.00 0.00 68.88 0.00 106851.00 106851.00 300582.00 407433 407433 -106851 1
NJV_C 0 1999ml 621252.00 4977163.75 11.32 7032572.64 1662000.00 6639163.75 100000.00 1762000 6739163.753 393408.8874 10.68 5.5941 2.83621 0
NJV_C 0 1999m2 572017.00 4582717.28 10.75 6149182.75 1746000.00 6328717.28 344000.00 2090000 6672717.284 -179534.5342 11.06 -2.9196 3.65374 0
NJV_C 0 1999m3 634615.00 5084221.50 12.86 8161148.90 1640000.00 6724221.50 155000.00 1795000 6879221.499 1436927.401 10.59 17.6069 2.82849 0
NJV_C 0 1999m4 595040.00 4767166.17 15.73 9359979.20 2297000.00 7064166.17 155000.00 2452000 7219166.173 2295813.027 11.87 24.528 4.12073 0
NJV_C 0 1999m5 550725.00 4412136.31 16.12 8877687.00 2434000.00 6846136.31 736000.00 3170000 7582136.311 2031550.689 12.43
11
22.8838 5.75605 0
NJV_C 0 1999m6 623117.00 4992105.21 16.24 10119420.08 2442000.00 7434105.21 1003000.00 3445000 8437105.21 2685314.87 11.93 26.5363 5.52866 0
NJV_C 0 1999m7 576223.00 4616413.68 18.75 10804181.25 2877000.00 7493413.68 3716000.00 6593000 11209413.68 3310767.574 13.00 30.6434 11.4418 0
NJV_C 0 1999m8 598082.00 4791537.17 20.21 12087237.22 3405000.00 8196537.17 5381000.00 8786000 13577537.17 3890700.048 13.70 32.1885 14.6903 0
NJV_C 0 1999m9 586724.00 4700542.49 22.37 13125015.88 1792000.00 6492542.49 4800000.00 6592000 11292542.49 6632473.386 11.06 50.5331 11.2353 0
58
271
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
C
O
M
P
A
N
Y
C
O
D
E
O
W
N
E
R
S
H
IP
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
T
IM
E
O
U
T
P
U
T
(B
B
L)
O
P
E
X
($
)
O
IL
P
R
IC
E
($
)
O
IL
R
E
V
($
)
R
O
Y
A
LT
Y
($
)
P
X
N
C
O
S
T
($
) ($)
id
d G
T
($
)
T
O
T
A
LC
O
S
T
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
P
R
O
F
IT
($
)
C
O
S
T
B
B
L
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
M
A
R
G
IN
($
)
G
T
B
B
L
($
)
A
F
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
NJV_C 0 1999ml0 612954.00 4910684.28 22.19 13601449.26 1731000.00 6641684.28 4800000.00 6531000 11441684.28 6959764.979 10.83 51.1693 10.655 0
NJV_C 0 1999mll 595617.00 4771788.81 24.22 14425843.74 4655000.00 9426788.81 8100000.00 12755000 17526788.81 4999054.928 15.82 34.6535 21.4148 0
NJV_C 0 1999ml2 616205.00 4936729.68 25.01 15411287.05 4380000.00 9316729.68 7050000.00 11430000 16366729.68 6094557.365 15.11 39.5461 18.549 0
NJV_C 0 2000ml 617442.00 5982990.92 25.21 15565712.82 4020000.00 10002990.92 4330000.00 8350000 14332990.92 5562721.905 16.20 35.737 13.5235 0
NJV_C 0 2000m2 597026.00 5785160.60 27.15 16209255.90 7261000.00 13046160.60 6026000.00 13287000 19072160.6 3163095.295 21.85 19.5141 22.2553 0
NJV_C 0 2000m3 623735.00 6043969.86 27.49 17146475.15 4824000.00 10867969.86 6026000.00 10850000 16893969.86 6278505.29 17.42 36.6169 17.3952 0
NJV_C 0 2000m4 603087.00 5843891.48 23.45 14142390.15 3028000.00 8871891.48 6026000.00 9054000 14897891.48 5270498.672 14.71 37.2674 15.0128 0
NJV_C 0 2000m5 624452.00 6050917.56 27.23 17003827.96 3473000.00 9523917.56 7474000.00 10947000 16997917.56 7479910.395 15.25 43.9896 17.5306 0
NJV_C 0 2000m6 605871.00 5870868.34 29.62 17945899.02 3048000.00 8918868.34 7797000.00 10845000 16715868.34 9027030.681 14.72 50.3014 17.8998 0
NJV_C 0 2000m7 626952.00 6075142.48 28.16 17654968.32 5650000.00 11725142.48 12116000.00 17766000 23841142.48 5929825.845 18.70 33.5873 28.3371 0
NJV_C 0 2000m8 628862.00 6093650.31 29.41 18494831.42 4929000.00 11022650.31 15123000.00 20052000 26145650.31 7472181.113 17.52 40.4015 31.8862 0
NJVC 0 2000m9 609539.00 5906411.13 32.08 19554011.12 6908000.00 12814411.13 17000000.00 23908000 29814411.13 6739599.993 21.02 34.4666 39.2231 0
NJV_C 0 2000ml0 625728.00 6063281.96 31.4 19647859.20 8886000.00 14949281.96 19000000.00 27886000 33949281.96 4698577.241 23.89 23.9139 44.5657 0
NJV_C 0 2000mll 612217.00 5932360.85 32.33 19792975.61 2940000.00 8872360.85 20000000.00 22940000 28872360.85 10920614.76 14.49 55.1742 37.4704 0
NJV_C 0 2000ml2 634191.00 6145288.13 25.28 16032348.48 5536000.00 11681288.13 22000000.00 27536000 33681288.13 4351060.354 18.41 27.1393 43.4191 0
NJV_C 0 2001ml 647752.00 6664893.96 25.95 16809164.40 4885000.00 11549893.96 12000000.00 16885000 23549893.96 5259270.441 17.83 31.2881 26.0671 0
NJV_C 0 2001m2 685508.00 7053375.56 27.24 18673237.92 4351000.00 11404375.56 12000000.00 16351000 23404375.56 7268862.356 16.63 38.9266 23.8524 0
NJV_C 0 2001m3 598947.00 6162726.23 25.02 14985653.94 5336000.00 11498726.23 12000000.00 17336000 23498726.23 3486927.708 19.19 23.2684 28.9441 0
NJV_C 0 20Olm4 645245.00 6639098.76 25.66 16556986.70 5683000.00 12322098.76 12000000.00 17683000 24322098.76 4234887.936 19.09 25.5776 27.4051 0
NJV_C 0 2001m5 661252.00 6803799.08 27.55 18217492.60 6206000.00 13009799.08 12000000.00 18206000 25009799.08 5207693.522 19.67 28.5862 27.5326 0
NJV_C 0 2001m6 641804.00 6603693.39 26.97 17309453.88 7127000.00 13730693.39 12000000.00 19127000 25730693.39 3578760.487 21.39 20.6752 29.8019 0
NJV_C 0 2001m7 657391.00 6764072.21 24.8 16303296.80 3721000.00 10485072.21 12000000.00 15721000 22485072.21 5818224.586 15.94 35.6874 23.9142 0
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NJV_C 0 2001m8 659370.00 6784434.68 25.81 17018339.70 7368000.00 14152434.68 12000000.00 19368000 26152434.68 2865905.025 21.46 16.8401 29.3735 0
NJV_C 0 2001m9 635989.00 6543861.30 25.03 15918804.67 4850000.00 11393861.30 9500000.00 14350000 20893861.3 4524943.371 17.91
52
28.4251 22.5633 0
NJV_C 0 2001ml0 655328.00 6742845.45 20.73 13584949.44 4381000.00 11123845.45 8000000.00 12381000 19123845.45 2461103.986 16.97 18.1164 18.8928 0
NJV_C 0 2001mll 632989.00 6512993.49 18.69 11830564.41 3804000.00 10316993.49 8200000.00 12004000 18516993.49 1513570.915 16.29
89
12.7937 18.964 0
NJV_C 0 2001ml2 654556.00 6734902.14 18.52 12122377.12 4217000.00 10951902.14 8200000.00 12417000 19151902.14 1170474.981 16.73 9.65549 18.9701 0
NJV_C 0 2002ml 643214.00 7906760.52 19.15 12317548.10 4173000.00 12079760.52 5400000.00 9573000 17479760.52 237787.5759 18.78 1.93048 14.8831 0
NJV_C 0 2 002 m2 559952.00 6883255.60 19.98 11187840.96 3282000.00 10165255.60 5400000.00 8682000 15565255.6 1022585.358 18.15 9.14015 15.5049 0
NJV_C 0 2002m3 593148.00 7291320.14 23.64 14022018.72 4395000.00 11686320.14 5300000.00 9695000 16986320.14 2335698.582 19.70 16.6574 16.345 0
NJV_C 0 2002m4 498627.00 6129413.04 25.43 12680084.61 5255000.00 11384413.04 5300000.00 10555000 16684413.04 1295671.569 22.83 10.2182 21.1681 0
NJV_C 0 2002m5 493269.00 6063549.39 25.69 12672080.61 3866000.00 9929549.39 5700000.00 9566000 15629549.39 2742531.221 20.13 21.6423 19.3931 0
NJV_C 0 2002m6 479881.00 5898976.31 24.49 11752285.69 3609000.00 9507976.31 5900000.00 9509000 15407976.31 2244309.382 19.81 19.0968 19.8153 0
NJVC 0 2002m6 473958.00 5826167.35 25.75 12204418.50 4737000.00 10563167.35 7100000.00 11837000 17663167.35 1641251.152 22.28 13.448 24.9748 0
NJV_C 0 2002m8 457683.00 5626105.58 26.78 12256750.74 5268000.00 10894105.58 7100000.00 12368000 17994105.58 1362645.156 23.80 11.1175 27.0231 0
NJV_C 0 2002m9 422344.00 5191698.05 28.28 11943888.32 4687000.00 9878698.05 4500000.00 9187000 14378698.05 2065190.274 23.39 17.2908 21.7524 0
NJV_C 0 2002ml0 379686.00 4667321.10 27.53 10452755.58 3837000.00 8504321.10 5300000.00 9137000 13804321.1 1948434.476 22.39 18.6404 24.0646 0
NJV_C 0 2002mll 410743.00 5049091.81 24.79 10182318.97 5171000.00 10220091.81 8100000.00 13271000 18320091.81 -37772.83762 24.88 -0.371 32.3097 0
NJV.C 0 2002ml2 412664.00 5072705.86 27.89 11509198.96 5164000.00 10236705.86 8150000.00 13314000 18386705.86 1272493.103 24.80 11.0563 32.2635 0
NJV_C 0 2003ml 404984.00 10259800.71 30.77 12461357.68 6605000.00 16864800.71 5300000.00 11905000 22164800.71 -4403443.026 41.64
31
-35.337 29.3962 1
NJV_C 0 2003m2 372083.00 9426291.97 32.88 12234089.04 5857000.00 15283291.97 5300000.00 11157000 20583291.97 -3049202.927 41.07 -24.924 29.9852 1
NJV_C 0 2003m3 395261.00 10013479.76 30.36 12000123.96 7666000.00 17679479.76 5300000.00 12966000 22979479.76 -5679355.799 44.72 -47.327 32.8036 1
NJV_C 0 2003m4 391205.00 9910725.70 25.49 9971815.45 5481000.00 15391725.70 5300000.00 10781000 20691725.7 -5419910.246 39.34 -54.352 27.5584 1
NJV_C 0 2003m5 389085.00 9857017.95 26.06 10139555.10 5904000.00 15761017.95 11400000.00 17304000 27161017.95 -5621462.85 40.50 -55.441 44.4736 1
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NJV_C 0 2003m6 368340.00 9331467.40 27.91 10280369.40 6718000.00 16049467.40 12400000.00 19118000 28449467.4 -5769097.996 43.57 -56.118 51.9031 1
NJVC 0 2003m7 355960.00 9017834.43 28.59 10176896.40 7540000.00 16557834.43 11600000.00 19140000 28157834.43 -6380938.031 45.51
6
-62.7 53.7701 1
NJV_C 0 2003m8 328407.00 8319811.08 29.68 9747119.76 5684000.00 14003811.08 10400000.00 16084000 24403811.08 -4256691.32 42.64 -43.671 48.9758 1
NJVC 0 2003m9 340328.00 8621815.81 26.88 9148016.64 7624000.00 16245815.81 17300000.00 24924000 33545815.81 -7097799.171 47.73
58
-77.588 73.2352 1
NJV_C 0 2003ml0 304928.00 7724997.80 29.01 8845961.28 6999000.00 14723997.80 20000000.00 26999000 34723997.8 -5878036.521 48.28
68
-66.449 88.5422 1
NJV_C 0 2003mll 275044.00 6967921.26 29.12 8009281.28 6474000.00 13441921.26 25000000.00 31474000 38441921.26 -5432639.984 48.87
19
-67.829 114.433 1
NJV.C 0 2003ml2 289154.00 7325381.78 29.95 8660162.30 7392000.00 14717381.78 24000000.00 31392000 38717381.78 -6057219.476 50.89 -69.943 108.565 1
NJV_C 0 2004ml 263081.00 8702662.21 31.4 8260743.40 5184000.00 13886662.21 5400000.00 10584000 19286662.21 -5625918.814 52.78
47
-68.104 40.231 1
NJV_C 0 2004m2 228613.00 7562468.28 31.32 7160159.16 5353000.00 12915468.28 6200000.00 11553000 19115468.28 -5755309.116 56.49 -80.38 50.5352 1
NJV_C 0 2004m3 181614.00 6007751.59 33.67 6114943.38 6142000.00 12149751.59 6200000.00 12342000 18349751.59 -6034808.207 66.89
88
-98.69 67.9573 1
NJV_C 0 2004m4 90498.00 2993654.14 33.71 3050687.58 8180000.00 11173654.14 6200000.00 14380000 17373654.14 -8122966.561 123.4 -266.27 158.899 1
NJVC 0 2004m5 86432.00 2859151.75 37.63 3252436.16 0.00 2859151.75 8100000.00 8100000 10959151.75 393284.4142 33.07
98
12.092 93.7153 1
NJV_C 0 2004m6 68825.00 2276716.02 35.54 2446040.50 74000.00 2350716.02 9700000.00 9774000 12050716.02 95324.48154 34.15
5
3.89709 142.012 1
NJV_C 0 2004m7 0.00 0.00 37.93 0.00 5972000.00 5972000.00 12700000.00 18672000 18672000 -5972000 1
NJV_C 0 2004m8 87007.00 2878172.62 42.08 3661254.56 10181000.00 13059172.62 18000000.00 28181000 31059172.62 -9397918.061 150.0 -256.69 323.893 1
NJV_C 0 2004m9 140302.00 4641159.62 41.65 5843578.30 8640000.00 13281159.62 23000000.00 31640000 36281159.62 -7437581.32 94.66
12
-127.28 225.514 1
NJV_C 0 2004ml0 152365.00 5040201.03 46.87 7141347.55 10151000.00 15191201.03 28000000.00 38151000 43191201.03 -8049853.484 99.70
27
-112.72 250.392 1
NJV_C 0 2004mll 148144.00 4900571.27 42.23 6256121.12 9942000.00 14842571.27 31000000.00 40942000 45842571.27 -8586450.153 100.1
9
-137.25 276.366 1
NJV_C 0 2004ml2 145531.00 4814133.80 39.09 5688806.79 7311000.00 12125133.80 23000000.00 30311000 35125133.8 -6436327.011 83.31 -113.14 208.279 1
NJV_C 0 2005ml 2594293.20 10117248.88 43.822 113687116.61 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 100551867.7 5.063
13
88.4461 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005m2 2594293.20 10117248.88 46.9836 121889233.99 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 108753985.1 5.063
13
89.2236 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005m3 2594293.20 10117248.88 53.2387 138116797.39 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 124981548.5 5.063 90.4898 16.386 1
13
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NJV_C 0 2005m4 2594293.20 10117248.88 52.1535 135301470.41 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 122166221.5 5.063 90.2919 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005m5 2594293.20 10117248.88 48.7608 126499811.87 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 113364563 5.063
13
89.6164 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005m6 2594293.20 10117248.88 54.3858 141092711.12 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 127957462.2 5.063 90.6903 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005m7 2594293.20 10117248.88 58.7619 152445597.59 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 139310348.7 5.063
13
91.3836 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 200Sm8 2594293.20 10117248.88 65.3707 169590762.49 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 156455513.6 5.063 92.2547 16.386 1
NJV.C 0 2005m9 2594293.20 10117248.88 63.8832 165731751.35 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 152596502.5 5.063
13
92.0744 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005ml0 2594293.20 10117248.88 60.87 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 5.063 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005mll 2594293.20 10117248.88 55.1381 143044397.89 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 129909149 5.063 90.8174 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2005ml2 2594293.20 10117248.88 58.3034 151256114.16 3018000.00 13135248.88 39492000.00 42510000 52627248.88 138120865.3 5.063 91.3159 16.386 1
NJV_C 0 2006ml 2643876.00 16749779.02 63.4921 167865239.38 12561000.00 29310779.02 11200000.00 23761000 40510779.02 138554460.4 11.08
63
82.5391 8.98718 1
NJV.C 0 2006m2 4675820.00 29622777.97 60.2523 281728909.39 14570000.00 44192777.97 10600000.00 25170000 54792777.97 237536131.4 9.451 84.3137 5.38301 1
NJV_C 0 2006m3 2108491.00 13357948.07 62.1603 131064433.11 11023000.00 24380948.07 11000000.00 22023000 35380948.07 106683485 11.56 81.3977 10.4449 1
NJV_C 0 2006m4 0.00 0.00 0.00 3847000.00 3847000.00 16000000.00 19847000 19847000 -3847000 1
NJV_C 0 2006m5 2441578.00 15468158.10 70.0808 171107739.50 22775000.00 38243158.10 18000000.00 40775000 56243158.1 132864581.4 15.66
33
77.6497 16.7003 1
NJV_C 0 2006m6 0.00 0.00 0.00 13338000.00 13338000.00 19000000.00 32338000 32338000 -13338000 1
NJVC 0 2006m7 2225343.00 14098241.93 74.2877 165315613.18 11452000.00 25550241.93 17500000.00 28952000 43050241.93 139765371.2 11.48 84.5446 13.0101 1
NJV_C 0 2006m8 2489026.00 15768755.98 69.6639 173395258.36 10581000.00 26349755.98 18000000.00 28581000 44349755.98 147045502.4 10.58 84.8036 11.4828 1
NJV_C 0 2006m9 2260757.00 14322600.67 63.1611 142791898.95 12157000.00 26479600.67 18000000.00 30157000 44479600.67 116312298.3 11.71
27
81.4558 13.3393 1
NJV_C 0 2006ml0 0.00 0.00 58.4447 0.00 12436000.00 12436000.00 14000000.00 26436000 26436000 -12436000 1
NJV_C 0 2006mll 0.00 0.00 60.4533 0.00 7380000.00 7380000.00 5000000.00 12380000 12380000 -7380000 1
NJV_C 0 2006ml2 1746150.00 11062404.83 59.084 103169526.60 15241000.00 26303404.83 22000000.00 37241000 48303404.83 76866121.77 15.06 74.5047 21.3275 1
NJV_C 0 2007ml 1602786.00 14618658.48 54.5782 87477174.87 7049000.00 21667658.48 12000000.00 19049000 33667658.48 65809516.39 13.51 75.2305 11.8849 1
87
275
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP ON THE PERFORMANCE OF UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS COMPANIES IN NIGERIA
C
O
M
P
A
N
Y
C
O
D
E
O
W
N
E
R
S
H
IP
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
T
IM
E
O
U
T
P
U
T
(B
B
L)
O
P
E
X
($
)
O
IL
P
R
IC
E
($
)
O
IL
R
E
V
($
)
R
O
Y
A
LT
Y
($
)
P
X
N
C
O
S
T
($
)
P
P
T
($
)
5  12
T
O
T
A
LC
O
S
T
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
P
R
O
F
IT
($
)
C
O
S
T
B
B
L
($
)
G
R
O
S
S
M
A
R
G
IN
($
)
G
T
B
B
L
($
)
A
F
(D
U
M
M
Y
)
NJV_C 0 2007m2 1430609.00 13048269.94 58.5746 83797349.93 4291000.00 17339269.94 13000000.00 17291000 30339269.94 66458079.99 12.12 79.3081 12.0865 1
NJVC 0 2007m3 1706183.00 15561719.76 64.3595 109809084.79 6880000.00 22441719.76 12000000.00 18880000 34441719.76 87367365.02 13.15 79.563 11.0656 1
NJV_C 0 2007m4 1460754.00 13323215.85 68.6 100207724.40 8096000.00 21419215.85 14000000.00 22096000 35419215.85 78788508.55 14.66 78.6252 15.1264 1
NJVC 0 2007m5 1559387.00 14222825.74 68.88 107410576.56 8704000.00 22926825.74 17000000.00 25704000 39926825.74 84483750.82 14.70
25
78.655 16.4834 1
NJV_C 0 2007m6 1559387.00 14222825.74 68.88 107410576.56 14039000.00 28261825.74 21000000.00 35039000 49261825.74 79148750.82 18.12 73.688 22.4697 1
NJV_C 0 2007m7 1559387.00 14222825.74 68.88 107410576.56 7017000.00 21239825.74 17000000.00 24017000 38239825.74 86170750.82 13.62 80.2256 15.4016 1
NJV_C 0 2007m8 1559387.00 14222825.74 68.88 107410576.56 8544000.00 22766825.74 20000000.00 28544000 42766825.74 84643750.82 14.59 78.8039 18.3046 1
NJV_C 0 2007m9 1559387.00 14222825.74 68.88 107410576.56 11961000.00 26183825.74 27000000.00 38961000 53183825.74 81226750.82 16.79 75.6227 24.9848 1
NJV_C 0 2007ml0 1559387.00 14222825.74 68.88 107410576.56 16766000.00 30988825.74 38000000.00 54766000 68988825.74 76421750.82 19.87 71.1492 35.1202 1
NJV_C 0 2007mll 1765000.00 16098176.68 68.88 121573200.00 18395000.00 34493176.68 54000000.00 72395000 88493176.68 87080023.32 19.54
29
71.6276 41.017 1
NJV_C 0 200m712 0.00 0.00 68.88 0.00 0.00 5000000.00 5000000 5000000 0 1
NJV_P 0 1999ml 141570.00 977501.11 11.32 1602572.40 624000.00 1601501.11 47000.00 671000 1648501.108 1071.292224 11.31 0.06685 4.7397 0
NJV_P 0 1999m2 75842.00 523667.72 10.75 815301.50 0.00 523667.72 0.00 0 523667.7193 291633.7807 6.904 35.7701 0 0
NJV_P 0 1999m3 125730.00 868130.35 12.86 1616887.80 853000.00 1721130.35 24000.00 877000 1745130.354 -104242.5545 13.68 -6.4471 6.97526 0
NJV_P 0 1999m4 134484.00 928574.27 15.73 2115433.32 0.00 928574.27 0.00 0 928574.267 1186859.053 6.904 56.1048 0 0
NJV_P 0 1999m5 146213.00 1009559.72 16.12 2356953.56 0.00 1009559.72 0.00 0 1009559.719 1347393.841 6.904 57.1668 0 0
NJV_P 0 1999m6 134314.00 927400.46 16.24 2181259.36 0.00 927400.46 0.00 0 927400.4647 1253858.895 6.904 57.4833 0 0
NJV_P 0 1999m7 181901.00 1255975.34 18.75 3410643.75 0.00 1255975.34 0.00 0 1255975.341 2154668.409 6.904
72
63.1748 0 0
NJV_P 0 1999m8 177786.00 1227562.42 20.21 3593055.06 0.00 1227562.42 0.00 0 1227562.421 2365492.639 6.904 65.8351 0 0
NJV_P 0 1999m9 190835.00 1317662.10 22.37 4268978.95 538000.00 1855662.10 8000.00 546000 1863662.103 2413316.847 9.723 56.5315 2.86111 0
NJV_P 0 1999ml0 194145.00 1340516.72 22.19 4308077.55 0.00 1340516.72 0.00 0 1340516.724 2967560.826 6.904 68.8836 0 0
NJV_P 0 1999mll 236565.00 1633414.92 24.22 5729604.30 685000.00 2318414.92 8000.00 693000 2326414.915 3411189.385 9.800 59.5362 2.92943 0
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NJV_P 0 1999ml2 260117.00 1796034.86 25.01 6505526.17 0.00 1796034.86 0.00 0 1796034.864 4709491.306 6.904 72.3922 0 0
NJV_P 0 2000ml 261670.00 874905.72 25.21 6596700.70 952000.00 1826905.72 8000.00 960000 1834905.722 4769794.978 6.981
72
72.3058 3.66874 0
NJV_P 0 2000m2 246349.00 823679.25 27.15 6688375.35 0.00 823679.25 0.00 0 823679.2515 5864696.099 3.343 87.6849 0 0
NJV_P 0 2000m3 250669.00 838123.37 27.49 6890890.81 1564000.00 2402123.37 223000.00 1787000 2625123.371 4488767.439 9.582 65.1406 7.12892 0
NJV_P 0 2000m4 246635.00 824635.51 23.45 5783590.75 0.00 824635.51 0.00 0 824635.5057 4958955.244 3.343 85.7418 0 0
NJV_P 0 2000m5 396405.00 1325398.41 27.23 10794108.15 1564000.00 2889398.41 223000.00 1787000 3112398.413 7904709.737 7.289 73.2317 4.50802 0
NJV_P 0 2000m6 347807.00 1162908.76 29.62 10302043.34 658000.00 1820908.76 74000.00 732000 1894908.757 8481134.583 5.235 82.3248 2.10462 0
NJV_P 0 2000m7 389239.00 1301438.56 28.16 10960970.24 846000.00 2147438.56 74000.00 920000 2221438.561 8813531.679 5.517 80.4083 2.36359 0
NJV_P 0 2000m8 199586.00 667325.00 29.41 5869824.26 686000.00 1353325.00 74000.00 760000 1427325.003 4516499.257 6.780 76.9444 3.80788 0
NJV_P 0 2000m9 96066.00 321201.10 32.08 3081797.28 888000.00 1209201.10 74000.00 962000 1283201.105 1872596.175 12.58 60.7631 10.0139 0
NJV_P 0 2000ml0 358345.00 1198143.05 31.4 11252033.00 474000.00 1672143.05 74000.00 548000 1746143.046 9579889.954 4.666 85.1392 1.52925 0
NJV_P 0 2000mll 540246.00 1806337.44 32.33 17466153.18 888000.00 2694337.44 247000.00 1135000 2941337.435 14771815.74 4.987 84.574 2.10089 0
NJV_P 0 2000ml2 456865.00 1527549.21 25.28 11549547.20 1509000.00 3036549.21 0.00 1509000 3036549.214 8512997.986 6.646 73.7085 3.30295 0
NJV_P 0 2001ml 470851.00 1100032.46 25.95 12218583.45 1509000.00 2609032.46 247000.00 1756000 2856032.459 9609550.991 5.541 78.647 3.72942 0
NJV_P 0 2001m2 577870.00 1350057.15 27.24 15741178.80 1188000.00 2538057.15 247000.00 1435000 2785057.146 13203121.65 4.392 83.8763 2.48326 0
NJV_P 0 2001m3 322165.00 752662.64 25.02 8060568.30 1560000.00 2312662.64 155000.00 1715000 2467662.641 5747905.659 7.178 71.3089 5.32336 0
NJV_P 0 2001m4 372450.00 870141.70 25.66 9557067.00 623000.00 1493141.70 155000.00 778000 1648141.7 8063925.3 4.008 84.3766 2.08887 0
NJV_P 0 2001m5 334453.00 781370.66 27.55 9214180.15 623000.00 1404370.66 155000.00 778000 1559370.659 7809809.491 4.199
01
84.7586 2.32619 0
NJV_P 0 2001m6 436905.00 1020725.63 26.97 11783327.85 1273000.00 2293725.63 155000.00 1428000 2448725.626 9489602.224 5.249 80.5341 3.26845 0
NJV_P 0 2001m7 435288.00 1016947.89 24.8 10795142.40 591000.00 1607947.89 155000.00 746000 1762947.886 9187194.514 3.693 85.1049 1.71381 0
NJV_P 0 2001m8 428274.00 1000561.33 25.81 11053751.94 591000.00 1591561.33 155000.00 746000 1746561.327 9462190.613 3.716 85.6016 1.74188 0
NJV_P 0 2001m9 419415.00 979864.36 25.03 10497957.45 830000.00 1809864.36 155000.00 985000 1964864.36 8688093.09 4.315 82.7598 2.34851 0
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NJV_P 0 2001ml0 466782.00 1090526.20 20.73 9676390.86 806000.00 1896526.20 116000.00 922000 2012526.199 7779864.661 4.062 80.4005 1.97523 0
NJV_P 0 2001mll 419744.00 980632.99 18.69 7845015.36 806000.00 1786632.99 311000.00 1117000 2097632.991 6058382.369 4.256 77.2259 2.66115 0
NJV_P 0 2001ml2 454746.00 1062406.92 18.52 8421895.92 1338000.00 2400406.92 0.00 1338000 2400406.92 6021489 5.278 71.498 2.9423 0
NJV_P 0 2002ml 424724.00 2087455.73 19.15 8133464.60 1338000.00 3425455.73 311000.00 1649000 3736455.732 4708008.868 8.065 57.8844 3.88252 0
NJV_P 0 2002m2 332748.00 1635407.28 19.98 6648305.04 1297000.00 2932407.28 0.00 1297000 2932407.276 3715897.764 8.812 55.8924 3.89784 0
NJV_P 0 2002m3 357535.00 1757231.72 23.64 8452127.40 652000.00 2409231.72 168000.00 820000 2577231.721 6042895.679 6.738 71.4956 2.29348 0
NJV_P 0 2002m4 347156.00 1706220.47 25.43 8828177.08 527000.00 2233220.47 168000.00 695000 2401220.468 6594956.612 6.432 74.7035 2.00198 0
NJV_P 0 2002m5 326652.00 1605446.34 25.69 8391689.88 549000.00 2154446.34 168000.00 717000 2322446.337 6237243.543 6.595 74.3264 2.195 0
NJV_P 0 2002m6 323199.00 1588475.35 24.49 7915143.51 699000.00 2287475.35 168000.00 867000 2455475.352 5627668.158 7.077 71.1 2.68256 0
NJV_P 0 2002m6 309292.00 1520124.50 25.75 7964269.00 623000.00 2143124.50 168000.00 791000 2311124.501 5821144.499 6.929 73.0908 2.55745 0
NJV_P 0 2002m8 363883.00 1788431.20 26.78 9744786.74 623000.00 2411431.20 168000.00 791000 2579431.203 7333355.537 6.626 75.2541 2.17378 0
NJV_P 0 2002m9 330001.00 1621906.18 28.28 9332428.28 632000.00 2253906.18 168000.00 800000 2421906.177 7078522.103 6.83 75.8487 2.42424 0
NJV_P 0 2002ml0 466782.00 2294164.59 27.53 12850508.46 771000.00 3065164.59 168000.00 939000 3233164.591 9785343.869 6.566 76.1475 2.01165 0
NJV_P 0 2002mll 419774.00 2063127.21 24.79 10406197.46 1403000.00 3466127.21 337000.00 1740000 3803127.214 6940070.246 8.257 66.6917 4.14509 0
NJV_P 0 2002ml2 454746.00 2235009.43 27.89 12682865.94 1430000.00 3665009.43 0.00 1430000 3665009.428 9017856.512 8.059 71.1027 3.14461 0
NJV_P 0 2003ml 389723.00 2243024.49 30.77 11991776.71 708000.00 2951024.49 168000.00 876000 3119024.488 9040752.222 7.572 75.3913 2.24775 1
NJV_P 0 2003m2 346939.00 1996784.06 32.88 11407354.32 912000.00 2908784.06 168000.00 1080000 3076784.057 8498570.263 8.384 74.5008 3.11294 1
NJV_P 0 2003m3 390401.00 2246926.67 30.36 11852574.36 879000.00 3125926.67 497000.00 1376000 3622926.672 8726647.688 8.006 73.6266 3.52458 1
NJV_P 0 2003m4 371879.00 2140324.55 25.49 9479195.71 892000.00 3032324.55 497000.00 1389000 3529324.548 6446871.162 8.154 68.0107 3.73509 1
NJV_P 0 2003m5 393513.00 2264837.58 26.06 10254948.78 955000.00 3219837.58 497000.00 1452000 3716837.578 7035111.202 8.182 68.6021 3.68984 1
NJV_P 0 2003m6 378845.00 2180416.89 27.91 10573563.95 0.00 2180416.89 543000.00 543000 2723416.892 8393147.058 5.755 79.3786 1.4333 1
NJV_P 0 2003m7 408090.00 2348734.52 28.59 11667293.10 1011000.00 3359734.52 543000.00 1554000 3902734.52 8307558.58 8.232 71.2038 3.80798 1
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NJV_P 0 2003m8 345855.00 1990545.17 29.68 10264976.40 843000.00 2833545.17 543000.00 1386000 3376545.168 7431431.232 8.192 72.396 4.00746 1
NJV_P 0 2003m9 334173.00 1923310.20 26.88 8982570.24 926000.00 2849310.20 543000.00 1469000 3392310.203 6133260.037 8.526 68.2796 4.39593 1
NJV_P 0 2003ml0 356647.00 2052657.80 29.01 10346329.47 833000.00 2885657.80 543000.00 1376000 3428657.797 7460671.673 8.091 72.1094 3.85816 1
NJV_P 0 2003mll 372942.00 2146442.57 29.12 10860071.04 725000.00 2871442.57 543000.00 1268000 3414442.573 7988628.467 7.699 73.5596 3.39999 1
NJV_P 0 2003ml2 384158.00 2210995.51 29.95 11505532.10 859000.00 3069995.51 543000.00 1402000 3612995.505 8435536.595 7.991 73.3172 3.64954 1
NJV_P 0 2004ml 434730.00 2606136.77 31.4 13650522.00 854000.00 3460136.77 543000.00 1397000 4003136.769 10190385.23 7.959 74.652 3.21349 1
NJV_P 0 2004m2 460735.00 2762032.58 31.32 14430220.20 885000.00 3647032.58 543000.00 1428000 4190032.582 10783187.62 7.915 74.7264 3.0994 1
NJV_P 0 20O4m3 592210.00 3550204.16 33.67 19939710.70 1023000.00 4573204.16 799000.00 1822000 5372204.164 15366506.54 7.722 77.0648 3.07661 1
NJV_P 0 2004m4 640736.00 3841109.77 33.71 21599210.56 1051000.00 4892109.77 799000.00 1850000 5691109.767 16707100.79 7.635 77.3505 2.8873 1
NJV_P 0 2004 m5 671043.00 4022795.38 37.63 25251348.09 1352000.00 5374795.38 799000.00 2151000 6173795.381 19876552.71 8.009 78.7148 3.20546 1
NJV_P 0 2004m6 650548.00 3899931.14 35.54 23120475.92 1875000.00 5774931.14 799000.00 2674000 6573931.137 17345544.78 8.877 75.0224 4.11038 1
NJV_P 0 2004 m7 679012.00 4070568.26 37.93 25754925.16 1851000.00 5921568.26 799000.00 2650000 6720568.261 19833356.9 8.720 77.008 3.90273 1
NJV_P 0 2004m8 650800.00 3901441.84 42.08 27385664.00 2095000.00 5996441.84 799000.00 2894000 6795441.836 21389222.16 9.213 78.1037 4.44683 1
NJV_P 0 2004m9 652464.00 3911417.25 41.65 27175125.60 2024000.00 5935417.25 799000.00 2823000 6734417.25 21239708.35 9.096 78.1586 4.32668 1
NJV_P 0 2004ml0 692301.00 4150233.69 46.87 32448147.87 1042000.00 5192233.69 799000.00 1841000 5991233.689 27255914.18 7.499 83.9984 2.65925 1
NJV_P 0 2004mll 682547.00 4091760.02 42.23 28823959.81 2687000.00 6778760.02 799000.00 3486000 7577760.02 22045199.79 9.931 76.4822 5.10734 1
NJV_P 0 2004ml2 712174.00 4269369.14 39.09 27838881.66 2396000.00 6665369.14 799000.00 3195000 7464369.143 21173512.52 9.359 76.0573 4.48626 1
NJV_P 0 2005ml 656485.00 8993845.04 43.822 28768485.67 13649000.00 22642845.04 25233333.00 38882333 47876178.04 6125640.63 34.49 21.2929 59.2281 1
NJV_P 0 2005m2 681724.00 9339619.36 46.9836 32029847.73 13649000.00 22988619.36 25233333.00 38882333 48221952.36 9041228.366 33.72 28.2275 57.0353 1
NJV_P 0 2005m3 673068.00 9221032.15 53.2387 35833265.33 13649000.00 22870032.15 25233333.00 38882333 48103365.15 12963233.18 33.97 36.1765 57.7688 1
NJV_P 0 2005m4 726518.00 9953297.20 52.1535 37890456.51 13649000.00 23602297.20 25233333.00 38882333 48835630.2 14288159.32 32.48 37.7091 53.5187 1
NJV_P 0 2005m5 752101.00 10303784.32 48.7608 36673046.44 13649000.00 23952784.32 25233333.00 38882333 49186117.32 12720262.12 31.84 34.6856 51.6983 1
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NJV_P 0 2005m6 715165.00 9797761.09 54.3858 38894820.66 13649000.00 23446761.09 25233333.00 38882333 48680094.09 15448059.57 32.78 39.7175 54.3683 1
NJV_P 0 2005m7 744279.00 10196622.91 58.7619 43735248.17 13649000.00 23845622.91 25233333.00 38882333 49078955.91 19889625.26 32.03 45.4773 52.2416 1
NJV_P 0 2005m8 740540.00 10145398.61 65.3707 48409618.18 13649000.00 23794398.61 25233333.00 38882333 49027731.61 24615219.57 32.13 50.8478 52.5054 1
NJV_P 0 2005m9 734963.00 10068993.70 63.8832 46951788.32 13649000.00 23717993.70 25233333.00 38882333 48951326.7 23233794.62 32.27 49.4844 52.9038 1
NJV_P 0 2005ml0 691813.00 9477838.67 60.87 13649000.00 23126838.67 25233333.00 38882333 48360171.67 33.42 56.2035 1
NJV_P 0 2005mll 775570.00 10625309.64 55.1381 42763456.22 13649000.00 24274309.64 25233333.00 38882333 49507642.64 18489146.58 31.29 43.2359 50.1339 1
NJV_P 0 2005ml2 739488.00 10130986.21 58.3034 43114664.66 13649000.00 23779986.21 25233333.00 38882333 49013319.21 19334678.45 32.15 44.8448 52.5801 1
NJV_P 0 2006ml 799658.00 41957836.84 63.4921 50771965.70 3683000.00 45640836.84 3683000 45640836.84 5131128.863 57.07 10.1062 4.60572 1
NJV_P 0 2006m2 404823.00 21240952.24 60.2523 24391516.84 10419000.00 31659952.24 10419000 31659952.24 -7268435.392 78.20 -29.799 25.7372 1
NJV_P 0 2006m3 404823.00 21240952.24 62.1603 25163919.13 7343000.00 28583952.24 7343000 28583952.24 -3420033.108 70.60 -13.591 18.1388 1
NJV_P 0 2006m4 404823.00 21240952.24 0.00 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 -21240952.24 52.46 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006m5 404823.00 21240952.24 70.0808 28370319.70 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 7129367.463 52.46 25.1297 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006m6 404823.00 21240952.24 0.00 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 -21240952.24 52.46 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006m7 404823.00 21240952.24 74.2877 30073369.58 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 8832417.342 52.46 29.3696 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006m8 404823.00 21240952.24 69.6639 28201548.99 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 6960596.754 52.46 24.6816 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006m9 404823.00 21240952.24 63.1611 25569065.99 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 4328113.75 52.46 16.9271 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006ml0 404823.00 21240952.24 58.4447 23659758.79 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 2418806.553 52.46 10.2233 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006mll 404823.00 21240952.24 60.4533 24472886.27 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 3231934.031 52.46 13.2062 0 1
NJV_P 0 2006ml2 404823.00 21240952.24 59.084 23918562.13 21240952.24 0 21240952.24 2677609.897 52.46 11.1947 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007ml 404823.00 20440679.37 54.5782 22094510.66 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 1653831.288 50.49 7.48526 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007m2 404823.00 20440679.37 58.5746 23712345.30 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 3271665.925 50.49 13.7973 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007m3 404823.00 20440679.37 64.3595 26054205.87 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 5613526.498 50.49 21.5456 0 1
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NJV_P 0 2007m4 404823.00 20440679.37 68.6 27770857.80 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7330178.43 50.49 26.3952 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007m5 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49
29
26.6944 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007m6 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49 26.6944 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007m7 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49 26.6944 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007m8 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49 26.6944 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007m9 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49 26.6944 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007ml0 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49 26.6944 0 1
NJV_P 0 2007mll 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49 26.6944 0 1
NJV_P 0 200m712 404823.00 20440679.37 68.88 27884208.24 20440679.37 0 20440679.37 7443528.87 50.49 26.6944 0 1
NJV_A 0 1999ml 317177.00 1182400.75 11.32 3590443.64 0.00 1182400.75 0.00 0 1182400.749 2408042.891 3.727 67.0681 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m2 270000.00 1006530.12 10.75 2902500.00 0.00 1006530.12 0.00 0 1006530.115 1895969.885 3.727 65.322 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m3 313371.00 1168212.40 12.86 4029951.06 0.00 1168212.40 0.00 0 1168212.403 2861738.657 3.727
89
71.0117 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m4 294039.00 1096144.85 15.73 4625233.47 0.00 1096144.85 0.00 0 1096144.846 3529088.624 3.727 76.3008 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m5 298621.00 1113226.04 16.12 4813770.52 0.00 1113226.04 0.00 0 1113226.035 3700544.485 3.727 76.8741 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m6 307186.00 1145155.41 16.24 4988700.64 0.00 1145155.41 0.00 0 1145155.407 3843545.233 3.727 77.045 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m7 303912.00 1132950.30 18.75 5698350.00 0.00 1132950.30 0.00 0 1132950.297 4565399.703 3.727 80.1179 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m8 286134.00 1066675.88 20.21 5782768.14 0.00 1066675.88 0.00 0 1066675.881 4716092.259 3.727 81.5542 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999m9 275749.00 1027961.75 22.37 6168505.13 0.00 1027961.75 0.00 0 1027961.751 5140543.379 3.727 83.3353 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999ml0 273403.00 1019216.12 22.19 6066812.57 0.00 1019216.12 0.00 0 1019216.122 5047596.448 3.727 83.2001 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999mll 278032.00 1036472.52 24.22 6733935.04 0.00 1036472.52 0.00 0 1036472.522 5697462.518 3.727 84.6082 0 0
NJV_A 0 1999ml2 269604.00 1005053.87 25.01 6742796.04 0.00 1005053.87 0.00 0 1005053.871 5737742.169 3.727 85.0944 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000ml 305482.00 1027439.07 25.21 7701201.22 0.00 1027439.07 0.00 0 1027439.068 6673762.152 3.363 86.6587 0 0
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NJV_A 0 2000m2 294357.00 990021.94 27.15 7991792.55 0.00 990021.94 0.00 0 990021.9386 7001770.611 3.363 87.612 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000m3 296462.00 997101.76 27.49 8149740.38 0.00 997101.76 0.00 0 997101.764 7152638.616 3.363 87.7652 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000m4 287908.00 968331.77 23.45 6751442.60 0.00 968331.77 0.00 0 968331.775 5783110.825 3.363 85.6574 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000m5 306915.00 1032258.73 27.23 8357295.45 0.00 1032258.73 0.00 0 1032258.731 7325036.719 3.363
34
87.6484 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000m6 340989.00 1146861.09 29.62 10100094.18 0.00 1146861.09 0.00 0 1146861.093 8953233.087 3.363 88.645 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000m7 369799.00 1243758.85 28.16 10413539.84 0.00 1243758.85 0.00 0 1243758.847 9169780.993 3.363 88.0563 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000m8 400384.00 1346626.52 29.41 11775293.44 0.00 1346626.52 0.00 0 1346626.524 10428666.92 3.363 88.564 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000m9 391636.00 1317204.05 32.08 12563682.88 0.00 1317204.05 0.00 0 1317204.048 11246478.83 3.363 89.5158 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000ml0 394918.00 1328242.52 31.4 12400425.20 0.00 1328242.52 0.00 0 1328242.522 11072182.68 3.363 89.2887 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000mll 374422.00 1259307.56 32.33 12105063.26 0.00 1259307.56 0.00 0 1259307.556 10845755.7 3.363 89.5969 0 0
NJV_A 0 2000ml2 399260.00 1342846.13 25.28 10093292.80 0.00 1342846.13 0.00 0 1342846.133 8750446.667 3.363 86.6957 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001ml 407948.00 1170520.92 25.95 10586250.60 0.00 1170520.92 0.00 0 1170520.92 9415729.68 2.869 88.943 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m2 367238.00 1053712.14 27.24 10003563.12 0.00 1053712.14 0.00 0 1053712.143 8949850.977 2.869 89.4666 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m3 410318.00 1177321.14 25.02 10266156.36 0.00 1177321.14 0.00 0 1177321.136 9088835.224 2.869 88.532 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m4 420706.00 1207127.32 25.66 10795315.96 0.00 1207127.32 0.00 0 1207127.315 9588188.645 2.869 88.818 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m5 450092.00 1291444.26 27.55 12400034.60 0.00 1291444.26 0.00 0 1291444.257 11108590.34 2.869 89.5852 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m6 412531.00 1183670.87 26.97 11125961.07 0.00 1183670.87 0.00 0 1183670.873 9942290.197 2.869 89.3612 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m7 431868.00 1239154.32 24.8 10710326.40 0.00 1239154.32 0.00 0 1239154.325 9471172.075 2.869
29
88.4303 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m8 419231.00 1202895.11 25.81 10820352.11 0.00 1202895.11 0.00 0 1202895.113 9617456.997 2.869 88.883 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001m9 425725.00 1221528.28 25.03 10655896.75 0.00 1221528.28 0.00 0 1221528.279 9434368.471 2.869 88.5366 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001ml0 519569.00 1490793.88 20.73 10770665.37 0.00 1490793.88 0.00 0 1490793.885 9279871.485 2.869 86.1588 0 0
NJV_A 0 2001mll 488125.00 1400571.95 18.69 9123056.25 0.00 1400571.95 0.00 0 1400571.945 7722484.305 2.869 84.648 0 0
29
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NJV_A 0 2001ml2 474424.00 1361259.81 18.52 8786332.48 0.00 1361259.81 0.00 0 1361259.809 7425072.671 2.869 84.5071 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002ml 467114.00 9582435.66 19.15 8945233.10 0.00 9582435.66 0.00 0 9582435.663 -637202.5635 20.51
41
-7.1234 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m2 394835.00 8099695.12 19.98 7888803.30 0.00 8099695.12 0.00 0 8099695.118 -210891.8176 20.51 -2.6733 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m3 472508.00 9693088.86 23.64 11170089.12 0.00 9693088.86 0.00 0 9693088.862 1477000.258 20.51 13.2228 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m4 353927.00 7260503.23 25.43 9000363.61 0.00 7260503.23 0.00 0 7260503.233 1739860.377 20.51 19.331 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m5 367268.00 7534182.19 25.69 9435114.92 0.00 7534182.19 0.00 0 7534182.194 1900932.726 20.51 20.1474 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m6 343693.00 7050561.66 24.49 8417041.57 0.00 7050561.66 0.00 0 7050561.663 1366479.907 20.51 16.2347 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m6 318411.00 6531923.52 25.75 8199083.25 0.00 6531923.52 0.00 0 6531923.518 1667159.732 20.51 20.3335 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m8 295210.00 6055975.27 26.78 7905723.80 0.00 6055975.27 0.00 0 6055975.27 1849748.53 20.51 23.3976 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002m9 298877.00 6131200.57 28.28 8452241.56 0.00 6131200.57 0.00 0 6131200.572 2321040.988 20.51 27.4607 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002ml0 311585.00 6391894.09 27.53 8577935.05 0.00 6391894.09 0.00 0 6391894.091 2186040.959 20.51 25.4845 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002mll 303134.00 6218529.21 24.79 7514691.86 0.00 6218529.21 0.00 0 6218529.208 1296162.652 20.51 17.2484 0 0
NJV_A 0 2002ml2 314418.00 6450010.61 27.89 8769118.02 0.00 6450010.61 0.00 0 6450010.611 2319107.409 20.51 26.4463 0 0
NJV_A 0 2003ml 313032.00 7457494.13 30.77 9631994.64 0.00 7457494.13 0.00 0 7457494.132 2174500.508 23.82 22.5758 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m2 274557.00 6540887.88 32.88 9027434.16 0.00 6540887.88 0.00 0 6540887.885 2486546.275 23.82 27.5443 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m3 309447.00 7372087.16 30.36 9394810.92 0.00 7372087.16 0.00 0 7372087.156 2022723.764 23.82 21.5302 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m4 301677.00 7186979.15 25.49 7689746.73 0.00 7186979.15 0.00 0 7186979.15 502767.5804 23.82 6.53816 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m5 301877.00 7191743.83 26.06 7866914.62 0.00 7191743.83 0.00 0 7191743.834 675170.7855 23.82
34
8.58241 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m6 295655.00 7043514.49 27.91 8251731.05 0.00 7043514.49 0.00 0 7043514.489 1208216.561 23.82 14.642 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m7 303670.00 7234459.23 28.59 8681925.30 0.00 7234459.23 0.00 0 7234459.234 1447466.066 23.82 16.6722 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m8 262583.00 6255626.20 29.68 7793463.44 0.00 6255626.20 0.00 0 6255626.203 1537837.237 23.82 19.7324 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003m9 272008.00 6480161.98 26.88 7311575.04 0.00 6480161.98 0.00 0 6480161.976 831413.0637 23.82 11.3712 0 1
34
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NJV_A 0 2003ml0 288753.00 6879085.21 29.01 8376724.53 0.00 6879085.21 0.00 0 6879085.215 1497639.315 23.82 17.8786 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003ml 1 275320.00 6559065.16 29.12 8017318.40 0.00 6559065.16 0.00 0 6559065.157 1458253.243 23.82
34
18.1888 0 1
NJV_A 0 2003ml2 285387.00 6798895.57 29.95 8547340.65 0.00 6798895.57 0.00 0 6798895.569 1748445.081 23.82 20.456 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004ml 280523.00 10792251.76 31.4 8808422.20 0.00 10792251.76 0.00 0 10792251.76 -1983829.56 38.47
19
-22.522 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004m2 256145.00 9854383.87 31.32 8022461.40 0.00 9854383.87 0.00 0 9854383.873 -1831922.473 38.47 -22.835 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004m3 305164.00 11740237.76 33.67 10274871.88 0.00 11740237.76 0.00 0 11740237.76 -1465365.876 38.47
19
-14.262 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004m4 311354.00 11978378.79 33.71 10495743.34 0.00 11978378.79 0.00 0 11978378.79 -1482635.454 38.47 -14.126 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004m5 335386.00 12902935.41 37.63 12620575.18 0.00 12902935.41 0.00 0 12902935.41 -282360.2257 38.47
19
-2.2373 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004m6 353218.00 13588966.26 35.54 12553367.72 0.00 13588966.26 0.00 0 13588966.26 -1035598.54 38.47
19
-8.2496 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004 m7 398149.00 15317547.03 37.93 15101791.57 0.00 15317547.03 0.00 0 15317547.03 -215755.4619 38.47
19
-1.4287 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004m8 390111.00 15008309.93 42.08 16415870.88 0.00 15008309.93 0.00 0 15008309.93 1407560.95 38.47
19
8.57439 0 1
NJVA 0 2004m9 322058.00 12390181.97 41.65 13413715.70 0.00 12390181.97 0.00 0 12390181.97 1023533.728 38.47
19
7.6305 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004ml0 342254.00 13167160.39 46.87 16041444.98 0.00 13167160.39 0.00 0 13167160.39 2874284.591 38.47 17.9179 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004mll 330060.00 12698034.09 42.23 13938433.80 0.00 12698034.09 0.00 0 12698034.09 1240399.714 38.47
19
8.89913 0 1
NJV_A 0 2004ml2 274528.00 10561612.74 39.09 10731299.52 0.00 10561612.74 0.00 0 10561612.74 169686.7781 38.47 1.58123 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005ml 308015.00 8847149.27 43.822 13497833.33 8847149.27 0 8847149.266 4650684.064 28.72
31
34.455 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005m2 300419.00 8628968.51 46.9836 14114766.13 8628968.51 0 8628968.509 5485797.619 28.72 38.8657 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005m3 380044.00 10916046.28 53.2387 20233048.50 10916046.28 0 10916046.28 9317002.221 28.72
31
46.0484 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005m4 358292.00 10291261.16 52.1535 18686181.82 10291261.16 0 10291261.16 8394920.667 28.72
31
44.9258 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005m5 369868.00 10623759.90 48.7608 18035059.57 10623759.90 0 10623759.9 7411299.677 28.72
31
41.0938 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005m6 356391.00 10236658.52 54.3858 19382609.65 10236658.52 0 10236658.52 9145951.128 28.72 47.1864 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005m7 360879.00 10365567.85 58.7619 21205935.71 10365567.85 0 10365567.85 10840367.86 28.72 51.1195 0 1
31
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NJV_A 0 2005m8 365443.00 10496660.13 65.3707 23889264.72 10496660.13 0 10496660.13 13392604.59 28.72
31
56.0612 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005m9 389225.00 11179753.17 63.8832 24864938.52 11179753.17 0 11179753.17 13685185.35 28.72
31
55.0381 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005ml0 395570.00 11362001.32 60.87 11362001.32 0 11362001.32 28.72 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005mll 369520.00 10613764.25 55.1381 20374630.71 10613764.25 0 10613764.25 9760866.458 28.72
31
47.907 0 1
NJV_A 0 2005ml2 363415.00 10438409.66 58.3034 21188330.11 10438409.66 0 10438409.66 10749920.45 28.72 50.7351 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006ml 363131.00 12484467.44 63.4921 23055949.77 12484467.44 0 12484467.44 10571482.33 34.38
01
45.8514 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m2 314990.00 10829376.72 60.2523 18978871.98 10829376.72 0 10829376.72 8149495.258 34.38 42.9398 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m3 355650.00 12227270.17 62.1603 22107310.70 12227270.17 0 12227270.17 9880040.527 34.38 44.6913 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m4 355650.00 12227270.17 0.00 12227270.17 0 12227270.17 -12227270.17 34.38 HDIV/01 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m5 353523.00 12154143.77 70.0808 24775174.66 12154143.77 0 12154143.77 12621030.89 34.38
01
50.9422 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m6 353523.00 12154143.77 0.00 12154143.77 0 12154143.77 -12154143.77 34.38 ftDIV/0! 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m7 350433.00 12047909.37 74.2877 26032861.57 12047909.37 0 12047909.37 13984952.21 34.38
01
53.7204 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m8 321794.00 11063298.68 69.6639 22417425.04 11063298.68 0 11063298.68 11354126.35 34.38
01
50.6487 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006m9 0.00 0.00 63.1611 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006ml0 0.00 0.00 58.4447 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006mll 0.00 0.00 60.4533 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1
NJV_A 0 2006ml2 331869.00 11409677.84 59.084 19608148.00 11409677.84 0 11409677.84 8198470.157 34.38 41.8115 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007ml 334623.00 12592882.17 54.5782 18263121.02 12592882.17 0 12592882.17 5670238.851 37.63
3
31.0475 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007m2 295720.00 11128843.85 58.5746 17321680.71 11128843.85 0 11128843.85 6192836.865 37.63 35.7519 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007m3 326758.00 12296898.27 64.3595 21029981.50 12296898.27 0 12296898.27 8733083.227 37.63 41.5268 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007m4 305268.00 11488164.15 68.6 20941384.80 11488164.15 0 11488164.15 9453220.647 37.63 45.1413 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007m5 326025.00 12269313.25 68.88 22456602.00 12269313.25 0 12269313.25 10187288.75 37.63
3
45.3643 0 1
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NJV_A 0 2007m6 326025.00 12269313.25 68.88 22456602.00 12269313.25 0 12269313.25 10187288.75 37.63 45.3643 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007m7 326025.00 12269313.25 68.88 22456602.00 12269313.25 0 12269313.25 10187288.75 37.63
3
45.3643 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007m8 326025.00 12269313.25 68.88 22456602.00 12269313.25 0 12269313.25 10187288.75 37.63 45.3643 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007m9 326025.00 12269313.25 68.88 22456602.00 12269313.25 0 12269313.25 10187288.75 37.63
3
45.3643 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007ml0 326025.00 12269313.25 68.88 22456602.00 12269313.25 0 12269313.25 10187288.75 37.63 45.3643 0 1
NJV_A 0 2007mll 330000.00 12418904.60 68.88 22730400.00 12418904.60 0 12418904.6 10311495.4 37.63
3
45.3643 0 1
NJV_A 0 200m712 0.00 0.00 68.88 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1
NJV_D 0 1999ml 6561.00 197444.93 11.32 74270.52 9000.00 206444.93 0.00 9000 206444.9267 -132174.4067 31.46 -177.96 1.37174 0
NJV_D 0 1999m2 18939.00 569945.05 10.75 203594.25 37000.00 606945.05 0.00 37000 606945.0489 -403350.7989 32.04 -198.12 1.95364 0
NJV_D 0 1999m3 21607.00 650235.11 12.86 277866.02 49000.00 699235.11 0.00 49000 699235.1059 -421369.0859 32.36
15
-151.64 2.26778 0
NJV_D 0 1999m4 19998.00 601814.30 15.73 314568.54 58000.00 659814.30 0.00 58000 659814.3032 -345245.7632 32.99 -109.75 2.90029 0
NJV_D 0 1999m5 1304.00 39242.22 16.12 21020.48 4000.00 43242.22 0.00 4000 43242.21679 -22221.73679 33.16 -105.71 3.06748 0
NJV_D 0 1999m6 20893.00 628748.19 16.24 339302.32 0.00 628748.19 0.00 0 628748.1866 -289445.8666 30.09 -85.306 0 0
NJV_D 0 1999m7 20893.00 628748.19 18.75 391743.75 0.00 628748.19 0.00 0 628748.1866 -237004.4366 30.09
37
-60.5 0 0
NJV_D 0 1999m8 20893.00 628748.19 20.21 422247.53 0.00 628748.19 0.00 0 628748.1866 -206500.6566 30.09 -48.905 0 0
NJV_D 0 1999m9 20893.00 628748.19 22.37 467376.41 0.00 628748.19 0.00 0 628748.1866 -161371.7766 30.09 -34.527 0 0
NJV_D 0 1999ml0 20893.00 628748.19 22.19 463615.67 0.00 628748.19 0.00 0 628748.1866 -165132.5166 30.09 -35.618 0 0
NJV_D 0 1999mll 20893.00 628748.19 24.22 506028.46 22000.00 650748.19 0.00 22000 650748.1866 -144719.7266 31.14
67
-28.599 1.05298 0
NJV_D 0 1999ml2 8858.00 266570.21 25.01 221538.58 65000.00 331570.21 0.00 65000 331570.2119 -110031.6319 37.43 -49.667 7.338 0
NJV_D 0 2000ml 8320.00 142792.92 25.21 209747.20 0.00 142792.92 0.00 0 142792.9177 66954.28229 17.16 31.9214 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000m2 5967.00 102409.30 27.15 162004.05 10000.00 112409.30 0.00 10000 112409.2957 49594.75433 18.83 30.6133 1.67588 0
NJV_D 0 2000m3 3580.00 61442.14 27.49 98414.20 27000.00 88442.14 0.00 27000 88442.14488 9972.055121 24.70 10.1327 7.5419 0
45
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NJV_D 0 2000m4 11975.00 205522.26 23.45 280813.75 0.00 205522.26 0.00 0 205522.2584 75291.49164 17.16 26.8119 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000m5 17245.00 295969.21 27.23 469581.35 0.00 295969.21 0.00 0 295969.2146 173612.1354 17.16
26
36.9717 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000m6 14093.00 241872.67 29.62 417434.66 0.00 241872.67 0.00 0 241872.667 175561.993 17.16 42.0574 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000m7 13696.00 235059.11 28.16 385679.36 0.00 235059.11 0.00 0 235059.1107 150620.2493 17.16
26
39.0532 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000m8 14815.00 254264.07 29.41 435709.15 0.00 254264.07 0.00 0 254264.0716 181445.0784 17.16 41.6436 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000m9 11605.00 199172.09 32.08 372288.40 0.00 199172.09 0.00 0 199172.0925 173116.3075 17.16
26
46.5006 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000ml0 19436.00 333572.49 31.4 610290.40 0.00 333572.49 0.00 0 333572.4938 276717.9062 17.16 45.342 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000mll 17890.00 307039.10 32.33 578383.70 0.00 307039.10 0.00 0 307039.0983 271344.6017 17.16
26
46.9143 0 0
NJV_D 0 2000ml2 17881.00 306884.63 25.28 452031.68 0.00 306884.63 0.00 0 306884.6348 145147.0452 17.16 32.1099 0 0
NJV_D 0 2001ml 8515.00 148372.73 25.95 220964.25 74000.00 222372.73 0.00 74000 222372.7301 -1408.480149 26.11
54
-0.6374 8.69055 0
NJV_D 0 2001m2 9804.00 170833.38 27.24 267060.96 67000.00 237833.38 0.00 67000 237833.3818 29227.57816 24.25 10.9442 6.83395 0
NJV_D 0 2001m3 9804.00 170833.38 25.02 245296.08 22000.00 192833.38 0.00 22000 192833.3818 52462.69816 19.66 21.3875 2.24398 0
NJV_D 0 2001m4 13041.00 227237.67 25.66 334632.06 0.00 227237.67 0.00 0 227237.6716 107394.3884 17.42 32.0933 0 0
NJV_D 0 2001m5 16276.00 283607.11 27.55 448403.80 0.00 283607.11 0.00 0 283607.1117 164796.6883 17.42
49
36.7518 0 0
NJV_D 0 2001m6 15665.00 272960.52 26.97 422485.05 0.00 272960.52 0.00 0 272960.5188 149524.5312 17.42 35.3917 0 0
NJV_D 0 2001m7 13390.00 233318.95 24.8 332072.00 74000.00 307318.95 0.00 74000 307318.9497 24753.0503 22.95 7.45412 5.52651 0
NJV_D 0 2001m8 14867.00 259055.48 25.81 383717.27 22000.00 281055.48 0.00 22000 281055.4761 102661.7939 18.90 26.7545 1.47979 0
NJV_D 0 2001m9 14508.00 252799.95 25.03 363135.24 0.00 252799.95 0.00 0 252799.9494 110335.2906 17.42
49
30.3841 0 0
NJV_D 0 2001ml0 15387.00 268116.41 20.73 318972.51 0.00 268116.41 0.00 0 268116.4062 50856.1038 17.42 15.9437 0 0
NJV_D 0 2001mll 13788.00 240254.05 18.69 257697.72 67000.00 307254.05 0.00 67000 307254.0462 -49556.32619 22.28
42
-19.23 4.8593 0
NJV_D 0 2001ml2 13005.00 226610.38 18.52 240852.60 0.00 226610.38 0.00 0 226610.3765 14242.22354 17.42 5.91325 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002ml 7296.00 148191.32 19.15 139718.40 28000.00 176191.32 0.00 28000 176191.3241 -36472.92408 24.14
9
-26.105 3.83772 0
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NJV_D 0 2002m2 14811.00 300830.83 19.98 295923.78 0.00 300830.83 0.00 0 300830.8252 -4907.045232 20.31 -1.6582 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002m3 15327.00 311311.46 23.64 362330.28 0.00 311311.46 0.00 0 311311.4616 51018.81836 20.31
13
14.0807 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002m4 13894.00 282205.35 25.43 353324.42 0.00 282205.35 0.00 0 282205.3532 71119.06683 20.31 20.1285 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002 mS 15556.00 315962.75 25.69 399633.64 0.00 315962.75 0.00 0 315962.7518 83670.88817 20.31
13
20.9369 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002m6 15035.00 305380.56 24.49 368207.15 0.00 305380.56 0.00 0 305380.5589 62826.59113 20.31 17.0628 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002m6 14536.00 295245.21 25.75 374302.00 0.00 295245.21 0.00 0 295245.2147 79056.78526 20.31
13
21.1211 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002m8 13810.00 280499.20 26.78 369831.80 0.00 280499.20 0.00 0 280499.2031 89332.59694 20.31
13
24.1549 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002m9 9430.00 191535.66 28.28 266680.40 0.00 191535.66 0.00 0 191535.6615 75144.73854 20.31
13
28.1778 0 0
NJV_D 0 2002ml0 0.00 0.00 27.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0
NJV_D 0 20O2mll 1901.00 38611.80 24.79 47125.79 9000.00 47611.80 0.00 9000 47611.80196 -486.0119557 25.04
57
-1.0313 4.73435 0
NJV_D 0 2002ml2 17686.00 359225.84 27.89 493262.54 0.00 359225.84 0.00 0 359225.844 134036.696 20.31 27.1735 0 0
NJV_D 0 2003ml 14863.00 438053.18 30.77 457334.51 0.00 438053.18 0.00 0 438053.1805 19281.32954 29.47
27
4.21602 0 1
NJV_D 0 2003m2 12522.00 369057.52 32.88 411723.36 37000.00 406057.52 0.00 37000 406057.5204 5665.839596 32.42
75
1.37613 2.9548 1
NJV_D 0 2003m3 12141.00 357828.41 30.36 368600.76 0.00 357828.41 0.00 0 357828.4104 10772.34958 29.47
27
2.9225 0 1
NJV_D 0 2003m4 1881.00 55438.20 25.49 47946.69 10000.00 65438.20 0.00 10000 65438.20443 -17491.51443 34.78
91
-36.481 5.31632 1
NJV_D 0 2003m5 0.00 0.00 26.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1
NJV_D 0 2003m6 4907.00 144622.68 27.91 136954.37 27000.00 171622.68 0.00 27000 171622.6843 -34668.31429 34.97 -25.314 5.50234 1
NJV_D 0 2003m7 4907.00 144622.68 28.59 140291.13 18000.00 162622.68 0.00 18000 162622.6843 -22331.55429 33.14
1
-15.918 3.66823 1
NJV_D 0 2003m8 4907.00 144622.68 29.68 145639.76 9000.00 153622.68 0.00 9000 153622.6843 -7982.924286 31.30
68
-5.4813 1.83411 1
NJV_D 0 2003m9 4907.00 144622.68 26.88 131900.16 0.00 144622.68 0.00 0 144622.6843 -12722.52429 29.47
27
-9.6456 0 1
NJV_D 0 2003ml0 4907.00 144622.68 29.01 142352.07 0.00 144622.68 0.00 0 144622.6843 -2270.614286 29.47
27
-1.5951 0 1
NJV_D 0 2003mll 4907.00 144622.68 29.12 142891.84 0.00 144622.68 0.00 0 144622.6343 -1730.844286 29.47 -1.2113 0 1
27
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NJV_D 0 2003ml2 4907.00 144622.68 29.95 146964.65 0.00 144622.68 0.00 0 144622.6843 2341.965714 29.47 1.59356 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004ml 4907.00 108685.00 31.4 154079.80 0.00 108685.00 0.00 0 108684.9952 45394.80475 22.14
9
29.4619 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004m2 4907.00 108685.00 31.32 153687.24 0.00 108685.00 0.00 0 108684.9952 45002.24475 22.14 29.2817 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004m3 4907.00 108685.00 33.67 165218.69 0.00 108685.00 0.00 0 108684.9952 56533.69475 22.14
9
34.2175 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004m4 4907.00 108685.00 33.71 165414.97 18000.00 126685.00 0.00 18000 126684.9952 38729.97475 25.81 23.4138 3.66823 1
NJV_D 0 2004mS 2350.00 52050.08 37.63 88430.50 0.00 52050.08 0.00 0 52050.07924 36380.42076 22.14
9
41.1401 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004m6 0.00 0.00 35.54 0.00 20000.00 20000.00 0.00 20000 20000 •20000 1
NJV_D 0 2004m7 2468.00 54663.66 37.93 93611.24 0.00 54663.66 0.00 0 54663.65769 38947.58231 22.14 41.6057 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004m8 21848.00 483910.69 42.08 919363.84 0.00 483910.69 0.00 0 483910.6941 435453.1459 22.14 47.3646 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004m9 15521.00 343774.16 41.65 646449.65 19000.00 362774.16 0.00 19000 362774.1616 283675.4884 23.37
31
43.8821 1.22415 1
NJV_D 0 2004ml0 12636.00 279874.38 46.87 592249.32 0.00 279874.38 0.00 0 279874.3835 312374.9365 22.14 52.7438 0 1
NJV_D 0 2004mll 10646.00 235797.93 42.23 449580.58 18000.00 253797.93 0.00 18000 253797.9334 195782.6466 23.83
97
43.5478 1.69078 1
NJV_D 0 2004ml2 13406.00 296929.09 39.09 524040.54 36000.00 332929.09 0.00 36000 332929.0903 191111.4497 24.83 36.4688 2.68536 1
NJV_D 0 2005ml 9806.00 338487.80 43.822 429718.53 338487.80 0 338487.803 91230.72904 34.51
84
21.2303 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m2 5007.00 172833.82 46.9836 235246.89 172833.82 0 172833.819 62413.06617 34.51 26.5309 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m3 15435.00 532792.09 53.2387 821739.33 532792.09 0 532792.0904 288947.2441 34.51
84
35.1629 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m4 15828.00 546357.84 52.1535 825485.60 546357.84 0 546357.8366 279127.7614 34.51 33.8138 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m5 15472.00 534069.27 48.7608 754427.10 534069.27 0 534069.2726 220357.825 34.51
84
29.2086 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m6 10446.00 360579.60 54.3858 568114.07 360579.60 0 360579.6033 207534.4635 34.51 36.5304 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m7 10705.00 369519.88 58.7619 629046.14 369519.88 0 369519.8787 259526.2608 34.51
84
41.2571 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m8 16298.00 562581.50 65.3707 1065411.67 562581.50 0 562581.5024 502830.1662 34.51 47.1959 0 1
NJV_D 0 2005m9 16277.00 561856.62 63.8832 1039826.85 561856.62 0 561856.6152 477970.2312 34.51 45.9663 0 1
84
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NJV_D 0 2005ml0 10558.00 364445.67 60.87 364445.67 0 364445.6683 34.51 0 l
NJV_D 0 2005mll 16179.00 558473.81 55.1381 892079.32 558473.81 0 558473.8083 333605.5116 34.51
84
37.3964 0 l
NJV_D 0 2005ml2 10688.00 368933.07 58.3034 623146.74 368933.07 0 368933.0653 254213.6739 34.51 40.7952 0 l
NJV_D 0 2006ml 10891.00 894318.18 63.4921 691492.46 894318.18 229000.00 229000 1123318.179 -202825.7181 82.11 -29.332 21.0265 l
NJV_D 0 2006m2 10821.00 888570.11 60.2523 651990.14 888570.11 151000.00 151000 1039570.105 -236579.9671 82.11 -36.286 13.9543 l
NJV_D 0 2006mB 5383.00 442026.88 62.1603 334608.89 442026.88 310000.00 310000 752026.8808 •107417.9859 82.11
53
-32.103 57.5887 l
NJV_D 0 2006m4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 l
NJV_D 0 2006m5 11136.00 914436.44 70.0808 780419.79 914436.44 172000.00 172000 1086436.438 -134016.649 82.11
53
-17.172 15.4454 l
NJV_D 0 2006m6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 297000.00 297000 297000 0 l
NJV_D 0 2006m7 10931.00 897602.79 74.2877 812038.85 897602.79 0 897602.7929 -85563.94418 82.11
53
-10.537 0 l
NJV_D 0 2006m8 10931.00 897602.79 69.6639 761496.09 897602.79 0 897602.7929 -136106.702 82.11 -17.874 0 l
NJV_D 0 2006m9 10931.00 897602.79 63.1611 690413.98 897602.79 182000.00 182000 1079602.793 -207188.8088 82.11
53
-30.009 16.6499 l
NJV_D 0 2006ml0 10931.00 897602.79 58.4447 638859.02 897602.79 0 897602.7929 -258743.7772 82.11 -40.501 0 l
NJV_D 0 2006mll 10931.00 897602.79 60.4533 660815.02 897602.79 0 897602.7929 •236787.7706 82.11
53
-35.833 0 l
NJV_D 0 2006ml2 10931.00 897602.79 59.084 645847.20 897602.79 0 897602.7929 -251755.5889 82.11
53
-38.981 0 l
NJV_D 0 2007ml 10931.00 987394.03 54.5782 596594.30 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -390799.7305 90.32
97
-65.505 0 l
NJV_D 0 2007m2 10931.00 987394.03 58.5746 640278.95 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -347115.0821 90.32 -54.213 0 l
NJV_D 0 2007m3 10931.00 987394.03 64.3595 703513.69 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -283880.3402 90.32
97
-40.352 0 l
NJV_D 0 2007m4 10931.00 987394.03 68.6 749866.60 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -237527.4347 90.32 -31.676 0 l
NJV_D 0 2007m5 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -234466.7547 90.32
97
-31.141 0 1
NJV_D 0 2007m6 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -234466.7547 90.32 -31.141 0 l
NJV D 0 2007m7 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 182000.00 182000 1169394.035 -234466.7547 90.32 -31.141 16.6499 l
97
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NJV_D 0 2007m8 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -234466.7547 90.3297
-31.141 0 1
NJV_D 0 2007m9 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -234466.7547 90.32
97
-31.141 0 1
NJV_D 0 2007ml0 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -234466.7547 90.32 -31.141 0 1
NJV_D 0 2007m ll 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -234466.7547 90.3297
-31.141 0 1
NJV_D 0 200m712 10931.00 987394.03 68.88 752927.28 987394.03 0 987394.0347 -234466.7547 90.32 -31.141 0 1
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Appendix 125: Data on Drilling Activities
Code Year Expl Dev Totalwells
Wells Wells
2_SH_JV 1999 1 26 27
2_SH_JV 2 0 0 0 1 18 19
2_SH_JV 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
2_SH_JV 2 0 0 2 6 48 54
2_SH_JV 2003 2 26 28
2_SH_JV 2004 1 11 1 2
2_SH_JV 2005 1 18 19
2_SH_JV 2006 2 6 8
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2007
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2 15 17
1 24 25
0 22 22
0 0 0
9 49 58
0 22 22
0 19 19
0 21 21
0 24 24
3 39 42
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1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1999
0 12 12
1 26 27
0 0 0
4 42 46
2 22 24
0 23 23
0 20 20
2 20 22
2 22 24
1 12 13
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5_ELF_JV 2000 0 9 9
5_ELF_JV 2001 0 0 0
5_ELF_JV 2002 0 3 3
5_ELF_JV 2003 0 18 18
5_ELF_JV 2004 0 17 17
5_ELF_JV 2005 0 6 6
5_ELF_JV 2006 3 16 19
5_ELF_JV 2007 1 9 10
10_N A_JV 1999 1 0 1
10_NA_JV 2000 2 12 14
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10_NA_JV 2001 0 0 0
10_NA_JV 2002 1 0 1
10_N A_JV 2003 0 0 0
10_NA_JV 2004 0 0 0
10_NA_JV 2005 0 0 0
10_NA_JV 2006 0 2 2
10_N A_JV 2007 0 0 0
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The Government of Nigeria holds 60°o in upstream oil and gas JVCs which operate 
alongside non-JVCs. Using a multivariate regression analysis based on a monthly 
panel dataset (1999 -  2007), we examined cost efficiency o f both JVCs and non- 
JVCs with the aim of determining whether or not Government ownership in the JVCs 
has any significant and systematic effect on their cost efficiency. Findings of the 
study indicate that non-JVCs spend twice as much as the JVCs to produce a barrel of 
oil. Findings are in line with the assumption that agent performs differently based on 
his ownership right on asset and the level of control of principal over him; as such 
right/control influences agent’s actions ex-ante. Therefore, findings of the study indi­
cate that Government ownership in the upstream oil and gas companies mitigates the 
potentials for adverse selection and moral hazard issues that characterized the up­
stream oil and gas sector. Overall, findings indicate that Government ownership has a 
significant impact on cost efficiency of the upstream oil and gas companies operating 
in Nigeria. Hence, continued Government participation in upstream operations in Ni­
geria is considered to be the most important policy implication o f our findings.
K e y w o r d s :  Government ownership; cost efficiency; upstream oil and gas companies.
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Nomenclature
JV C s Joint venture companies.
N o n -JV C s Non JVCs.
S ta te s Oil rich nations.
IO C s International oil companies.
P SC s Production-sharing contracts.
S C s Service contracts.
N N P C A S B Nigeria national petroleum corporation annual statistical bulletin.
O U T P U T Volume o f crude oil produced.
O P E X Operating expenditure.
R O Y A L T Y Royalty payment.
N E IT I Nigeria extractive industries transparency initiative.
M c f Thousand standard cubic feet.
i Company.
O L S Ordinary least squares.
F E M Fixed-effects model.
R E M Random-effects model.
y „ Cost efficiency.
a Intercept term.
f t k  x 1 vector o f parameters estimated on the explanatory variables.
Xu 1 x k  vector o f observations on the explanatory' variables across com­
panies over time.
u„ Disturbance term across companies over time.
Pi Company specific effect.
v„ Disturbance across companies over time.
Idiosyncratic error term across companies over time.
L S D V Least squares dummy variable.
D \, Ownership type 1 for JVCs and zero otherwise.
L M Lagrange multiplier.
Icostbblj, Log o f cost efficiency across companies over time.
loutputi, Log o f quantity o f crude oil produced across companies over time.
lopex,, Log o f operating expenditure across companies over time.
1 royalty,, Log o f royalty payment across companies over time.
1. Introduction
Upstream activities require intensive capital investment. On one hand, the oil-rich nations 
are endowed with huge oil reserves but lack the capacity to explore for and exploit their 
oil reserves, on the other hand the IOCs who have the required funds and expertise are 
w illing to invest their funds for good returns [1]. Therefore, the IOCs and the states pool 
their resources together in order to explore for, and exploit oil in the most effective and 
efficient routine. However, the uncertainties surrounding the discovery o f oil, despite the 
intensive capital investment, constitutes the major source o f risks in upstream operations 
[2]. These risks may be geological, prospect, political, regulator)', or commercial [3].
Consequently, for the IOCs to take-up such risks that may or may not result in 
oil discover)', they need to be motivated by the states via an effective incentive-system
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[1]. Therefore, the jo int venture operation that accords the IOCs title to oil resources is 
considered to be a high-powered incentive system. Under this operation, the IOCs operate 
the ventures due to their technical capability. On the other hand, Government enters into 
contractual agreement with other IOCs (production-sharing contract for example) to ex­
plore for oil at their own risk. This normally results in moral hazard and adverse-selection 
problems with the discovery o f oil reserves [4]. It is however argued that these problems 
arise because the value o f assets (oil reserves) in upstream operations are not contractible; 
hence, whoever owns the assets receives its value [5]. To understand these issues, agency 
theory is adopted.
Agency theory can be applied in analyzing contract relationships between firms 
or jo in t operations among firms [4, 5]. Hence, the theory is useful in analyzing the per­
formance o f upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria that have different 
ownership status and operate under different petroleum fiscal regimes.
The remainder o f this paper is structured into five sections as follows. Section 2 
reviews literature on petroleum fiscal regimes, the theoretical framework underpinning 
the paper and prior studies on the effect o f government control on the performance o f  
upstream oil and gas companies. Section 3 discusses the dataset and the methodology 
employed. Section 4 presents the results and discussion on findings. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Concessionary agreement
The traditional concessionary agreement in oil exploration is considered the first genera­
tion o f  petroleum fiscal system. Concessionary agreement is a contractual arrangement in 
which a host country gives prospecting and exploration rights to a foreign oil company in 
return for a consideration to the host country in the form o f royalty [6].
Some o f the basic features o f a concessionary system include the following: 
Firstly, development rights granted to the IOCs cover a vast area or even the entire coun- 
tiy; secondly, contracts are for a long period; lastly, and perhaps the most important is 
that, the IOCs have absolute control over their operations. Hence, it is argued that the 
IOCs may manipulate their operations to their own advantage. For example, productions 
may be lowered when oil prices are low' [1], this manipulation reduces the oil revenue 
accruable to the states. Consequently, the modem concessionary systems are being struc­
tured to provide for a shorter contract period, work obligation for the IOCs, relinquish­
ment clause at the expiration o f agreed period, higher royalties, and option for state par­
ticipation -jo in t venture concession [3].
Although the concessionary agreement was the first type o f petroleum fiscal sys­
tem in Nigeria (as in the case o f German Bitumen Company, and Shell D ’Arcy Petroleum 
Company in 1908 and 1937 respectively [7]), the concessionary system no longer exists 
in Nigeria. A t present there are five types o f petroleum fiscal regimes in Nigeria, these
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include JVCs, PSC, SC. Moreover, there is a sole risk operation, where the upstream oil 
and gas companies are independent and do not involve in any o f  the aforementioned fis­
cal arrangements. Lastly, there is what is commonly known as marginal field operation, 
where the indigenous upstream oil and gas companies take over the oil fields that have 
been ‘abandoned’ by the IOC. A  discussion on the first three fiscal systems is provided 
below.
2.2. J o in t V enture C om pa n ies
JVCs emerged when oil-rich nations w anted to reclaim control o f their oil resources; as 
against the previous status under the concession agreements where they simply receive 
royalties and taxes from the IOCs [ 8 ]. This paradigm shift in the 1970s changed the status 
o f oil-rich nations from ‘ landlords to entrepreneurs’ [9]. More so, membership o f OPEC 
is considered to be the major momentum towards such paradigm shift [6 ]. For example, 
OPEC demanded its members to modify the traditional concessionary agreements in or­
der to participate in the exploration and exploitation o f their oil resources; the OPEC pol­
icy statement provided that Governments o f oil producing countries shall under the prin­
ciple o f changing circumstances acquire a reasonable participation in existing contractual 
agreements i f  such are not provided. Where such have been provided but not implement­
ed by the operators, the provided rate shall be the minimum basis o f participation [6 ].
Under the JVCs, both the IOCs and the oil-rich nations (represented by their 
NOCs) participate in upstream operations. Production output and costs are shared on a 
pro-rata basis between the parties involved. Therefore, the oil-rich nations do not only 
receive royalties and taxes but also share in the equity oil. Similarly, the IOCs share with 
the oil-rich nations costs o f production via a funding agreement [2 ].
2.3. P ro d u ctio n -sh a rin g  co n tra c t
As mentioned above, the traditional concessionary agreement o f petroleum exploration 
was considered exploitative [8 ]. Hence, increased criticisms on the exploitative nature o f 
the old concessionary system on one hand and the perennial funding problems associated 
w'ith the operations o f the JVCs on the other hand paved way for the introduction o f PSC 
[1, 4, and 10]. Indeed, the introduction o f PSC in Nigeria was informed by the aforemen­
tioned perennial funding problems under the JVCs [11-13]. PSC is a contractual regime 
in which an oil company solely undertakes to explore and produce oil w'ith a provision 
for a predetermined cost recover}' (cost oil) from the oil produced in any one year. The 
remaining oil which is termed as profit oil is then shared between the host country and 
the oil company based on an agreed percentage; for instance, 55% to the government and 
the balance to the oil company [6 ].
The first PSC was introduced in Indonesia in the 1960s modeled after the agri­
cultural crop sharing contract [10]. One fundamental difference between the PSC and the 
concessionary system is that, w hile ownership o f petroleum resources rests w ith the IOCs 
under the concessionary system, ownership o f petroleum resources rests w'ith the states
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under the PSCs [4]. Another difference between the PSC and the JVC is that while states 
must fund JV operation based on their percentage o f ownership, under the PSC states are 
not obliged for any financial commitment. Hence, the lOCs must bare all the risks asso­
ciated with the exploration activities.
In a nutshell, PSC shields the states from the exploration risk; because the lOCs 
solely bear the risk o f investment in the exploration activities [1]. That notwithstanding, 
states being the owners o f  the asset (oil reserves) not only share in the rew'ard o f oil dis­
covered but also own the facilities emplaced by the contractors [3]. Even though the 
IOCs recover their cost o f  investment before production and/or profit is shared with the 
states, moral-hazard and adverse selection problems normally characterize the relation­
ship between the states and the IOCs [4].
For example, some o f the vital aspects o f PSC that cause problems between 
states and the IOCs include title to crude oil [14], work programs and expenditures [3]. It 
is argued that although a national oil company has the right to make suggestions and pro­
pose revisions to any work plan and budget for the IOC, the IOC has the authority, by 
virtue o f the contractual terms to make the final decisions on the matters concerning the 
operations [3].
Discussion on the PSC indicates that problems mainly arise due to risk-averse atti­
tude o f the states in the contractual relationship. Conversely, under the SC states may 
carry all the risks involved ( i f  it is a non-risk service contract) or share some o f the explo­
ration risks with the IOCs ( i f  it is a risk service contract) an issue discussed hereunder.
2.4. S erv ice  co n tra ct
Unlike the PSC, under SC the IOCs provide services in petroleum exploration activities 
that are o f two categories. These are risk-service and non-risk service contracts. In the 
risk-service, the IOCs bear the financial risks involved in exploration activities for a fixed 
fee. However, i f  the IOCs are paid a flat fee based on the services rendered only without 
bearing the financial risks involved then the contract is called a non-risk service contract 
[2]. Although the SC is similar to the PSC because the IOCs do not possess ownership o f 
oil reserves, SC differs from the PSC from the perspectives o f remunerations, control 
over operations, and bearing o f exploration risks [ 1 ],
In summary, the three distinguishing features o f these petroleum fiscal regimes are 
attitude toward risk-taking, incentive-system, and performance-reward relationship. Un­
der the JVCs risks are shared between the NOC and the IOCs. Hence, costs o f production 
as well as production output are shared on a pro-rata basis. It can be argued that JV op­
eration combines both risk-sharing and high-powered incentive system that motivates the 
IOCs to be more efficient. On the other hand, the PSCs may be less efficient because the 
IOCs under the PSCs bear all the risks associated with oil exploration activities and do 
not share in the asset ownership. Accordingly, agency theory is adopted in order to un­
derstand the extent to which the IOCs are motivated to be more efficient in their opera­
tions. Discussion on agency theory is provided below.
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2.5. A g e n c y  th eo ry
This section discusses agency theory, especially the effect o f separation o f ownership and 
control on the performance o f companies [15, 16]. Agency theory focuses on the relation­
ship between principals and agents and the costs o f resolving conflicts o f interest between 
principals and agents. Some o f the basic assumptions upon which the theory is founded 
include the following. Firstly, agents are assumed to be risk-averse and are driven by self- 
interest [17]. Therefore, agents opt for short-term investments that guarantee them their 
rewards [18]. On the other hand, the principals prefer for long-term investments that do 
not only provide them with a steady flow o f income, but also the appreciation o f their 
asset in the long-run [19]. Similarly, principal can adopt some control mechanisms in 
order to monitor the activities o f agent and measure its performance [2 0 ].
However, it is argued that the performance measures used in agency relationship 
may not capture the ‘ real’ effort o f agents in establishing the relationship between input 
and output [2 1 ]; hence the problem o f moral hazard and adverse selection on the side o f 
the agent [19, 20]. Overall, agency problems arise mainly because o f the risk-averse atti­
tude o f agents and principals which emerge due to divergent goals o f both the principals 
and agents [22]. In what follows, agency problems are discussed.
2.6. A g e n c y  p ro b le m
Principals appoint agents to manage their resources; this brings about the fragmentation 
o f ownership and control [19]. While agents are expected to run the businesses in a way 
that w ill maximize the principals’ wealth; it is, however, argued that agents may pursue 
some goals that w ill enable them maximize their wealth rather than that o f the principals’ 
[22]. Similarly, while agents have first-hand information as a result o f managing the 
business on a day to day basis, principals get information periodically which may be ma­
neuvered by the agents [23].
When the aforementioned complications are taken into consideration, it can be de­
duced that agents are in a position to maximize their owrn wealth without necessarily be­
ing detected by the principals. In summary, agency problem arises when agents make 
decisions that are contrary to that o f principals’ wealth maximization. Furthermore, it is 
important to state that the principal-agent conflict is more prevalent in the state-owned 
companies than w'hat is experienced in the privately-owned companies [24].
2.7. C o n tro l m ech an ism s in  a g en cy  re la tio n sh ip
Agency theory literature indicates that agency problems can be mitigated by either in­
cluding some clauses in the contract that formalize punishment and reward [17, 23] or by 
adopting effective monitoring mechanisms [20]. However, the inclusion o f such clauses 
in contracts seems easier than adopting monitoring mechanisms which proved to be d iffi­
cult and costly [18]. That notwithstanding, an optimal incentive-system linked to perfor­
mance o f the agent may be more effective in addressing these problems.
G overn m en t ow n ersh ip  a n d  c o st e ff ic ien cy  o f  u pstream  o il a n d  g a s  c o m pan ies  in N igeria 7
The performance-related incentive system aims at mitigating moral hazards and 
adverse selection problems which ultimately motivates the agents to maximize the prin­
cipals’ wealth. However, it was argued whether the performance-related incentive-system 
works in addressing the agency problems [21]. One o f the problems in the performance- 
related incentive-system is the difficulty to establish a correlation between the agent’s 
efforts and the business’ performance because o f the possibility that the performance 
indicators o f the business may be maneuvered by the agent who has the advantage o f 
information asymmetry.
While the proponents o f agency theory believe that it can be used in addressing 
agency problems, others argued that the highly simplified assumptions portrayed by 
agency theorists alongside very complex models required to address such assumptions 
are not only d ifficult but unattainable in most cases [25-29]. Also, the inability o f the 
theory to address the performance measurement issues adds to its limitations [2 1 ].
2.8. A g e n c y  re la tio n sh ip  in  u p strea m  o il a n d  g a s  opera tio n s
First o f all, issues o f separation o f ownership and control [17] and risk-averse attitude o f 
agent and principal [30] as explained by the classical model o f  agency theory’ are ana­
lyzed in the context o f upstream operation. In upstream operation, for example, the state 
(principal) engages an IOC (agent) in a JVC, PSC or SC.
Under the JV operation, the IOC and the state engage in a jo in t operation with 
the state having the largest ownership in the venture while the IOC is serving as the oper­
ator o f the venture. Hence, costs o f operations as well as the outputs are shared between 
the state and the IOC on a pro rata basis. Although the IOC’s inputs (operator’ s share o f 
costs) are being monitored, due to the problem o f information asymmetry the state cannot 
confirm whether the inputs o f the IOC are the best chosen for a particular combination o f 
outputs; the output may be either oil, gas, or a combination o f both. It is argued that, the 
information asymmetry issue in such an agency relationship results in an adverse selec­
tion problem [4].
On the other hand, the state shields itself from the risks associated with the ex­
ploration activities; thereby allowing the IOC to recover its investment only i f  oil is dis­
covered. Consequently, the IOC’s action ex-ante (investment decisions taken) is reward­
ed based on the performance o f the IOC ex-post which is associated with a number o f 
risks and uncertainties the IOC has to overcome [5]. Hence, i f  the IOC is risk-averse, it 
w ill make investment that provides optimal trade-off between risk-taken and expected 
reward provided under the PSC [1]. Thus, a reward system based on measured perfor­
mance, which may not capture the specific relationship between IOC’s inputs and out­
puts, may warrant the IOC to manipulate their input (cost oil); thereby resulting in the 
problem o f moral hazard [4]. Therefore, it can be argued that the IOC, being the sole op­
erator o f the venture in the PSC, may engage in sub-optimal behaviors (adverse selection 
and moral hazard) that may enhance its performance.
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the IOC decides on the course o f ac­
tion to be taken in order to maximize output from the resources o f  the state. As ownership
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o f oil reserves plays a vital role in determining pay-off to the parties involved in either a 
JVC or a non-JVC, it can be argued that asset ownership is one o f the agency problems 
that characterize upstream operations. Consequently, where the agent is accorded with 
the right to own part o f the asset in question, such ownership facilitates principal-agent 
contractual relationship [31]. That is, i f  an agent does not own the asset being used in the 
contract, the agent's incentive comes only from the measured performance. However, i f  
the agent owns the asset, the agent's incentive is not only based on the measured perfor­
mance but also on the residual value o f the asset [5].
In a nutshell, agent performs differently based on its ownership right on asset. 
Consequently, considering the assumption that agent’ s ownership right on asset influ­
ences the agent's actions ex-ante the state can structure an optimal incentive-system in a 
way that w ill mitigate the potentials for adverse selection and moral hazard problems in 
either o f the petroleum fiscal regimes. Incentive design is discussed hereunder.
2.9. In cen tive -system  in  agen cy  re la tio n sh ip
The need to design an optimal incentive system stems from the need to align the goals o f 
the principal and that o f the agent which mitigates the moral-hazard problems and u lti­
mately results in efficient performance by the agent. As argued, the moral-hazard model 
o f incentive design is one o f the major tools used to understand performance- 
measurement systems and the provision o f incentives [32].
Following Sappington’s modeling o f  incentive-system, w'e now have the follow­
ing assumptions on principal-agent relationship [33]. Principal may be accorded with the 
power to make a Take-it-or-leave-it' contract offer to an agent. However, the agent may 
only accept the offer i f  the agent's expectations (expected pay-off) are met or even ex­
ceeded. Therefore, there may be two possible outcomes in this contracting relationship as 
applied in the upstream operations.
The first scenario is the situation whereby the agent, working alongside the prin­
cipal, uses the most efficient input for production; which in turn results in an increased 
surplus to both parties. This scenario is possible where the principal is not risk-averse (as 
in JVCs) and the agent is motivated by having a share on the residual value o f the asset. 
Consequently, agent’s interest is aligned with that o f the principal. The second scenario is 
where the principal is risk-averse (as in non-JVCs) and the agent does not share the re­
sidual value o f the asset. Consequently, there may be some frictions in the principal-agent 
relationship.
Consequently, JVCs whose rewards are based on both measured performance 
and the residual value o f the asset may be more efficient than the non-JVCs whose re­
wards are based on measured performance that in turn depends on ‘ cost o il’ . More so, 
the closer cost monitoring under the JV operation, because the state is a partner in the 
operation, means that the JVCs may be more efficient than the non-JVCs who solely op­
erate and may manipulate their costs. In viewr o f the forgoing assumptions, we now- have 
the following:
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Hypothesis: Joint venture companies (JVCs) are more cost efficient than non­
joint venture companies (non-JVCs).
Discussion so far provides details on how an agency relationship between principal and 
agent can be managed effectively via an optimal incentive-system. However, where there 
seems to be some frictions in the agency relationship between principal and agent, the 
need for finding a solution cannot be overemphasized. For example, where there is an 
information asymmetry', the principal opts for adopting some control mechanisms in or­
der to checkmate the problems o f moral-hazard and sub-optimal behaviors on the side o f 
the agent.
In the same line o f reasoning o f agency theory, one o f the major reasons for 
government participation in upstream operations can be attributed to such frictions in the 
agency relationship between the oil-rich nations and the IOCs. One major issue causing 
such frictions can be attributed to lack o f goal congruence between the oil-rich nations 
and the lOCs [1]. This problem is highly associated with the kind o f ownership o f com­
panies.
The relationship between ownership structure o f companies and their perfor­
mance is a well-researched area; see for example [15]. However, discussion in the litera­
ture focuses generally on the effect o f ownership structure on privately owned companies 
[15]. Nonetheless, because the upstream oil and gas companies are not only private, but 
can be partially owned by states or even wholly owned by states, then the need for ana­
lyzing the performance o f the upstream oil and gas companies in their distinctive way 
becomes necessary; hence the importance o f this paper. Performance o f upstream oil and 
gas companies can be affected by a number o f factors [34-38]. These factors can be com­
pany-specific [35], country specific [36], and market specific [37] or based on the type o f 
petroleum fiscal regimes obtained in a particular country [38].
3. Methods
3.1. Population
Companies involved in the upstream operation in Nigeria constitute the population o f this 
study, and these companies include both IOCs and indigenous oil companies. Based on 
the NNPC ASB, there are 31 upstream oil and gas companies that are engaged in the ex­
ploration and production o f crude oil in Nigeria [39]. These companies are involved in 
different upstream operations ranging from the JVCs, PSC, SC, independent operators 
and marginal field operators. Hence, the upstream oil and gas companies that engaged in 
the exploration and production activities during the period 1999 - 2007 formed popula­
tion o f the study.
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3.2. S a m p le
Obtaining complete data on all the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria 
was not feasible; thus, the need for sampling from the population. In this regard, a con­
venience sampling method was adopted based on the availability o f data from some o f 
the upstream oil and gas companies. Hence, the upstream oil and gas companies that op­
erated during the period (1999 -  2007) and have complete data needed for this analysis 
formed the sample.
The sample comprises o f 5 JVCs and 4 non-JVCs, i.e. 9 companies out o f 31 com­
panies, making the sample 29% o f the total population. It is important to note here that 
this sample (29%) accounts for more than 85% o f the total crude oil production. There­
fore, our sample covers 85% o f the upstream operations in Nigeria.
3.3. D a ta
Our dataset includes the following variables: OUTPUT, OPEX, and ROYALTY. The 
sources o f our data are NNPC ASB and NEITI audit reports. Data on crude oil produc­
tion were obtained from the NNPC ASB 1999-2007 [39]; ROYALTY and OPEX were 
obtained from NEITI audit reports for the period 1999 -  2007 [40].
Data on upstream operation are generally lacking in Nigeria. For example, data 
on crude oil production are only available (at public domain) for the period 1997 -  2013. 
Similarly, data on royalty are only available for the period 1999 -  2011 [41]. However, 
data on OPEX (an important variable in this analysis) are lacking and the only data avail­
able (at the public domain) are for the period 1999-2007 [40-42]. Hence the selection o f 
the period (1999-2007) because o f the availability o f data needed for this analysis.
Although data on OUTPUT and ROYALTY are available on a monthly-basis, 
data on OPEX are on annual-basis. Consequently, the OPEX annual data were converted 
to a monthly data based on output (crude oil and natural gas). In order to apportion the 
OPEX data appropriately, the natural gas produced was converted to oil equivalent based 
on a general approximation that one barrel o f oil contains six times as much energy as 
does one thousand cubic feet (mcf) o f gas [43].
3.4. M o d e l specifica tio n
This study employs a multivariate regression analysis based on a panel dataset. Panel 
data regression technique allows for multiple companies to be observed at two or more 
periods. Hence, the cross-sectional information resonated in the differences between 
companies and the time-series information reflected in the changes within companies 
over time provides us with rich data relating to the companies. Moreover, the problem o f 
multi-collinearity is highly mitigated due to variability o f  the data, while controlling for 
individual heterogeneity [44, 45]. Following Brooks’ modeling [45], the panel regression 
model used by this paper is in the form of:
y„ = “ + £ * „ + « „ • 0 )
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The independent variables are all captured by Xu . Individual effect is a  that is taken as 
constant over time (/) and is specific to each company (/); where a  is considered to be 
uniform across all the companies, the OLS provides an efficient estimate o f a  and f t  
[44]. However, i f  heterogeneity exists across companies, the OLS w ill lead to a heteroge­
neity bias because the differences across companies have not been captured by the OLS. 
Hence, the two approaches that are normally applied in addressing the issue o f heteroge­
neity bias are: (i) FEM and, (ii) REM.
Under the fixed-effect approach, a  is taken to be a company specific constant 
term. Therefore, by decomposing the*/, into a company specific effect, JJ.j and the re­
mainder as disturbance U„ (idiosyncratic error term), that varies over time and across 
companies capturing everything that is left unexplained about y jt [45]. Hence, the Equa­
tion (2 ) below:
=M, + tV  (2)
Now we can re-write Equation (1) as follows:
y u = a  +  P x l l + i i l + v „ .  (3 )
Let us now consider the company heterogeneity / I ,  (ownership type) that affects 
y i( (cost efficiency) across companies but does not vary over time. For example, while 
the alternate hypothesis states that cost efficiency varies across companies and over-time, 
the ownership type remains fixed overtime. Therefore, our model can be estimated using 
the LSDV approach as follows:
y„ = P X n + / ' |0 1 ,  + M2D2l + / J3-D3, + -  + MnDNi +U„- (4)
The LSDV set out in Equation (4) above includes a company-specific dummy variable 
D t that changes the intercept a  for each company. Thus, the effect o f government own­
ership on cost efficiency can be determined using this model that captures ownership type 
o f companies. In a nutshell, the LSDV provides unbiased coefficients f3 because the 
companies’ differences are correlated with the independent variables. On the other hand, 
i f  the companies’ differences are not correlated with the independent variables, then we 
can assume that the companies’ differences are accounted for randomly. Hence, the need 
for using REM, as specified in Equation (5) below7:
y „ = a  +  P x „ + a ) „ ,  © „ = e , + t v  (5)
The REM considers a  being a group specific disturbance that is captured by random 
error te rm s,, which is independent o f the individual observation error term V u and the 
independent variables X „. Although the REM makes some strong assumptions, its ro­
bustness cannot be overemphasized as it is Theoretically superior’ to FEM [36].
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In order to determine which o f the above models are more appropriate to be 
used, we conducted a Hausman test for fixed-effect vs. random effects. The null hypothe­
sis is that random effect model is better. The test results (chi2  value = 25.53 andp-value = 
0.0000) indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis and use the FEM. Similarly, a 
Breusch-Pagan LM test for random effects was conducted with the null hypothesis that 
the OLS is better. The test results (chi2 value = 47.02 and p-value = 0.0000) indicate that 
we can reject the null hypothesis and use the REM. However, since the Hausman test 
indicates that FEM is better than the REM, the FEM is adopted. The FEM adopted is in 
the form of:
l o s t b b l jf =  a  +  P J o u t p u t ,, +  P 2lo p e x jt +  p yl r o y a l t y jt +  e j +  u  (6)
where, Icostbblj, is a proxy for cost efficiency, a  and s are vectors o f parameters in the 
cases o f /? ,,/?2 /?3 a n d  J34 , £ , captures company-specific disturbance but does not 
vary over time, / = 1 , . . . ,  N  ; t = 1, . . . ,  Tr
4. Results and Discussion on Findings
This study investigates the effect o f government ownership on production efficiency o f 
the upstream oil and gas JVCs operating in Nigeria alongside the non-JVCs. The owner­
ship type takes the value 1 i f  the company is a JVC and the value 0 for non-JVCs. Own­
ership is interacted w ith the independent variables so as to see its effect on such variables. 
Find below' the model estimated.
l c o s tb b l it =  a  +  /?j lo u tp u tu -I- f i2lo p e x it +  P 3l r o y a l t y it +  /?4o w n _ l o u t p u t it 
+  P s o w n J o p e x . t +  P 6o w n _ lr o y a l ty . +  £,
+  i9 ‘ “  (7)
Table 1 below' provides us with interesting results on the parameters used in our 
model, below' is a discussion on the overall, between and within variations. Overall varia­
tion is the variation over time and betw een the companies involved, that is both the JVCs 
and the non-JVCs. However, it is important to state that the aim o f this analysis is not 
only about the overall mean and the standard deviation for the overall variation over time 
and between companies, but also to break it dow n to the level o f betw een and w ithin var­
iation. Between variation is the variation between the companies involved. Here, the var­
iation accounts for changes in our parameters between companies, taking into considera­
tion the companies distinctive characteristics but does not focus on how' it changes over 
time. On the other hand, within variation is the variation within the companies involved 
over time; that is how the respective parameters change over time.
We now consider the variations (both betw een and within) for each o f the pa­
rameters used in our model so as to understand howr they vary between and within com­
panies. The time-invariant regressor id (ownership) in our model does not vary over time, 
therefore we can see that the within variation is zero. On the other hand, the individual-
G overn m en t o w n ersh ip  a n d  cost e ffic ien cy  o f  u p stream  o il a n d  p a s  com pan ies in N ig e ria 13
invariant regressor (month) does not vary between individual companies; therefore it has 
a 0  between variation because it does not vary with the ownership type o f the companies.
On the dependent variable in our model, costbbl, we have less between varia­
tions (10.29532) than within variation (88.97887). This indicates that ownership type is 
instrumental on the performance o f the companies; therefore the need to control for it in 
our model. Similarly, we can see that all the regressors in our model have more w'ithin 
variation than between variation.
Additionally, we can see a huge difference between the minimum and the max­
imum cost per barrel o f oil produced. The overall minimum cost per barrel is zero and the 
maximum is 1993.01.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: Overall, between and within variations.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. M in Max Observa­
tions
Id Overall 5 2.583318 1 9 N = 972
Between 2.738613 1 9 n = 9
Within 0 5 5 T = 108
Month Overall 521.5 31.19163 468 575 N = 972
Between 0 521.5 521.5 n = 9
Within 31.19163 468 575 T = 108
Costbbl Overall 18.44764 89.50728 0 1993.01 N = 972
Between 10.29532 6.142942 36.87675 n = 9
Within 88.97887 -18.4291 1988.908 T = 108
Output Overall 7122288 1.31E+07 0 3.23E+08 N = 972
Between 8532307 11281.55 2.22E+07 n = 9
Within 1.04E+07 -1.50E+07 3.11E+08 T = 108
Opex Overall 2.00E+07 2.80E+07 0 6.17E+08 N = 972
Between 1.90E+07 411350.4 5.48E+07 n = 9
Within 2.15E+07 -3.49E+07 5.98E+08 T = 108
Royalty Overall 1.45E+07 2.02E+07 0 9.83E+07 N = 972
Between 1.41E+07 0 3.88E+07 n = 9
Within 1.52E+07 -2.43E+07 7.40E+07 T = 108
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Own_output Overall 6931084 1.32E+07 0 3.23E+08 N = 972
Between 8699029 0 2.22E+07 n = 9
Within 1.04E+07 -1.52E+07 3.11E+08 T = 108
O wnopex Overall 1.75E+07 2.91E+07 0 6.17E+08 N = 972
Between 2.11E+07 0 5.48E+07 n = 9
Within 2.12E+07 -3.73E+07 5.96E+08 T = 108
Own_royalty Overall 1.35E-KJ7 2.06E+07 0 9.83E+07 N = 972
Between 1.50E+07 0 3.88E+07 n - 9
Within 1.50E+07 -2.52E+07 7.31E+07 T = 108
Considering the between variation, the minimum cost per barrel is $6.14294 and 
the maximum is $36.87675. On the other hand, the within variation differs significantly, 
with a minimum o f $-18.42911 (this indicates a loss) and a maximum o f $1988.908. This 
clearly indicates that companies’ distinctiveness accounts for such variation. It is im­
portant to state here that such companies’ differences emerge when their mean value is 
deducted from the overall mean.
More so, it is important to distinguish the effect o f ownership from other factors 
such as royalty payments, quantity o f output produced and the operating expenditure. 
Table 2 below presents a two sample /-test on the sampled companies based on their 
ownership type; that is the JVCs (=1) and the non-JVCs (=0). We tested the following 
hypotheses:
H0: Average cost o f production o f non-JVCs is not more than the average cost o f 
production o f JVCs.
Hi: Average cost o f production o f non-JVCs is more than the average cost o f 
production o f JVCs.
Analysis o f variance was conducted in order to decide whether the variances assumed are 
equal or not (see Table 2). The essence o f doing this is to find out whether or not sam­
pling distributions o f the two groups have similar or different standard errors, because the 
difference ( i f  any) between the two sample variances is one out o f many possible differ­
ences. The test for equality variances used is as follows:
This means that the ratio o f variances has an F-distribution with the denominator degrees 
o f freedom calculated as in n ( l  — 1) and the numerator degrees o f freedom calculated as
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n2 -  1. So, the following null hypothesis was tested, which states that the variances be­
tween the two groups are the same:
^o: °i — °22 
Hf.a-j} =£ a22
From the results obtained in Table 2 below, (F  = 4.66, F-value = 0.0311) we can reject 
the null hypothesis and accept that there are differences between the two group o f com­
panies.
We now consider the extent to which production cost per barrel o f oil is affected 
by other factors such as OUTPUT, OPEX, ROYALTY, and Government ownership 
(ownership).
Table 2. Bartlett's test for equal variances.
Ownership type 
(l=JVCs, 
0=non-JVCs)
Summary o f cost 
per barrel o f oi 1 
produced (Mean)
0 25.366283
1 12.912724
Total 18.447639
Analysis o f Variance
Source SS d f MS F Prob > F
Between 37221.8707 1 37221.871 4.66 0.0311
groups
Within 7741996.02 970 7981.4392
groups
Total 7779217.89 971 8011.5529
chi2( l )  = 869.8327 prob>chi2 = 0.000
An F-test for jo in t significance o f the independent variables wras conducted and the fo l­
lowing results wrere obtained w ith F  =654.34 and />value = 0.0000. The essence o f con­
ducting the F-test is to ascertain which o f the variables to be included and w hich ones to 
be excluded. Therefore, we tested whether at the same time the coefficients are all equal 
to zero. The results provided us with the evidence that we can reject the null hypothesis 
which postulates that at the same time these variables are all equal to zero; hence, our 
decision to include all the variables in our model.
We now' present our models below after the relevant diagnostic tests were con­
ducted:
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l c o s tb b lu =  a  +  P J o u tp u t i t  +  /?2 /opexit +  /?3 /ro ya /ty it +  / ? 4  o w n _ lo u tp u t it 
+  P 5o w n _ lo p e x it +  p 6o w n J r o y a l t y it +  ef 
+  ^  (9)
Table 3 below provides us with regression results from our models. The fixed effects 
model, with an overall R : o f 0.82, explains a considerable amount o f variation in the cost 
efficiency o f the upstream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. Crude oil produc­
tion (output) with a coefficient o f  -1.00917 has a negative relationship w ith the cost per 
barrel o f oil produced. That is production cost reduces with every increase in a barrel o f 
oil produced. This is in line with the economies o f  scale theory, that companies take ad­
vantage o f cost reduction due to their size (throughput).
Table 3. Regression results.
OLS Model Fixed-effects Model Random-effects Model
Variables
Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test Coeff z-test
loutput
-0.998 -96.02*** -1.009 -28.39*** -9.999 -32 11 ** *
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
lopex 1.015 78.98*** 1.017 28.57*** 1.016 32.85***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 )
1 royalty 0.034 22.83*** 0.033 4.25*** 0.034 11.33***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0.003) (0 .0 0 0 )
o w n l  output 0.199 2.40*** 0.215 0.93 0.203 1 . 2 2
(0.017) (0.378) (0.223)
own_lopex -0.269 -4.14*** -0.262 -1.18 -0.272 -1.75
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0.273) (0.079)
ow nlroya lty 0.091 4.69*** 0.098 5.29*** 0.090 q 7 4 ***
(0 .0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 )
_cons -0.242 -2.18** -0.394 -1.43 -0.249 -1.79*
(0.029) (0.191) (0.073)
N 972 972 972
F-test 4901.64 162.64 6331.84
R-Sq/Wald 0.858 0.8225 0.8225
Note: * * * ,  * *  indicate significance at 1% and5% level respectively.
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This relationship is found to be significant at 1% (p-value < 0.05 = 0.000). This indicates 
that for every additional barrel o f  oil produced there is a reduction in the production cost 
by 1.01%. However, government ownership does not have any significant effect (p-value 
> 0.05 = 0.378) on the quantity o f  crude oil produced by the companies and in return does 
not reduce cost (-1.009167 + 0.21575 = -0.79342).
On the other hand, operating expenditure has a positive (1.01793) and signifi­
cant (p-value < 0.05 = 0.000) effect on the production cost. This indicates that an increase 
in operating expenditure by one dollar increases cost o f production by 1 .0 2 % for the non- 
JVCs. On the other hand, the JVCs spend less than the non-JVCs per barrel o f oil pro­
duced 0.75562 (1.01732 + -0.26231). Therefore, an increase in operating expenditure by 
the JVCs increases the cost per barrel by 0.75% unlike in the case o f non-JVCs where the 
cost per barrel increases by 1 .0 2 %.
Spending patterns o f the companies and the control mechanisms put in place to 
monitor such patterns greatly contribute to how much is spent per barrel o f oil produced. 
Consequently, the operating expenditure in the upstream oil and gas operations proves to 
be one o f the contentious areas. In this context, the agency theory issue becomes useful in 
explaining the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms in the upstream operations. 
Therefore, government ownership proves to be effective as a control mechanism as ar­
gued [20]. In this context, a cooperative relationship between the government and the 
IOCs may be more productive than a contentious relationship that may be detrimental to 
their success as argued by this paper.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the higher cost per barrel o f oil pro­
duced by non-JVCs is due to the problem o f information asymmetry because government 
cannot confirm whether the inputs used by the IOC are the best chosen for the output. 
Hence, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept that government ownership in the 
JVCs has a significant and systematic effect on the companies’ cost efficiency.
Similarly, royalty has a positive and significant effect on the production cost per 
barrel o f oil, with a coefficient o f 0.33599 (p-value < 0.05 = 0.003). However, we can see 
that the JVCs pay more royalty 0.131889 (0.03359 + 0.09829) than the non-JVCs 
(0.03359). This may be attributed to the disparity in the different royalty rates paid by the 
upstream oil and gas companies based on their area o f operations. Overall, we can see 
that government ownership has a significant effect (p-value < 0.05) on the production 
cost per barrel o f oil produced by the JVCs.
5. Conclusions
Revenue enhancement is one o f the major reasons advanced in the argument on why gov­
ernment participates in upstream oil and gas operations. This is largely because govern­
ment increases its take by obtaining ownership in the companies involved in upstream 
operations. On the other hand, it is argued that government participation in the upstream 
oil and gas operations reduces the efficiency o f such operations, thereby discouraging 
investment by the IOCs.
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In Nigeria for example, government participates in upstream oil and gas opera­
tions in what is commonly known as JV operations. Government owns a stake in the 
JVCs which operate alongside other companies (non-JVCs). This paper investigated the 
effect o f such government ownership in the JVCs on their cost efficiency. Findings indi­
cate that non-JVCs spend twice as much as the JVCs in producing a barrel o f crude oil.
Our findings are in line with the assumptions o f  agency theory that agent per­
forms differently based on its ownership right on asset. Considering the assumption that 
agent’s ownership right on an asset influences the agent’s actions ex-ante, it is argued 
here that the JVCs have an optimal incentive-system in such a way that the IOCs owner­
ship in the oil resources mitigates the potentials for adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Similarly, government ownership in the JVCs provides the government with 
representation in managing the affairs o f the JVCs, which in itself is a strong control 
mechanism in ensuring efficient operations.
Findings o f this paper indicate the importance o f government ownership in up­
stream oil and gas operations in Nigeria. These findings are not in line with the argument 
that government ownership in upstream operations result to inefficient operations by the 
companies with government ownership. On the contrary, findings o f this paper indicate 
that government ownership really matters in improving production efficiency o f the up­
stream oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria.
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TS10 An Introduction to Marking, 
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Teaching and Learning
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Research Student Workshop 
- RefWorks Advanced
•  RefWorks
Wednesday, 1 May 2013 from 13:00 to 14:00 (BST)
Research students
Free Order
Seminar Room A, level 3 
Bernard King Library 
Bell St 
DD1 1HG Dundee 
United Kingdom
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ABERTAYDUNDEE
ENGLISH FOR STUDY 
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Academic Writing
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Advanced Methods Taster Event
Friday 7th September 2012,12.30-7.30pm
VENUE: University of Edinburgh, Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JZ
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SAFA
BRITISH ACCOUNTING & 
FINANCE ASSOCIATION
This is to certify that
Sunusi Sa'ad Ahmad
attended and participated in the 
BAFA Doctoral Conference 
London School of Economics, 
13-14 April 2014
SC O T TISH
G RADUATE
S c h o o l  o f
S o c i a l
s c i e n c e
CONFIRMATION OF ATTENDANCE 
SCOTTISH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
SUMMER SCHOOL 2013
This is to certify that
Sunusi Sa'ad Ahmad
Attended the following courses:
Regression Modelling for Categorical Data 
Qualitative Research in Accounting and Finance 
How NVivo can support the different stages of the doctoral research
process
Secondary Data Analysis: Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
Presenting Yourself, Presenting your Research
These courses were part of the Scottish Graduate School of Social 
Science Summer School held in Edinburgh in June 2013
Professor Graham Crow
Director, Scottish Graduate School of Social Science
E S R C
ECONOMIC 
& SO C I A I. 
RESEARCH 
C O U N C I I.
Scottish Funding Council
Scottish Graduate School of Social Science 
University of Edinburgh | 2.03,56George Square | Edinburgh! EH8 9JU 
T: 0131 651 1366 | E: admin@socsciscotland.acuk 
W: www.socsciscotland.ac.uk
Fast Track Quantitative Methods Course -  Participant list
Comfort Adeosun com fort adeosun@ abdn.ac.uk University o f Aberdeen
Sunusi Ahmad 1007411@ live.abertav.ac.uk University o f Abertay
Manal Alothman m alothman2000@ vahoo.com Heriot-W att University
Dorine Boumans dorine.boum ans@ strath.ac.uk University o f Strathclyde
Nick Fuller nick.fuller@ nhs.net University o f Stirlinq
Ruth Hunter RHunter@ amu.ac.uk Queen Marqaret University
Anna Lopez Hernandez
a.k.loDez-
hernandez@ sms.ed. ac.uk
University o f Edinburgh
Stuart MacKinven stuartm ackinven@ hotmail.com University o f Strathclyde
Ashleiqh McGreqor 0600401@ live.abertav.ac.uk University o f Abertay
Judith Montford iem25@ hw.ac.uk Heriot-W att University
Samuel Opponq Frimponq sofrimoonq@ abdn.ac.uk University o f Aberdeen
Anne Marie Rennie a.m.rennie@ rqu.ac.uk Robert Gordon University
Laura Robertson laurar33@ hotmail.co.uk University o f Glasqow
Rebecca Smith rebecca.smith@ lews.uhi.ac.uk UHI Millennium Ins titu te
Vijay Solanki 0800196s@ student.qla.ac.uk University o f Glasqow
Stoyan Stoyanov S.P.Stovanov@sms.ed.ac.uk University o f Edinburqh
Emma Sutherland emma.sutherland@ sac.ac.uk Scottish Aqricultural Colleqe
Sarah Thomas sthomas@ amu.ac.uk Queen Marqaret University
Olubukola Tokede olubukolatokede@ vahoo.com Napier University
Wendy Wu 2005wu@ amail.com University o f Edinburgh
Helen Younq hlv00002@ students.stir.ac.uk University o f Stirling
e
ff
O /
f t
e
r?
AQMt’N
A pplied  Q uantitative M ethods N etw ork
This is to certify that
....................S u O U S L . A h O T C W t ..........................
attended the tw o day training workshop
Graphs and Graphical Representation in Stata
organised by the
Applied Quantitative Methods Network (AQMeN)
on
10th- 1 1 th October 2013
at
University of Edinburgh
Professor Susan McVie, Director of AQMeN
The UniversityofW rit
Centre for Health Economics
Workshop: Introduction to Measuring 
Efficiency in Public Sector Organisations, 
held at the University of York.
This is to certify that
Sunusi Sa'acC JLUmacC
attended the above Workshop, 
1 6 -1 9  October 2012.
Signed  by: R O W E N A  JA C O B S
Workshop Tutor
Centre for Health Economics
University of York, York, United Kingdom
AQMeN
A pplied Quantitative M ethods Netw ork
This is to certify that
........ SuruASA
attended the three day training workshop
Introduction to Structural Equation Modelling
Applied Quantitative Methods Network (AQMeN)
organised by the
on
19th- 2 1 st March 2014
at
The University of Edinburgh
Professor Susan McVie, Director of AQMeN
KE Scotland Conference 2012
D elegate List P a g e  11
Mr Khalid Abdalla PGR Napier U niversity
Dr Katharine Abernethy RS U niversity o f Stirling
Dr Elaine Adam RS U niversity o f Aberdeen
Dr Colin Adams Commercial D irector, School o f In form atics U niversity o f Edinburgh
M r Alaba Agbatogun PGR U niversity o f Edinburgh
M r Sunusi Sa'ad Ahmad PGR U niversity o f A bertay Dundee
Mrs Nada Alam ri PGR H erio t-W att U niversity
Mrs W ejdan Alghafari PGR H erio t-W att U niversity
Dr M ubarak Alkhatnai PGR U niversity o f Edinburgh
M r Irvine Allan Lecturer Queen M argare t U niversity
Miss Nicola Allan Program me A dm in is tra to r University o f Strathclyde
Dr Helen A llb u tt Lead fo r  Research Governance NHS Education fo r  Scotland
Mrs Joanne Allday M anager Scottish Association For M arine Science
M r Saud Al-O taibi PGR H erio t-W att U niversity
M r V irgilio Am briz-Vilchis PGR University o f Edinburgh
Dr Sarah Anderson Public Engagement O fficer U niversity o f Edinburgh
Dr John Andresen Lecturer H erio t-W a tt U niversity
Miss Sally Andrews PGR University o f Aberdeen
Ms llektra  M arina A posto lopoulou MSc In ternationa l Fashion M arketing  s tudent Glasgow Caledonian U niversity
Ms E irini-lro A rvanitidou RS U niversity o f Glasgow
M r S.M. Ashekuzzaman PGR Glasgow Caledonian U niversity
Dr Richard Axton RS U niversity o f Edinburgh
Mrs M aria Aznarez Research A d m in is tra to r U niversity o f Durham
Miss Jaleh Bahri-Esfahani PGR U niversity o f Dundee
M r Ali Bakari PGR University o f A bertay Dundee
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This is to certify that
..........S an ul si... KV>m ad.............
attended the three day training workshop
Longitudinal Data Analysis in Stata
organised by the
Applied Quantitative Methods Network (AQMeN)
on
7th -  9th October 2013
at
University of Edinburgh
........................ ...................
Professor Susan McVie, Director of AQMeN
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January -  M arch  2 0 1 3
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A series of workshops addressing contemporary issues in qualitative 
research for MRes and PhD students within the School of Social and 
Health Science.
i Workshop!: Philosophy and practice in the qualitative research process
Wednesday 24 October 3-4pm 
Room 3510
Programme:
Introduction: purpose o f workshops 
The philosophy of qualitative research
Workshop 2: Representation, language and Interpretation
Wednesday 21 November i.30-4pm 
Room 3510
Programme:
Reflecting on interview practice
Meaning-making in the research process
Writing fo r postgraduates: narrative voice and analytical style
Workshop 3: Data, Explanation and Understanding
Wednesday 19 December i.30-4pm 
Room 3510
Programme:
Emergent issues from data sources 
Documentary analysis 
Discourse analysis 
Grounded Theory/Critical Theory 
Reflexivity and qualitative research
To register for these workshops please email: 
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This is to certify that
......... S anus L.. h\ym<x d............
attended the four day training workshop
Regression Diagnostics and Model Building in Stata
organised by the
Applied Quantitative Methods Network (AQMeN)
on
28th - 3 1 st May 2013
at
The University of Glasgow
Professor Susan McVie, Director of AQMeN
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This is to certify that
...................................................................................................................
attended the tw o  day training w orkshop
egression M odelling for Categorical Data (SGS Summer School)
organ ised  b y  the
Applied Quantitative Methods Network (AQM eN)
on
10th-  11th June 2013
at
The University o f Edinburgh
....................
Professor Susan McVie, Director of AQMeN
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This is to certify that
.........Sy.na.sC... .^ hoO.Q-d-...............
attended the tw o day training workshop
Stata Fast Track Workshop
organised by the
Applied Quantitative Methods Network (AQMeN)
on
4th -  5 th June 2013
at
The University of Edinburgh
Professor Susan Me Vie, Director of AQMeN
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Sunusi Sa'ad Ahmad
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Writing For Business Students
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Principal & Vice-Chancellor
